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DARWINISM,  AND 
ESSAYS 

BY  JOHN 

NEW  EDITION,  REVISED  AND  ENLARGED 


"  Qui  itaque  sues  affectus  et  appetitus  ex  solo  libertatis  amore 
moderari  studet,  is,  quantum  potest,  nitetur,  virtutes  earumque 
causas  noscere,  et  animum  gaudio,  quod  ex  earum  vera  cogni- 
tione  oritur,  implere."  —  SPINOZA 


BOSTON   AND    NEW   YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 


Copyright,  1879  and  1886, 
Bt  JOHN  FISKE. 

All  rights  reserved. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.S.  A. 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  &  Company. 


To 
THOMAS  HENRY  HUXLEY, 

IN   REMEMP.KANCE  OF 

THREE  HAPPY  DAYS   AT  PETERSHAM, 

AMONG    THE    BLUE    HILLS    OF    MASSACHUSETTS, 

AND  OF  MANY 
PLEASANT  FIRESIDE  CHAT8  IN  LONDON, 

31  Uetricate 

THIS  LITTLE  BOOK. 


LOITDOH,  June  30,  1879. 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


MY  DEAR  HUXLEY  :  —  In  publishing  a  new 
edition  of  this  collection  of  essays,  which  has 
been  for  some  time  out  of  print,  I  have  taken  oc- 
casion to  add  three  articles  not  heretofore  re- 
printed. It  was  with  some  hesitation  that  in 
originally  making  up  the  book  I  included  the  ar- 
ticle on  "  Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies,"  which  was  the 
first  writing  of  mine  that  ever  appeared  in  print, 
and  naturally  bears  many  marks  of  immaturity 
in  thought  and  style.  It  was  partly  because  so 
many  friends  had  expressed  a  desire  to  see  it 
again  that  I  decided  to  include  it ;  partly  also  be- 
cause it  is  to  me  associated  with  the  beginnings 
of  two  of  the  most  treasured  friendships  of  my 
life,  —  first  with  Herbert  Spencer,  and  afterwards, 
through  a  somewhat  longer  but  still  unmistaka- 
ble chain  of  causation,  with  yourself.  Those 
noctes  ccenceque  Deum  of  the  old  times  in  London 


vi  Prefatory  Note. 

become  more  and  more  sacred  in  memory  as  the 
years  pass  by,  even  while  it  is  hoped  there  may 
be  yet  others  like  them  in  reserve ;  and  whatever 
recalls  them,  however  indirectly,  becomes  en- 
deared to  me. 

Having  for  such  reasons,  largely  personal,  re- 
published  this  article,  I  have  found  it  so  well  re- 
ceived and  so  kindly  mentioned  that  it  has  seemed 
worth  while  to  look  up  and  add  to  this  somewhat 
miscellaneous  collection  three  other  youthful  writ- 
ings. The  brief  remarks  on  "  Comte's  Positive 
Philosophy  "  serve  to  explain  some  crude  expres- 
sions in  the  paper  on  Buckle  which  might  other- 
wise be  interpreted  as  the  words  of  a  "  Positivist." 
After  twenty  years  of  vigorous  and  untiring  pro- 
test, I  believe  we  may  congratulate  ourselves  that 
we  have  got  that  wretched  label  pretty  thoroughly 
torn  off.  "  Agnostic,"  which  seems  for  the  time 
to  have  replaced  it,  is  meaningless  enough,  and  I 
for  one  no  more  accept  it  than  I  accepted  the  old 
epithet.  But  its  utter  vagueness  renders  it  com- 
paratively harmless,  whereas  "  Positivist "  was  a 
word  brimful  of  meaning.  It  connoted  almost 
everything  in  the  shape  of  hasty  superficial  gen- 
eralization and  overweening  intellectual  arro- 
gance which  the  true  servant  and  interpreter  of 
Nature  instinctively  and  rightly  abhors.  We  may 


Prefatory  Note.  vii 

rejoice  that  the  time  has  come  at  last  when  a  man 
may  abandon  old  mythologies  and  devote  himself 
to  the  disinterested  pursuit  of  science,  without 
being  supposed  to  be  an  aider  and  abettor  of  the 
colossal  vagaries  of  the  vainest  of  modern  French- 
men. 

The  two  other  early  papers,  on  "  Liberal  Edu- 
cation "  and  "  University  Reform,"  deal  with  sub- 
jects about  which  we  used  sometimes  to  talk  to- 
gether ;  and  on  looking  them  over,  they  seem  to 
contain  suggestions  not  wholly  without  a  bearing 
upon  questions  just  now  warmly  discussed  at  our 
Cambridge.  I  have  therefore  added  them  to  the 
book.  In  some  of  the  twelve  essays  of  the  origi- 
nal edition  I  have  made  a  few  slight  changes. 

I  say  now,  as  I  said  before,  that  I  wish  it  were 
a  better  book  I  were  offering  you.  But,  such  as 
it  is,  it  is  offered  with  all  my  heart. 

Ever  faithfully  yours, 

JOHN  FISKE. 
PETERSHAM,  October  14,  1885. 


CONTENTS. 


I.  DARWINISM  VERIFIED 1 

II.  MR.  MIVART  ON  DARWINISM        ....        33 

III.  DR.  BATEMAN  ON  DARWINISM         .        .        .        .40 

IV.  DR.  BUCHNER  ON  DARWINISM      ....        50 
V.  A  CRUMB  FOR  THE  "  MODERN  SYMPOSIUM  "  .        .56 

VI.  CHAUNCEY  WRIGHT 79 

VII.  WHAT  is  INSPIRATION? Ill 

VIII.   MODERN  WITCHCRAFT 120 

IX.  COMTE'S  POSITIVE  PHILOSOPHY       .        .        .        .131 

X.   MR.  BUCKLE'S  FALLACIES 143 

XL  POSTSCRIPT  ON  MR.  BUCKLE 207 

XII.  THE  KACES  OF  THE  DANUBE       .        .        .        .219 

XIII.  LIBERAL  EDUCATION 253 

XIV.  UNIVERSITY  REFORM 287 

XV.  A  LIBRARIAN'S  WORK                                            .  332 


DARWINISM  AND  OTHER  ESSAYS. 


DARWINISM   VERIFIED. 

IT  is  not  often  that  the  propounder  of  a  new 
and  startling  scientific  theory  has  lived  to  see  his 
daring  innovations  accepted  by  the  scientific 
world  in  general.  Harvey's  great  discovery  of 
the  circulation  of  the  blood  was  scoffed  at  for 
nearly  a  whole  generation  ;  and  Newton's  law  of 
gravitation,  though  proved  by  the  strictest  math- 
ematical proof,  received  from  many  eminent  men 
but  a  slow  and  grudging  acquiescence.  Even 
Leibnitz,  who,  as  a  mathematician  hardly  inferior 
to  Newton  himself,  might  have  been  expected  to 
be  convinced  on  simple  inspection  of  the  theory, 
was  prevented  from  accepting  it  by  the  theo- 
logical objection  that  it  appeared  to  substitute 
the  action  of  a  physical  force  for  the  direct  ac- 
tion of  the  Deity.  In  France,  where  ideas  not 
of  French  origin  are  very  apt  to  be  but  slowly 
i 


2  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

apprehended,  the  opposition  to  the  Newtonian 
theory  was  not  silenced  till  1759,  when  Clairaut 
and  Lalande,  by  calculating  the  retardation  of 
Halley's  comet,  furnished  such  crucial  proof  as 
could  not  possibly  be  overcome.  At  this  time 
Newton  had  been  thirty-two  years  in  his  grave  ; 
seventy-two  years  had  elapsed  since  the  publi- 
cation of  the  "  Principia,"  and  ninety-four  since 
the  hypothesis  was  first  definitely  conceived. 

In  the  present  age,  when  the  number  of  sci- 
entific inquirers  has  greatly  increased  and  the  in- 
terchange  of  thoughts  has  become  rapid  and  con- 
stant, it  takes  much  less  time  for  a  new  gener- 
alization to  make  its  way  into  people's  minds. 
It  is  now  barely  eighteen  years  since  Mr.  Dar- 
win's views  on  the  origin  of  species  were  an- 
nounced in  a  book  which  purported  to  be  only 
the  rough  preliminary  sketch  of  a  greater  work 
in  course  of  preparation.  But,  though  greeted  at 
the  beginning  with  ridicule  and  opprobrium,  the 
theory  of  natural  selection  has  already  won  a 
complete  and  overwhelming  victory.  One  could 
count  on  one's  fingers  the  number  of  eminent 
naturalists  who  still  decline  to  adopt  it,  and  the 
hesitancy  of  these  appears  to  be  determined  in 
the  main  by  theological  or  metaphysical,  and 
therefore  not  strictly  relevant,  objections.  But 


Darwinism   Verified.  3 

it  is  not  simply  that  the  great  body  of  naturalists 
have  accepted  the  Darwinian  theory  :  it  has  be- 
come part  and  parcel  of  their  daily  thoughts,  an 
element  in  every  investigation  which  cannot  be 
got  rid  of.  With  a  tacit  consent  that  is  almost 
unanimous,  the  classificatory  relations  among 
plants  and  animals  have  come  to  be  recognized 
as  representing  degrees  of  genetic  kinship.  One 
needs  but  to  read  constantly  such  scientific  jour- 
nals as  "  Nature,"  or  to  peer  into  the  proceedings 
of  scientific  societies,  to  see  how  thoroughly  all 
contemporary  inquiry  is  permeated  by  the  con- 
ception of  natural  selection.  The  record  of  re- 
search, whether  in  embryology,  in  palaeontology, 
or  in  the  study  of  the  classification  and  distri- 
bution of  organized  beings,  has  come  to  be  the 
registration  of  testimony  in  support  of  Mr.  Dar- 
win's hypothesis.  So  deeply,  indeed,  has  this 
mighty  thinker  impressed  his  thoughts  on  the 
mind  of  the  age  that  in  order  fully  to  unfold  the 
connotations  of  the  word  "  Darwinism  "  one  could 
hardly  stop  short  of  making  an  index  to  the 
entire  recent  literature  of  the  organic  sciences. 
The  sway  of  natural  selection  in  biology  is  hardly 
less  complete  than  that  of  gravitation  in  astron- 
omy ;  and  thus  it  is  probably  true  that  no  other 
scientific  discoverer  has  within  his  own  lifetime 


4  Darwinism  and   Other  JZssays. 

obtained  so  magnificent  a  triumph  as  Mr.  Dar- 
win. 

The  comparison  of  the  doctrine  of  natural  selec- 
tion with  the  Newtonian  theory  is  made  advisedly, 
as  I  wish  to  call  attention  to  some  differences  in 
the  aspect  of  the  proofs  by  which  two  such  differ- 
ent hypotheses  are  established.  First,  however, 
as  the  point  will  not  hereafter  come  up  for  con- 
sideration in  this  paper,  it  may  be  well  to  notice 
the  theological  objection  which  has  been  urged 
against  Mr.  Darwin,  as  it  was  once  urged  against 
Newton,  and  to  show  briefly  why,  as  above  hinted, 
it  cannot  be  regarded  as  properly  relevant  to  the 
discussion  of  the  scientific  hypothesis.  The  the- 
ological objection  to  natural  selection,  which  has 
weight  with  many  minds,  is  precisely  the  same 
objection  that  Leibnitz  made  to  gravitation, — 
that  the  action  of  physical  forces  appears  to  be 
substituted  for  the  direct  action  of  the  Deity. 
This  has,  indeed,  been  a  very  common  objection 
to  theories  which  enlarge  and  define  what  is 
called  the  action  of  secondary  causes,  but  it  has 
been  peculiarly  unfortunate  iu  this  respect,  that 
with  the  progress  of  inquiry  it  has  invariably 
been  overruled  without  practical  detriment  to 
theism.  It  regularly  happens  that  the  so-called 
atheistical  theory  becomes  accepted  as  part  and 


Darwinism   Verified.  5 

parcel  of  science,  and  yet  men  remain  as  firm 
theists  as  ever.  The  objection  is,  therefore,  evi- 
dently fallacious,  and  the  fallacy  is  not  difficult 
to  point  out.  It  lies  in  a  metaphysical  miscon- 
ception of  the  words  "  force "  and  "  cause." 
"Force"  is  implicitly  regarded  as  a  sort  of  en- 
tity or  daemon  which  has  a  mode  of  action  distin- 
guishable from  that  of  universal  Deity ;  other- 
wise it  is  meaningless  to  speak  of  substituting  the 
one  for  the  other.  But  such  a  personification  of 
"  force  "  is  a  remnant  of  barbaric  thought,  and  is 
in  no  wise  sanctioned  by  physical  science.  When 
astronomy  speaks  of  two  planets  as  attracting 
each  other  with  a  "  force  "  which  varies  directly 
as  their  masses  and  inversely  as  the  squares  of 
their  distances  apart,  it  simply  uses  the  phrase 
as  a  convenient  metaphor  by  which  to  describe 
the  manner  in  which  the  observed  movements  of 
the  two  bodies  occur.  It  explains  that  in  pres- 
ence of  each  other  the  two  bodies  are  observed  to 
change  their  positions  in  a  certain  specified  way, 
and  this  is  all  that  it  means.  This  is  all  that  a 
strictly  scientific  hypothesis  can  possibly  allege, 
and  this  is  all  that  observation  can  possibly  prove. 
Whatever  goes  beyond  this,  and  imagines  or  as- 
serts a  kind  of  "  pull "  between  the  two  bodies, 
is  not  science,  but  metaphysics.  An  atheistic 


6  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

metaphysics  may  imagine  such  a  "  pull,"  and 
may  interpret  it  as  the  "  action  "  of  something 
that  is  not  Deity,  but  such  a  conclusion  can  find 
no  support  in  the  scientific  theorem,  which  is 
simply  a  generalized  description  of  phenomena. 
The  general  considerations  upon  which  the  belief 
in  the  existence  and  direct  action  of  Deity  are 
otherwise  founded  are  in  no  wise  disturbed  by 
the  establishment  of  any  such  scientific  theorem. 
The  theological  question  is  left  just  where  it  was 
before.  We  are  still  at  perfect  liberty  to  main- 
tain that  it  is  the  direct  action  of  Deity  which  is 
manifested  in  the  planetary  movements ;  having 
done  nothing  more  with  our  Newtonian  hypoth- 
esis than  to  construct  a  happy  formula  for  ex- 
pressing the  mode  or  order  of  the  manifestation. 
We  may  have  learned  something  new  concerning 
the  manner  of  Divine  action  ;  we  certainly  have 
not  "  substituted  "  any  other  kind  of  action  for  it. 
And  what  is  thus  obvious  in  this  simple  astro- 
nomical example  is  equally  true  in  principle  in 
every  case  whatever  in  which  one  set  of  phenom- 
ena is  interpreted  by  comparison  with  another 
set.  In  no  case  whatever  can  science  use  the 
words  "  force  "  or  "  cause  "  except  as  metaphori- 
cally descriptive  of  some  observed  or  observable 
sequence  of  phenomena.  And  consequently  at 


Darwinism   Verified.  7 

no  imaginable  future  time,  so  long  as  the  essen- 
tial conditions  of  human  thinking  are  maintained, 
can  science  even  attempt  to  substitute  the  action 
of  any  other  power  for  the  direct  action  of  Deity. 
Darwinism  may  convince  us  that  the  existence 
of  highly  complicated  organisms  is  the  result  of 
an  infinitely  diversified  aggregate  of  circumstances 
so  minute  as  severally  to  seem  trivial  or  acciden- 
tal ;  yet  the  consistent  theist  will  always  occupy 
an  impregnable  position  in  maintaining  that  the 
entire  series  in  each  and  every  one  of  its  incidents 
is  an  immediate  manifestation  of  the  creative  ac- 
tion of  God. 

From  an  obverse  point  of  view  it  might  be  ar- 
gued that  since  a  philosophical  theism  must  regard 
Divine  power  as  the  immediate  source  of  all  phe- 
nomena alike,  therefore  science  cannot  properly 
explain  any  particular  group  of  phenomena  by  a 
direct  reference  to  the  action  of  Deity.  Such  a 
reference  is  not  an  explanation,  since  it  adds  noth- 
ing to  our  previous  knowledge  either  of  the  phe- 
nomena or  of  the  manner  of  Divine  action.  The 
business  of  science  is  simply  to  ascertain  in  what 
manner  phenomena  co-exist  with  each  other  or 
follow  each  other,  and  the  only  kind  of  explana- 
tion with  which  it  can  properly  deal  is  that  which 
refers  one  set  of  phenomena  to  another  set.  In 


8  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

pursuing  this  its  legitimate  business,  science  does 
not  trench  on  the  province  of  theology  in  any 
way,  and  there  is  no  conceivable  occasion  for  any 
conflict  between  the  two.  From  this  and  the  pre- 
vious considerations,  taken  together,  it  follows  not 
only  that  such  explanations  as  are  contained  in 
the  Newtonian  and  Darwinian  theories  are  en- 
tirely consistent  with  theism,  but  also  that  they 
are  the  only  kind  of  explanations  with  which  sci- 
ence can  properly  concern  itself  at  all.  To  say 
that  complex  organisms  were  directly  created  by 
the  Deity  is  to  make  an  assertion  which,  however 
true  in  a  theistic  sense,  is  utterly  barren.  It  is 
of  no  profit  to  theism,  which  must  be  taken  for 
granted  before  the  assertion  can  be  made  ;  and  it 
is  of  no  profit  to  science,  which  must  still  ask  its 
question,  "  How  ?  "  l 

Setting  aside,  then,  the  theological  criticism  as 
irrelevant  to  the  question  really  at  stake,  the  Dar- 
winian theory,  like  the  Newtonian,  remains  to  be 
tested  by  strictly  scientific  considerations.  In  the 
more  recent  instance,  as  in  the  earlier,  the  rel- 
evant question  is  how  far  the  course  of  events  as 
sketched  by  the  hypothesis  agrees  with  the  ob- 

1  I  have  repeated  this  argument,  and  surrounded  it  with  its  proper 
philosophical  context,  in  The  Idea  of  God,  as  affected  by  Moden 
Knowledge,  section  VII. 


Darwinism   Verified.  9 

served  phenomena  of  nature.  But  in  the  direct- 
ness with  which  this  question  can  be  answered 
there  is  great  difference  between  the  two  theories. 
The  Newtonian  hypothesis  asserted  the  existence 
of  a  general  physical  property  of  matter,  and  could 
therefore  be  tested  by  a  single  crucial  instance, 
such  as  was  afforded  by  the  simple  case  of  the 
planetary  motions.  Kepler's  three  laws  comprised 
in  succinct  form  a  very  complete  description  of  the 
movements  of  the  planets ;  and  when  it  was  shown 
that  these  movements  were  just  such  as  must  oc- 
cur according  to  the  theory  of  gravitation,  the 
theory  was  rightly  regarded  as  verified.  Further 
confirmatory  instances  could  but  repeat  the  same 
lesson,  as  when  the  irregularities  of  movement, 
due  to  the  attractions  exercised  by  the  various 
planets  upon  each  other,  were  likewise  seen  to 
conform  strictly  to  the  hypothesis.  Nor  was  any 
alteration  or  enlargement  of  the  original  theory 
required  in  order  to  obtain  the  supreme  triumph 
of  verified  prediction,  as  when  Clairaut  foretold 
the  precise  amount  of  delay  in  the  reappearance 
of  Halley's  comet,  caused  by  the  interfering  attrac- 
tions of  Jupiter  and  Saturn,  or  as  when  Leverrier 
and  Adams  discovered  the  existence  of  Neptune 
through  its  effects  upon  the  motions  of  Uranus. 
In  all  these  cases  the  physical  principle  involved 


10  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

was  simple,  and  admitted  of  precise  mathematical 
treatment ;  and  it  is  owing  to  this  that  the  law  of 
gravitation  has  become  the  most  illustrious  exam- 
ple which  the  history  of  science  can  furnish  of  a 
completely  verified  hypothesis. 

To  look  for  similar  conciseness  of  verification 
in  the  case  of  the  Darwinian  theory  would  be  to 
mistake  entirely  the  conditions  under  which  sci- 
entific evidence  can  be  procured.  To  estimate 
properly  the  value  of  any  hypothesis,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  we  should  know  what  kind  and  degree 
of  proof  to  expect;  and  in  the  present  case  we 
must  not  look  for  a  demonstration  that  shall  be  di- 
rect and  simple.  Instead  of  a  universal  property 
of  matter,  so  conspicuous  as  to  be  recognized  at 
once  by  the  inspection  of  a  few  striking  instances, 
we  have  in  the  theory  of  natural  selection  to 
deal  with  a  very  complex  process,  working  results 
of  endless  diversity  throughout  the  organic  world, 
and  often  masked  in  its  action  by  accompanying 
processes,  some  of  which  we  can  detect  without 
being  able  to  estimate  their  relative  potency, 
while  others,  no  doubt,  have  thus  far  escaped  our 
attention  altogether.  Accordingly,  while  we  may 
consider  it  as  certain  that  natural  selection  is  ca- 
pable of  working  specific  changes  in  organisms,  we 
may  at  the  same  time  find  it  impossible  to  give  a 


Darwinism   Verified.  11 

complete  account  of  the  origin  of  any  one  particu- 
lar species  through  natural  selection,  because  we 
can  never  be  sure  that  we  have  taken  due  notice 
of  all  the  innumerable  concrete  circumstances  in- 
volved in  such  an  event.  The  theory,  therefore, 
cannot  be  adequately  tested  by  any  single  striking 
instance,  but  must  depend  for  its  support  on  the 
cumulative  evidence  afforded  by  its  general  har- 
mony with  the  processes  of  organic  nature. 

If  we  consider  the  Darwinian  theory  as  a  whole, 
it  must  be  admitted  that  such  cumulative  evi- 
dence has  already  been  brought  forward  in  suffi- 
cient quantity  to  amount  to  a  satisfactory  demon- 
stration. The  convergence  of  proofs  is  too  per- 
sistent and  unmistakable  to  allow  of  any  alter- 
native hypothesis  being  put  in  the  field.  But,  in 
exhibiting  this,  it  is  desirable  that  there  should 
be  no  confusion  of  thought  as  to  the  full  import 
of  the  Darwinian  theory.  Mr.  Mivart's  way  of 
describing  that  theory  as  an  attempt  to  account 
for  the  origin  of  all  the  various  forms  of  life 
through  the  operation  of  natural  selection  alone 
is  a  gross  misrepresentation.  Mr.  Darwin  has 
never  urged  his  hypothesis  in  this  limited  shape. 
The  essential  theorems  of  Darwinism  are,  first, 
that  forms  of  life  now  widely  unlike  have  been 
produced  from  a  common  original  through  the  ac- 


12  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

cumulated  inheritance  of  minute  individual  mod- 
ifications ;  and,  secondly,  that  such  modifications 
have  been  accumulated  mainly,  or  in  great  part, 
through  the  selection  of  individuals  best  fitted  to 
survive  and  transmit  their  peculiarities  to  their 
offspring.  But  that  this  survival  of  the  fittest 
individuals  has  been  the  sole  agency  concerned  in 
bringing  about  the  present  wondrous  variety  of 
living  beings  Mr.  Darwin  has  nowhere  asserted 
or  implied,  having  even  in  the  earliest  edition  of 
his  great  work  explicitly  pointed  out  certain  other 
agencies  as  involved  in  the  complex  result.  Yet 
other  agencies,  hitherto  unsuspected,  may  be  dis- 
covered in  the  future ;  but  such  discoveries,  how- 
ever far  they  may  go  in  supplementing  the  Dar- 
winian theory,  can  only  strengthen  the  central 
position  as  regards  the  rise  of  specific  differences 
through  gradual  modifications. 

That  natural  selection  is  a  true  cause,  and  one 
capable  of  accumulating  variations  to  an  indefi- 
nite extent,  is  now  held  to  be  beyond  question. 
The  wonders  wrought  by  artificial  selection  in 
the  breeding  of  domestic  animals  and  cultivated 
plants  are  such  that  one  might  well  have  attrib- 
uted great  results  to  the  exercise  of  a  similar  se- 
lection by  Nature  through  countless  ages,  could 
any  such  process  be  detected.  Few,  however, 


Darwinism   Verified.  13 

save  those  instructed  naturalists  who  have  fre- 
quent occasion  to  ponder  the  subject,  are  aware 
what  a  tremendous  reality  natural  selection  is. 
As  I  have  elsewhere  observed,  "  a  single  codfish 
has  been  known  to  lay  six  million  eggs  within  a 
year.  If  these  eggs  were  all  to  become  adult  cod- 
fishes, and  the  multiplication  were  to  continue  at 
this  rate  for  three  or  four  years,  the  ocean  would 
not  afford  room  for  the  species.  Yet  we  have  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  race  of  codfishes  is  ac- 
tually increasing  in  numbers  to  any  notable  ex- 
tent. With  the  codfish,  as  with  animal  species  in 
general,  the  numbers  during  many  successive  gen- 
erations oscillate  about  a  point  which  is  fixed,  or 
moves  but  slowly  forward  or  backward.  Instead 
of  a  geometrical  increase  with  a  ratio  of  six  mill- 
ions, there  is  practically  no  marked  increase  at  all. 
Now  this  implies  that  out  of  the  six  million  em- 
bryo codfish  a  sufficient  number  will  survive  to 
replace  their  two  parents,  and  to  replace  a  certain 
small  proportion  of  those  contemporary  codfishes 
who  leave  no  progeny.  Perhaps  a  dozen  may 
suffice  for  this,  perhaps  a  hundred.  The  rest  of 
the  six  million  must  die."  l  The  amount  of  de- 
struction is  not  so  great  as  this  in  all  parts  of  the 
animal  kingdom.  Among  the  higher  birds  and 

1  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  vol.  ii.  p.  12. 


14  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

mammals  the  preservation  of  the  individual  bears 
a  very  much  higher  ratio  to  the  preservation  of 
the  race.  But  with  the  immense  classes  of  fishes, 
insects,  and  crustaceans,  as  well  as  the  sub-king- 
dom of  mollusks,  —  which  taken  together  make 
up  by  far  the  greater  portion  of  the  animal  world, 
—  the  destruction  continually  going  on  is  prob- 
ably not  less  than  that  which  is  described  in  the 
example  cited.  Even  if  we  were  to  take  account 
only  of  the  individuals  which  survive  the  embryo 
or  larva  state,  but  do  not  succeed  in  leaving  off- 
spring behind  them,  the  cases  of  destruction  would 
still  bear  an  enormous  ratio  to  the  cases  of  pres- 
ervation. But  in  maintaining  the  characteristics 
of  a  race  only  those  individuals  can  be  counted 
who  produce  offspring.  It  is  obvious,  then,  that 
each  species  of  organisms,  as  we  know  it,  consists 
only  of  a  few  favoured  individuals  selected  out  of 
countless  multitudes  who  have  been  tried  and  re- 
jected as  unworthy  to  live.  No  selection  that  is 
exercised  by  man  compares  in  rigour  with  this. 
It  is  somewhat  as  if  a  breeder  of  race-horses  were 
to  choose,  with  infallible  accuracy  of  judgment, 
the  two  or  three  fleetest  out  of  each  hundred 
thousand,  destroying  all  the  rest,  that  the  high 
standard  of  the  breed  might  run  no  possible  risk 
of  deterioration.  In  such  a  rigorous  competition 


Darwinism   Verified.  15 

as  this,  no  individual  peculiarity  can  be  so  slight 
that  we  are  entitled  to  regard  it  as  unimportant. 
No  peculiarity  is  really  slight  that  enables  its 
possessor  to  survive  until  he  transmits  it  to  pos- 
terity. 

In  view  of  all  this  we  see  how  misleading  it  is 
to  describe  natural  selection  (as  Mr.  Mivart  does) 
as  a  process  which  operates  only  occasionally  upon 
variations  assumed  to  be  fortuitous.  We  see  that 
natural  selection,  like  a  power  that  slumbers  not 
nor  sleeps,  is  ever  preserving  the  stability  of  spe- 
cies by  seizing  all  individual  peculiarities  that  os- 
cillate within  narrow  limits  on  either  side  of  the 
mean  that  is  most  advantageous  to  the  species, 
while  cutting  off  all  such  peculiarities  as  trans- 
gress these  limits.  Domesticated  animals,  pro- 
tected from  the  exigencies  of  wild  life,  often 
exhibit  great  varieties  in  colouring,  while  wild 
animals  of  the  same  genus  or  species  are  monoto- 
nously coloured,  because  only  one  kind  of  colour- 
ing will  aid  them  in  catching  prey  or  eluding  ene- 
mies, and  all  the  variations  are  killed  out.  Who 
can  doubt  that  antelopes  are  so  fleet  only  because 
all  but  the  fleetest  individuals  are  sure  to  be  over- 
taken and  eaten  by  lions?  Protected  from  the 
lions,  a  thousand  generations  might  well  make 
them  as  lazy  and  clumsy  as  sheep. 


16  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

Operating  in  this  stern  way,  natural  selection 
secures  the  general  adaptation  of  each  race  of  or- 
ganisms to  the  conditions  of  life  which  surround 
it.  And  so  long  as  a  species  continues  surrounded 
by  circumstances  that  are  tolerably  persistent, 
natural  selection  maintains  its  stability  of  char- 
acter. Thus  what  the  older  naturalists  called  the 
"  fixity  of  species  "  is  fully  accounted  for.  But  a 
"  fixity  of  species  "  that  is  maintained  only  under 
such  conditions  is  really  no  fixity  at  all.  Change 
the  surrounding  circumstances,  and  the  average 
character  of  the  species  must  change.  Slight  pe- 
culiarities that  once  insured  survival  will  now 
insure  destruction,  and  tendencies  to  vary  that 
once  would  have  been  nipped  short  will  now  be 
encouraged  and  exaggerated.  In  this  way  the 
strong  tendency,  hereditary  in  all  mammals,  to- 
ward the  growth  of  hair  on  the  surface,  was 
greatly  exaggerated  in  the  Siberian  mammoth, 
while  checked  in  his  brethren,  the  elephants  of 
India  and  Africa.  In  this  way  a  peculiar  curve 
in  the  contour  of  butterflies'  wings,  which  is  per- 
sistently killed  out  in  India  and  Java,  is  with 
equal  persistency  selected  for  preservation  in 
Celebes.  How  far  such  alterations  in  the  direc* 
tion  of  natural  selection  may  work  deep-seated 
changes  in  the  structure  of  an  organism  one  can- 


Darwinism   Verified.  17 

not  accurately  define ;  but  there  is  no  doubt  that 
they  go  very  far  indeed,  when  taken  in  connec- 
tion with  the  facts  of  what  is  called  "  correlation 
of  growth."  An  organism  is  not  a  mere  aggre- 
gation of  parts,  of  which  one  can  be  altered  with- 
out affecting  the  others.  Increase  in  the  size 
and  weight  of  a  deer's  horns  entails  an  increase 
in  the  size  of  the  cervical  vertebrae  and  muscles, 
and  indirectly  modifies  the  shoulders  and  fore- 
limbs  ;  while  all  these  changes,  by  altering  the 
animal's  centre  of  gravity,  cause  compensating 
changes  in  the  rest  of  the  body.  Increased  thick- 
ness of  fur  modifies  the  efficiency  of  the  skin  as 
an  excreting  organ,  and  thus  reacts  upon  the 
lungs,  liver,  and  kidneys.  But  it  is  not  only  in 
these  clearly  traceable  ways  that  correlation  of 
growth  is  manifested.  Sometimes  the  correla- 
tions are  inexplicable.  Thus,  to  lengthen  the 
beak  of  a  pigeon  is  to  increase  the  size  of  his 
feet,  hairless  dogs  have  their  teeth  imperfect,  and 
white  tomcats  with  blue  eyes  are  almost  invari- 
ably deaf.  In  the  present  state  of  physiological 
knowledge  we  cannot  account  for  such  facts ;  but 
it  is  enough  for  the  purposes  of  the  Darwinian 
theory  to  know  that  they  exist.  For,  taken  all 
together,  they  show  that  natural  selection,  oper- 
ating on  even  the  most  superficial  variations,  is 
2 


18  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

quite  competent  to  work  deep-seated  changes  of 
structure  and  function. 

When  we  consider,  then,  that  the  circumstances 
which  determine  what  individuals  shall  survive 
are  not  constant  in  the  long  run  for  any  species, 
though  apparently  constant  for  limited  periods  of 
time ;  when  we  reflect  that  there  is  no  one  of 
the  larger  groups  of  plants  and  animals  —  such  as 
orders,  or  families,  or  even  genera  —  which  have 
not  been  subjected  again  and  again  to  great  and 
complicated  changes  of  environment,  it  becomes 
evident  that  anything  like  "  fixity  of  species "  is 
utterly  out  of  the  question.  No  such  thing  is 
possible  or  even  imaginable,  when  once  the  facts 
of  the  case  have  been  thoroughly  conceived. 
Looking  over  the  earth's  surface  to-day,  things 
may  seem  quiet  and  stable  enough.  But  if  we 
contemplate  the  succession  of  past  events,  as  dis- 
closed by  the  geologist,  what  mainly  strikes  our 
attention  is  the  secular  turmoil.  Islands  aggre- 
gating into  continents  ;  continents  breaking  up 
into  archipelagoes ;  rivers  shifting  their  beds ; 
coast-lines  changing  their  direction  ;  oceans  now 
separated  by  impassable  isthmus-walls,  now  min- 
gling their  floras  and  faunas  through  new-made 
channels  ;  torrid  zones  becoming  temperate,  and 
temperate  zones  growing  frigid;  marshes  trans- 


Darwinism   Verified.  19 

formed  into  deserts,  and  glaciated  valleys  thaw- 
ing into  sunny  lakes;  high  table-lands  sinking 
into  ocean-floors,  and  submarine  ledges  rearing 
their  heads  as  Alpine  ranges  ;  deep-sea  mollusks 
and  crustaceans  seeking  refuge  in  shallow  waters, 
while  littoral  organisms  migrate  upland  to  find 
new  food  and  contend  with  new  enemies  ;  plant- 
seeds  carried  by  vagrant  birds  to  unwonted  hab- 
itats ;  peaceful  tribes  of  ruminants  decimated  by 
invading  carnivores ;  ceaseless  conflict,  and  redis- 
tribution of  every  possible  sort,  —  these  are  the 
things  we  are  called  upon  to  contemplate.  Re- 
membering, then,  how  stability  of  species  is  main- 
tained only  by  the  rigorous  selection  of  a  few  in- 
dividuals that  are  best  adapted  to  a  given  set  of 
exigencies,  we  see  that,  as  the  combinations  of 
exigencies  are  altered  from  time  to  time,  the  sta- 
bility of  species  can  in  general  be  but  temporary. 
Now  and  then  we  may  expect  to  find  very  long 
persistency  of  type  where,  in  spite  of  great  ter- 
restrial changes,  some  simple  set  of  conditions 
most  important  to  the  organism  remains  unal- 
tered ;  but  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  such  per- 
sistence is  impossible.  It  is  seldom  that  the  life 
of  any  species  extends  over  more  than  one  geo- 
logical epoch ;  often  the  duration  is  much  shorter 
than  this. 


20  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

Whether,  therefore,  it  is  practicable  for  us  to- 
day to  explain  every  minute  peculiarity  of  any 
one  particular  species  by  an  appeal  to  natural  se- 
lection alone  is  not  the  main  point  to  be  consid- 
ered in  estimating  the  success  of  the  Darwinian 
theory.  The  question  has  a  scientific  interest  of 
its  own  which  is  very  great,  but  it  is  not  the  main 
question.  The  main  point  is  that,  admitting  nat- 
ural selection  to  be  a  vera  causa  at  all  (and  this 
no  one  denies),  the  stability  of  species  is  proved 
to  be  but  a  contingent  and  temporary  affair.  The 
old  notion  of  an  absolute  fixity  of  species  is  over- 
thrown once  for  all,  and  with  it  the  only  sem- 
blance of  an  argument  that  could  ever  have  been 
alleged  in  behalf  of  the  hypothesis  of  special  cre- 
ations. For  in  considering  nearly  allied  forms, 
like  the  lion,  tiger,  and  leopard,  their  actual  con- 
sanguinity would  never  have  been  doubted  for  a 
moment  but  for  the  inability  of  naturalists  to  un- 
derstand how  the  type  which  appears  so  constant, 
when  viewed  through  a  short  period  of  time  and 
amid  unchanging  conditions,  should  after  all  be 
variable.  Unable  to  imagine  any  probable  cause 
or  method  of  variation  by  which  the  descendants 
of  a  common  feline  ancestor  should  have  acquired 
the  divergent  characters  of  lions  and  leopards,  the 
naturalist  either  gave  up  the  problem  as  insoluble, 


Darwinism   Verified.  21 

or  else  retreated  upon  the  assumption  that  leop- 
ards and  lions  were  separately  created.  In  either 
case  science  was  equally  at  fault ;  for,  as  above 
argued,  the  hypothesis  of  special  creations,  as  re- 
ferring a  particular  group  of  phenomena  to  that 
Divine  action  which  is  the  equal  source  of  all  phe- 
nomena, is  not  entitled  to  be  considered  a  scien- 
tific explanation.  But  when  Mr.  Darwin  called 
attention  to  the  working  of  natural  selection,  the 
difficulty  was  removed,  and  it  at  once  became 
highly  probable  that  such  allied  forms  had  di- 
verged from  a  common  stock  through  the  accumu- 
lation of  minute  modifications. 

Such  being  the  conclusion  to  which  we  are  led 
by  considering  the  process  of  natural  selection,  it 
becomes  desirable  to  inquire  whether  the  conclu- 
sion is  confirmed  by  the  most  general  phenomena 
of  organic  life  that  have  been  observed  and  tab- 
ulated. There  is  no  hesitation  or  ambiguity  in 
the  answer.  Whether  we  consider  the  classifi- 
catory  relationships  of  plants  and  animals,  their 
embryology,  their  morphology,  their  geographical 
distribution,  or  their  geological  succession,  there 
is  not  only  abundance  of  evidence,  but  the  evi- 
dence points  wholly  in  one  direction.  With  en- 
tire unanimity  the  phenomena  in  question  testify 
that  species  have  arisen  by  descent  with  niodifi- 


22  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

cations,  and  not  by  disconnected  acts  of  creation. 
The  facts  of  classification  alone  are  sufficiently 
decisive.  By  the  older  naturalists,  who  sought  to 
arrange  animals  and  plants  in  groups  according  to 
their  resemblances,  attempts  were  often  made  to 
construct  a  linear  series  in  which  each  group 
should  be  intermediate  between  those  which  pre- 
ceded and  those  which  followed  it.  All  such  at- 
tempts proved  futile,  and  after  a  half-century  of 
discussion  and  criticism  it  became  evident  that 
the  only  possible  classification  which  correctly 
represents  the  facts  is  one  in  which  organisms  are 
arranged  in  divergent  groups  and  sub-groups,  like 
the  branches  and  twigs  of  what  is  aptly  termed  a 
family  tree.  Wherever  different  orders,  families, 
or  genera  show  points  of  resemblance  to  each 
other,  the  resemblances  occur  always  at  the  bot- 
tom, among  their  least  highly  developed  species. 
Apes,  bats,  and  rabbits  are  sufficiently  distinct  in 
type,  but  the  lowest  members  of  the  orders  to 
which  these  animals  respectively  belong  are  strik- 
ingly like  one  another.  At  the  bottom  of  the 
mammalian  class,  the  echidna  and  duck-bill  have 
many  points  in  common  with  birds  and  reptiles ; 
while  birds  and  reptiles  not  only  draw  together  so 
that  it  is  hard  to  distinguish  their  most  primitive 
forms  as  clearly  bird  or  clearly  reptile,  but  these 


Darwinism   Verified.  23 

primitive  forms  remind  one  in  many  ways  of  the 
batrachians.  A  batrachian,  in  turn,  is  an  animal 
which  ends  its  life  as  a  kind  of  reptile  after  hav- 
ing begun  it  as  a  kind  of  imperfectly  specialized 
fish.  Again,  the  lowest  known  vertebrate,  the 
amphioxus,  usually  ranked  with  fishes,  though 
hardly  specialized  enough  to  be  called  a  true  fish, 
exhibits  marks  of  actual  relationship  with  the 
ascidian,  which  is  nothing  more  than  a  worm  of 
the  order  known  as  tunicata.  No  two  animals 
could  be  less  like  each  other  than  a  bee  and  a 
nautilus,  yet  in  their  lowest  members  the  two 
sub-kingdoms  of  articulata  and  mollusks  become 
barely  distinguishable  from  each  other  and  from 
the  worms  with  which  the  vertebrate  sub-kingdom 
also  becomes  blended.  It  is  on  account  of  this 
convergence  of  types  as  we  descend  in  the  scale 
that  naturalists  have  found  it  so  difficult  to  clas- 
sify satisfactorily  those  lower  organisms  which  Cu- 
vier  roughly  grouped  together  as  radiata.  Par- 
allel phenomena  recur  as  we  reach  the  confines  of 
the  animal  and  vegetal  kingdoms,  and  meet  with 
numbers  of  organisms  which  there  is  as  much 
reason  for  assigning  to  the  one  kingdom  as  to  the 
other.  All  this  complicated  arrangement  of  or- 
ganisms in  groups  within  groups,  resembling  each 
other  at  the  bottom  of  the  scale,  and  differing 


24  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

most  widely  at  the  top,  is  just  what  is  presupposed 
by  the  Darwinian  theory  of  "  descent  with  mod- 
ification," and  on  any  other  theory  it  appears  to 
be  totally  inexplicable. 

Precisely  similar  testimony  as  to  gradual  diver- 
gence is  found  in  the  facts  of  embryology  and 
morphology.  It  is  a  familiar  fact  that  the  germs 
of  all  organisms  are  like  each  other,  and  are, 
moreover,  very  like  such  lowest  forms  of  life  as 
the  amoeba  and  protococcus.  But  as  a  germ  de- 
velops it  becomes  specialized  and  denned,  first 
as  to  its  sub-kingdom,  then  as  to  its  class,  order, 
family,  genus,  species,  and  variety.  The  germ- 
cell  of  a  mandril  is  at  first  indistinguishable  from 
that  of  a  snail  or  lobster.  The  fostal  ape  arising 
therefrom  is  at  first  definable  as  a  vertebrate, 
but  not  as  a  mammal ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  cir- 
culates its  blood  through  a  system  of  gills,  and 
its  nascent  heart  is  like  the  heart  of  a  fish.  Pres- 
ently, with  the  appearance  of  the  allantoidal 
membrane,  the  fo3tus  seems  to  be  on  the  point  of 
becoming  a  reptile  or  bird ;  but  after  a  while  it 
declares  itself  a  mammal.  Next  it  becomes  ap- 
parent that  it  is  not  a  rodent  or  insectivore,  but 
a  primate  ;  next,  it  exhibits  characteristics  which 
define  it  as  a  true  ape,  and  not  a  lemur  ;  still  later, 
it  is  seen  to  be  a  catarrhine  ape ;  and  finally,  it 


Darwinism   Verified,  25 

is  born  with  the  specific  attributes  of  a  mandril, 
which  are,  however,  further  intensified  as  it 
reaches  maturity.  Facts  like  these,  which  are 
invariably  found  in  the  embryonic  development 
of  organisms,  tell  just  the  same  story  as  the  facts 
of  classification.  If  they  do  not  mean  that  the 
various  forms  of  organic  life  have  arisen  by  grad-. 
ual  divergence  from  a  common  original,  one 
might  well  be  excused  for  doubting  whether  the 
phenomena  of  nature  have  any  rational  meaning 
whatever.  Of  like  import  are  many  of  the  more 
special  facts  of  embryology,  such  as  the  useless 
rudiments  of  hind  limbs  in  many  snakes,  the 
presence  of  teeth  in  the  beaks  of  sundry  embry- 
onic birds  and  in  the  jaws  of  foetal  whales,  and  the 
gill-like  glands  in  the  human  throat.  As  if  all 
this  were  not  enough,  the  study  of  morphology 
discloses  that  all  the  diversified  mechanical  func- 
tions performed  by  the  various  animals  comprised 
in  any  sub-kingdom  are  achieved  by  more  or  less 
considerable  modifications  of  a  framework  that  in 
its  typical  features  is  common  to  all.  In  embry- 
onic development  the  fins  of  the  fish  correspond 
with  the  legs  of  reptiles  and  mammals,  and  with 
the  legs  and  wings  of  birds.  To  enable  the  bat 
to  fly,  no  new  mechanism  is  invented,  but  an 
embryonal  hand  develops  into  a  whig  by  the 


26  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

elongation  of  its  fingers  and  the  growth  of  a  web- 
like  skin  between  them. 

If  we  consider  the  most  general  features  of  the 
geographical  distribution  and  geological  succes- 
sion of  organisms,  we  find  the  evidence  hardly 
less  complete  and  convincing.  Generally  speak- 
ing, the  contemporary  species  found  in  any  geo- 
graphical area  most  closely  resemble  the  species 
that  inhabited  the  same  area  in  former  ages. 
Thus  in  the  Miocene  age  Australia  abounded  in 
marsupials,  and  marsupials  specifically  different, 
though  nearly  allied  to  these,  make  up  to-day  the 
greater  part  of  the  mammalian  fauna  of  Austra- 
lia. There  is  no  imaginable  reason  why  this 
should  be  so,  unless  the  contemporary  marsupials 
are  descended  from  the  earlier  forms.  It  cannot 
be  urged  that  marsupials  are  better  adapted  to 
the  conditions  of  life  in  Australia  than  placental 
mammals  ;  for  the  placental  mammals  lately  in- 
troduced there  are  already  beginning  to  supplant 
and  exterminate  the  marsupials.  The  only  possi- 
ble explanation  is  that,  whereas  marsupials  once 
covered  the  terrestrial  globe,  and  have  been  sup- 
planted by  better  adapted  forms  in  the  Old 
World  and  (with  the  exception  of  the  opossum) 
in  America,  on  the  other  hand  the  isolation  of 
Australia  has  allowed  them  there  to  go  on  repro- 


Darwinism   Verified.  27 

ducing  their  kind  until  the  present  day.  In  such 
an  instance  as  this  we  have  something  very  nearly 
like  crucial  proof  of  the  theory  of  "  descent  with 
modifications."  In  like  manner  the  extinct  eden- 
tata  of  South  America  are  closely  allied  to  the 
living  ant-eaters,  sloths,  and  armadilloes.  So, 
too,  the  indigenous  floras  and  faunas  of  islands 
lying  near  continents  always  resemble  the  floras 
and  faunas  of  the  continents  near  which  they  lie. 
The  Galapagos  archipelago,  distant  some  five  hun- 
dred miles  from  the  coast  of  Ecuador,  has  a  fauna 
which,  though  generically  distinct  from  all  others, 
is  yet  South  American  in  type,  and  closely  resem- 
bles the  fauna  of  Ecuador.  Again,  among  the  ani- 
mals living  on  the  different  islands  of  this  group, 
we  find  specific  diversity  along  with  generic  iden- 
tity. On  the  Darwinian  theory  this  is  just  what 
might  be  expected.  The  long  isolation  of  the 
archipelago  from  the  continent  has  given  oppor- 
tunity for  the  rise  of  generic  divergences  between 
their  once  homogeneous  faunas,  while  the  briefer 
isolation  of  the  several  islands  from  each  other 
has  been  attended  by  slighter,  or  specific,  diver- 
gences ;  and,  as  if  to  complete  by  contrast  the 
force  of  the  example,  we  find  that  the  only  ani- 
mals on  the  archipelago  which  are  not  generically 
different  from  their  allies  on  the  continent  are 


28  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

birds,  able  to  fly  back  and  forth  over  the  inter- 
vening sea.  Unless  the  Darwinian  theory  be 
true,  these  striking  relations  not  only  become 
meaningless,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  any 
discernible  relations  at  all  should  exist  between 
these  neighboring  faunas.  To  cite  all  the  con- 
firmatory facts  of  this  sort  would  be  to  write  an 
exhaustive  account  of  the  distribution  of  plants 
and  animals. 

In  examining  the  geological  record  in  general, 
we  are  struck  with  its  corroboration  of  the  above- 
cited  testimony  of  classification  and  embryology. 
For  instance,  as  we  go  back  in  time,  we  find  fam- 
ilies and  orders  drawing  more  and  more  closely 
together;  we  find  earlier  forms  less  specialized 
than  their  successors ;  and,  as  we  now  have  em- 
bryonic birds  with  rudimentary  teeth  in  their 
beaks,  so  we  find  that  formerly  adult  birds  with 
such  teeth  existed.  It  is  one  of  the  most  signifi- 
cant truths  of  palaeontology  that  extinct  forms  are 
generally  intercalary  between  forms  now  existing ; 
so  that  not  only  genera  and  families,  but  even 
orders,  of  contemporary  animals  are  every  now 
and  then  fused  together  by  the  discovery  of  ex- 
tinct intermediate  forms.  It  is  in  this  way  that 
the  Cuvierian  orders  of  pachyderms  and  rumi- 
nants have  come  to  be  ranked  as  a  single  order, 


Darwinism   Verified.  29 

the  horse  and  pig  being  connected  by  numerous 
fossil  links  with  the  camel  and  antelope.  Until 
quite  lately  there  has  been  less  success  in  the 
attempt  to  find  a  perfect  series  of  transitional 
forms  connecting  some  well-known  animal  with 
its  generically  different  ancestor.  But  the  argu- 
ment heretofore  urged  against  the  Darwinian 
theory,  on  the  ground  of  this  imperfect  success, 
was  at  best  a  weak  one,  as  resting  merely  upon 
the  absence  of  evidence  which  further  discovery 
might  furnish  at  any  moment.  The  Darwinian 
might  candidly  urge  that  his  failure  was  due 
partly  to  the  fragmentary  character  of  the  geolog- 
ical record,  in  which  there  is  no  reason  for  sup- 
posing that  more  than  one  form  out  of  a  hundred 
has  been  preserved,  and  partly  to  the  fact  that 
only  a  small  portion  of  the  earth's  surface  has 
been  explored  by  the  paleontologist,  and  that  por- 
tion but  superficially.  The  justice  of  such  a  plea 
is  rendered  apparent,  while  the  hostile  argument 
is  completely  silenced,  by  the  recent  discoveries 
of  Professor  Marsh  as  to  the  palseontological  his- 
tory of  the  ancestors  of  the  horse.  As  these  dis- 
coveries have  just  been  well  described  in  Profes- 
sor Huxley's  admirable  lectures  in  New  York,  a 
brief  mention  here  will  suffice  to  show  their  im- 
port. 


30  Darwinism  ar,d   Other  Essays. 

One  of  the  most  striking  peculiarities  of  the 
equine  genus  —  including  the  horse,  ass,  zebra, 
and  quagga  —  is  the  modification  of  the  limbs,  so 
that  what  appears  to  be  the  horse's  fore-knee  is 
really  his  wrist,  and  what  in  the  hind-limb  looks 
like  a  reversed  knee  is  really  his  heel,  while  the 
lower  halves  of  the  legs  are  really  feet  terminat- 
ing in  the  middle  toe  armed  with  its  nail,  which 
we  call  the  hoof.  The  two  adjacent  toes  are  rep- 
resented only  by  splint-bones  on  either  side  of 
the  middle  metacarpal  or  metatarsal,  and  the  ra- 
dius and  ulna  in  the  fore-limb,  as  well  as  the  tibia 
and  fibula  in  the  hind-limb,  are  almost  completely 
fused  together.  Now  according  to  the  Darwinian 
theory,  such  a  highly  specialized  animal  as  the 
horse  must  be  descended  from  a  less  specialized 
mammal  in  which  the  limbs  were  like  ordinary 
mammalian  limbs,  ending  in  ordinary  feet  with 
five  separate  toes  each.  The  embryology  of  the 
horse  points  to  this  conclusion,  and  here,  as  usual, 
but  with  unwonted  emphasis,  palaeontology  con- 
firms the  inference.  Already  in  Europe  had  been 
found  the  three-toed  hipparion,  in  which  the  two 
side  toes  were  like  dew-claws,  and  the  older  an- 
chitherium,  in  which  all  three  toes  were  complete. 
But  the  discoveries  of  Professor  Marsh  have  set 
before  us  a  much  more  perfect  series.  Going 


Darwinism   Verified.  31 

back  in  time,  as  we  reach  the  upper  Pliocene, 
the  horse  disappears,  and  we  find  the  pliohippus, 
very  much  like  him.  In  the  lower  Pliocene  this 
creature  is  replaced  by  the  protohippus,  with 
three  toes  like  the  hipparion.  In  the  upper  Mio- 
cene we  have  the  miohippus,  with  three  well-de- 
veloped toes  like  the  anchitherium,  and  with  the 
rudiment  of  a  fore-toe  on  the  fore-foot.  In  the 
mesohippus  of  the  lower  Miocene  this  rudiment 
is  a  splint-bone,  like  those  which  represent  the 
later-disappearing  toes  in  the  modern  horse.  By 
this  time  we  find  the  ulna  and  fibula  well  devel- 
oped and  distinct  from  the  radius  and  tibia.  Still 
further  back,  in  the  upper  Eocene,  comes  the 
orohippus,  with  four  complete  toes  on  the  fore- 
foot. And  finally,  in  the  lower  Eocene,  we  get 
the  eohippus,  which  shows  the  rudiment  of  a  fifth 
toe  on  the  front  and  a  fourth  toe  on  the  hind  foot. 
In  the  structure  of  the  teeth  —  the  other  chief 
point  in  which  the  modern  horse  is  notably  spe- 
cialized—  we  find  a  similar  gradation  back  to  the 
ordinary  mammalian  type. 

The  agreement  of  observed  facts  with  the  re- 
quirements of  theory  is  here  complete,  minute, 
and  specific ;  and  Professor  Huxley  may  well  say 
that  the  history  of  the  descent  of  the  horse  from 
a  five-toed  mammal,  as  thus  demonstrated,  sup- 


32  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

plies  all  that  was  required  to  complete  the  proof 
of  the  Darwinian  theory.  The  theory  not  only 
alleges  a  vera  causa,  and  is  not  only  confirmed  by 
the  unanimous  import  of  the  facts  of  classification, 
embryology,  morphology,  distribution,  and  succes- 
sion ;  but  it  has  further  succeeded  in  tracing  the 
actual  origination  of  one  generic  type  from  an- 
other, through  gradual  "descent  with  modifica- 
tions." And  thus,  within  a  score  of  years  from 
its  first  announcement,  the  daring  hypothesis  of 
Mr.  Darwin  may  fairly  claim  to  be  regarded  as 
one  of  the  established  truths  of  science. 

December,  1876. 


II. 

MR.   MIVART   ON  DARWINISM. 

IT  can  hardly  be  said  that  in  this  volume1 
Mr.  Mivart  has  brought  any  new  contribution  to 
the  discussion  of  evolution  and  its  consequences, 
though  he  has  succeeded  in  marshalling  together, 
in  a  goodly  phalanx,  the  various  doubts,  objec- 
tions, and  misconceptions  with  which  the  question 
has  disturbed  the  peace  of  his  mind.  The  book 
is  so  polemic  as  quite  to  belie  its  placid  and  deco- 
rous title.  The  "  Lessons  from  Nature  "  turn  out 
to  be  a  series  of  eager  assaults  upon  "  Darwinians  " 
and  "  Agnostics,"  mingled  with  jeremiads  over 
the  tendency  of  the  times  when  such  perverted 
thinkers  can  obtain  such  extensive  following. 
Though  it  would  be  unfair  to  say  that  there  is  no 
trace  of  a  disposition  to  interrogate  nature  calmly 
and  accept  the  results,  yet  this  disposition  is  well- 
nigh  paralyzed  by  a  strong  mental  bias  towards 
considering  facts  only  in  their  supposed  bearing 

1  Lessons  from  Nature,  as  manifested  in  Mind  and  Matter,    By 
St.  George  Mivart.    New  York :  D.  Appleton  &  Co.  1876. 


34  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

on  certain  assumed  practical  needs  of  theology. 
An  evident  struggle  between  theological  predispo- 
sitions and  acquired  scientific  habits  has  interfered 
seriously  with  the  author's  balance  of  mind ;  and 
the  net  result  is  a  book  by  no  means  commenda- 
ble for  scientific  spirit,  though  it  exhibits  praise- 
worthy industry,  and  often  considerable  ingenuity 
and  dialectical  skill. 

So  far  is  Mr.  Mivart  from  occupying  the  posi- 
tion of  a  disinterested  student  of  nature  that  his 
numerous  misrepresentations  can  be  explained 
without  necessarily  charging  him  with  a  conscious 
willingness  to  be  unfair.  Sometimes,  at  least,  he 
appears  to  misrepresent  scientific  thinkers  through 
sheer  incapacity  to  comprehend  the  motives  which 
guide  them.  Mr.  Darwin's  candour,  for  example, 
in  modifying  or  retracting  hasty  inferences  im- 
plies an  attitude  of  mind  which  our  author  seems 
quite  unable  to  appreciate.  The  nature  of  Mr. 
Darwin's  inquiries  involves  him  in  the  consider- 
ation of  thousands  of  exceedingly  complex  cases 
of  causation,  for  the  unravelling  of  which  a  vast 
experience,  the  most  delicate  analytic  power,  and 
a  prodigious  memory  for  details  are  absolutely 
essential.  The  general  sagacity  of  his  conclusions 
shows  that  Mr.  Darwin  possesses  these  qualities  in 
a  degree  rarely,  if  ever,  surpassed  by  any  scientific 


Mr.  Mivart  on  Darwinism.  35 

inquirer ;  yet  once  in  a  while  he  makes  a  slip, 
forgets  or  overlooks  some  inconspicuous  but  im- 
portant fact,  or  sets  down  an  inference  without 
his  customary  caution.  Ordinary  writers  in  such 
cases  too  often  prefer  to  stand  by  what  they  have 
written,  quietly  ignoring  criticisms  that  are  hard 
to  dispose  of,  very  much  as  Mr.  Mivart,  in  re- 
printing his  rejoinder  to  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright, 
takes  care  not  to  inform  the  reader  of  the  surre- 
joinder which  came  from  his  powerful  antagonist. 
But  Mr.  Darwin  finds  it  easy  to  acknowledge 
himself  mistaken.  His  interest  in  his  personal 
reputation  for  infallibility,  and  his  zeal  in  behalf 
of  the  doctrine  he  is  defending,  are  held  in  entire 
subordination  to  the  main  purpose  of  getting  the 
facts  presented  as  fairly  and  completely  as  pos- 
sible. This  is  the  true  scientific  spirit  —  the 
spirit  in  which  to  acquire  lessons  from  nature, 
whether  in  the  world  of  mind  or  in  the  world  of 
matter ;  and  when  a  writer  manifests  this  spirit 
so  consistently  as  Mr.  Darwin,  he  is  sure  to  win 
the  respect  and  confidence  of  his  readers  in  the 
highest  degree.  An  occasional  error  goes  for  lit- 
tle when  weighed  in  the  scales  against  entire  dis- 
interestedness. 

To  a  disinterested   critic   all   this,  one  would 
think,  should  be  self-evident.     Yet  so  far  is  Mr. 


36  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Mivart  from  recognizing  anything  of  the  sort  that 
he  cites  Mr.  Darwin's  scrupulous  self-corrections 
as  evidence  of  his  utter  untrustworthiness  !  What 
confidence  can  we  place,  he  asks,  in  a  thinker  who 
makes  so  many  hasty  inferences  ?  —  overlooking 
the  fact  that,  in  daily  experience,  those  who  are 
the  most  rash  in  forming  their  opinions  are  apt  to 
be  likewise  the  most  indisposed  to  reconsider 
them.  If  Mr.  Mivart  had  any  genuine  sympathy 
with  the  scientific  temper  of  mind,  this  particular 
kind  of  misrepresentation  would  never  have  oc- 
curred to  him. 

Along  with  this  inability  to  appreciate  disinter- 
ested thinking,  Mr.  Mivart  has  one  or  two  other 
peculiarities  which,  taken  together,  give  him  a 
real  genius  for  twisting  things.  He  is  character- 
ized by  a  sort  of  cantankerousness  which  prompts 
him  to  put  a  controversial  aspect  on  points  which 
properly  require  only  a  judicial  estimate  of  the 
bearings  of  circumstances.  On  the  question  as 
to  just  how  much  effectiveness  is  to  be  allowed 
to  the  principle  of  natural  selection,  he  approaches 
Mr.  Darwin  with  the  air  of  a  lawyer  browbeating 
a  witness ;  and  when  Mr.  Darwin  admits  that 
formerly  his  attention  was  somewhat  too  exclu- 
sively directed  toward  this  cause  of  the  modifi- 
cation of  species,  his  belligerent  critic  cries  out 


Mr.  Mivart  on  Darwinism.  37 

that  here  is  "  a  change  of  front  in  face  of  the 
enemy ! " 

Further  twisting  is  caused  by  unintelligent 
study  of  the  subject  criticised.  Mr.  Mivart,  for 
example,  attributes  to  the  evolutionists  the  opin- 
ion that  "virtue  and  pleasure  are  synonymous, 
for  in  root  and  origin  they  are  identical."  This 
misrepresentation  arises  from  imperfect  apprehen- 
sion of  the  fact  that,  according  to  the  doctrine  of 
evolution,  differences  in  kind  result  from  the  ac- 
cumulation of  differences  in  degree.  One  might 
as  well  say  that  evolutionists  consider  the  work- 
ings of  Newton's  genius  to  be  identical  with  re- 
flex action,  since  in  its  root  and  origin  all  mental 
activity  was  a  kind  of  reflex  action.  Nay,  one 
might  as  well  say  that  evolutionists  consider  a 
man  indistinguishable  from  a  cuttle-fish,  since  in 
their  root  and  origin  the  vertebrate  and  mollus- 
can  types  have  been  proved  by  Kovalevsky  to  be 
identical. 

For  the  rest,  Mr.  Mivart  evinces  frequent  want 
of  sagacity  as  to  the  really  vital  points  of  the  case 
in  which  he  appears  as  an  advocate.  He  takes 
great  pains  to  show  that  some  savage  races  have 
degenerated  in  civilization,  and  also  that  the  in- 
tellectual difference  between  the  lowest  men  and 
the  highest  apes  far  exceeds  the  structural  differ- 


38  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ence.  But  this  is,  after  all,  a  misconception  of 
the  requirements  of  the  argument ;  for  on  the 
one  hand  the  Darwinian  theory  nowhere  requires 
an  uninterrupted  progress,  but  rather  implies  a 
complicated  backward  and  forward  movement,  of 
which  an  irregular  progress  is  the  differential  re- 
sult. And  as  to  the  second  point,  it  is  just  one 
of  the  triumphs  of  Darwinism,  as  regards  specu- 
lative consistency  with  facts,  that  it  does  account 
for  the  alteration  in  the  series  of  effects  which 
occurs  as  we  approach  the  origin  of  mankind. 
For  when  intelligence  has  increased  pari  passu 
with  physical  advantages  up  to  a  certain  point, 
the  variations  in  intelligence  begin  to  become 
more  valuable  than  any  variations  in  physical 
constitution,  and  consequently  become  predomi- 
nantly subject  to  the  operation  of  natural  selec- 
tion, to  the  comparative  neglect  of  purely  physi- 
cal variations.  A  change  of  this  sort,  if  prolonged 
for  a  sufficient  length  of  time,  would  go  far  to  ac- 
count for  the  greatness  of  the  mental  difference 
between  men  and  apes,  as  contrasted  with  the 
smallness  of  the  structural  difference. 

That  Mr.  Mivart  should  fail  to  appreciate  this 
point,  long  since  suggested  by  Mr.  Wallace,  is 
perhaps  not  to  be  wondered  at,  since  he  reduces 
the  inquiry  to  a  mere  controversy  in  which  he 


Mr.  Mivart  on  Darwinism.  39 

holds  a  brief  against  the  Darwinians.  What  his 
own  views  may  be  as  to  the  origin  of  man  he  no- 
where explicitly  states.  But,  in  spite  of  his  hos- 
tility to  Mr.  Darwin  and  his  theories,  he  takes 
pains  to  proclaim  himself  an  evolutionist  —  within 
such  limits  as  a  profound  study  of  Suarez  and  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas  may  determine. 

December,  1876. 


IIL 

DE.   BATEMAN  ON  DAKWINISM.1 

DR.  BATEMAN'S  argument  against  Darwinism 
is  based  upon  a  fallacy  which  is  quite  commonly 
shared  by  those  who  have  failed  to  comprehend 
the  doctrine  of  evolution.2  This  is  the  fallacy  of 
supposing  that  the  Darwinian  theory  can  be  over- 
thrown simply  by  insisting  upon  the  obvious  fact 
that  the  intelligence  and  acquirements  of  man  are 
enormously  —  almost  incommensurably  —  greater 
than  the  intelligence  and  acquirements  of  the 
highest  apes.  As  urged  in  the  case  of  language, 
Dr.  Bateman's  argument  is  not  original  with 
him,  as  he  seems  to  suppose  ;  it  has  already  been 
urged  by  Max  Miiller,  a  writer  far  more  distin- 
guished for  brilliancy  of  expression  than  for  pro- 
fundity of  thought.  In  substance  it  consists  of 
three  propositions :  — 

1  Darwinism  Tested  by  Language.    By  Frederic  Bateman,  M.  D. 
With  a  Preface  by  E.  M.  Goulbura,  D.  D.,  Dean  of  Norwich.    Lon- 
don.   New  York  :  Scribner  and  Welford.    1878. 

2  On  this  point  see  my  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  1874,  Part  H, 
chaps,  xxi.,  xxii. 


Dr.  Bateman  on  Darwinism.  41 

"  1.  That  articulate  speech  is  a  distinctive  at- 
tribute of  man,  and  that  the  ape  and  lower  an- 
imals do  not  possess  a  trace  of  it. 

"  2.  That  articulate  speech  is  a  universal  at- 
tribute of  man ;  that  all  races  have  a  language,  or 
the  capacity  of  acquiring  it. 

"  3.  The  immateriality  of  the  faculty  of  speech." 

It  is  perhaps  hardly  correct  to  call  this  last 
point  a  "  proposition,"  nor  is  it  easy  to  determine 
precisely  its  purport  or  its  relevance.  We  are 
told  farther  on  that,  although  "a  certain  normal 
and  healthy  state  of  cerebral  tissue  is  necessary 
for  the  exterior  manifestation  of  the  faculty  of 
speech,"  it  by  no  means  follows  that  speech  is 
located  in  a  particular  portion  of  the  brain,  or  is 
the  "  result  of  a  certain  definite  molecular  condi- 
tion of  the  cerebral  organ."  Of  course  it  does  not 
follow ;  but  the  conclusion,  however  interesting 
to  phrenologists  and  materialists,  is  irrelevant  to 
the  discussion  of  the  Darwinian  theory,  or  to  that 
of  the  origin  of  language.  In  such  inquiries  all 
that  any  one  needs  to  know  is  that  the  faculty  of 
speech  implies,  among  other  things,  the  presence 
of  a  brain,  and  whether  this  "  faculty  "  is  to  be 
called  "  immaterial "  or  not  is  quite  beside  the 
question. 

Our  author's  argumentation,  it  will  be  rightly 


42  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

inferred,  is  more  or  less  rambling  in  character. 
Returning  to  the  two  propositions  which  really 
make  up  his  argument,  it  is  an  obvious  criticism 
that  every  sensible  Darwinian  will  concede  them 
both  without  a  moment's  hesitation.  There  is  not 
the  slightest  evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  race  of 
men  destitute  of  articulate  speech  ;  and  if  apes  or 
any  other  animals  do  possess  the  slightest  trace 
of  such  an  acquisition,  it  may  safely  be  neglected 
on  the  principle  of  de  minimis  non  curat  lex.1  It 
is  only  Dr.  Bateman's  imaginary  Darwinian  who 
finds  it  difficult  to  admit  these  plain  facts.  The 
actual  supporters  of  this  "  dangerous  heresy  "  have 
never  gone  out  of  their  way  to  detect  an  historical 
substratum  for  Reynard  or  JEsop,  or  to  hunt  from 
its  obscurity  the  Leibnitzian  story  of  the  Latin- 
speaking  dog ;  there  are  some  of  them,  we  fear, 
who  would  even,  on  general  grounds,  cast  dis- 
credit on  the  story  of  Balaam.  But  if  this  be 
really  the  Darwinian  state  of  mind,  then  Dr. 
Bateman's  work  is  plainly  a  case  of  ignoratio  elen- 
chi,  or  what  is  otherwise  called  "  barking  up  the 
wrong  tree." 
As  regards  the  process,  psychological  and  phys- 

1  Neglected,   or  conceded,  by  the  controversialist,  I  mean :  to  the 
disinterested  student  of  natura  no  fact,  however  small,  is  really  triv. 

in. 


Dr.  Bateman  on  Darwinism.  48 

iological,  by  which  the  faculty  of  articulate 
speech  was  acquired  by  mankind,  no  thorough 
explanation  has  yet  been  offered,  either  upon  the 
Darwinian  or  upon  any  other  theory.  The  so- 
called  "  bow-wow  "  or  onoraatopoetic  theory  is  no 
doubt  correct,  so  far  as  it  goes,  as  a  description 
of  facts  which  have  attended  the  acquisition  of 
speech ;  but  it  hardly  goes  to  the  root  of  the  mat- 
ter. The  power  of  enunciating  sounds  so  as  to 
communicate  ideas  and  feelings  is  certainly  an  art, 
as  much  as  the  later  acquired  powers  of  writing 
or  drawing.  For  the  original  acquisition  of  such 
an  art  two  conditions  were  requisite  —  the  phys- 
iological capacity  of  the  vocal  organs  for  produc- 
ing articulate  sounds,  and  the  psychological  ca- 
pacity of  abstraction  implied  in  the  conception  of 
a  sign  or  symbol.  There  must  also  have  been  re- 
quired—  as  underlying  the  last-named  capacity 
—  the  possession  of  a  certain  amount  of  mental 
flexibility,  or  inventiveness,  or  capability  of  fram- 
ing new  combinations  of  ideas.  This  sort  of  men- 
tal flexibility  is  found  among  animals  in  man 
alone,  and  in  his  case  it  is  the  accompaniment, 
and  probably  the  result,  of  an  exceptionally  long 
period  of  infancy.  The  significance  of  infancy, 
psychologically,  is  that  it  is  a  period  during  which 
a  great  number  of  all-important  nervous  combina- 


44  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

tions  are  formed  after  birth  under  the  influence 
of  outward  circumstances  which  slightly  vary 
from  generation  to  generation.  Where  there  is 
no  infancy,  all  the  most  important  nervous  com- 
binations are  established  before  birth,  and  under 
the  unmodified  influence  of  the  powerful  conserva- 
tive tendency  of  heredity.  Where  there  is  an  in- 
fancy, many  important  nervous  combinations  are 
not  formed  until  after  birth,  and  the  strictly  con- 
servative tendency  of  heredity  is  liable  to  be 
modified  by  the  fact  that  the  experience  of  the 
offspring  amid  environing  circumstances  is  not 
likely  to  be  precisely  the  same  as  that  of  the  par- 
ent. The  prolongation  of  infancy,  therefore,  in- 
creases the  opportunities  for  the  production  of  a 
mental  type  more  plastic  than  that  which  is  wit- 
nessed in  the  lower  animals  ;  it  paves  the  way  for 
inventiveness  and  for  progress.  It  is,  further- 
more, the  increased  variety  of  experience  result- 
ing from  this  increased  mental  plasticity  that  leads 
to  the  power  of  abstraction  and  generalization  — 
the  power  of  marking  out  and  isolating  in  thought 
the  element  that  is  common  to  different  groups  of 
phenomena. 

Now,  in  the  first  employment  of  articulated 
words  by  inchoate  man,  who  had  hitherto  only 
grunted  or  howled,  the  main  point  to  be  inter 


Dr.  Bateman  on  Darwinism.  45 

preted  psychologically  is  the  inventive  turn  of 
mind  which  could  establish  an  association  be- 
tween a  number  of  vocal  sounds  and  a  corre- 
sponding number  of  objects,  and  which  could 
appreciate  the  utility  of  such  an  association  in 
facilitating  concerted  action  with  one's  fellow- 
creatures  ;  though,  as  to  the  last  point,  the  utility 
would  be  so  enormous  that  the  maintenance  of 
the  device,  when  once  conceived,  could  never  be 
in  doubt.  In  the  origination  of  language  it  is 
but  the  first  costly  step  that  requires  considera- 
tion ;  but  this  step  obviously  involved  no  super- 
human mystery.  It  was  but  an  instance  —  though 
the  greatest  of  all  in  its  consequences  —  of  that 
general  psychical  plasticity  which  characterizes 
the  only  animal  which  begins  life  with  a  consid- 
erable proportion  of  its  nervous  combinations  un- 
determined. 

It  is  not  pretended  that  such  considerations 
solve  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  speech.  They 
nevertheless  go  far  toward  putting  it  into  its 
proper  position,  and  indicating  the  class  of  in- 
quiries with  which  it  must  be  grouped  if  it  is  to 
be  treated  in  that  broad  philosophical  way  which 
can  alone  connect  its  solution  with  the  fortunes 
of  the  Darwinian  theory.  The  existence  of  lan- 
guage is  not,  as  Max  Miiller's  dicta  imply,  a  fact 


4:6  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

in  the  universe  that  is  isolated  or  sui  generis  in 
being  incapable  of  scientific  explanation.  Im- 
mense as  the  fabric  of  human  speech  has  grown 
to  be,  it  is  undoubtedly  based  on  sundry  acts  of 
discovery  or  invention  —  not  necessarily  very 
conspicuous  at  the  outset  —  among  primeval  semi- 
human  savages.  The  inventive  acts  which  led  to 
the  systematic  use  of  vocal  sounds  for  the  inter- 
change of  ideas,  like  the  inventive  acts  which  re- 
sulted in  bows  and  arrows  and  in  cookery,  are  to 
be  regarded  simply  as  instances  of  the  general 
increase  in  psychical  plasticity  which  has  been 
the  fundamental  fact  in  the  genesis  of  man  in- 
tellectually. In  other  words,  the  existence  of 
language  is  a  fact  no  more  wonderful  than  the 
general  superiority  of  human  over  simian  intelli- 
gence ;  and  when  it  shall  have  been  shown  how 
the  rigid  mind  of  an  ape  might  acquire  plasticity, 
the  problem  of  the  origin  of  language,  along  with 
many  other  problems,  will  have  been,  ipso  facto, 
more  than  half  solved. 

A  great  step  in  this  direction  was  taken  by 
Mr.  Wallace,  when  he  pointed  out  that  when 
variations  in  intelligence  have  become,  on  the 
whole,  more  useful  to  a  race  of  animals  than 
variations  in  physical  constitution,  then  natural 
selection  must  seize  upon  the  former  to  the  rela. 


Dr.  Bateman  on  Darwinism.  47 

tive  neglect  of  the  latter.  This  conclusion  follows 
inevitably  from  the  theory  of  natural  selection 
as  conceived  by  Mr.  Darwin  ;  and  it  further  fol- 
lows, with  equal  cogency,  that  when  this  point  is 
reached  an  entirely  new  chapter  is  opened  in  the 
history  of  the  evolution  of  life.  A  race  which 
maintains  itself  by  psychical  variations  can  never, 
by  natural  selection,  give  rise  to  a  race  specifically 
different  from  itself  in  a  zoological  sense.  It  may 
go  on  adding  increments  to  its  intelligence  until 
it  evolves  Newtons  and  Beethovens,  while  its 
physical  structure  will  undergo  but  slight  and 
secondary  modifications.  Obviously,  the  first  be- 
ginning of  such  a  race  of  creatures,  though  but  a 
slight  affair  zoologically,  was,  in  the  history  of 
the  world,  an  event  quite  incomparable  in  impor- 
tance with  any  other  instance  of  specific  genesis 
that  ever  occurred.  It  constituted  a  new  depar- 
ture, so  to  speak,  not  inferior  in  value  to  the  first 
beginning  of  organic  life.  From  Mr.  Spencer's 
researches  into  the  organization  of  correspond- 
ences in  the  nervous  system  it  follows  that  the 
general  increase  of  intelligence  cannot  be  carried 
much  farther  than  it  has  reached  in  the  average 
higher  mammalia  without  necessitating  the  gene- 
sis of  infancy.  The  amount  of  work  to  be  done 
by  the  developing  nervous  system  of  the  offspring, 
in  reproducing  the  various  combinations  achieved 


48  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

by  the  parental  nervous  system,  becomes  so  con- 
siderable that  it  cannot  all  be  performed  before 
birth.  A  considerable  and  increasing  number  of 
combinations  have  to  be  adjusted  after  birth; 
and  thus  arise  the  phenomena  of  infancy.  Among 
mammalia  the  point  at  which  this  change  be- 
comes observable  lies  between  the  true  monkeys 
and  the  man-like  apes.  The  orang-outang  is  un- 
able to  walk  until  a  month  old,  and  its  period  of 
babyhood  lasts  considerably  longer. 

The  establishment  of  infancy  is  the  most  im- 
portant among  the  series  of  events  which  resulted 
in  the  genesis  of  man.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
prolongation  of  this  period  of  immaturity  had  for 
its  direct  effect  the  liberation  of  intelligence  from 
the  shackles  of  rigid  conservatism  by  which  the 
unchecked  influence  of  heredity  had  hitherto  con- 
fined it.  On  the  other  hand,  as  its  indirect  effect, 
the  prolongation  of  the  period  of  helplessness 
served  to  inaugurate  social  life  by  establishing 
the  family,  and  thus  prepared  the  way  for  the 
development  of  the  moral  sense.  It  is  by  follow- 
ing out  this  line  of  inquiry  that  we  shall  elucidate 
the  question  of  the  causes  of  man's  enormous  in- 
tellectual superiority  over  his  nearest  zoological 
congeners.  Meanwhile,  and  until  further  light 
shall  have  been  thrown  upon  such  incidental 
questions  as  the  inventiveness  displayed  in  the 


Dr.  Bateman  on  Darwinism.  49 

origin  of  language,  the  Darwinian  is  in  no  wise 
debarred,  by  any  logical  necessity  of  his  position, 
from  fully  recognizing  the  fact  of  this  enormous 
superiority.  Writers  like  Dr.  Bateman  argue  as 
if  they  supposed  Darwinians  to  be  in  the  habit 
of  depicting  the  human  race  as  a  parcel  of  naked, 
howling  troglodytes.  They  "  point  with  pride  " 
to  Parthenons  and  Iliads,  and  ask  us  to  produce 
from  his  African  forests  some  gorilla  who  can 
perform  the  like.  These  worthy  critics  should 
first  try  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  the  contrast, 
that  while  zoologically  man  presents  differences 
from  the  higher  catarrhine  apes  that  are  barely 
of  generic  value,  on  the  other  hand  the  psycholog- 
ical difference  is  so  great  as,  in  Mr.  Mivart's 
emphatic  language,  to  transcend  the  difference 
between  an  ape  and  a  blade  of  grass.  After 
duly  reflecting  on  this,  with  the  aid  to  be  derived 
from  Mr.  Wallace's  suggestion  above  cited,  they 
will  perhaps  be  able  to  comprehend  how  it  is  that 
the  Darwinian,  without  ignoring  the  immensity 
of  this  difference,  seeks,  nevertheless,  by  working 
hypotheses  to  bring  it  out  of  the  region  of  bar- 
ren mystery  into  that  of  scientific  interpretation. 
When  they  have  once  got  this  through  their 
heads,  such  trash  as  Dr.  Bateman's  will  no  longer 
get  published. 

November,  1878. 


IV. 

DR.   BT7CHNER   ON  DARWINISM.1 

THE  words  "  materialist "  and  "  atheist  "  have 
been  so  long  employed  as  death-dealing  epithets 
in  the  hands  of  hard-hitting  theological  controver- 
sialists that  it  seems  hardly  kind  in  us  to  begin 
the  notice  of  a  somewhat  meritorious  book  by 
saying  that  it  is  the  work  of  a  materialist  and  an 
atheist.  We  are  reassured,  however,  by  the  re- 
flection that  these  are  just  the  titles  which  the 
author  himself  delights  in  claiming.  Dr.  Biich- 
ner  would  regard  it  as  a  slur  upon  his  mental  fit- 
ness for  philosophizing  if  we  were  to  refuse  him 
the  title  of  atheist ;  and  "  materialism "  is  the 
name  of  that  which  is  as  dear  to  him  as  "  liberty  " 
was  dear  to  the  followers  of  Danton  and  Mirabeau. 
Accordingly,  in  applying  these  terms  to  Dr.  Biich- 
ner,  they  become  divested  of  their  old  opprobri- 
ousness,  and  are  enabled  to  discharge  the  proper 

1  Man  in  the  Past,  Present,  and  Future.  A  Popular  Account  of 
the  Results  of  Recent  Scientific  Research  as  regards  the  Origin,  Posi- 
tion, and  Prospects  of  the  Human  Race.  From  the  German  of  Dr.  L. 
Biichner ,  by  W.  S.  Dallas,  F.  L.  S.  London,  1872. 


Dr.  Bilchner  on  Darwinism.  51 

function  of  descriptive  epithets  by  serving  as  ab- 
stract symbols  for  certain  closely  allied  modes  of 
thinking.  Considered  in  this  purely  philosoph- 
ical way,  an  "  atheist "  is  one  to  whom  the  time- 
honoured  notion  of  Deity  has  become  a  meaning- 
less and  empty  notion ;  and  a  "  materialist "  is 
one  who  regards  the  story  of  the  universe  as  com- 
pletely and  satisfactorily  told  when  it  is  wholly 
told  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion,  without  ref- 
erence to  any  ultimate  underlying  Existence,  of 
which  matter  and  motion  are  only  the  phenome- 
nal manifestations.  To  Dr.  Biichner's  mind  the 
criticism  of  the  various  historic  conceptions  of 
godhood  has  not  only  stripped  these  conceptions 
of  their  anthropomorphic  vestments,  but  has  left 
them  destitute  of  any  validity  or  solid  content 
whatever ;  and  in  similar  wise  he  is  satisfied  with 
describing  the  operations  of  nature,  alike  in  the 
physical  and  psychical  worlds,  as  merely  the  re- 
distributions of  matter  and  motion,  without  seek- 
ing to  answer  the  inquiry  as  to  what  matter  and 
motion  are,  or  how  they  can  be  supposed  to  exist 
as  such  at  all,  save  in  reference  to. the  mind  by 
which  they  are  cognized. 

Starting,  then,  upon  this  twofold  basis,  —  that 
the  notion  of  God  is  a  figment,  and  that  matter  in 
motion  is  the  only  real  existence,  —  Dr.  Biichner 


52  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

seeks  in  the  present  work  to  interpret  the  facts 
disclosed  by  scientific  induction  concerning  the 
origin  of  man,  his  psychical  nature,  his  history,  and 
his  destiny  as  a  denizen  of  the  earth.  With  ref- 
erence to  these  topics  Dr.  Buchner  is  a  follower  of 
Mr.  Darwin,  especially  of  Mr.  Darwin  as  amended 
by  Professor  Haeckel.  His  book,  considered  on 
its  scientific  merits  only,  and  without  regard  to 
its  philosophic  bearings,  is  a  popular  exposition 
of  the  Darwinian  theory  as  applied  to  the  origin 
of  the  human  race.  Regarded  simply  as  a  sci- 
entific exposition,  conducted  on  these  fundamen- 
tal principles,  there  is  in  the  book  little  which 
calls  for  criticism.  Dr.  Buchner  has  studied  the 
Darwinian  theory  very  thoroughly,  and  his  state- 
ments in  illustration  of  it  are  for  the  most  part 
very  accurate,  showing,  so  far  as  this  portion  of 
the  work  is  concerned,  the  evidences  of  a  truly 
scientific  spirit.  He  is  as  lucid,  moreover,  as 
Taine  or  Haeckel,  and  nothing  is  wanting  to  one's 
entire  enjoyment  of  his  book,  save  that  modesty 
in  the  presence  of  the  limitless  workings  of  nature 
in  which  Dr.  Buchner  is  far  more  deficient  than 
even  Taine  or  Haeckel. 

But  from  the  scientific  point  of  view  it  is  not 
necessary  for  us  to  discuss  Dr.  Biichner's  book,  as 
it  is  not  an  original  scientific  treatise,  but  only  a 


Dr.  Biichner  on  Darwinism.  53 

lucid  exposition  of  the  speculations  and  discover- 
ies of  other  students  of  nature.  When  we  have 
described  it  as  in  the  main  lucid  and  accurate,  we 
have  given  it  all  the  praise  which  as  a  scientific 
exposition  it  can  legitimately  claim  to  have  earned. 
When  we  consider  it  as  a  contribution  to  philoso- 
phy, when  we  ask  the  question  whether  it  can  be 
of  any  use  to  us  in  solving  the  great  problem  of 
our  relations  to  the  universe  in  which  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being,  we  must  set  down  quite 
another  verdict.  As  an  exposition  of  Darwinism, 
the  work,  though  by  no  means  all  that  could  be 
desired,  is  still  an  admirable  work.  But  as  a  vin- 
dication of  the  atheistic  and  materialistic  way  of 
explaining  the  universe,  it  is  an  utter  failure.  To 
suppose  that  the  establishment  of  the  Darwinian 
theory  of  man's  origin  is  equivalent  to  the  vin- 
dication of  materialism  and  atheism  is  a  mistake 
of  Dr.  Biichner's  which  would  be  very  absurd 
were  it  not  so  very  serious.  Mr.  Darwin's  theory 
only  supposes  that  a  certain  aggregate  of  phe- 
nomena now  existing  has  had  for  its  antecedent  a 
certain  other  and  different  aggregate  of  phenom- 
ena. The  entire  victory  of  this  theory  will  only 
—  like  the  previous  victory  of  Newton's  theory 
over  the  doctrine  of  guiding  angels,  espoused  even 
by  Kepler  —  assure  us  that  in  the  entire  series  of 


54  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

phenomenal  manifestations  of  which  the  world  is 
made  up  there  is  no  miraculous  break,  no  con- 
juring, no  freak  of  the  magician.  And  to  this 
conclusion  all  modern  scientific  inquiry  has  long 
been  leading  us.  It  needed  no  Dr.  Biichner  to 
tell  us  this. 

All  this,  however,  cannot  stir  us  one  inch  to- 
ward the  philosophic  doctrine  of  which  Dr.  Biich- 
ner is  the  advocate.  Dr.  Biichner  shares  with 
the  theologians  whom  he  combats  the  error  of 
supposing  that  godhood  cannot  be  manifested  in 
a  regular  series  of  phenomena,  but  only  in  fortui- 
tous miraculous  surprises.  When  he  has  proved 
that  mankind  was  originated  through  the  ordi- 
nary processes  of  paternity  from  some  lower  form 
of  life,  he  thinks  he  has  overturned  the  belief  in 
God,  whereas  he  has  really  only  overturned  a 
crude  and  barbarous  conception  of  the  way  in 
which  God  acts.  And  so  when  it  is  shown  that 
all  the  phenomena  of  the  world  can  be  explained 
in  conformity  to  a  doctrine  of  evolution  which 
originated  in  the  study  of  material  phenomena, 
our  author  thinks  that  the  ground-theorem  of  ma- 
terialism is  forever  established  ;  quite  forgetting 
that  what  we  call  material  phenomena  are,  after 
all  said  and  done,  nothing  but  expressions  for  cer- 
tain changes  occurring  in  a  complicated  series  of 
psychical  states. 


Dr.  Biichner  on  Darwinism.  55 

In  short,  no  matter  how  far  the  scientific  inter- 
pretation of  nature  may  be  carried,  it  can  reveal 
to  us  only  the  fact  that  the  workings  of  the  ulti- 
mate Existence  of  which  Nature  is  the  phenome- 
nal expression  are  different  from  what  they  were 
supposed  to  be  by  uninstructed  thinkers  of  former 
times.  And  no  matter  how  far  we  may  carry  the 
interpretation  of  natural  phenomena  in  terms  of 
matter  and  motion,  we  cannot  escape  the  conclu- 
sion that  matter  and  motion,  as  phenomenal  man- 
ifestations, can  have  no  genuine  existence  save  as 
the  correlatives  of  a  cognizing  mind.  To  treat 
of  the  universe  of  phenomena  without  the  nou- 
menon  God  is  nonsense  ;  and  likewise  to  treat  of 
matter  (a  congeries  of  attributes)  without  refer- 
ence to  the  mind  in  whose  cognizance  alone  can 
attributes  have  any  existence  is  also  nonsense. 
However  praiseworthy,  therefore,  Dr.  Biichner's 
book  may  be  as  an  exposition  of  a  particular  set 
of  scientific  doctrines,  we  think  it  can  have  but 
small  value  as  a  contribution  to  philosophy.  Its 
author  is  one  of  those  men  who  see  very  distinctly 
what  they  really  see,  but  who  in  reality  see  but  a 
very  little  way  before  them. 

November,  1872. 


V. 

A   CKUMB   FOB   THE   "MODERN   SYMPOSIUM." 

No  one  to  whom  the  question  of  man's  destiny 
is  a  matter  of  grave  speculative  concern  can  have 
read,  without  serious  and  solemn  interest,  the  dis- 
cussion lately  called  forth  in  England  by  Mr. 
Frederic  Harrison's  essay  on  "  The  Soul  and  Fu- 
ture Life."  l  In  no  way,  perhaps,  could  the  dark- 
ness of  incomprehensibility  which  enshrouds  the 
problem  be  more  thoroughly  demonstrated  than 
by  the  candid  presentation  of  so  many  diverse 
views  by  ten  writers  of  very  different  degrees  of 
philosophic  profundity,  but  all  of  them  able  and 
fair-minded,  and  all  of  them  actuated  —  each  in 
his  own  way — by  a  spirit  of  religious  faith.  This 
last  clause  will  no  doubt  seem  startling,  if  not 
paradoxical,  to  many  who  have  not  yet  come  to 
realize  how  true  it  is  that  there  is  often  more  real 
faith  in  honest  scepticism  than  in  languid  or  tim- 

l  "A  Modern  Symposium,"  The  Nineteenth  Century,  1877,  i.  623, 
832;  ii.  329,  497.  The  articles  are  all  reproduced  in  America,  in  The 
Popular  Science  Monthly  Supplement,  Nos.  1,  2,  6,  and  7,  and  have 
been  published  in  book  form  at  Toronto,  Canada.  1878. 


A  Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium."     57 

orous  assent  to  a  half-understood  creed.  But  no 
paradox  is  intended.  I  believe  that  there  is  as 
much  of  the  true  essence  of  religion  —  the  spirit 
of  trust  in  God  that  has  ever  borne  men  triumph- 
antly through  the  perplexities  and  woes  of  the 
world,  and  the  possession  of  which,  in  some  de- 
gree, by  most  of  its  members,  is  the  chief  differ- 
ential attribute  of  the  human  race  —  I  believe 
that  there  is  as  much  of  this  spirit  exhibited  in 
the  remarks  of  Professor  Huxley  as  in  those  of 
Lord  Blachford.  In  the  serenity  of  mood  with 
which  the  great  scientific  sceptic  awaits  the  end, 
whatever  it  may  prove  to  be ;  in  the  unflinching 
integrity  with  which  his  intellect  refuses  to  enter- 
tain theories  that  do  not  seem  properly  accred- 
ited ;  in  the  glorious  energy  with  which,  accepting 
the  world  as  it  is,  he  performs  with  all  his  might 
and  main  the  good  work  for  which  he  is  by  na- 
ture fitted  —  in  all  this  I  can  see  the  evidence  of 
a  trust  in  God  no  less  real  than  that  which  makes 
it  possible  for  his  noble  Christian  friend  to  "  be- 
lieve because  he  is  told."  I  am  sure  that  I  un- 
derstand Professor  Huxley's  attitude ;  I  think  I 
understand  Lord  Blachford's,  also ;  and  it  seems 
to  me  that  the  difference  between  the  two  atti- 
tudes, wide  as  it  is,  is  stiR  a  purely  intellectual 
difference.  It  has  its  root  in  differently  blended 


58  Darwinism  and  Other  Es*ays. 

capacities  of  judgment  and  insight,  and  in  no 
wise  fundamentally  affects  the  religious  charac- 
ter. 

It  will  be  well  for  the  world  when  this  lesson 
has  been  thoroughly  learned,  so  as  to  leave  no 
further  room  for  misapprehension.  That  great 
progress  has  already  been  made  in  learning  it  we 
need  no  other  proof  than  the  mere  existence  of 
this  "  Modern  Symposium  "  on  the  subject  of  a 
future  life.  Three  centuries  ago  it  would  have 
been  in  strict  accordance  with  propriety  for  the 
ten  disputants  to  have  adjourned  their  symposium 
to  some  ecclesiastical  court,  preparatory  to  a  final 
settlement  at  Smithfield.  One  century  ago  there 
would  have  been  wholesale  vituperation,  attended 
with  more  or  less  imputation  of  unworthy  mo- 
tives, and  very  likely  there  would  have  been  some 
Jesuitical  paltering  with  truth.  To-day,  however, 
the  tremendous  question  is  discussed  on  all  sides 
—  alike  by  Protestant  and  Catholic,  by  transcen- 
dentalist,  sceptic,  and  positivist — with  evident 
candour  and  praiseworthy  courtesy  ;  for,  in  spite 
of  Professor  Huxley's  keen-edged  wit  and  Mr. 
Harrison's  fervent  heat,  there  is  no  one  so  fortu- 
nate as  to  know  these  gentlemen  who  does  not 
know  that  manly  tenderness  and  good  feeling 
are  by  no  means  incompatible  with  the  ability 


A  Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium."    59 

to  exchange  good  hard  blows  in  a  fair  English 
fight. 

It  is  with  some  diffidence  that  I  venture  to  add 
my  voice  to  a  conversation  carried  on  by  such 
accomplished  speakers,  but  the  present  seems  to 
be  a  proper  occasion  for  calling  attention  to  some 
of  the  misconceptions  which  ordinarily  cluster 
around  the  treatment  of  questions  relating  to  the 
soul  and  a  future  life.  In  thus  entering  upon  the 
discussion,  I  do  not  feel  called  upon  to  defend  any 
particular  solution  of  the  main  question  at  issue. 
Going  by  the  "  light  of  Nature  "  alone  —  to  use 
the  old-fashioned  phrase  —  it  will  be  generally 
conceded  that  the  problem  of  a  future  life  is  so 
abstruse  and  complicated  that  one  is  quite  excus- 
able for  refraining  from  a  dogmatic  treatment  of 
it.  Nay,  one  is  not  only  excusable,  one  is  morally 
bound  not  to  dogmatize  unless  one  has  a  firmer 
basis  to  stand  on  than  any  of  us  are  likely  to 
find  for  some  time  to  come.  We  may  entertain 
hypotheses  in  private,  but  we  are  hardly  entitled 
to  urge  them  upon  our  friends  until  we  feel  as- 
sured, in  the  first  place,  that  we  have  duly  fath- 
omed the  conditions  requisite  for  a  rational  treat- 
ment of  the  problem. 

It  would  appear  that  some  of  the  participators 
in  the  "  Modern  Symposium  "  have  not  sufficiently 


60  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

heeded  this  obvious  maxim  of  philosophic  cau- 
tion. Loose  talk  about  "  materialism  "  is  apt  to 
imply  loose  thinking  as  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  metaphysical  relations  of  body  and  soul  are 
to  be  apprehended.  Perhaps  Mr.  Harrison,  as  a 
positivist,  will  say  that  he  has  nothing  to  do  with 
apprehending  the  metaphysical  relations  between 
body  and  soul ;  but,  however  that  may  be,  there 
is  some  laxity  of  thought  exhibited  in  charging 
Professor  Huxley  with  "  materialism  "  because 
he  speaks  of  "  building  up  a  physical  theory  of 
moral  phenomena."  To  try  to  explain  conscience, 
with  metaphysical  strictness,  as  a  result  of  the 
grouping  of  material  molecules,  is  something 
which  I  am  sure  Professor  Huxley  would  never 
think  of  doing ;  but,  unless  I  am  entirely  mis- 
taken on  this  point,  there  is  no  ground  for  Mr. 
Harrison's  charge  of  materialism. 

To  see  Professor  Huxley  charged  with  mate- 
rialism, and  in  a  reproachful  tone  withal,  by  a 
positivist  who  does  not  acknowledge  the  existence 
of  a  soul,  save  in  some  extremely  Pickwickian 
sense,  is  a  strange,  not  to  say  comical,  spectacle. 
**  What  next  ?"  one  is  inclined  to  ask.  Positivists 
are  apt  to  have,  indeed,  an  ecclesiastical  style  of 
expression,  and  one  would  almost  think,  from 
his  manner,  that  Mr.  Harrison  was  making  com- 


A   Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium.''1     61 

mon  cause  with  theologians.  Into  the  explana- 
tion of  this  curious  phenomenon  I  cannot  here 
profitably  enter.  The  reasons  for  it  are  some- 
what recondite,  and  are  subtly  linked  with  the 
general  incapacity,  under  which  positivists  seem 
to  labour,  of  understanding  the  real  import  of  the 
doctrine  of  evolution.  However  this  may  be,  the 
impression  that  the  group  of  opinions  represented 
by  Mr.  Spencer  and  Professor  Huxley  are  ma- 
terialistic is  so  widely  spread  that  it  is  worth 
our  while  to  spend  a  few  moments  in  ascertaining 
what  materialism  is,  and  how  far  it  is  involved 
in  recent  scientific  speculations.  Is  the  present 
drift  of  scientific  thought  really  setting  toward 
materialism,  or  is  it  not  ? 

No  epithets  are  more  familiarly  used  nowadays 
than  "  materialism  "  and  "  materialist,"  but  their 
ordinary  function  is  vituperative  rather  than  log- 
ical. As  vague  terms  of  abuse  they  are  hurled 
about  with  a  zeal  that  may  be  praiseworthy,  but 
with  an  indiscreetness  that  is  scarcely  commend- 
able, being  aimed,  as  often  as  not,  at  the  heads 
of  writers  who  doubt  or  deny  the  substantial  ex- 
istence of  matter  altogether !  Such  blunders 
show  (among  other  things)  how  difficult  meta- 
physical studies  are,  and  indicate  that  a  little 
more  care  expended  upon  analysis  and  definition 


62  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

would  not  be  thrown  away.  It  is  true  that  some- 
thing has  already  been  said  upon  this  point  — 
enough,  one  would  think,  to  obviate  the  necessity 
of  turning  back  to  slay  the  resuscitated  ghosts  of 
thrice-slaughtered  misconceptions.  On  the  char- 
acter of  materialism  as  a  philosophical  hypothesis, 
Mr.  Spencer  has  been  tolerably  explicit.  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  has  summed  up  .the  case  with  his 
customary  felicity,  at  the  close  of  that  famous 
Edinburgh  lecture  which  everybody  is  supposed 
to  have  read.1  In  my  work  on  "  Cosmic  Philoso- 
phy," I  have  devoted  a  very  plain-spoken  chapter 
to  the  subject.  Nevertheless,  as  Mr.  Freeman 
says,  it  is  not  a  bad  plan,  when  you  have  once  got 
hold  of  a  truth,  to  keep  hammering  it  into  peo- 
ple's heads  on  all  occasions,  even  at  the  risk  of 
being  voted  a  tedious  bore  or  a  victim  of  crotch- 
ets. We  live  in  a  hurried  and  not  over-intelli- 
gent world,  wherein  the  wariest  of  us  do  not 
always  pay  due  heed  to  what  we  are  told,  and 
the  keenest  do  not  always  divine  its  sense ;  but, 
after  we  have  heard  it  repeated  fifty  times  that 
Alfred  was  an  Englishman,  and  Charles  the  Great 
was  not  a  Frenchman,  we  may  perhaps  succeed 
in  waking  up  to  the  historical  import  of  such 
statements.  In  this  pithy  though  somewhat  cyn- 

1  "The  Physical  Basis  of  Life,"  Lay  Sermons,  p.  160. 


A  Crumb  for  the  "Modern  Symposium."     63 

ical  suggestion  I  shall  seek  an  excuse  for  recur- 
ring here  to  what  I  have  said  more  than  once 
already.1 

From  one  point  of  view  materialism  may  be 
characterized  as  a  system  of  opinions  based  on  the 
assumption  that  matter  is  the  only  real  existence. 
On  this  view  the  phenomena  of  conscious  intelli- 
gence are  supposed  to  be  explicable,  as  momentary 
results  of  fleeting  collocations  of  material  parti- 
cles, as  when  a  discharge  between  two  or  more 
cells  of  grey  cerebral  tissue  is  accompanied  by 
what  we  call  a  thought.  It  requires  but  little 
effort  to  see  that  materialism,  as  thus  defined, 
does  not  comport  well  with  the  most  advanced 
philosophy  of  our  time.  Materialism  of  this  sort 
has  plenty  of  defenders,  no  doubt,  but  not  among 
those  who  are  skilled  in  philosophy.  The  un- 
trained thinker,  who  believes  that  the  group  of 
phenomena  constituting  the  table  on  which  he  is 
writing  has  an  objective  existence  independent  of 
consciousness,  will  probably  find  no  difficulty  in 
accepting  this  sort  of  materialism.  If  he  is  de- 
voted to  the  study  of  nervous  physiology,  he  will 
be  very  likely  to  adopt  some  such  crude  notion, 
and  to  proclaim  it  as  zealously  as  if  it  were  a  very 
important  truth,  calculated  to  promote,  in  many 

1  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  ii.79,  432-451.  The  Unseen  World, 
41,53. 


64  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ways,  the  welfare  of  mankind.  The  science  of 
such  a  writer  is  very  likely  to  be  sound  and  valu- 
able, and  what  he  tells  us  about  woorara-poison 
and  frogs'  legs,  and  acute  mania,  will  probably  be 
worthy  of  serious  attention.  But  with  his  philos- 
ophy it  is  quite  otherwise.  When  he  has  pro- 
ceeded as  far  in  subjective  analysis  as  he  has  in 
the  study  of  nerves,  our  materialist  will  find  that 
it  was  demonstrated,  a  century  ago,  that  the  group 
of  phenomena  constituting  the  table  has  no  real 
existence  whatever  in  a  philosophical  sense.  For 
by  "  reality  "  in  philosophy  is  meant  "  persistence 
irrespective  of  particular '  conditions,"  and  the 
group  of  phenomena  constituting  a  table  persists 
only  in  so  far  as  it  is  held  together  in  cognition. 
Take  away  the  cognizing  mind,  and  the  colour, 
form,  position,  and  hardness  of  the  table  —  all  the 
attributes,  in  short,  that  characterize  it  as  matter 
—  at  once  disappear.  That  something  remains 
we  may  grant,  but  this  something  is  unknown  and 
unknowable  :  it  is  certainly  not  the  group  of  phe- 
nomena constituting  the  table.  Apart  from  con- 
sciousness there  are  no  such  things  as  colour,  form, 
position,  or  hardness,  and  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  matter.  This  great  truth,  established  by 
Berkeley,  is  the  very  foundation  of  modern  scien- 
tific philosophy;  and,  though  it  has  been  misap- 


A  Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium."     65 

prehended  by  many,  no  one  has  ever  refuted  it, 
and  it.  is  not  likely  that  any  one  ever  will.  Con- 
cerning the  value  of  Berkeley's  idealism,  when 
taken  with  all  its  ontological  implications,  there 
is  plenty  of  room  for  disagreement ;  but  his  psy- 
chological analysis  of  the  relation  of  consciousness 
to  the  external  world  is  of  such  fundamental  im- 
portance that,  until  one  has  mastered  it,  one  has 
no  right  to  speak  on  philosophical  questions.  It 
is  not  unfair  to  say  that  materialists,  as  a  rule, 
have  not  mastered  the  Berkeleian  psychology,  or 
given  much  attention  to  it.  In  general,  their  at- 
tention has  been  too  much  occupied  with  fila- 
ments and  ganglia,  to  the  neglect  of  that  close 
subjective  analysis  which  they  unwisely  stigmatize 
as  dreamy  metaphysic.  Hence,  on  the  whole, 
materialism  does  not  represent  anything  of  pri- 
mary importance  in  modern  philosophy ;  it  repre- 
sents rather  the  crude  speculation  of  that  large 
and  increasing  number  of  people  who  have  ac- 
quired some  knowledge  of  the  truths  of  physical 
science,  without  possessing  sufficient  subtlety  to 
apprehend  their  metaphysical  bearings.  Biichner, 
the  favorite  spokesman  of  this  class  of  people, 
occupies  a  position  precisely  similar  to  that  of 
Lamettrie  in  the  last  century,  and  will,  no- doubt, 
in  the  days  of  our  grandchildren  be  as  thoroughly 


66  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

forgotten  as  his  predecessor,  while  the  same  bar- 
ren platitudes  will  be  echoed  by  some  new  writer 
in  the  scientific  phraseology  then  current. 

But  there  is  another  way  of  looking  at  material- 
ism which  makes  it  for  a  moment  seem  important, 
and  which  serves  to  explain,  though  not  to  justify, 
the  alarm  with  which  many  excellent  people  con- 
template the  progress  of  modern  science.  A  con- 
spicuous characteristic  of  materialism  is  the  en- 
deavour to  interpret  mind  as  a  product  —  as  the 
transient  result  of  a  certain  specific  aggregation 
of  matter.  To  a  person  familiar  with  post-Berke- 
leian  psychology  it  seems  clear  that  such  an  en- 
deavour is  quite  hopeless,  and  that  no  such  in- 
terpretation of  mind  can  ever  be  made.  But  a 
multitude  of  very  respectable  readers,  who  are 
not  so  profoundly  conversant  with  metaphysics  as 
Spencer  and  Huxley,  have  taken  it  into  their 
heads  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  is  advancing 
with  rapid  strides  towards  just  such  an  interpre- 
tation of  mind ;  and  hence  it  is  quite  common  to 
allude  to  Spencer  and  Huxley  as  "  materialists," 
which,  to  my  mind,  is  very  much  as  if  one  were 
to  allude  to  Mr.  Wendell  Phillips  as  a  distin- 
guished pro-slavery  orator. 

The  mistake,  however,  is  not  unnatural  when 
we  consider  its  causes.  In  point  of  fact  the  ter- 


A   Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium."    67 

minology  of  science  is  thoroughly  materialistic, 
though  probably  not  more  so  than  the  language 
of  ordinary  discourse.  It  is  intensely  material- 
istic for  us  to  speak  of  the  table  as  if  it  had  some 
objective  existence,  independent  of  a  cognizing 
mind ;  and  yet,  in  common  parlance,  we  invari- 
ably allude  to  the  table  in  terms  which  imply  or 
suggest  such  an  independent  existence.  Just  so 
in  theoretical  science.  In  describing  the  develop- 
ment of  life  upon  the  earth's  surface,  when  we 
say  that  consciousness  appeared  on  the  scene  pari 
passu  with  the  appearance  of  nervous  systems,  it 
is  not  strange  if  we  are  supposed  to  mean  that 
consciousness  is  somehow  produced  by  a  peculiar 
arrangement  of  nervous  tissue  —  that  "  spirit "  is 
in  some  way  or  other  evolved  from  "  matter." 

In  reality,  however,  nothing  of  the  kind  is  in- 
tended. Laxity  of  speech  is  mainly  responsible 
for  the  misapprehension.  The  evolutionist,  in 
describing  the  course  of  life  upon  the  earth,  is 
simply  imparting  to  us,  so  far  as  he  is  able,  a 
piece  of  historical  information.  Through  various 
complex  and  indirect  processes  of  inference,  he 
has  become  capable  of  telling  us,  with  some  prob- 
ability, how  things  would  have  looked  to  us  in 
the  remote  past  if  we  had  been  there  to  see.  He 
tells  us  that  if  we  had  been  on  hand  in  palaeozoic 


68  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

ages  we  should  not  have  seen  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness  manifested  in  connection  with  a 
fragment  of  porphyry,  or  a  handful  of  sand,  or  a 
tree-fern,  any  more  than  we  see  such  things  to* 
day,  but  only  in  connection  with  animals  endowed 
with  nerves.  In  thus  extending  the  results  of 
present  experience  to  the  past,  the  element  of 
sequence  in  time  is  introduced  in  such  a  way  as 
to  suggest  the  causation  of  consciousness  by  nerve- 
matter.  Nevertheless,  the  assertion  of  the  evolu- 
tionist is  purely  historical  in  its  import,  and  in- 
cludes no  hypothesis  whatever  as  to  the  ultimate 
origin  of  consciousness ;  least  of  all  is  it  intended 
to  imply  that  consciousness  was  evolved  from  mat- 
ter. It  is  riot  only  inconceivable  how  mind  should 
have  been  produced  from  matter,  but  it  is  incon- 
ceivable that  it  should  have  been  produced  from 
matter,  unless  matter  possessed  already  the  attri- 
butes of  mind  in  embryo,  —  an  alternative  which 
it  is  difficult  to  invest  with  any  real  meaning.  The 
problem  is  altogether  too  abstruse  to  be  solved 
with  our  present  resources.  But  it  is  curious  to 
hear  honest  theologians  gravely  urging  against 
Mr.  Spencer  that  you  cannot  obtain  mind  from 
the  "primordial  fire-mist"  unless  the  germs  of 
mind  were  somehow  present  already.  I  hope  I 
am  not  accrediting  Mr.  Spencer  with  any  opinion 


A   Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium"     69 

he  does  not  hold,  and  I  speak  subject  to  correc- 
tion ;  but,  if  my  memory  serves  me,  I  have  more 
than  once  heard  him  in  conversation  urging  this 
very  objection  to  any  materialistic  interpretation 
of  evolution.  His  wonderfully  subtle  chapter  on 
"  The  Substance  of  Mind  " l  contains,  as  I  under- 
stand it,  the  same  argument ;  but  it  is  easy  to 
miss  an  author's  meaning  sometimes  when  the 
point  expounded  is  so  formidably  abstract  and 
general. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  we  are  not  helped  much  by 
supposing  the  germs  of  mind  to  have  been  some- 
how latent  in  the  primeval  nebula.  The  notion 
is  too  vague  to  be  of  any  use.  The  only  point  on 
which  we  can  be  clear  is  that  no  mere  collocation 
of  material  atoms  could  ever  have  evolved  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness.  Beyond  this  we  can- 
not go.  We  are  confronted  with  an  insoluble 
metaphysical  problem.  Of  the  origin  of  mind  we 
can  give  no  scientific  account,  but  only  an  histor- 
ical one.  We  can  say  when  (i.  e.,  in  connection 
with  what  material  circumstances)  mind  came 
upon  the  scene  of  evolution ;  but  we  can  neither 
say  whence,  nor  how,  nor  why.  In  just  the  same 

l  Principles  of  Psychology,  second  edition,  ii.  145-162.  [On  refer- 
ring this  point  to  Mr.  Spencer,  he  desires  me  to  add  that  I  am  quite 
correct  in  my  recollection  of  his  conversations  and  in  my  interpreta- 
tion of  his  position.] 


70  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

way  we  see  to-day  that  inind  appears  in  connec- 
tion with  certain  material  circumstances,  but  we 
cannot  see  how  or  why  it  is  so.  Least  of  all  can 
we  say  that  the  material  circumstances  produce 
mind ;  on  the  contrary,  we  can  assert  most  pos- 
itively that  they  do  not. 

The  proof  of  this  rather  dogmatic  assertion  is 
to  be  found  hi  the  careful  study  of  that  very  doc- 
trine of  the  "  correlation  of  forces  "  which  superfi- 
cial materialists  have  exultingly  claimed  as  their 
own,  and  which  their  superficial  opponents  have 
foolishly  conceded  to  them.  We  have  been  wont 
to  hear  this  doctrine  —  the  crowning  achievement 
of  modern  science  —  decried  as  lending  support  to 
materialism.  If  this  were  really  so,  we  anti-ma- 
terialists would  have  a  poor  case,  for  the  doctrine 
in  question  is  established  beyond  all  possibility  of 
refutation.  But  it  is  not  really  so.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  final  and  irretrievable  discomfiture  of 
materialism  follows  as  a  direct  corollary  from  the 
discovery  of  the  correlation  of  forces. 

By  the  loose  phrase,  "  correlation  of  forces," 
what  is  strictly  meant  is  the  transformation  of 
one  kind  of  motion  into  another  kind.  What 
used  to  be  called  the  "physical  forces"  —  such  as 
light,  heat,  magnetism,  and  electricity  —  are  now 
known  to  be  peculiar  kinds  of  motion  among  the 


A  Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium"     71 

imperceptible  molecules  of  which  perceptible  bod- 
ies are  composed.  The  discovery  of  the  "  correla- 
tion of  forces  "  was  the  discovery  of  the  fact  that 
any  one  of  these  kinds  of  molecular  motion  is  con- 
stantly liable  to  be  transformed  into  any  one  of 
the  other  kinds,  or,  now  and  then,  into  the  molar 
motion  of  a  perceptible  body.  Heat  is  all  the 
time  being  converted  into  light,  or  into  electric- 
ity, or  into  the  peculiar  kind  of  undulatory  mo- 
tion known  as  "  nerve-force  "  —  and  vice  versa. 
And  the  law  of  the  correlation  is  that,  when  any 
one  of  these  species  of  motion  appears,  an  equiva- 
lent amount  of  some  other  species  disappears  in 
producing  it.  Throughout  the  world  the  sum-to- 
tal of  motion  is  ever  the  same,  but  its  distribution 
into  heat-waves,  light- waves,  nerve- waves,  etc., 
varies  from  moment  to  moment. 

Let  us  now  apply  these  principles  to  the  case  of 
an  organism  such  as  the  human  body.  All  of  the 
"  force  "  —  i.  e.,  capacity  of  motion  —  present  at 
any  moment  in  the  human  body  is  derived  from  the 
food  that  we  eat  and  the  air  that  we  breathe.  As 
food  is  turned  into  oxygenated  blood  and  assimi- 
lated with  the  various  tissues  of  the  body  —  which 
themselves  represent  previously-assimilated  food 
—  the  molecular  movements  of  the  food-material 
become  variously  combined  into  molecular  move- 


72  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ments  in  tissue  —  in  muscular  tissue,  in  adipose, 
in  cellular,  and  in  nerve  tissue,  and  so  on.  Every 
undulation  that  takes  place  among  the  molecules 
of  a  nerve  represents  some  simpler  form  of  molec- 
ular motion  contained  in  food  that  has  been  as- 
similated ;  and,  for  every  given  quantity  of  the 
former  kind  of  motion  that  appears,  an  equivalent 
quantity  of  the  latter  kind  disappears  in  producing 
it.  And  so  we  may  go  on,  keeping  the  account 
strictly  balanced,  until  we  reach  the  peculiar  dis- 
charge of  undulatory  motion  between  cerebral 
ganglia  that  uniformly  accompanies  a  feeling  or 
state  of  consciousness. 

What  now  occurs  ?  Along  with  this  peculiar 
form  of  undulatory  motion  there  occurs  a  feeling 
—  the  primary  element  of  a  thought  or  of  an 
emotion.  But  does  the  motion  produce  the  feel- 
ing, in  the  same  sense  that  heat  produces  light  ? 
Does  a  given  quantity  of  motion  disappear,  to  be 
replaced  by  an  equivalent  quantity  of  feeling? 
By  no  means.  The  nerve-motion,  in  disappear- 
ing, is  simply  distributed  into  other  nerve-mo- 
tions in  various  parts  of  the  body,  and  these  other 
nerve-motions,  in  their  turn,  become  variously 
metamorphosed  into  motions  of  contraction  in 
muscles,  motions  of  secretion  in  glands,  motions 
of  assimilation  in  tissues  generally,  or  into  yet 


A   Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium."     73 

other  nerve-motions.  Nowhere  is  there  such  a 
thing  as  the  metamorphosis  of  motion  into  feeling 
or  of  feeling  into  motion. 

Of  course  I  do  not  mean  that  the  circuit,  as  thus 
described,  has  ever  been  experimentally  traced,  or 
that  it  can  be  experimentally  traced.  What  I 
mean  is  that,  if  the  law  of  the  "correlation  of 
forces  "  is  to  be  applied  at  all  to  the  physical  pro- 
cesses which  go  on  within  the  living  organism,  we 
are  of  necessity  bound  to  render  our  whole  ac- 
count in  terms  of  motion  that  can  be  quanti- 
tatively measured.  Once  admit  into  the  circuit 
of  metamorphosis  some  element  —  such  as  feel- 
ing—  that  does  not  allow  of  quantitative  meas- 
urement, and  the  correlation  can  no  longer  be  es- 
tablished ;  we  are  landed  at  once  in  absurdity  and 
contradiction.  So  far  as  the  correlation  of  forces 
has  anything  to  do  with  it,  the  entire  circle  of 
transmutation,  from  the  lowest  physico-chemical 
motion  all  the  way  up  to  the  highest  nerve-motion 
and  all  the  way  down  again  to  the  lowest  physico- 
chemical  motion,  must  be  described  in  physical 
terms,  and  no  account  whatever  can  be  taken  of 
any  such  thing  as  feeling  or  consciousness. 

On  such  grounds  as  these  I  maintain  that  feel- 
ing is  not  a  product  of  nerve-motion  in  anything 
like  the  sense  that  light  is  sometimes  a  product 


74  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

of  heat,  or  that  friction-electricity  is  a  product  of 
sensible  motion.  Instead  of  entering  into  the  dy- 
namic circuit  of  correlated  physical  motions,  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  stand  outside  as  ut- 
terly alien  and  disparate  phenomena.  They  stand 
outside,  but  uniformly  parallel  to  that  segment 
of  the  circuit  which  consists  of  neural  undula- 
tions. The  relation  between  what  goes  on  in  con- 
sciousness and  what  goes  on  simultaneously  in  the 
nervous  system  may  best  be  described  as  a  re- 
lation of  uniform  concomitance.  I  agree  with 
Professor  Huxley  and  Mr.  Harrison  that  along 
with  every  act  of  consciousness  there  goes  a  mo- 
lecular change  in  the  substance  of  the  brain,  in- 
volving a  waste  of  tissue.  This  is  not  materialism, 
nor  does  it  alter  a  whit  the  position  in  which  we 
were  left  by  common  sense  before  nervous  physi- 
ology was  ever  heard  of.  Everybody  knows  that, 
so  long  as  we  live  on  the  earth,  the  activity  of 
mind  as  a  whole  is  accompanied  by  the  activity 
of  brain  as  a  whole.  What  nervous  physiology 
teaches  is  simply  that  each  particular  mental  act 
is  accompanied  by  a  particular  cerebral  act.  In 
proving  this,  the  two  sets  of  phenomena,  mental 
and  physical,  are  reduced  each  to  its  lowest  terms, 
but  not  a  step  is  taken  toward  confounding  the 
one  set  with  the  other.  On  the  contrary,  the 


A  Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium."     75 

keener  our  analysis,  the  more  clearly  does  it  ap- 
pear that  the  two  can  never  be  confounded.  The 
relation  of  concomitance  between  them  remains 
an  ultimate  and  insoluble  mystery. 

I  believe,  therefore^  that  modern  scientific  phi- 
losophy, as  represented  by  Spencer  and  Huxley, 
not  only  affords  no  support  to  materialism,  but 
condemns  it  utterly,  and  drives  it  off  the  field 
altogether.  I  believe  it  is  even  clearer  to-day 
than  it  was  in  the  time  of  Descartes  that  no 
possible  analytic  legerdemain  can  ever  translate 
thought  into  extension,  or  extension  into  thought. 
The  antithesis  is  of  God's  own  making,  and  no 
wit  of  man  can  undo  it. 

The  bearing  of  these  arguments  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  a  future  life  may  be  very  briefly  stated. 
So  far  as  I  can  judge,  I  should  say  that,  among 
highly-educated  people,  the  belief  in  a  continu- 
ance of  conscious  existence  after  death  has  visibly 
weakened  during  the  present  century.  I  infer 
this  as  much  from  the  timorousness  of  conserva- 
tive thinkers  as  from  the  aggressiveness  of  their 
radical  opponents.  In  so  far  as  this  weakening 
of  belief  is  due  to  an  imperfect  apprehension  of 
the  scientific  discoveries  which  our  age  has  wit- 
nessed in  such  bewildering  rapidity,  a  word  of 
caution  may  not  be  out  of  piace.  For  all  that 


76  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

physiological  psychology  has  achieved  there  is  no 
more  ground  for  doubt  as  to  a  future  life  to-day 
than  there  was  in  the  time  of  Descartes  :  what- 
ever grounds  of  belief  were  really  valid  then  are 
equally  valid  now.  The  belief  has  never  been 
one  which  could  be  maintained  on  scientific 
grounds.  For  science  is  but  the  codification  of 
experience,  and  it  is  helpless  without  the  .data 
which  experience  furnishes.  Now,  science  may 
easily  demolish  materialism  and  show  that  mind 
cannot  be  regarded  as  a  product  of  matter,  but 
the  belief  in  a  future  life  requires  something  more 
than  this  for  its  support.  It  requires  evidence 
that  the  phenomena  we  class  as  mental  can  sub- 
sist apart  from  the  phenomena  we  class  as  mate- 
rial ;  and  such  evidence,  of  course,  cannot  be  fur- 
nished by  science.  It  cannot  be  furnished  until 
we  have  had  some  actual  experimental  knowledge 
of  soul  as  dissociated  from  body,  and  under  the 
conditions  of  the  present  life  no  such  knowledge 
can  possibly  be  obtained. 

But  this  undoubted  fact  has  a  twofold  import. 
While  on  the  one  hand  it  shuts  us  off  from  all 
scientific  proof  of  immortality,  on  the  other  hand 
it  shows  that  the  absence  of  scientific  proof  affords 
no  valid  ground  for  a  negative  conclusion.  If  soul 
can  exist  when  dissociated  from  body,  we  have  no 


A  Crumb  for  the  "  Modern  Symposium"     77 

means  of  apprehending  the  fact ;  and  therefore 
our  inability  to  apprehend  it  does  not  entitle  us 
to  deny  that  soul  may  have  some  such  indepen- 
dent existence.  We  cannot  allow  the  materialist 
even  this  crumb  of  consolation, — that,  although 
he  cannot  prove  that  consciousness  ceases  with 
death,  nevertheless  the  presumption  is  with  him 
and  the  burden  of  proof  upon  his  antagonists. 
Scientifically  speaking,  there  is  no  presumption 
either  way,  and  there  is  no  burden  of  proof  on 
either  side.  The  question  is  simply  one  which 
science  cannot  touch.  In  the  future,  as  in  the 
past,  I  have  no  doubt  it  will  be  provisionally  an- 
swered in  different  ways  by  different  minds,  on 
an  estimate  of  what  is  called  "moral  probabil- 
ity," just  as  we  see  it  diversely  answered  in  the 
"  Modern  Symposium." 

For  my  own  part,  I  should  be  much  better  sat- 
isfied with  an  affirmative  answer,1  as  affording 
perhaps  some  unforeseen  solution  to  the  general 
mystery  of  life.  I  have  no  sympathy  with  those 
who  stigmatize  the  hope  of  immortal  life  as  selfish 
or  degrading,  and  with  Mr.  Harrison's  proffered 
substitute  I  confess  I  have  no  patience  whatever. 
This  travesty  of  Christianity  by  Positivism  seems 

l  For  a  more  complete  expression  of  my  view  of  the  case  see  The 
Destiny  of  Man,  pp.  108-119. 


78  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

to  me,  as  it  does  to  Professor  Huxley,  a  very 
sorry  business.  On  the  other  hand,  I  cannot 
agree  with  those  who  consider  a  dogmatic  belief 
in  another  life  essential  to  the  proper  discharge 
of  our  duty  in  this.  Though  we  may  not  know 
what  is  to  corne  hereafter,  we  have. at  any  rate  all 
the  means  of  knowledge  requisite  for  making  our 
present  lives  pure  and  beautiful.  It  was  Jeho- 
vah's cherished  servant  who  declared  in  Holy 
Writ  that  his  faith  was  stronger  than  death. 
There  is  something  overwhelming  in  the  thought 
that  all  our  rich  stores  of  spiritual  acquisition 
may  at  any  moment  perish  with  us.  But  the 
wise  man  will  cheerfully  order  his  life,  undaunted 
by  the  metaphysical  snares  that  beset  him;  learn- 
ing and  learning  afresh,  as  if  all  eternity  lay  be- 
fore him  —  battling  steadfastly  for  the  right,  as  if 
this  day  were  his  last.  "  Disce  ut  semper  victu- 
rus,  vive  ut  eras  moriturus" 

December,  1877 


VI. 

CHAUNCEY  WRIGHT.1 

THE  sudden  and  untimely  death  of  Mr.  Chaun- 
cey  Wright,  in  September,  1875,  was  an  irrepara- 
ble loss  not  only  to  the  friends  whose  privilege  it 
had  been  to  know  so  wise  and  amiable  a  man,  but 
to  the  interests  of  sound  philosophy  in  general. 
To  some,  perhaps,  there  may  seem  to  be  extrava- 
gance in  speaking  of  any  such  loss  to  philosophy 
as  irreparable  ;  for  in  the  great  work  of  the  world 
we  are  accustomed  to  see  the  ranks  close  up  as 
heroes  fall  by  the  way,  and  when  we  come  to 
reckon  up  the  sum  of  actual  achievement,  in  our 
thankfulness  over  the  calculable  results  obtained 
we  seldom  take  heed  of  those  innumerable  unre- 
alized possibilities  upon  which  in  the  nature  of 
things  we  can  place  no  just  estimate.  Of  course 
it  is  right,  as  it  is  inevitable,  that  this  should  be 
so.  There  is,  however,  a  point  of  view  from  which 

l  Philosophical  Discussions.  By  Chauncey  Wright.  With  a  Bio- 
graphical Sketch  of  the  Author  by  Charles  Eliot  Norton.  New  York : 
Henry  Holt  &  Co.  1876. 


80  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

it  may  be  fairly  urged  that  the  work  which  rare 
and  original  minds  fall  short  of  doing  because  of 
straitened  circumstances  or  brevity  of  life  does 
never  really  get  done  at  all.  Something  like  it 
gets  performed,  no  doubt,  but  it  gets  performed 
in  a  different  order  of  causation  ;  and  though 
there  may  be  an  appearance  of  equivalence,  the 
fact  remains  that,  from  the  sum  of  human  striv- 
ing, an  indefinite  amount  of  rich  and  fruitful  life 
has  been  lost.  True  as  this  is  in  the  case  of  ex- 
act science,  it  is  still  more  obviously  true  in  spec- 
ulative science  or  philosophy.  For  the  work  of  a 
philosopher,  like  the  work  of  an  artist,  is  the  pe- 
culiar product  of  endless  complexities  of  individ- 
ual character.  His  mental  tone,  his  shades  of 
prejudice,  his  method  of  thought,  are  often  of 
as  much  interest  and  value  to  mankind  as  any  of 
the  theories  which  he  may  devise ;  and  thus  it  not 
seldom  happens  that  personal  familiarity  with  the 
philosopher  is  itself  a  most  instructive  lesson  in 
philosophy. 

In  the  case  of  Chauncey  Wright,  none  save  the 
friends  who  knew  the  rich  treasures  of  his  mind 
as  shown  in  familiar  conversation  are  likely  to 
realize  how  great  is  the  loss  which  philosophy  has 
sustained  in  his  death.  For  not  only  was  he 
somewhat  deficient  in  the  literary  knack  of  ex« 


Chauncey   Wright.  81 

pressing  his  thoughts  in  language  generally  intel- 
ligible and  interesting,  but  he  was  also  singularly 
devoid  of  the  literary  ambition  which  leads  one 
to  seek  to  influence  the  public  by  written  expo- 
sition. Had  he  possessed  more  of  this  kind  of 
ambition,  perhaps  the  requisite  knack  would  not 
have  been  wanting ;  for  Mr.  Wright  was  by  no 
means  deficient  in  clearness  of  thought  or  in 
command  of  language.  The  difficulty  —  or,  if 
we  prefer  so  to  call  it,  the  esoteric  character  —  of 
his  writings  was  due  rather  to  the  sheer  extent  of 
their  richness  and  originality.  His  essays  and 
review-articles  were  pregnant  with  valuable  sug- 
gestions, which  he  was  wont  to  emphasize  so 
slightly  that  their  significance  might  easily  pass 
unheeded  ;  and  such  subtle  suggestions  made  so 
large  a  part  of  his  philosophical  style  that,  if  any 
of  them  chanced  to  be  overlooked  by  the  reader, 
the  point  and  bearing  of  the  entire  argument  was 
liable  to  be  misapprehended.  His  sentences  often 
abounded  in  terse  allusive  clauses  or  epithets 
which  were  unintelligible  for  want  of  a  sufficient 
clue  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  allusion :  in  the 
absence  of  an  exhaustive  acquaintance  with  the 
contents  of  the  author's  mind,  the  reader  could 
only  wonder,  and  miss  the  point  of  the  incidental 
remark.  Of  such  sort  of  obscure,  though  preg- 


82  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

nant,  allusions  we  have  an  instance  in  the  use 
made  of  the  conception  of  a  "  spherical  intelli- 
gence "  in  the  essay  on  "  The  Evolution  of  Self- 
Consciousness,"  where  the  brief  reference  to  the 
Platonic  Timaios  is  by  no  means  sufficient  to  re- 
lieve the  strain  upon  the  reader's  attention.  It  is 
this  too  compact  suggestiveness  which  makes  this 
remarkable  essay  so  hard  to  understand,  and  the 
exuberance  of  which  half  tempted  Mr.  Wright  to 
give  to  the  paper  the  very  esoteric  title  of  "  The 
Cognition  of  Cogito."  A  writer  who  kept  the 
public  in  his  mind  would  not  proceed  in  this  way, 
but  would  more  often  give  pages  luminous  with 
concrete  illustrations  where  Mr.  Wright  only 
gave  sentences  cumbrous  with  epigrammatic 
terseness.  If  Mr.  Wright  did  not  keep  the  pub- 
lic in  mind  while  writing,  it  was  not  from  the 
pride  of  knowledge,  for  no  feeling  could  have 
been  more  foreign  to  him ;  and  there  was  some- 
thing almost  touching  in  the  endless  patience 
with  which  he  would  strive  in  conversation  to 
make  abstruse  matters  clear  to  ordinary  minds. 
It  was  because,  as  a  writer,  he  thought  in  solilo- 
quy, using  his  pen  to  note  down  the  course  of 
his  reasoning,  but  failing  to  realize  the  difficulty 
which  others  might  find  in  apprehending  the  nu- 
merous and  far-reaching  connotations  of  phrases 
to  him  entirely  familiar. 


Ohaunoey   Wright.  83 

It  was  only  some  such  circumstances  as  these, 
joined  to  a  kind  of  mental  inertness  which  made 
some  unusually  strong  incentive  needful  to  any 
prolonged  attempt  at  literary  self-exposition,  that 
prevented  Chauncey  Wright  from  taking  rank,  in 
public  estimation,  among  the  foremost  philoso- 
phers of  our  time.  '  An  intellect  more  powerful 
from  its  happy  union  of  aouteness  with  sobriety 
has  probably  not  yet  been  seen  in  America.  In 
these  respects  he  reminds  one  of  Mr.  Mill,  whom 
he  so  warmly  admired.  Though  immeasurably 
inferior  to  Mill  in  extent  of  literary  acquirement, 
he  was  hardly  inferior  to  him  in  penetrating  and 
fertile  ingenuity,  while  in  native  soberness  or 
balance  of  mind  it  seems  to  me  that  Wright  was, 
on  the  whole,  the  superior.  In  reading  Mr. 
Mill's  greater  works,  one  is  constantly  impressed 
with  the  admirable  thoroughness  with  which  the 
author's  faculties  are  disciplined.  Inflexible  in- 
tellectual honesty  is  there  accompanied  by  sleep- 
less vigilance  against  fallacy  or  prejudice;  and 
while  generous  emotion  often  kindles  a  warmth  of 
expression,  yet  the  jurisdiction  of  feeling  is  sel- 
dom allowed  to  encroach  upon  that  of  reason. 
Nevertheless  there  are  numerous  little  signs  which 
give  one  the  impression  that  this  wonderful  equi- 
poise of  mind  did  not  come  by  nature  altogether, 


84  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

but  was  in  great  part  the  result  of  consummate 
training,  —  of  unremitting  watchfulness  over  self. 
Some  of  his  smaller  political  writings  and  the 
"  Autobiography "  entirely  confirm  this  impres- 
sion, and  show  that  in  Mr.  Mill's  mind  there  were 
not  only  immense  enthusiasms,  but  even  a  slight 
tinge  of  mysticism.  All  the  more  praiseworthy 
seems  his  remarkable  self-discipline  in  view  of 
such  circumstances. 

Mr.  Wright,  though  so  nearly  in  harmony  with 
Mr.  Mill  in  methods  and  conclusions,  was  very 
different  in  native  mental  temperament.  An 
illustration  of  the  difference  is  furnished  by  the 
striking  remarks  in  which  Mr.  Mill  acknowledges 
—  in  common  with  his  father  —  a  preference  for 
the  experience-philosophy  on  utilitarian  grounds : 
it  obliges  men  'to  try  their  beliefs  by  tests  that 
are  perpetually  subject  to  criticism,  and  thus 
affords  no  room  for  doctrines  which,  by  reason  of 
some  presumed  sanctity,  men  may  find  an  excuse 
for  trying  to  impose  on  one  another.  That  there 
is  profound  truth  in  this  no  one  can  deny ;  but 
prejudice  and  partisanship  are  liable  to  grow  out 
of  any  such  practical  preference  for  a  given  form 
of  philosophy,  and  one  cannot  readily  imagine 
Mr.  Wright  as  influenced,  even  slightly,  in  his 
philosophic  attitude  by  such  a  consideration  of 


Cliauneey  Wright.  86 

utility.  His  opinions  were  determined  only  by 
direct  evidence,  and  to  this  he  always  accorded  a 
hospitable  reception.  A  mind  more  placid  in  its 
working,  more  unalloyed  by  emotional  prejudice 
or  less  solicited  by  the  various  temptations  of 
speculation,  I  have  never  known.  Judicial  can- 
dour and  rectitude  of  inference  were  with  him 
inborn.  On  many  points  his  judgment  might 
need  further  enlightenment,  but  it  stood  in  no 
need  of  a  rectifying  impulse.  No  craving  for 
speculative  consistency,  or  what  Comte  would 
have  called  "  unity  "  of  doctrine,  ever  hindered 
him  from  giving  due  weight  to  opposing,  or  even 
seemingly  incompatible,  considerations.  For,  in 
view  of  the  largeness  and  complexity  of  the  uni- 
verse, he  realized  how  treacherous  the  most  plau- 
sible generalizations  are  liable  to  prove  when  a 
vast  area  of  facts  is  to  be  covered,  and  how  great 
is  the  value  of  seemingly  incongruous  facts  in 
prompting  us  to  revise  or  amend  our  first-formed 
theories. 

With  these  mental  characteristics  Mr.  Wright 
seems  to  have  been  fitted  for  the  work  of  sceptical 
criticism,  or  for  the  discovery  and  illustration  of 
specific  truths,  rather  than  for  the  elaboration  of 
a  general  system  of  philosophy.  As  our  very 
sources  of  mental  strength  in  one  direction  may 


86  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

become  sources  of  mental  weakness  in  another,  as 
we  are  very  likely  to  have  what  the  French  would 
call  "  the  defects  of  our  excellences,"  so  we 
may,  perhaps,  count  it  as  a  weakness,  or  at  least 
a  limitation,  in  Mr.  Wright  that  he  was  some 
what  over-suspicious  of  all  attempts  at  construct- 
ing ideally  coherent  and  comprehensive  systems. 
That  there  is  coherency  throughout  the  processes 
of  Nature  he  would  certainly  have  admitted,  in  so 
far  as  belief  in  the  universality  of  causation  is  to 
be  construed  as  such  an  admission.  But  that 
there  is  any  such  discernible  coherency  in  the  re- 
sults of  causation  as  would  admit  of  description 
in  a  grand  series  of  all-embracing  generalizations, 
I  think  he  would  have  doubted  or  denied.  Such 
denial  or  doubt  seems,  at  least,  to  be  implied  in 
his  frequent  condemnation  of  cosmic  or  synthetic 
systems  of  philosophy  as  metaphysical  "  anticipa- 
tions of  Nature,"  incompatible  with  the  true  spirit 
of  Baconistn.  The  denial  or  doubt  would  have 
referred,  perhaps,  not  so  much  to  the  probable 
constitution  of  Nature  as  to  the  possibilities  of 
human  knowledge.  He  would  have  argued  that 
the  stupendous  group  of  events  which  we  call  the 
universe  consists  so  largely  of  unexplored,  or  even 
unsuspected,  phenomena  that  the  only  safe  gen- 
eralizations we  can  make  concerning  it  must  needs 


Chauncey   Wright.  87 

be  eminently  fragmentary ;  and  if  any  one  had 
asked  whether,  after  all,  we  have  not  great  reason 
to  believe  that  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
and  duration  of  the  boundless  and  endless  uni- 
verse there  is  an  all-pervading  coherency  of  ac- 
tion, such  as  would  be  implied  in  the  theorem 
that  all  Nature  is  the  manifestation  of  one  In- 
finite Power,  —  to  any  such  question  he  would 
probably  have  held  that  no  legitimate  answer  can 
be  given. 

In  this  general  way  of  looking  at  things  we  have 
the  explanation  of  Mr.  Wright's  persistent  hostil- 
ity to  the  philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer.  This 
hostility  is  declared  in  his  earliest  essay,  entitled 
"  A  Physical  Theory  of  the  Universe,"  and  it  is 
maintained  in  the  paper  on  "  German  Darwinism," 
published  only  three  days  before  his  death,  where- 
in great  pains  are  taken  to  show  that  Mr.  Spen- 
cer's philosophy  is  utterly  un-Baconian  and  un- 
scientific, as  resting,  not  upon  inductive  inquiry, 
but  upon  "  undemonstrated  beliefs  assumed  to  be 
axiomatic  and  irresistible."  In  the  first  and  last 
of  my  many  conversations  with  Mr.  Wright  —  in 
July,  1862,  and  in  July,  1875  —  I  found  myself 
charged  with  the  defence  of  Mr.  Spencer's  phi- 
losophy against  what  then  seemed,  and  still  seems, 
to  me  a  profound  misunderstanding  of  its  true 


88  Darwinism  and  Other  Essay*. 

character  and  purpose.  As  the  point  is  one  which 
goes  as  far  as  any  other  toward  illustrating  Mr. 
Wright's  philosophic  position,  and  as  it  has  an 
immediate  bearing  on  the  vexed  question  of  sci- 
ence and  religion,  I  will  crave  the  reader's  in- 
dulgence while  I  illustrate  it  briefly  here. 

Doctors  are  proverbially  known  to  disagree, 
whether  they  be  doctors  in  philosophy  or  in  med- 
icine ;  but  I  have  often  thought  that  an  interest- 
ing case  might  be  made  out  by  any  one  who 
should  endeavour  to  signalize  the  half-hidden  as- 
pects of  agreement  rather  than  the  conspicuous 
aspects  of  difference  among  philosophic  schools. 
Certainly,  in  the  controversy  which  has  been 
waged  of  late  years  concerning  the  sources  of 
knowledge  and  the  criterion  of  truth,  one  is  in- 
clined to  suspect  that  a  greater  amount  of  antag- 
onism has  been  brought  to  the  surface  than  is 
altogether  required  by  the  circumstances.  In  old 
times,  when  you  were  asked  why  you  believed 
that  things  would  happen  in  future  after  much 
the  same  general  fashion  as  in  the  past,  there 
were  two  replies  which  you  could  make.  If  you 
were  a  believer  in  Locke,  you  would  say  that  you 
trusted  in  the  testimony  of  experience ;  but  here 
the  follower  of  Leibnitz  would  declare  that  you 
were  very  unwise,  since  experience  can  only  tes- 


CJiauncey   Wright.  89 

tify  to  what  has  happened  already,  and,  so  far  as 
experience  goes,  you  have  n't  an  iota  of  warrant 
for  your  belief  that  the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow 
morning.  Your  trust  in  the  constancy  of  Nature 
must  be  derived,  therefore,  from  some  principle 
inherent  in  the  very  constitution  of  your  mind, 
implanted  there  by  the  Creator  for  a  wise  and 
beneficent  purpose. 

Once  this  transcendentalist  argument  was 
thought  to  have  great  weight,  but  of  late  years 
it  has  fallen  irredeemably  into  discredit.  For  to- 
day the  empiricist  retorts  with  crushing  effect 
that,  precisely  because  we  are  wholly  dependent 
on  experience,  and  have  no  other  quarter  to  go  to 
for  rules  of  belief  and  conduct,  we  cannot  apply 
to  the  future  any  other  rules  of  probability  than 
those  with  which  our  experience  of  the  past  has 
furnished  us.  If  we  had  any  criterion  of  belief 
independent  of  experience,  then  we  might  perhaps 
be  able  to  believe  that  on  the  earth  a  million 
years  hence,  or  on  Mars  to-day,  a  piece  of  red-hot 
iron  would  not  burn  the  hand.  Were  we  not 
strictly  hampered  by  experience,  we  might  doubt 
the  universality  of  causation.  But  being  thus 
strictly  hampered,  we  must  either  imagine  the 
future  under  the  same  rules  as  those  under  which 
we  remember  the  past,  or  else  subside  in  a  kind 


90  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

of  mental  chaos  and  form  no  expectations  what- 
ever. To  this  view  of  the  case  transcendentalism 
has  as  yet  made  no  satisfactory  rejoinder. 

Our  faith  in  the  constancy  of  Nature  results, 
therefore,  from  our  inability  to  overcome  or  "go 
behind "  the  certified  testimony  of  experience. 
Such  is  the  primary  psychological  fact,  about 
which  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Mr. 
Wright  and  Mr.  Spencer  would  disagree.  But 
this,  like  many  other  facts,  has  two  sides ;  or  at 
least,  there  are  two  possible  ways  of  interpreting 
it,  and  here  arises  the  misunderstanding.  On  the 
one  hand,  our  belief  in  the  constancy  of  Nature 
may  be  the  result  of  an  immense  induction  or 
counting  up  of  the  whole  series  of  events  which 
show  that  Nature  is  not  capricious ;  or,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  may  be  the  generalization  of  a  sim- 
ple assumption  which  we  make  in  every  act  of 
experience,  and  without  which  we  could  not  carry 
on  any  thinking  whatever.  The  first  alternative 
is  the  one  defended  by  Mr.  Wright  in  common 
with  Mr.  Mill,  while  the  second  is  the  one  more 
prominently  insisted  upon  by  Mr.  Spencer.  To 
me  it  seems  that  Mr.  Spencer's  view  is  very  much 
the  more  profound  and  satisfactory ;  but  I  fail  to 
see  that  there  is  necessarily  any  such  practical 
antagonism  between  the  two  as  is  implied  in  re- 


Chauncey    Wright.  91 

cent  controversies  on  the  subject.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  seems  clear  to  me  that  the  two  views  are 
simply  two  complementary  or  obverse  aspects  of 
the  same  fundamental  truth. 

At  first  sight  it  may  seem  very  bold  to  assert 
that  in  every  act  of  our  mental  lives  we  make 
such  a  grand  assumption  as  that  of  the  constancy 
of  Nature ;  but  it  is  very  certain  that,  in  some 
form  or  other,  we  do  keep  making  this  assump- 
tion. Every  time  that  the  grocer  weighs  a  pound 
of  sugar  and  exchanges  it  for  a  piece  of  silver,  the 
practical  validity  of  the  transaction  rests  upon 
the  assumption  that  the  same  lump  of  iron  will 
not  counterbalance  one  quantity  of  sugar  to-day 
and  a  different  quantity  to-morrow  ;  and  a  similar 
assumption  of  constancy  in  weight  and  exchange- 
ability is  made  regarding  the  silver.  The  inde- 
structibility of  matter  and  the  continuity  or  per- 
sistence of  force  are  taken  for  granted,  though 
neither  the  grocer  nor  his  customer  may  have  re- 
ceived enough  mental  training  to  understand  these 
axioms  when  stated  in  abstract  form.  Nay,  more, 
though  they  may  be  superstitious  men,  believing 
in  a  world  full  of  sprites  and  goblins;  though 
they  may  be  so  ignorant  as  to  suppose  that,  when 
wood  is  burned  and  water  dried  up,  some  portions 
of  matter  are  annihilated,  —  yet  in  each  of  these 


92  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

little  practical  transactions  of  life  they  go  upon 
the  same  assumption  that  the  philosopher  goes 
upon  when,  with  his  wider  knowledge  and  deeper 
insight,  he  rules  out  the  goblins  and  declares  that 
no  matter  is  ever  destroyed.  Without  this  as- 
sumption in  some  form  we  could  not  carry  on  the 
work  of  life  for  a  single  day.  The  assumption, 
moreover,  is  absolutely  unconditional ;  no  occur- 
rence ever  shakes  our  reliance  upon  it.  I  set  my 
clock  to-day,  and  depend  on  its  testimony  to-mor- 
row in  starting  on  a  journey :  if  I  miss  the  train, 
I  may  conclude  that  the  clock  was  not  well  regu- 
lated, or  that  it  has  begun  to  need  cleaning ;  but 
it  never  occurs  to  me  that  my  confidence  in  the 
mechanical  laws  of  cog-wheels  and  pendulums  has 
been  at  all  misplaced. 

This  universal  and  unqualified  assumption  of 
the  constancy  of  Nature  is,  in  a  certain  sense,  a 
net  result  of  experience,  inasmuch  as  we  find  it 
tested  and  verified  in  every  act  of  our  conscious 
lives.  Acting  on  the  principle  that  "  a  pound  is 
a  pound,  all  the  world  around,"  we  find  that  our 
mental  operations  harmonize  with  outward  facts. 
Doubt  it,  if  we  could,  and  our  mental  operations 
would  forthwith  tumble  into  chaos.  Experience, 
therefore,  —  by  which  is  meant  our  daily  inter- 
course with  outward  facts,  —  continually  forces 


Chauncey   Wright.  93 

upon  us  this  assumption.  Along  with  whatever 
else  we  are  taught  about  ourselves  and  the  world, 
there  comes  as  part  and  parcel  the  ever-repeated 
lesson  that  the  order  of  Nature  may  be  relied  on. 
In  this  sense  the  belief  may  be  said  to  be  a  net 
result  of  all  our  experience. 

But  this  is  by  no  means  an  adequate  account 
of  the  matter.  The  case  has  another  aspect,  to 
which  neither  Mr.  Mill  nor  Mr.  Wright  has  done 
justice.  How  can  the  constancy  of  Nature  be 
said  to  be  proved  by  experience,  when  we  begin 
by  assuming  it  in  each  of  the  single  acts  of  expe- 
rience which,  taken  together,  are  said  to  prove 
it  ?  Does  not  this  look  like  reasoning  in  a  circle  ? 
We  are  told  that  the  constancy  of  Nature  is  proved 
for  us  by  an  unbroken  series  of  experiences,  be- 
ginning with  our  birth  and  ending  with  our  death ; 
and  yet  not  one  of  this  series  of  experiences  can 
have  any  validity,  or  indeed  any  existence,  unless 
the  constancy  of  Nature  be  tacitly  assumed  to 
begin  with.  It  is  the  balance,  we  are  told,  which 
assures  us  that  no  particle  of  matter  is  ever  lost ; 
but  in  weighing  things  in  a  balance  we  must  take 
it  for  granted  that  the  earth's  gravitative  force  is 
uniform,  —  is  not  one  thing  to-day  and  another 
to-morrow ;  nay,  we  must  also  assume  that  the 
present  testimony  of  our  senses  will  continue  to 


94:  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

be  consistent  in  principle  with  their  past  testi- 
mony. Whatever  system  of  forces  we  estimate 
or  measure  in  support  of  our  implicit  belief  in  the 
constancy  of  Nature,  we  must  sooner  or  later  ap- 
peal to  some  fundamental  unit  of  measurement 
which  is  invariable.  Without  some  such  constant 
unit  we  cannot  prove  that  the  order  of  Nature  is 
uniform  :  but  we  cannot  prove  the  constancy  of 
such  a  unit  without  referring  it  to  some  other 
unit,  a'nd  so  on  forever ;  while  to  assume  the  con- 
stancy of  such  a  unit  is  simply  to  assume  the 
whole  case. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  our  belief  in  the 
trustworthiness  of  Nature  is  not  properly  described 
when  it  is  treated  simply  as  a  vast  induction.  It 
should  rather  be  regarded  as  a  postulate  indispen- 
sable to  the  carrying  on  of  rational  thought,  —  a 
postulate  ratified  in  every  act  of  experience,  but 
without  which  no  act  of  experience  can  have  any 
validity  or  meaning.  It  is  for  taking  this  view  of 
the  case  that  Mr.  Spencer  is  charged  with  rearing 
a  system  of  philosophy  upon  "  undemonstrable 
beliefs  assumed  to  be  axiomatic  and  irresistible." 
Considering  that  the  undemonstrable  belief  in 
question  is  simply  the  belief  in  the  constancy  of 
Nature,  one  would  be  at  a  loss  to  see  what  there 
is  so  very  heinous  in  Mr.  Spencer's  proceeding, 


Chauncey   Wright.  95 

were  it  not  obvious  that  we  have  here  struck 
upon  a  grave  misconception  on  the  part  of  Mr. 
Wright.  Misled,  no  doubt,  by  some  ambiguity 
of  expression,  Mr.  Wright  supposed  Mr.  Spencer 
to  be  laying  down  some  everlasting  principle  of 
universal  objective  validity,  and  quite  indepen- 
dent of  experience.  To  do  this  would  undoubt- 
edly be  to  desert  science  for  metaphysics ;  but 
Mr.  Spencer  has  not  done  anything  of  the  kind. 
As  I  said  before,  there  has  probably  been  an  ex- 
cess of  controversy  on  this  point.  For  my  own 
part,  without  retreating  from  any  position  for- 
merly taken,1  I  should  be  willing,  for  all  practi- 
cal purposes,  to  waive  the  question  altogether. 
Whether  our  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  Nature 
be  a  primary  datum  for  rational  thinking  or  a  net 
result  of  all  induction,  or  whether,  with  the  au- 
thors of  the  "  Unseen  Universe,"  we  prefer  to 
call  it  an  expression  of  trust  that  the  Deity  "  will 
not  put  us  to  permanent  intellectual  confusion," 
—  whichever  alternative  we  adopt,  our  theories 
of  the  universe  will  be  pretty  much  the  same  in 
the  end,  provided  we  content  ourselves  with  a 
simple  scientific  coordination  of  the  phenomena 
before  us.  And  this  is  all  that  has  been  aimed 

1   Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  Part  I.,  chap.  iii. ;  Part  II.,  chaps, 
i,  xvi. 


96  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

at  in  the  attempt  to  construct  a  synthetic,  or  cos- 
mic, system  of  philosophy.  There  has  been  no 
further  transcending  of  experience  than  is  implied 
in  the  assumption  that  the  order  of  Nature  is  the 
same  in  the  Pleiades  and  in  the  Solar  System 
until  we  learn  to  the  contrary  ;  and  it  would  be 
difficult  to  set  aside  Mr.  Spencer's  proceedings  as 
un-Baconian  without  so  drawing  the  line  as  to 
exclude  Newton's  comparison  of  the  falling  moon 
to  the  falling  apple,  —  the  grand  achievement 
which  first  extended  the  known  dynamic  order  of 
Nature  from  the  earth  to  the  heavens. 

Our  knowledge  of  the  universe  is  no  doubt 
well-nigh  infinitely  small,  —  how  small  we  can- 
not know.  The  butterfly  sailing  on  the  summer 
breeze  may  be  no  farther  from  comprehending 
the  secular  changes  in  the  earth's  orbit  than  man 
is  from  fathoming  the  real  course  and  direction  of 
cosmic  events.  Yet  if  throughout  the  tiny  area 
which  alone  we  have  partially  explored  we  every- 
where find  coherency  of  causation,  then,  just  be- 
cause we  are  incapable  of  transcending  expe- 
rience, we  cannot  avoid  attributing  further  co- 
herency to  the  regions  beyond  our  ken,  so  far  as 
such  regions  can  afford  occasion  for  thought  at  all. 
The  very  limitations  under  which  thinking  is  con- 
ducted thus  urge  us  to  seek  the  One  in  the  Many ; 


Chauncey   Wright.  97 

yet,  if  ouv  words  are  rightly  weighed,  this  does 
not  imply  a  striving  after  "systematic  omnis- 
cience," nor  can  any  theistic  conception  which 
confines  itself  within  these  limits  of  inference  be 
properly  stigmatized  as  contrary  to  the  spirit  of 
science. 

One  of  the  most  marked  features  of  Mr. 
Wright's  style  of  thinking  was  his  insuperable 
aversion  to  all  forms  of  teleology.  As  an  able 
critic  in  "  The  Nation  "  observes,  to  Mr.  Wright 
"  such  ideas  as  optimism  or  pessimism  were  alike 
irrelevant.  Whereas  most  men's  interest  in  a 
thought  is  proportional  to  its  possible  relation  to 
human  destiny,  with  him  it  was  almost  the  re- 
verse." But  the  antagonism  went  even  deeper 
than  this.  Not  only  did  he  condemn  the  shallow 
teleology  of  Paley  and  the  Bridgewater  Treatises, 
but  any  theory  which  seemed  to  imply  a  discern- 
ible direction  or  tendency  in  the  career  of  the 
universe  became  to  him  at  once  an  object  of  sus- 
picion. As  he  was  inclined  to  doubt  or  deny  any 
ultimate  coherency  among  cosmical  events,  he 
was  of  course  indisposed  to  admit  that  such  events 
are  working  together  toward  any  assignable  re- 
sult whatever.  From  his  peculiar  point  of  view 
it  seemed  more  appropriate  to  look  upon  phe- 
nomena as  drifting  and  eddying  about  in  an 


98  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

utterly  blind  and  irrational  manner,  though  now 
and  then  evolving,  as  if  by  accident,  temporary 
combinations  which  have  to  us  a  rational  appear- 
ance. "  Cosmical  weather  "  was  the  tersely  allu- 
sive phrase  with  which  he  was  wont  to  describe 
this  purposeless  play  of  events,  as  if  to  liken  the 
formation  and  dissipation  of  worlds  to  the  ca- 
pricious changes  of  the  wind.  So  strong  a  hojd 
had  this  notion  acquired  in  his  mind  that  for 
once  it  warped  his  estimate  of  scientific  evidence, 
and  led  him  to  throw  aside  the  well-grounded 
nebular  hypothesis  in  favour  of  the  ill-conceived 
and  unsupported  meteoric  theory  of  Mayer.  In 
Mr.  Wright's  mind  it  was  an  insuperable  objec- 
tion to  the  nebular  hypothesis  that  it  seems  to 
take  the  world  from  a  definable  beginning  to  a 
definable  end,  and  such  dramatic  consistency,  he 
argued,  is  not  to  be  found  amid  the  actual  turmoil 
of  Nature's  workings.  It  would  be  improbable, 
he  thought,  that  things  should  happen  so  prettily 
as  the  hypothesis  asserts :  in  point  of  fact,  Nature 
does  so  many  things  to  disconcert  our  ingenious 
formulas !  To  the  general  doctrine  of  evolution, 
of  which  the  nebular  hypothesis  is  a  part,  Mr. 
Wright  urged  the  same  comprehensive  objection. 
The  dramatic  interest  of  the  doctrine,  which  gives 
it  its  chief  attraction  to  many  minds,  was  to  Mr, 


CJiauncey   Wright.  99 

Wright  primd  facie  evidence  of  its  unscientific 
character.  The  events  of  the  universe  have  no 
orderly  progression  like  the  scenes  of  a  well-con- 
structed plot,  but  in  the  manner  of  their  coming 
and  going  they  constitute  simply  a  "  cosmical 
weather." 

Without  pausing  over  the  question  whether 
dramatic  completeness,  belongs  properly  to  meta- 
physical theories  only,  or  may  sometimes  also  be 
found  in  doctrines  that  rightly  lay  claim  to  scien- 
tific competence,  we  may  call  attention  to  the  in- 
teresting fact  that  Mr.  Wright's  objection  reveals 
a  grave  misunderstanding  of  the  true  import  of 
the  doctrine  of  evolution  in  general,  as  well  as  of 
the  nebular  hypothesis  in  particular.  The  objec- 
tion —  if  it  be  admitted  as  an  objection  —  applies 
only  to  the  crude  popular  notion  of  the  doctrine 
of  evolution,  that  it  is  all  an  affair  of  progress, 
wherein  a  better  state  of  things  (that  is,  better 
from  a  human  point  of  view)  keeps  continually 
supplanting  a  less  excellent  state,  and  so  on  for- 
ever, or  at  least  without  definite  limit.  That  Mr. 
Wright  understood  the  doctrine  in  this  crude  way 
was  evident  from  the  manner  in  which  he  was 
wont  to  urge  his  anti-teleological  objection  both  in 
his  writings  and  in  conversation.  In  criticizing  the 
nebular  hypothesis,  for  instance,  he  was  sure  to 


100  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

let  fall  some  expression  which  showed  that  in  his 
mind  the  hypothesis  stood  for  a  presumptuous  at- 
tempt to  go  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  universe 
and  give  some  account  of  its  total  past  career  in 
terms  of  progress.  But  the  nebular  hypothesis, 
as  it  is  now  held  by  evolutionists,  does  not  make 
any  such  attempt  at  all.  The  nebular  hypothesis 
traces,  from  indications  in  the  present  structure 
of  the  solar  system,  the  general  history  of  the  pro- 
cess by  which  the  system  arose  out  of  a  mass  of 
vaporous  or  nebulous  matter.  That  process  has 
been  a  species  of  evolution  in  so  far  as  it  has  sub- 
stituted a  determinate  and  complicated  for  an  in- 
determinate and  simple  arrangement ;  and  in  so 
far  as  it  has  resulted  in  the  production  of  the 
earth  or  whatever  other  planet  may  be  the  abode 
of  conscious  intelligence,  it  has  been  a  kind  of 
progress  judged  with  reference  to  human  ends. 
But  so  far  from  this  evolution  or  progress  being 
set  down  as  a  universal  or  eternal  affair,  it  is 
most  explicitly  regarded  as  local  and  temporary. 
Throughout  the  starry  groups  analogous  changes 
are  supposed  to  be  going  on,  but  at  different 
stages  in  different  systems,  just  as  the  various 
members  of  a  human  society  coexist  in  all  stages 
of  youth,  maturity,  or  decline ;  while  here  and 
there  are  nebulse  in  which  the  first  steps  of  devel- 


Chauncey  Wright.  101 

opment  have  not  yet  become  apparent,  and  cir- 
cumstances can  be  pointed  out  under  which  one 
of  these  masses  might  now  and  then  fail  to  pro- 
duce a  system  of  worlds  at  all.  Not  only  is  there 
all  this  scope  for  irregular  variety,  but  the  theory 
further  supposes  that  in  every  single  instance,  but 
at  different  times  in  different  systems,  the  process 
of  evolution  will  come  to  an  end,  the  determinate 
complexity  be  destroyed,  and  the  dead  substance 
of  extinct  worlds  be  scattered  broadcast  through 
space,  to  serve,  perhaps,  as  the  raw  material  for 
further  local  and  temporary  processes  of  aggrega- 
tion and  evolution.  This  view  is  held  as  scien- 
tifically probable  by  many  who  have  not  been 
helped  to  it  by  Mr.  Spencer's  general  arguments ; 
but  whoever  will  duly  study  the  profound  con- 
siderations on  the  rhythm  of  motion,  set  forth  in 
the  rewritten  edition  of  "  First  Principles,"  will 
see  that  it  is  just  this  endlessly  irregular  alterna- 
tion of  progress  and  retrogression,  of  epochs  of 
life  with  epochs  of  decay,  which  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  asserts  as  one  of  its  leading  theorems. 
In  this  respect  the  accepted  name  of  the  doctrine, 
though  perhaps  not  unfortunate,  is  but  imper- 
fectly descriptive,  and  is  therefore  liable  to  mis- 
lead. What  the  doctrine  really  maintains  is  the 
universal  rhythmic  alternation  of  evolution  and 


102  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

dissolution,  only  that  our  attention  is  pre-emi- 
nently attracted  to  the  former  aspect  of  the  two- 
fold process,  as  that  which  is  at  present  upper- 
most in  our  own  portion  of  the  universe.  In  no 
department  of  Nature,  whether  in  the  heavens  or 
on  the  earth,  in  the  constitution  of  organic  life  or 
in  the  career  of  human  society,  does  the  doctrine 
of  evolution  assert  progress  as  necessary,  uni- 
versal, and  perpetual,  but  always  as  a  contingent, 
local,  and  temporary  phenomenon. 

But  what  better  phrase  could  we  desire  than 
"  cosmical  weather  "  whereby  tersely  to  describe 
the  endlessly  diversified  and  apparently  capricious 
course  of  Nature  as  it  is  thus  set  forth  in  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution  ?  As  the  wind  bloweth  where 
it  listeth,  but  we  know  not  whence  it  came,  nor 
whither  it  goes,  so  in  the  local  condensations  and 
rarefactions  of  cosmical  matter  which  make  up 
the  giant  careers  of  stellar  systems  we  can  detect 
neither  source  nor  direction.  Not  only  is  there 
,  no  reference  to  any  end  which  humanity  can  rec- 
ognize as  good  or  evil,  but  there  is  not  the  slight- 
est indication  of  dramatic  progress  toward  any 
dSnofiment  whatever.  There  is  simply  the  never- 
ending  onward  rush  of  events,  as  undiscriminat- 
ing,  as  ruthless,  as  irresistible,  as  the  current  of 
Niagara  or  the  blast  of  the  tropical  hurricane. 


Chauncey  Wright.  103 

This  is  a  picture  which  ought  to  satisfy  the 
most  inexorable  opponent  of  teleology.  For  my 
own  part,  I  can  see  nothing  very  attractive  in  it, 
even  from  a  purely  speculative  point  of  view, 
though  it  is  as  striking  a  statement  as  can  well 
be  made  of  the  meagreness  of  our  knowledge 
when  confronted  with  the  immensity  of  Nature. 
The  phrase  "  cosmical  weather  "  happily  comports 
with  our  enormous  ignorance  of  the  real  tendency 
of  events.  But  as  terrestrial  weather  is  after  all 
subject  to  discoverable  laws,  so  to  an  intelligence 
sufficiently  vast  the  appearance  of  fickleness  in 
"  cosmical  weather "  would  no  doubt  cease,  and 
the  sequence  of  events  would  doubtless  begin  to 
disclose  a  dramatic  tendency,  though  whether  to- 
ward any  end  appreciable  by  us  or  not  it  would 
be  difficult  to  say.1 

In  the  discussion  of  such  questions,  called  up 
by  Mr.  Spencer's  philosophy,  Mr.  Wright  always 
appeared  in  the  light  of  a  most  consistent  and  un- 
qualified positivist.  He  hardly  could  be  called  a 
follower  of  Comte,  and  I  doubt  if  he  even  knew 
the  latter's  works  save  by  hearsay.  But  he 
needed  no  lessons  from  Comte.  He  was  born  a 
positivist,  and  a  more  complete  specimen  of  the 

1  This  point  is  treated  from  a  far  more  advanced  position  in  my  new 
book,  The  Idea  of  God,  as  affected  by  Modern  Knowledge. 


104  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

positive  philosopher  has  probably  never  existed. 
He  went  as  far  as  it  was  possible  for  a  human 
thinker  to  go  toward  a  philosophy  which  should 
take  no  note  of  anything  beyond  the  content  of 
observed  facts.  He  always  kept  the  razor  of 
Occam  uncased  and  ready  for  use,  and  was  espe- 
cially fond  of  applying  it  to  such  entities  as  "  sub- 
stance "  and  "  force,"  the  very  names  of  which, 
he  thought,  might  advantageously  be  excluded 
from  philosophical  terminology.  Sometimes  he 
described  himself  as  a  positivist,  but  more  often 
called  himself  a  Lucretian,  —  the  difference  be- 
tween the  two  designations  being,  perhaps,  not 
great.  As  a  champion  of  Lucretius,  I  remember 
his  once  making  a  sharp  attack  upon  Anaxagoras 
for  introducing  creative  design  into  the  universe 
in  order  to  bring  coherence  out  of  chaos.  What 
need,  he  argued,  to  imagine  a  supernatural  agency 
in  order  to  get  rid  of  primeval  chaos,  when  we 
have  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  primeval  chaos 
ever  had  an  existence  save  as  a  figment  of  the 
metaphysician !  To  assume  that  the  present  or- 
derly system  of  relations  among  things  ever 
emerged  from  an  antecedent  state  of  disorder  is, 
as  he  justly  maintained,  a  wholly  arbitrary  and  un- 
warrantable proceeding.  No  one  could  ask  for  a 
simpler  or  more  incisive  criticism  upon  that  crude 


Chauncey  Wright.  105 

species  of  theism  which  represents  the  Deity  as  a 
power  outside  the  universe  which  coerces  it  into 
orderly  behaviour. 

Although,  like  all  consistent  positivists,  Mr. 
Wright  waged  unceasing  war  against  Mr.  Spen- 
cer's system  of  philosophy,  there  was  yet  one  por- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  which  found  in 
him  a  most  eminent  and  efficient  defender.  In 
spite  of  his  objections  to  evolution  in  general,  Mr. 
Wright  thoroughly  appreciated  and  warmly  es- 
poused the  Darwinian  theory  of  the  origin  of  spe- 
cies by  "  descent  with  modifications."  His  most 
important  literary  work  was  done  in  elucidation 
and  defence  of  this  theory.  Of  all  his  writings, 
by  far  the  clearest  and  most  satisfactory  to  read  is 
the  review  of  Mr.  Mivart's  "  Genesis  of  Species," 
which  Mr.  Darwin  thought  it  worth  while  to  re- 
print and  circulate  in  England.  Its  acute  and 
original  illustrations  of  the  Darwinian  theory  give 
it  very  great  value.  The  essay  on  phyllotaxy, 
explaining  the  origin  and  uses  of  the  arrange- 
ments of  leaves  in  plants,  is  a  contribution  of 
very  great  importance  to  the  theory  of  natural 
selection.  So,  too,  in  a  different  sense,  is  the  pa- 
per on  the  evolution  of  self-consciousness,  which 
is  the  most  elaborate  of  Mr.  Wright's  productions, 
but  so  full  of  his  worst  faults  of  style  that,  even 


106          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

after  much  cross-questioning  of  the  author,  I 
never  felt  quite  sure  that  I  grasped  his  central 
meaning. 

It  was  in  such  detached  essays  or  monographs 
as  these  that  much  was  to  have  been  expected 
from  Mr.  Wright,  especially  in  the  application  of 
Darwinian  conceptions  to  the  study  of  psychol- 
ogy. Could  he  have  been  induced  to  undertake 
an  elaborate  treatise,  we  should  have  seen  the 
philosophy  of  Mill  and  Bain  carried  to  its  furthest 
development  and  illustrated  with  Darwinian  sug- 
gestions by  a  writer  not  in  sympathy  with  the 
general  doctrine  of  evolution,  —  an  interesting 
and  instructive  spectacle.  But  I  doubt  if  Mr. 
Wright  would  ever  have  undertaken  an  extensive 
•work.  To  sit  down  and  map  out  a  subject  for 
systematic  exploration  would  have  been  a  pro- 
ceeding wholly  foreign  to  his  habits.  Once 
launched  out  on  a  shoreless  sea  of  speculation,  he 
would  brood  and  ponder  for  weeks,  while  bright 
determining  thoughts  would  occur  to  him  at  seem- 
ing haphazard,  like  the  rational  combinations  of 
phenomena  in  his  theory  of  "cosmic  weather." 
To  his  suggestive  and  stimulating  conversation 
this  unsystematic  habit  gave  additional  charm. 
An  evening's  talk  with  Mr.  Wright  always  seemed 
to  me  one  of  the  richest  of  intellectual  entertain- 


Chauncey  Wright.  107 

merits,  but  there  was  no  telling  how  or  where  it 
would  end.  At  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  he 
would  perhaps  take  his  hat  and  saunter  home- 
ward with  me  by  way  of  finishing  the  subject; 
but  on  reaching  my  gate  a  new  suggestion  would 
turn  us  back,  —  and  so  we  would  alternately  es- 
cort each  other  home  perhaps  a  dozen  times,  until 
tired  Nature  asserted  her  rights,  and  the  newly 
opening  vistas  of  discussion  were  regretfully  left 
unexplored. 

I  never  knew  an  educated  man  who  set  so  little 
store  by  mere  reading,  except  Mr.  Herbert  Spen- 
cer ;  but,  like  Mr.  Spencer,  whom  he  resembled  in 
little  else,  Mr.  Wright  had  an  incomprehensible 
way  of-  absorbing  all  sorts  of  knowledge,  great 
and  small,  until  the  number  of  diverse  subjects  on 
which  he  could  instruct  even  trained  specialists 
was  quite  surprising.  There  were  but  few  topics 
on  which  he  had  not  some  acute  suggestion  to 
offer ;  and  with  regard  to  matters  of  which  he 
was  absolutely  ignorant  —  such  as  music  —  his 
general  good  sense  and  his  lack  of  impulsiveness 
prevented  his  ever  talking  foolishly. 

This  lack  of  impulsiveness,  a  kind  of  physical 
and  intellectual  inertness,  counted  for  a  great  deal 
both  in  his  excellences  and  in  his  shortcomings. 
His  movements  were  slow  and  ponderous,  his 


108  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

mild  blue  eye  never  lighted  with  any  other  ex- 
pression than  placid  good  humour,  and  his  voice 
never  varied  its  gentle  monotony.  His  absolute 
freedom  from  egotism  made  him  slow  to  take  of- 
fence, and  among  the  many  accidents  of  contro- 
versy there  was  none  which  could  avail  to  ruffle 
him.  The  patient  deference  with  which  he  would 
answer  the  silly  remarks  of  stupid  or  conceited 
people  was  as  extraordinary  as  the  untiring  in- 
terest with  which  he  would  seek  to  make  things 
plain  to  the  least  cultivated  intelligence.  This 
kind  of  patient  interest,  joined  with  his  sweet- 
ness of  disposition  and  winning  simplicity  of  man- 
ner, made  him  a  great  favourite  with  children. 
He  would  amuse  and  instruct  them  by  the  hour 
together  with  games  and  stories  and  conjurer's 
tricks,  in  which  he  had  acquired  no  mean  pro- 
ficiency. 

Along  with  this  absence  of  emotional  excita- 
bility, Mr.  Wright  was  characterized  by  the  ab- 
sence of  sesthetic  impulses  or  needs.  He  was 
utterly  insensible  to  music,  and  but  slightly  af- 
fected by  artistic  beauty  of  any  sort.  Excepting 
his  own  Sokratic  presence,  there  never  was  any- 
thing attractive  about  his  room,  or  indeed  any- 
thing to  give  it  an  individual  character.  In  ro- 
mance, too,  he  was  equally  deficient :  after  his 


Chauncey  Wright.  109 

first  and  only  journey  to  Europe,  I  observed  that 
he  recalled  sundry  historic  streets  of  London  and 
Paris  only  as  spots  where  some  happy  generaliza- 
tion had  occurred  to  him. 

But  romantic  sentiment,  aesthetic  sensitiveness, 
and  passionate  emotion, — these  are  among  the 
things  which  hinder  most  of  us  from  resting  con- 
tent with  a  philosophy  which  applies  the  law  of 
parsimony  so  rigorously  as  to  cut  away  every- 
thing except  the  actuality  of  observed  phenomena. 
In  his  freedom  from  all  such  kinds  of  extra-ra- 
tional solicitation  Mr.  Wright  most  completely 
realized  the  ideal  of  the  positive  philosopher.  His 
positivism  was  an  affair  of  temperament  as  much 
as  of  conviction ;  and  he  illustrates  afresh  the 
profound  truth  of  Goethe's  remark  that  a  man's 
philosophy  is  but  the  expression  of  his  person- 
ality. In  his  simplicity  of  life,  serenity  of  mood, 
and  freedom  from  mental  or  material  wants,  he 
well  exemplified  the  principles  and  practice  of 
Epikuros ;  and  he  died  as  peacefully  as  he  had 
lived,  —  on  a  summer's  night,  sitting  at  his  desk 
with  his  papers  before  him. 

It  is  a  bitter  thing  to  lose  a  thinker  of  this 
mould,  just  in  the  prime  vigour  of  life,  and  at  a 
time  when  the  growing  habit  of  writing  seemed 
to  be  making  authorship  easier  and  pleasanter,  so 


110  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

that  in  years  to  come  we  were  likely  to  have  had 
even  richer  and  brighter  thoughts  from  the  pen 
that  must  now  forever  lie  idle.  The  general  fla- 
vour of  Mr.  Wright's  philosophy  —  unsystematic, 
but  fruitful  in  hints  —  may  be  gathered  well 
enough  from  the  papers  which  Mr.  Norton  has 
carefully  collected  in  this  memorial  volume.  But 
the  best  that  can  now  be  done  in  the  way  of 
editing  will  give  but  an  inadequate  impression  of 
Chauncey  Wright  to  those  who  have  not  listened 
to  his  wise  and  pleasant  talk.  To  have  known 
such  a  man  is  an  experience  one  cannot  forget  or 
outlive.  To  have  had  him  pass  away,  leaving  so 
scanty  a  record  of  what  he  had  it  in  him  to  utter, 
is  nothing  less  than  a  public  calamity. 

December,  1876. 


VII. 

WHAT   IS  INSPIRATION? 

THE  word  "  inspiration  "  furnishes  an  excellent 
example  of  the  way  in  which  a  whole  theory  of 
the  universe  may  be  imbedded  in  an  etymology. 
In  its  origin  the  word  means  a  "  breathing  in,"  or 
suggestion  from  some  external  source,  of  thoughts 
not  natural  to  the  writer  or  speaker.  The  non- 
naturalness  of  the  thought  is  an  essential  part  of 
the  definition,  since,  if  the  thought  be  such  as 
would  naturally  arise,  through  ordinary  logical  or 
emotional  sequence,  in  the  mind  of  the  writer  or 
speaker,  there  is  no  reason  for  referring  it  to  any 
external  source.  That  thoughts  often  do  come 
into  the  mind  unbidden,  and  apparently  without 
any  assignable  immediate  antecedent,  is  a  matter 
of  the  commonest  experience.  From  the  purpose- 
less succession  of  phantasms  in  idle  reverie  up 
to  the  orderly  visions  of  Milton,  the  melodious 
themes  of  Beethoven,  or  even  the  wonderful 
flashes  of  insight  of  Newton  or  Faraday,  we  have 
instances  of  visual  or  auditory  images,  or  appre- 


112  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

hensions  of  physical  truths,  entering  and  occupy- 
ing the  foreground  of  consciousness  suddenly  and 
without  warning.  The  more  valuable  and  strik- 
ing instances  of  this  sort  are,  in  modern  parlance, 
described  as  cases  of  inspiration,  though  by  this 
phrase  no  more  is  now  meant  than  to  designate 
some  rare  or  admirable  kind  of  normal  mental  ac- 
tion. The  modern  student  has  learned  that  con- 
sciousness has  a  background  as  well  as  a  fore- 
ground, —  that  a  number  of  mental  processes  go 
on  within  us,  of  which  we  cannot  always  render 
a  full  and  satisfactory  account.  Many  a  link  of 
association  is  buried  beneath  the  surface,  and  the 
coveted  flash  of  memory,  of  judgment,  or  of  fancy 
does  not  always  come  at  our  bidding.  To  account 
for  this  group  of  phenomena,  modern  psycholo- 
gists have  propounded  various  theories  of  "  latent 
mental  action  "  or  "  unconscious  cerebration ;  " 
but  no  one  now  resorts  to  the  hypothesis  that 
such  phenomena  are  due  to  the  operation  of  some 
outside  spirit  or  intelligence  acting  upon  the 
mind.  Hypotheses  of  this  sort  do  not  harmonize 
with  the  accumulated  experience  of  modern  times, 
and  they  have  become  utterly  and  hopelessly  dis- 
credited. 

In  ancient  times,  however,  the  case  was  entirely 
different.     In  one  of  the  most  enlightened   and 


What  is  Inspiration  ?  113 

sceptical  communities  of  antiquity  we  find  one  of 
the  most  enlightened  and  sceptical  minds  habitu- 
ally explaining  the  suggestions  of  its  own  supreme 
common  sense  by  ascribing  them  to  the  dictation 
of  an  indescribable  external  agency.  The  daimo- 
nion,  or  familiar  warning  spirit,  of  Sokrates  shows 
how  consonant  with  the  general  theories  of  the 
ancients  was  the  conception  of  inspiration  in  its 
full  and  literal  sense.  In  the  stage  of  culture 
thus  exemplified  every  bright  stroke  of  genius  was 
interpreted  as  the  result  of  inspiration,  though  it 
was  naturally  in  cases  of  supreme  practical  im- 
portance that  the  interpretation  was  most  forcibly 
felt  and  most  thoroughly  believed.  The  poet's 
invocation  to  the  Muse  was  at  first  no  doubt  much 
more  than  a  faded  metaphor ;  but  it  is  beyond 
question  that  men  like  Isaiah  and  Mohammed  be- 
lieved themselves  to  be  mere  mouth-pieces  of  the 
living  word  of  God. 

The  belief  in  inspiration,  as  thus  generally 
cherished  in  ancient  times,  seems  to  have  grown 
out  of  a  more  primitive  belief  in  possession,  which 
is  found  everywhere  current  among  savage  and 
barbarous  tribes,  and  which,  until  within  a  few 
generations,  has  maintained  itself  even  in  the 
Christian  world.  The  subject  has  been  treated 
hi  an  elaborate  and  masterly  manner  by  Mr.  Ty- 


114  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

lor  in  the  second  volume  of  his  great  work  on 
"  Primitive  Culture."  In  the  lower  stages  of  cul- 
ture, the  morbid  phenomena  of  hysteria,  epilepsy, 
and  mania  are  explained  by  the  hypothesis  of  a 
foreign  spirit,  which  is  supposed  to  have  taken 
temporary  possession  of  the  body  or  earthly  taber- 
nacle of  the  patient.  In  Christian  cases  of  exor- 
cism, this  foreign  spirit  was  naturally  supposed  to 
be  of  diabolical  character ;  but  in  the  cruder  the- 
ory of  the  barbarian  no  such  uncanny  suspicion 
is  attached  to  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  possessed 
person  is  usually  regarded  as  an  exceptionally 
valuable  source  of  information  concerning  the  su- 
pernatural world  to  which  the  possessing  spirit 
belongs.  Alike  in  the  medicine-man  of  the  Amer- 
ican Indian,  and  in  the  Pythian  priestess  of  Del- 
phi, may  be  seen  the  close  theoretical  connection 
between  disease-possession  and  oracle-possession. 
The  Zulu  diviners  ascribe  their  hysterical  symp- 
toms to  possession  by  "  amatongo,"  or  ancestral 
spirits  ;  and  the  Siberian  shamans  select  epileptic 
children  to  be  educated  for  the  priesthood,  which 
is  thus  "  apt  to  become  hereditary  along  with  the 
epileptic  tendencies  it  belongs  to."  In  the  prim- 
itive theory,  the  diviner  or  prophet  can  give  in- 
formation from  the  supernatural  world  because 
bis  own  personality  is  for  the  time  being  sup- 


What  is  Inspiration?  115 

planted  by  the  personality  of  the  foreign  spirit 
which  has  come  to  dwell  in  his  body.  This  is 
the  theory  of  oracle-possession,  and  from  this  to 
the  theory  of  inspiration,  as  generally  current  in 
antiquity,  it  is  evidently  but  a  short  step.  Instead 
of  supplanting  the  personality  of  the  prophet,  the 
foreign  spirit  has  but  to  be  conceived  as  swaying 
or  influencing  the  prophet's  mind  from  without, 
and  this  step  is  taken  ;  instead  of  possession  we 
have  inspiration. 

Thus  in  its  origin  the  word  "  inspiration "  is 
implicated  with  a  whole  theory  of  the  universe,  — 
or,  to  speak  more  appropriately,  with  a  general 
way  of  looking  at  natural  phenomena.  In  the 
lower  stages  of  culture  men  know  nothing  of  a 
universe,  but  they  contemplate  natural  phenomena 
as  under  the  capricious  direction  of  innumerable 
ghostly  beings  similar  to  men.  In  most  cases,  in- 
deed, these  demons  or  deities  are  supposed  to  be 
the  ghosts  of  ancestral  chieftains.  The  philoso- 
phy which  interprets  Nature  in  this  way  is  ex- 
tremely crude,  but  it  is  quite  intelligible  and  con- 
sistent with  itself  ;  and,  when  a  barbarian  speaks 
of  his  prophet  as  "  inspired  "  by  the  tutelary  de- 
ity of  the  tribe,  we  know  exactly  what  he  means. 
He  means  that  the  words  are  whispered  or  other- 
wise suggested  to  the  prophet  by  the  ghost  of 


116  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

gome  old  chief  of  the  tribe  ;  and,  when  he  himself 
has  thoughts,  waking  or  sleeping,  which  he  can- 
not readily  account  for,  he  thinks  that  these  are 
similarly  suggested  to  him  by  some  ghostly  de- 
mon or  deity.  The  daimonion  of  Sokrates  was  a 
specimen  of  just  this  sort  of  barbaric  psychology. 
Now,  in  modern  times  and  among  Christian 
peoples,  this  primitive  philosophy  of  Nature  is 
pretty  thoroughly  superseded.  The  tendency  of 
modern  thought  is  strongly  towards  a  very  strict 
monotheism.  An  imperfect  monotheism  had  long 
ago  driven  out  the  general  notion  of  innumerable 
ghost-deities  ;  but  Christianity  arose  at  a  time 
when  the  primitive  philosophy  was  still  very 
strong,  and  so  Christianity  has  always  been  more 
or  less  incrusted  with  heathen  conceptions.  In 
recent  times,  however,  the  prolonged  study  of 
physical  science  has  begun  to  tell  powerfully  upon 
all  our  habits  of  thought ;  and  one  effect  of  this 
is  that  we  have  at  last  really  begun  to  grasp  the 
conception  of  the  unity  of  God,  in  the  only  sense 
in  which  such  a  conception  can  have  any  validity. 
We  have  begun  to  conceive  of  Divine  action  as 
uniform,  incessant,  and  general,  throughout  each 
and  every  region  of  the  universe,  however  vast  or 
however  tiny,  so  that  the  infinite  whole  is  ani. 
mated  forever  by  one  immutable  principle  of 


What  is  Inspiration  ?  117 

life ;  and  this  conception  we  call,  in  common  par- 
lance, the  conception  of  a  government  of  law,  and 
not  of  caprice.  So  strong  has  this  habit  become 
that  we  look  with  distrust  upon  any  hypothesis 
which  implies  a  conception  of  Divine  action  as  in 
any  sense  local,  or  special,  or  transitory. 

The  hypothesis  of  inspiration  has  been  retained 
by  modern  Protestant  Christianity,  chiefly  as  a 
means  of  accounting  for  the  assumed  infallibility 
or  supernatural  excellence  of  the  literature  gath- 
ered together  in  the  canonical  Scriptures.  It  is 
supposed  that  the  writers  of  these  works  were  in 
some  way  instructed  by  Divine  action,  so  that 
their  works  are  either  entirely  true  in  every  state- 
ment, or  at  least  may  claim  to  be  examined  in 
accordance  with  different  canons  of  criticism  from 
those  which  we  feel  bound  to  apply  to  all  other 
works.  Now,  this  hypothesis  most  certainly  im- 
plies a  conception  of  Divine  action  as  local,  spe- 
cial, and  transitory ;  and,  in  so  far  as  it  does  this, 
it  bears  the  marks  of  that  heathen  mode  of  philos- 
ophizing which  was  current  when  Christian  mono- 
theism arose,  and  which  has  incrusted  Christianity 
with  many  of  its  conceptions.  It  is  obviously  not 
an  hypothesis  in  accord  with  the  very  strict  mono- 
theism towards  which  modern  thought  is  so  mani- 
festly tending,  and  it  is  not  likely  long  to  survive 


118  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

unless  upheld  by  very  weighty  evidence.  Such 
evidence  might  be  forthcoming  if  the  various 
books  of  the  Bible  had  been  found  able  to  with- 
stand every  test  of  scientific  and  literary  criticism 
that  could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  them,  and 
come  out  unscathed  in  every  statement.  Such  a 
phenomenon  would  at  least  have  been  very  re- 
markable, but  in  point  of  fact  the  outcome  of 
Biblical  criticism  has  been  very  different  from 
this.  A  century  of  intense  study  and  searching 
controversy  has  superabundantly  proved  that  the 
Bible  not  only  contains  much  that  conflicts  both 
with  modern  knowledge  and  with  modern  moral- 
ity, but  that  the  various  parts  of  it  often  hope- 
lessly contradict  each  other  in  matters  of  fact,  and 
sometimes  present  irreconcilable  divergences  in 
matters  of  doctrine,  while  minor  errors  of  histor- 
ical or  philological  interpretation  abound  in  it 
throughout.  In  view  of  such  a  conclusion  there 
would  seem  to  be  no  need  for  any  hypothesis  of 
special  Divine  action  in  the  composition  of  the 
Bible.  On  the  contrary,  the  belief  in  the  peculiar 
inspiration  of  this  collection  of  books  should  prob- 
ably be  regarded  as  one  of  the  incumbrances  with 
which  Christianity  has  been  loaded  by  the  old 
heathen  way  of  looking  at  things. 

A  sad  incumbrance  it  certainly  is  to  any  one 


What  is  Inspiration?  119 

who  truly  loves  and  reveres  the  Bible.  To  make 
a  fetish  of  the  best  of  books  does  not,  after  all, 
seem  to  be  the  most  reverent  way  of  treating  it. 
Take  away  the  discredited  hypothesis  of  infalli- 
bility, and  the  errors  of  statement  and  crudities 
of  doctrine  at  once  become  of  no  consequence,  and 
cease  to  occupy  our  attention.  It  no  longer  seems 
worth  while  to  write  puerile  essays  to  show  that 
the  Elohist  was  versed  in  all  the  conclusions  of 
modern  geology,  or  that  the  books  of  Kings  and 
Chronicles  tell  the  same  story.  The  spiritual 
import  of  this  wonderful  collection  of  writings 
becomes  its  most  prominent  aspect ;  and,  freed 
from  the  exigencies  of  a  crude  philosophy  and  an 
inane  criticism,  the  Bible  becomes  once  more  the 
Book  of  mankind. 

August,  1878. 


VIII. 

MODERN  WITCHCRAFT.1 

ON  this  most  dismal  of  subjects  Dr.  Hammond 
has  given  us  a  book  that  is  both  sensible  and  en- 
tertaining. His  survey  of  so-called  "  spiritualis- 
tic "  phenomena  is  extensive,  and  with  a  large  and 
important  part  of  them  his  intimate  acquaintance 
with  abnormal  states  of  the  nervous  system  has 
enabled  him  to  deal  very  successfully.  The  re- 
sults of  a  physician's  experience  are,  moreover, 
very  happily  supplemented  by  historical  research. 
One  of  the  excellent  points  about  Dr.  Hammond's 
book  is  its  frequent  comparison  of  contemporary 
delusions  with  those  of  earlier  times.  He  makes 
such  wholesome  use  of  the  annals  of  witchcraft 
and  the  biographies  of  mediseval  saints,  mystics, 
and  charlatans,  as  fairly  entitles  his  book  to  a 
prominent  place  on  the  Index  Expurgatorius. 
The  marvels  countenanced  from  time  to  time  by 

l  Spiritualism  and  Allied  Causes  and  Conditions  of  Nervous  De- 
rangement. By  W.  A.  Hammond,  M.  D.  New  York:  G.  P.  Put- 
nam and  Sons.  1876. 


Modern  Witchcraft.  121 

the  Roman  Church  fare  no  better  in  his  hands 
than  the  wonderful  deeds  of  the  Homes  and  the 
Davenports,  and  of  these  it  is  left  doubtful 
whether  the  most  marvellous  part  is  the  audacity 
of  the  performers  or  the  gullibility  of  the  spec- 
tators. 

According  to  Dr.  Hammond,  spiritualism  is  for 
the  most  part  barefaced  imposture,  the  remainder 
being  innocent  delusion.  By  many  persons  who 
adopt  this  view  on  the  whole,  yet  are  unable  to 
realize  how  great  is  the  capacity  of  the  human 
mind  for  being  deceived,  a  reservation  is  made  in 
behalf  of  divers  phenomena  which  are  alleged  to 
take  place  in  conformity  to  some  undiscovered 
"  natural  law,"  or  to  require  for  their  explanation 
some  species  of  "  force "  other  than  those  with 
which  scientific  men  are  familiar.  Dr.  Hammond 
is  not  inclined  to  admit  any  such  reservation  as 
this,  which,  even  if  it  were  allowed,  would  be  of 
small  use  to  the  spiritualists.  Even  if  an  event 
were  admitted  to  be  inexplicable  save  by  an  ap- 
peal to  some  "  force  "  other  than  those  that  have 
hitherto  been  studied,  we  should  still  have  no  sort 
of  reason  for  assuming  any  connection  between 
this  unknown  "  force  "  and  the  "  spirits  "  of  de- 
ceased persons.  Such  an  assumption  could  find 
no  warrant  whatever,  save  in  a  general  a  priori 


122  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

hypothesis,  handed  down  to  us  from  barbarous 
times,  which  has  been  uniformly  discredited  wher- 
ever there  has  been  an  opportunity  for  testing  it. 
Even  to  describe  such  a  "  force  "  as  "  psychic  "  is 
to  beg  the  whole  question ;  for  until  we  have  sub- 
jected it  to  a  long  course  of  experimentation,  like 
that  which  has  built  up  our  scientific  knowledge 
of  heat  and  light,  we  can  have  no  means  of  know- 
ing whether  it  is  "  psychic  "  or  not. 

It  is,  however,  very  unphilosophical  at  the  out- 
set to  appeal  to  any  new  or  unknown  force  until 
we  have  thoroughly  exhausted  all  means  of  ex- 
planation furnishable  by  forces  that  have  already 
been  defined  ;  and  by  the  advocates  of  spiritualism 
no  such  preliminary  inquiry  has  ever  been  made 
or  even  attempted.  When,  therefore,  Mr.  Crookes 
finds  himself  unable  to  explain  the  way  in  which 
Mr.  Home  causes  the  index  of  a  spring-balance  to 
descend  without  exerting  any  apparent  pressure 
on  the  lever,  it  is  a  very  violent  stretch  of  in- 
ference to  call  in  an  imaginary  "  psychic  force  " 
by  way  of  simplifying  the  matter.  This  is  ap- 
pealing from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  and  it 
is  in  no  such  way  that  discoveries  are  made  in 
those  physical  sciences  which  Mr.  Crookes  has  so 
carefully  studied.  Dr.  Hammond  may  well  say 
that  "there  are  so  many  ways  in  which  known 


Modern  Witchcraft.  123 

forces  manifest  themselves,  and  so  little  is  known 
of  the  laws  which  govern  them,  that  Mr.  Crookes 
might,  for  the  present,  with  safety  and  propriety, 
have  held  his  opinion  in  abeyance."  As  Mr. 
Crookes's  experiment  is  the  only  one  cited  in 
which  the  spiritualists  seem  to  have  been  able  to 
work  in  broad  daylight,  and  to  dispense  with  the 
grosser  forms  of  jugglery,  a  brief  description  of  it 
may  prove  instructive.  • 

In  order  to  test  Mr.  Home's  pretensions  to  a 
power  of  altering  the  weights  of  bodies  by  "  spir- 
itual agency,"  Mr.  Crookes  constructed  a  simple 
and  ingenious  apparatus  "  consisting  of  a  mahog- 
any board  thirty-six  inches  long  by  nine  and  a 
half  inches  wide  and  one  inch  thick.  At  one  end 
a  strip  of  mahogany  was  screwed  on,  forming  a 
foot,  the  length  of  which  equalled  the  width  of 
the  board.  This  end  of  the  board  rested  on  [the 
edge  of]  a  table,  while  the  other  end  was  sup- 
ported by  a  spring-balance  "  pendent  from  a  tri- 
pod stand.  Obviously,  now,  when  Mr.  Home 
placed  the  tips  of  his  fingers  lightly  on  the  end  of 
the  board  which  was  resting  on  the  foot  or  ful- 
crum, the  pointer  of  the  balance  ought  to  have 
remained  perfectly  stationary  ;  even  a  heavy  pres- 
sure directly  over  the  fulcrum  could  not  alter  the 
position  of  the  lever.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 


124  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

the  pointer  descended,  showing  that  the  weight 
or  downward  pull  at  the  end  of  the  lever  sup- 
ported by  the  balance  had  been  increased  by  from 
three  to  six  pounds.  In  order  still  further  to 
guard  against  the  possibility  of  Mr.  Home's  ex- 
erting any  muscular  action  on  the  board,  Mr. 
Crookes  placed  a  glass  vessel  full  of  water  over 
the  centre  of  the  fulcrum,  "  and  by  means  of  an 
iron  stand,  quite  detached  from  all  the  rest  of  the 
apparatus,  a  vessel  of  copper  was  held  so  that  it 
dipped  into  the  water  without  touching  the  sides 
of  the  glass  vessel,  the  bottom  of  the  copper  ves- 
sel being  perforated  with  holes,  in  consequence 
of  which  it  was  partially  filled  with  water.  .  .  . 
When  Mr.  Home  placed  his  hands  inside  the  cop- 
per vessel,  any  force  passing  through  his  hands 
had  to  traverse  the  water  hence  no  muscular  ac- 
tion of  his  could  have  any  effect  upon  the  spring- 
balance.  With  the  apparatus  thus  arranged,  the 
lever  oscillated  as  in  his  previous  experiment, 
the  average  strain  registered  being  three  or  four 
pounds." 

Such  were  the  phenomena  to  explain  which 
Mr.  Crookes  invoked  the  assistance  of  an  un- 
known something  which  it  pleased  his  fancy  to 
call  "psychic  force,"  while  his  companion,  Dr. 
Huggins,  more  wisely  declined  to  express  any 


Modern  Witchcraft.  125 

opinion.  In  connection  with  these  phenomena, 
Dr.  Hammond  calls  attention  to  an  experiment 
of  Professor  Tyndall's,  in  which  an  egg  is  placed 
in  an  egg-cup  and  a  long  lath  balanced  upon  the 
egg :  if  a  dry  stick  of  sealing-wax,  which  has  been 
well  rubbed  with  a  piece  of  woollen  cloth,  be  held 
over  one  end  of  the  lath,  the  latter,  no  matter 
how  heavy,  will  rise  to  meet  it.  In  dry  weather 
many  persons  can  make  the  finger  serve  the  same 
purpose  as  the  sealing-wax,  by  first  shuffling  their 
feet  for  a  few  moments  over  the  carpet.  Taking 
these  things  into  consideration,  Dr.  Hammond 
arranged  an  apparatus  like  that  of  Mr.  Crookes, 
and,  applying  the  stick  of  sealing-wax  just  over 
the  fulcrum,  where  Mr.  Home's  finger-tips  had 
rested,  the  pointer  of  the  balance  at  once  de- 
scended. The  same  result  was  immediately  af- 
terwards obtained  when,  after  shuffling  over  a 
thick  rug,  Dr.  Hammond  rested  his  finger  on  the 
same  place.  So  far,  therefore,  the  strain  on  the 
balance  would  seem  to  be  due  neither  to  ghosts 
of  departed  men  nor  to  "  psychic  force,"  but  to 
some  peculiar  manifestation  of  that  commonplace 
agent,  friction  electricity.  How  far  Dr.  Ham- 
mond's experiments  may  be  conclusive,  it  is  not 
in  our  power  to  say.  What  it  concerns  us  to 
notice  is  that  his  method  of  going  to  work,  by 


126  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

searching  for  some  analogous  case  within  the  re- 
gion of  experience,  is  the  method  of  science  and 
common  sense,  whereas  Mr.  Crookes's  method,  of 
deserting  the  region  of  experience  in  quest  of 
some  "  psychic  force,"  is  the  method  which  char- 
acterizes alike  the  barbaric  myth-maker  and  the 
ill-trained  thinker  in  a  civilized  community.  So 
long  as  scientific  men  are  capable  of  doing  such 
unscientific  things,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
that  primitive  superstitions  still  survive. 

Some  of  Mr.  Home's  other  tricks  are  suggestive 
in  another  way.  The  feat  of  making  a  small 
table  so  heavy  that  the  credulous  bystander  can- 
not stir  it  from  the  floor  shows  what  curious  re- 
sults may  be  obtained  from  highly  impressionable 
people  by  riveting  their  attention.  Dr.  Ham- 
mond has  himself  performed  this  trick  with  entire 
success.  Taking  a  small  Japanese  table,  weigh- 
ing less  than  two  pounds,  he  informed  a  young 
man  that  he  was  going  to  make  it  too  heavy  to 
be  raised  from  the  floor.  For  a  Quarter  of  an 
hour  he  held  the  tips  of  his  fingers  on  it,  until 
the  young  man's  attention  became  riveted,  when 
he  removed  his  hands  and  challenged  the  young 
man  to  lift  the  table.  It  proved  immovable,  and 
"  I  saw,"  says  our  author,  "  that  so  far  from 
endeavouring  to  lift  it,  as  he  supposed  he  was 


Modern  Witchcraft.  127 

doing,  he  was  in  reality  pressing  it  with  all  his 
might  towards  the  floor."  But  as  soon  as  Dr. 
Hammond  had  waved  his  hand  over  the  table 
and  declared  that  it  might  now  be  lifted,  the 
young  man  lifted  it  with  ease.  Scientifically 
viewed,  such  phenomena  are  very  interesting; 
they  seem  closely  akin  to  the  phenomena  of  hyp- 
notism in  men  and  animals,  so  strikingly  illus- 
trated in  the  experiments  of  Kircher  and  Czer- 
mak.  Hens  and  pigeons  can  easily  be  put  into 
a  cataleptic  state  by  holding  a  cork  or  a  bit  of 
chalk  before  their  eyes  so  as  to  attract  their  at- 
tention ;  and  in  a  similar  way  a  frog's  attention 
may  be  so  absorbed  that  his  belly  may  be  cut 
open  without  his  seeming  to  notice  it.  Mr.  Braid 
has  similarly  hypnotized  men ;  and  Dr.  Hammond 
produced  complete  anaesthesia  in  a  lady  by  caus- 
ing her  to  look  for  a  few  moments  at  a  cork 
fastened  upon  her  forehead  while  her  back  was 
cauterized  with  a  red-hot  iron. 

As  for  Mr.  Home's  tricks  of  putting  live  coals 
into  his  waistcoat  pocket  and  on  other  people's 
bald  heads  with  impunity,  such  things  have  so 
long  been  commonplaces  with  second-rate  con- 
jurers that  it  is  astonishing  to  find  intelligent 
men  like  Mr.  Wallace  quoting  them  as  instances 
of  ghostly  agency.  Nothing  could  be  easier  for  a 


128  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

clever  juggler  like  Mr.  Home  than  to  exchange 
real  coals  for  false  ones,  or  to  protect  his  own 
pockets  and  the  heads  of  his  dupes  with  asbestos 
cloth,  without  attracting  notice.  Such  a  pro- 
ceeding would  require  far  less  skill  than  those  of 
professional  magicians,  like  Hermann  or  Houdin, 
in  comparison  with  whose  truly  wonderful  achieve- 
ments the  best  performances  of  spiritualists  are 
not  for  a  moment  worthy  to  be  named. 

Still  keeping  to  Mr.  Home,  his  famous  trick  of 
"  levitation,"  or  appearing  to  float  through  the  air 
out  of  one  third-story  window  into  another,  seems 
partly  to  illustrate  the  effects  of  intense  expecta- 
tion in  producing  hallucination,  partly  to  show  us 
for  the  thousandth  time  how  little  unsifted  human 
testimony  is  worth ;  for  on  one  occasion,  while 
two  "respectable  witnesses"  were  sure  that  they 
saw  the  great  "  medium  "  come  sailing  feet  fore- 
most through  the  window,  their  less  gullible  com- 
panion was  equally  positive  that  the  levitating  gen- 
tleman was  sitting  quietly  in  his  arm-chair  all  the 
while  !  Nothing  is  more  common  than  for  us  to  be 
told  what  people  of  undoubted  veracity  have  seen. 
For  my  own  part,  if  I  were  to  answer  frankly 
in  such  cases,  I  should  take  my  cue  from  a  cele- 
brated naturalist  whose  friend  was  recounting  to 
him  a  miraculous  shower  of  frogs  from  the  sky. 


Modern  Witchcraft.  129 

"  It  is  fortunate,"  said  he,  "  that  you  have  seen 
it,  for  now  I  can  believe  it.  If  I  had  seen  it 
myself,  I  should  not  have  believed  it !  "  The 
commonest  acts  of  perception  are  so  liable  to  be 
warped  by  hypothesis  (a  fact  which  conjurers 
like  Houdin  consummately  understand)  that  it  is 
quite  useless  to  conjecture  what  our  witnesses 
may  really  have  seen,  unless  we  know  much  more 
than  they  are  likely  to  tell  us  of  the  physical 
and  mental  conditions  under  which  their  seeing 
was  done.  At  a  meeting  of  spiritualists  in  Bos- 
ton, Mr.  Robert  Dale  Owen  once  saw  what  he 
took  to  be  an  "apparition  in  shining  raiment," 
being  quite  clear  in  his  mind  that  no  deception 
or  illusion  was  possible  under  the  circumstances. 
But  Dr.  Hammond,  making  a  diagram  of  the 
rooms  from  data  contained  in  Mr.  Owen's  ac- 
count, shows  that,  with  the  greatest  ease,  a 
"  woman  in  white "  might  have  been  brought 
into  the  room  and  illuminated  by  means  of  a 
dark  lantern  without  awakening  suspicion.  The 
case  of  Ange*lique  Cottin,  the  famous  "  electric 
girl,"  is  equally  instructive.  After  tipping  tables, 
repelling  books,  brushes,  and  other  small  objects, 
and  disturbing  magnetic  needles  before  numer- 
ous "  intelligent  audiences,"  her  alleged  powers 
were  carefully  investigated  by  a  committee  of  the 

9 


130  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Academy  of  Sciences,  consisting  of  Arago,  Bec- 
querel,  Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire,  and  others.  Tables, 
books,  brushes,  and  magnetic  needles,  all  kept 
most  provokingly  quiet,  and  the  "  electric  girl " 
subsided  into  oblivion.  So,  numbers  of  people 
who  watched  the  "  Welsh  fasting-girl "  were 
quite  sure  that  she  subsisted  without  food ;  but, 
when  really  competent  watchers  were  introduced, 
the  poor  creature  died  of  starvation,  destroyed 
by  her  own  obstinacy  and  the  criminal  acquies- 
cence of  her  parents. 

We  have  touched  upon  but  few  of  the  topics 
treated  in  Dr.  Hammond's  book.  Into  his  elab- 
orate discussion  of  the  painful  and  often  disgust- 
ing phenomena  of  hysteria,  ecstasy,  and  stigmat- 
ization,  we  have  not  space  to  follow  him.  His 
subject  is  one  which  leads  the  inquirer  into  some 
of  the  darkest  and  most  loathsome  corners  of  the 
human  mind ;  but  the  inquiry  has,  nevertheless, 
its  uses. 

July,  1876. 


IX. 

COMTE'S  POSITIVE  PHILOSOPHY.1 

IT  is  now  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  since, 
by  the  publication  of  the  last  volume  of  the 
"  Cours  de  Philosophie  Positive,"  Auguste  Comte 
completed  his  great  task  of  organizing  into  a  co- 
herent system  the  doctrines  held  and  the  methods 
of  investigation  pursued  by  scientific  men.  His 
work  was  not  long  in  obtaining  the  recognition  of 
advanced  thinkers ;  and  during  the  period  which 
has  elapsed  since  its  completion,  its  leading  views 
—  noticed  with  more  or  less  approval  by  Mr.  Mill, 
Mr.  Grote,  and  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  explained  and 
defended  by  Mr.  Lewes  and  M.  Littre*,  partially 
adopted  by  Mr.  Buckle,  adversely  criticised  by 
Mr.  Spencer,  and  violently  attacked  by  the  entire 
a  priori  school  of  philosophers  and  theologians  — 
have  seriously  occupied  the  attention  of  a  large 
part  of  the  thinking  public.  The  term  "  positiv- 
ism "  has  won  for  itself  a  place  in  the  vocabulary 

l  The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte.    By  John  Stuart  MilL 
Boston :  William  V.  Spencer.     1866.    12mo,  pp.  182. 


132  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

of  philosophy  beside  the  older  names  "  idealism  " 
and  "  scepticism,"  as  indicating  a  distinct  and  im- 
portant phase  in  the  development  of  speculative 
thought.  But  its  more  recent  introduction  into 
philosophic  language  has  not  availed  to  protect  it 
from  those  ambiguities  of  interpretation  which 
envelop,  as  with  a  halo,  the  latter  time-honoured 
appellations.  On  the  contrary,  so  far  are  most 
persons  from  having  a  distinct  idea  of  what  they 
mean  when  they  speak  of  positivism  that  it  is 
not  uncommon  to  hear  classed  as  positivists  men 
like  Professors  Tyndall  and  Huxley,  the  peculiar 
tendency  of  whose  opinions  has  been  but  slightly, 
if  at  all,  determined  by  the  speculations  of  M. 
Comte.  To  call  these  men  positivists  is  to  neces- 
sitate such  an  extension  of  the  term  as  to  include 
all  truly  scientific  investigators  of  phenomena, 
from  the  days  of  Galileo  and  Newton  downwards. 
This  vagueness  results  naturally  from  the  circum- 
stance that  many  of  M.  Comte's  most  prominent 
doctrines  did  not  originate  with  himself,  but  were 
held  by  him  in  common  with  many  thinkers,  both 
of  the  present  and  of  past  ages.  Not  only  as  a 
discoverer  of  new  truths,  but  as  an  organizer  of 
those  already  discovered,  did  he  announce  himself 
to  the  world. 

At  the  present  time,  when  such  a  general  inter- 


Comte's  Positive  Philosophy.  133 

est  is  felt  in  the  philosophy  of  M.  Comte,  and 
such  a  wide-spread  curiosity  is  manifested  to  know 
in  what  that  philosophy  really  consists,  a  work 
like  the  one  now  before  us  is  most  welcome.  Mr. 
Mill  is  admirably  qualified  to  furnish  us  with  a 
clear  and  trustworthy  exposition  of  the  Positive 
Philosophy.  His  own  researches  have  led  him 
over  the  same  paths  which  were  traversed  by  M. 
Comte,  and  the  results  of  his  meditations  on  the 
proper  methods  to  be  pursued  in  scientific  explora- 
tion were  laid  before  the  world  nearly  a  genera- 
tion ago,  in  his  "  System  of  Logic, "  —  a  work 
which  in  our  opinion  is  as  important  a  contribu- 
tion to  human  knowledge  as  the  "Philosophic 
Positive"  itself.  And  while,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  number  of  opinions  held  in  common  by  the 
two,  to  say  nothing  of  Mr.  Mill's  well-known  can- 
dour, is  a  sufficient  guaranty  for  the  fair  treatment 
of  the  subject,  on  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Mill's  emi- 
nence as  an  original  thinker  prevents  him  from 
ever  abdicating  the  position  of  a  critic  for  that  of 
a  disciple. 

In  common  with  the  majority  of  scientific  think- 
ers, M.  Comte  asserts  the  universality  and  inva- 
riability of  natural  laws  •,  and  he  coincides  in  the 
opinion,  held  by  one  great  school  of  psychologists 
since  Locke,  that  all  knowledge  is  derived  from 


134          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

experience.  But  his  emphatic  and  determined 
rejection  of  the  methods  of  subjective  psychology 
leaves  him  so  destitute  of  the  means  for  establish- 
ing this  doctrine  that  it  can  hardly  be  regarded 
as  a  coherent,  though  doubtless  an  indispensable, 
portion  of  his  system.  Allied  to  this  theorem  is 
that  of  the  relativity  of  all  knowledge,  which  also 
is  not  peculiar  to  the  Positive  Philosophy.  It  has 
been  held  with  more  or  less  consistency  by  a  vast 
number  of  thinkers  from  Protagoras  downward, 
including  in  the  list  of  its  adherents  many  whose 
antagonism  on  most  other  points  has  been  unqual- 
ified, —  men  such  as  Aristotle  and  Bruno,  Aver- 
roes  and  Bacon,  Hume  and  Kant.  In  relation  to 
this  dogma,  M.  Comte  is  the  natural  successor  of 
Brown.  As  Mr.  Mill  truly  remarks,  "  the  doc- 
trine and  spirit  of  Brown's  philosophy  are  en- 
tirely positivist,  and  no  better  introduction  to 
positivism  than  the  early  part  of  his  Lectures  has 
yet  been  produced."  While,  curiously  enough, 
Brown's  most  redoubtable  opponent,  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  has  also  verbally  adopted  this  positive 
theorem,  although  his  simultaneous  assertion  of 
the  principles  of  Natural  Dualism  sufficiently 
shows  that  he  never  really  understood  it.  Hume 
was  probably  its  first  consistent  supporter,  though 
he  often  pushes  scepticism  to  the  point  of  denial, 


Comte's  Positive  Philosophy.  135 

apparently  maintaining  the  relativity  not  only  of 
all  knowledge,  but  of  all  existence  likewise.  Not 
BO  M.  Cointe,  who  ever  implicitly  recognizes  the 
existence  of  noumena,  while  insisting  upon  their 
eternal  banishment  to  the  realm  of  the  Unknow- 
able. We  should  strive,  therefore,  not  to  ascer- 
tain the  causes  of  phenomena,  either  primary  or 
final,  but  only  to  formulate  the  laws  of  their  co- 
existence and  sequence.  With  the  study  of  phe- 
nomena as  causes,  i.  e.  as  invariable  antecedents 
of  other  phenomena,  M.  Comte  has  never,  as  it 
has  been  foolishly  asserted,  found  fault.  His  phi- 
losophy is  entirely  concerned  with  the  investiga- 
tion of  these,  in  distinction  from  noumenal  causes, 
the  origin  of  phenomena,  and  the  end  for  which 
they  exist.  Of  this  bridge  of  Time,  which  man 
and  Nature  alike  are  traversing,  he  forbids  us  to 
strain  our  vision  in  vain  efforts  to  discern  the  be- 
ginning and  the  end,  immersed  as  they  both  are 
in  the  utter  darkness  of  eternity. 

But  though  M.  Comte  did  not  originate  the 
doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  all  knowledge,  and 
though  while  ignoring  psychologic  research  he 
can  in  no  wise  prove  it,  he  has  yet,  as  Mr.  Mill 
observes,  made  it  in  a  great  measure  his  own  doc- 
trine by  his  method  of  treating  it.  The  first  dis- 
tinctive feature  of  his  philosophy  is  the  assertion 


136          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

that,  in  its  investigation  of  nature,  the  human 
mind  has  passed  through  three  essentially  different 
stages.  These  are,  first,  the  Theological  stage,  in 
which  all  phenomena  are  viewed  as  resulting  from 
the  volitions  of  supernatural  agents  ;  second,  the 
Metaphysical  stage,  in  which  phenomena  are  sup- 
posed to  be  determined  by  the  existence  of  inher- 
ent occult  causes ;  and,  third,  the  Positive  stage,  in 
which,  the  search  for  causes  being  abandoned,  the 
mind  rests  content  with  grouping  phenomena  ac- 
cording to  their  relations  of  coexistence  and  suc- 
cession. The  exposition  of  this  law  of  intellectual 
development  occupies  a  considerable  portion  of 
Mr.  Mill's  volume,  and  is,  we  think,  both  lucid 
and  profound.  But  we  cannot  go  so  far  as  Mr. 
Mill  in  accepting  the  theorem  as  a  true  and  ad- 
equate statement  of  the  course  which  the  human 
mind  has  pursued.  As  such  a  statement,  we  be- 
lieve it  to  be  imperfect  and  superficial,  though 
containing  a  sufficient  amount  of  truth  to  have 
made  its  application  to  the  study  of  history  result 
in  sundry  minor  generalizations  of  the  highest 
value.  The  "  positive "  method  of  contemplat- 
ing phenomena  is  doubtless  becoming  exclusively 
prevalent  with  scientific  explorers  ;  and  for  this 
reason,  the  name  "  positivism,"  after  losing  its 
more  special  connotations,  is  perhaps  destined  to 


Comte's  Positive  Philosophy.  137 

become  the  designation  of  scientific  thought  in 
general.  The  naturalistic  tendencies  observable 
in  Sokrates  and  Aristotle,  organized  by  Bacon 
and  Descartes,  and  represented  by  subsequent  dis- 
coverers, might  thus  without  inaccuracy  be  con- 
sidered "positive." 

The  second  distinctive  feature  of  M.  Comte's 
philosophy  is  its  arrangement  of  the  sciences  in 
such  an  order  that  those  which  deal  with  the  most 
general  and  least  complex  relations  are  studied 
prior  to  those  which  treat  of  relations  more  spe- 
cial and  involved.  M.  Comte  distinguishes  be- 
tween the  abstract  sciences,  "  which  have  to  do 
with  the  laws  which  govern  the  elementary  facts 
of  nature,"  and  the  concrete  sciences,  which  "  con- 
cern themselves  only  with  the  particular  com- 
binations of  phenomena  which  are  found  in  ex- 
istence." Thus  Physics  and  Chemistry  are  the 
abstract  sciences  corresponding  to  the  concrete 
science  Mineralogy,  while  Zoology  and  Botany 
deal  with  concrete  examples  of  the  abstract  laws 
enunciated  by  Physiology.  Leaving  the  concrete 
sciences  out  of  consideration,  M.  Comte  arranges 
the  abstract  sciences  as  follows :  I.  Mathematics  ; 
II.  Astronomy  ;  III.  Physics  (comprising  the  sci- 
ences of  Weight,  Heat,  Sound,  Light,  and  Elec- 
tricity) ;  IV.  Chemistry  ,  V.  Biology ;  and  VI. 


138  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Sociology.  In  the  arrangement  of  the  subdivis- 
ions of  each  science,  he  attempts  to  apply  the 
same  principle  of  advancing  from  the  general  to 
the  special :  thus,  in  Mathematics,  the  laws  of 
number  are  to  be  studied  before  those  of  magni- 
tude, and  these  again  before  those  of  equilibrium. 
In  the  arrangement  of  the  different  branches  of 
Physics,  however,  this  principle  evidently  fails; 
it  being  impossible  to  assert  that  the  phenomena 
of  weight  and  pressure  are  less  general  than  those 
of  heat,  or  perhaps  even  those  of  light.  The 
omission  of  a  science  of  Psychology  from  the 
above  scheme  will  be  deemed  by  most  persons  a 
grave  defect.  Nor  can  M.  Comte  be  said  to  have 
at  all  mended  the  matter  by  offering  us  in  its 
stead  (we  blush  to  tell  it)  the  wretched  substi- 
tute Phrenology.  In  spite  of  these  defects,  the 
advantages  of  studying  the  sciences  m  this  order 
will  be  disputed  by  no  one ;  it  being  manifest 
that  each  science  furnishes  almost  indispensable 
aid  to  the  study  of  its  successors,  while  throwing 
comparatively  little  light  on  the  subjects  treated 
by  its  predecessors.  Each  science,  too,  has  meth- 
ods of  investigation  peculiar  to  itself ;  and  it  is 
the  elaborate  statement  of  these  methods  that  we 
consider  the  most  permanently  valuable  of  M. 
Comte's  contributions  to  philosophy.  But  we  do 


Comte's  Positive  Philosophy.  139 

not  agree  with  the  statement  that  this  admirable 
arrangement  of  the  sciences  represents  the  true 
order  of  their  historic  development ;  and  that, 
while  each  science  has  experienced  successively 
the  application  of  the  theological,  the  metaphysi- 
cal, and  the  positive  methods,  the  order  in  which 
they  have  attained  the  positive  stage  conforms  to 
the  order  in  which  they  are  here  placed.  We  do 
not  believe  that  any  serial  arrangement  can  rep- 
resent either  the  true  relations  of  the  sciences  to 
each  other,  or  the  comparative  rapidity  with  which 
they  have  advanced  toward  perfection.  The  sim- 
plicity of  the  phenomena  with  which  they  deal 
is  far  from  being  the  only  condition  which  has 
determined  their  evolution.  And  we  therefore 
differ  from  Mr.  Mill  in  thinking  that  Mr.  Spen- 
cer has  entirely  destroyed  the  pretensions  of  M. 
Comte's  classification  to  be  considered  as  founded 
in  the  nature  of  things,  however  valuable  it  may 
be  as  a  help  to  study. 

It  is  on  his  contributions  to  our  knowledge  of 
the  laws  of  social  evolution  that  M.  Comte  chiefly 
prides  himself.  He  claims  the  right  to  be  called 
the  founder  and  legislator  of  the  science  of  soci- 
ety. We  are  not  among  the  number  of  those  who 
are  disposed  to  grant  him  this  lofty  title.  We  do 
not  even  think  that  the  science  of  society,  as  a 


140          Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

systematic  whole,  can  yet  be  said  to  exist.  Much 
has  indeed  been  done  to  prepare  the  way  for  such 
a  science.  Some  subordinate  discoveries  of  ines, 
timable  value  have  been  made,  and  it  has  been 
conclusively  shown  that  social  phenomena  are 
proper  objects  of  scientific  treatment.  Among 
the  pioneers  of  this  new  science,  M.  Comte  will 
always  hold  an  honourable  place.  His  treatment 
of  history  is  eminently  original  and  suggestive ; 
and  his  views,  even  when  not  wholly  true,  are 
rarely  without  a  large  amount  of  truth.  His  cath- 
olic spirit,  and  his  hearty  admiration  for  whatever 
is  great  and  good  in  the  past,  are  moral  qualities 
beyond  all  praise. 

It  is  impossible,  in  our  limited  space,  to  do 
more  than  allude  to  the  subjects  which  are  so 
admirably  elucidated  and  commented  on  in  Mr. 
Mill's  volume.  To  M.  Comte's  later  speculations 
we  do  not  wish  to  refer,  further  than  to  express 
our  opinion  that  they  are  a  tissue  of  the  wildest 
and  most  extravagant  vagaries  ever  conceived  out- 
side of  Bedlam ;  or,  remembering  all  that  the 
world  owes  M.  Comte,  we  might  less  harshly  and 
not  less  truly  call  them  the  most  mournful  exhi- 
bition furnished  by  the  annals  of  philosophy  of  a 
great  mind  utterly  shattered  and  ruined.  It  is  a 
spectacle  to  which  we  cannot  refuse  our  pitying 


Comte's  Positive  Philosophy.  141 

sympathy,  even  while  we  are  unable  to  repress 
our  contempt.  We  have  no  criticism  to  make  on 
Mr.  Mill's  treatment  of  the  subject,  which  is  in 
the  main  sober  and  just.  But  we  are  surprised 
at  the  remark  with  which  he  concludes  the  book, 
that  M.  Comte  should  be  considered  as  great  a 
thinker  as  either  Descartes  or  Leibnitz,  and  hardly 
more  extravagant  than  they.  M.  Comte's  achieve- 
ments have  indeed  been  great.  But  neither  in 
_,ne  amount  of  mental  effort  implied  by  them,  nor 
in  the  magnificence  of  their  consequences,  can 
they  ever  be  compared  to  Descartes's  application 
of  algebra  to  geometry,  or  to  Leibnitz's  discovery 
of  the  differential  calculus.  Our  surprise  is  all 
the  greater  since,  in  his  recent  work  on  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton,  Mr.  Mill  has  shown  himself  quite 
capable  both  of  appreciating  the  transcendent 
merits  of  Descartes,  and  of  sympathizing  with 
the  state  of  mind  which  led  to  the  eccentricities 
of  Leibnitz.  M.  Comte  might  in  some  respects 
be  more  justly  compared  to  Bacon;  and  the  rejec- 
tion of  the  Copernican  system,  which  has  so  often 
been  alleged  as  a  proof  of  the  narrowness  of  the 
latter,  seems  after  all  a  trifling  blemish,  when  we 
remember  how  persistently  M.  Comte  ignores  all 
that  has  been  achieved  in  the  department  of  Psy- 
chology. The  above  is  one  of  the  rare  cases  in 


142  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

which  Mr.  Mill  must  be  accused  of  haste  and  par- 
tiality. And  we  deem  it  not  inconsistent  with  the 
respect  due  to  his  noble  qualities  to  say  that, 
while  his  aim  is  ever  to  present  in  the  most  fa- 
vourat)le  light  opinions  from  which  he  differs,  he 
does  not  always  succeed  in  maintaining  the  im- 
partial attitude  so  indispensable  in  a  critic,  and 
of  wnich  Bayle  has  given  us  perhaps  the  finest 
example. 

Octooer-  1865. 


X. 

ME.  BUCKLE'S   FALLACIES.1 

IT  has  always  been  a  favourite  illusion  that 
social  changes  do  not,  like  physical  changes, 
conform  to  fixed  and  ascertainable  laws.  Not 
only  is  it  that  philosophers  of  a  certain  class 
have,  from  the  earliest  times,  explained  histori- 
cal events  as  instances  of  the  continued  interpo- 
sition of  an  arbitrary  power,  exterior  to  and  in- 
dependent of  the  material  universe ;  not  only  is 
it  that  thinkers  of  an  opposite  school  have  re- 
ferred the  actions  of  men  to  a  no  less  arbitrary 
power,  operative  in  each  individual  as  an  ulti- 

i  As  this  review  of  Mr.  Buckle's  History  of  Civilisation  was  written 
and  published  when  I  was  only  nineteen  years  old,  I  must  not  now  be 
held  responsible  for  all  the  opinions  expressed  in  it.  The  apparently 
favourable  estimate  of  Positivism  which  runs  through  it  will  best  be 
understood  from  the  preceding  article,  which  was  written  only  four 
years  later,  when  my  view  of  Comte  was  essentially  the  same.  It 
will  be  seen  that  I  have  never  been,  in  any  legitimate  sense  of  the 
word,  a  positivist.  I  have  reproduced  this  article  without  altering  a 
single  word;  and  have  appended  to  it  a  "Postscript,"  written  fifteen 
years  later,  as  an  illustration  of  the  change  which  Mr.  Buckle's  repu' 
tation  has  undergone. 


144  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays, 

mate  inexplicable  agent ;  but  it  is  that  the  mass 
of  men  have  ever  been  accustomed  to  look  upon 
the  phenomena  of  society  as  upon  isolated  facts, 
incapable  of  any  scientific  explanation  whatever. 
And  this  is  what  might  be  expected  from  the 
great  abstruseness  and  complexity  of  the  subject. 
Since  the  science  of  human  actions  is  the  most 
difficult  of  all,  and  since  it  depends  on  the  sim- 
pler physical  sciences,  it  was  not  until  these  in 
the  course  of  their  development  had  been  purified 
from  the  dreamy  obscurities  of  metaphysics  that 
the  conception  of  a  universal  and  undeviating 
regularity  in  the  succession  of  historic  events 
was  rendered  possible.  Accordingly,  when  phys- 
ical science  was  yet  in  its  infancy,  as  in  ancient 
times,  there  could  be  no  social  science.  The 
speculations  of  Plato  upon  this  subject  were  but 
profitless  reveries  ;  and  even  the  admirable  "  Pol- 
itics "  of  Aristotle  disclosed  "  no  sense  of  the  pro- 
gressive tendencies  of  humanity,  nor  the  slight- 
est glimpse  of  the  natural  laws  of  civilization."  l 
Coming  down  even  to  modern  times,  we  find  in 
the  seventeenth  century  nothing  better  on  the 
philosophy  of  history  than  the  puerile  "  Dis- 
course" of  Bossuet.  The  profound  remarks  of 
Pascal  and  Leibnitz,  in  regard  to  the  progress  of 

i  Comte,  Philotophie  Positive,  tome  iv.  p.  240. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  145 

society,  are  to  be  deemed  rather  presentiments  of 
the  truth  than  the  results  of  deliberate  investiga- 
tion. Machiavelli  was  one  of  the  first  to  subject 
social  phenomena  to  a  careful  study ;  but  he  ar- 
rived at  no  broad  generalizations,  and  "  he  suf- 
fered, moreover,  from  the  serious  deficiency  of 
being  too  much  occupied  with  the  practical  utility 
of  his  subject." J  The  "  Scienza  Nuova  "  of  Vico 
contained  many  new  and  startling  views  of  his- 
tory, and  the  writings  of  Montesquieu  presented 
a  daring  attempt  to  constitute  a  social  science ; 
but  both  these  great  thinkers  were  crippled  by  a 
lack  of  materials,  owing  to  the  imperfect  condi- 
tion of  physical  knowledge  at  the  time  when  they 
wrote.  Condorcet,  proceeding  from  the  sugges- 
tions of  his  friend  Turgot,  arrived  at  the  law 
that  the  whole  human  race  is  in  a  course  of  evo- 
lution, from  the  less  perfect  to  the  more  perfect ; 
but  his  writings  are  encumbered  with  metaphysi- 
cal notions,  and  he  had  no  idea  of  the  true  nature 
of  human  development.  For  above  all  his  pre- 
decessors stands  Voltaire,  whose  "  Essai  sur  les 
Moeurs  "  was  an  immortal  attempt  to  apply  the 
principles  of  scientific  investigation  to  the  entire 
history  of  our  race.  Nothing  more  was  done  in 
this  direction  until  the  unprecedented  develop- 

1  Buckle,  vol.  i.  p.  751,  note  131. 
10 


146  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

ment  of  physical  knowledge  which  ushered  in  the 
present  century  was  followed  by  the  appearance 
of  the  "  Philosophic  Positive"  of  Auguste  Comte. 
In  this  noble  work,  social  as  well  as  physical 
changes  are  shown  to  conform  to  invariable  laws. 
Comte  thus  founded  social  science,  and  opened  a 
path  for  future  discoverers.  But  he  did  not  per- 
ceive, any  more  than  previous  inquirers,  the  fun- 
damental law  of  human  evolution.  It  was  re- 
served for  Herbert  Spencer  to  discover  this  all- 
comprehensive  law,  which  is  found  to  explain 
alike  all  the  phenomena  of  man's  history  and 
all  those  of  external  nature.  This  sublime  dis- 
covery, —  that  the  Universe  is  in  a  continuous 
process  of  evolution  from  the  homogeneous  to  the 
heterogeneous,  —  with  which  only  Newton's  dis- 
covery of  the  law  of  gravitation  is  at  all  worthy 
to  be  compared,  underlies  not  only  physics,  but 
also  history.  It  reveals  the  law  to  which  social 
changes  conform. 

This  preliminary  glance  is  necessary,  in  order 
to  comprehend  the  relation  of  Mr.  Buckle's  work 
to  the  treatises  on  social  science  which  have  pre- 
ceded it.  Mr.  Buckle  is  one  of  that  series  of 
philosophers  who,  from  Plato  downwards,  have 
studied  human  affairs.  The  Introduction  to  his 
"  History  of  Civilization  in  England  "  is  similar 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  147 

to  the  works  we  have  just  mentioned,  in  attempt- 
ing to  discover  the  laws  which  regulate  the  prog- 
ress of  society ;  and  in  many  respects  it  surpasses 
them  all.  Mr.  Buckle,  it  is  true,  gives  us  no 
new  method  of  research,  like  Comte ;  nor  does 
he,  as  we  shall  see,  discover  any  universal  law, 
like  Spencer.  Yet,  in  the  boldness  and  com- 
prehensiveness of  his  views,  and  in  the  fearless 
candour  with  which  they  are  stated ;  in  the 
wealth  of  his  erudition,  and  in  the  honesty  with 
which  he  applies  his  facts ;  in  the  noble  love  of 
liberty  which  pervades  his  work,  and  in  the  elo- 
quence which  invests  all  parts  of  it  with  an  un- 
dying charm,  he  has  had  few  equals  in  any  age. 
Feeling  that  it  is  but  just  to  pronounce  our 
opinion  at  the  outset,  we  say  this  with  the  more 
readiness,  both  because  in  the  course  of  this  crit- 
icism we  shall  be  compelled  to  differ  from  him  on 
many  points  of  vital  importance,  and  especially 
because  Mr.  Buckle's  work  has  been  received 
with  a  bitter  and  contemptuous  hostility  on  the 
part  of  many  reviewers,  which  cannot  have  failed 
to  excite  much  groundless  prejudice  against  the 
author  and  his  doctrines.  Not  only  is  it  that  the 
merits  of  the  work  have  been  lost  sight  of,  while 
its  defects  have  been  exaggerated  to  an  enormous 


148  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

extent ; 1  not  only  is  it  that  its  tendencies  have 
been  perversely  misrepresented,  and  that  it  has 
been  accused  of  aiming  to  subvert  the  principles 
of  morality  and  religion :  but  it  is  that  some  of 
the  most  obvious  facts  upon  which  its  arguments 
are  based  have  been  disputed ;  it  is  that  the  au- 
thor has  been  charged  with  inaccuracies  and 
errors  which  would  disgrace  the  composition  of  a 
school-boy.  Without  repeating  or  taking  further 
notice  of  such  accusations,  which  savour  no  less 
of  ignorance  than  of  a  spirit  of  unfair  deprecia- 
tion, we  propose  to  examine  Mr.  Buckle's  leading 
propositions,  in  the  hope  of  ascertaining  how  far 
they  explain  the  phenomena  of  society. 

Proceeding  on  the  method  of  investigation 
pointed  out  by  Comte,  Mr.  Buckle  claims  to  have 
established,  in  the  volumes  now  before  us,  four 
great  laws,  which  "  are  to  be  deemed  the  basis  of 
the  history  of  civilization."  2 

The  first  of  these  fundamental  laws  is  "  that 
the  progress  of  mankind  depends  on  the  success 
with  which  the  laws  of  phenomena  are  investi- 
gated, and  on  the  extent  to  which  a  knowledge  of 
those  laws  is  diffused."  In  laying  down  this  prop- 

1  [I  had  reference  to  the  absurd  article  in  the  Quarterly  Review, 
July,  1857.] 

2  Buckle,  vol.  ii.  p.  1. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  149 

osition,  Mr.  Buckle  can,  of  course,  make  no  claims 
to  originality.  It  is  simply  a  clear  and  precise 
statement  of  the  position  taken  by  all  the  fore- 
most thinkers  of  the  age.  For  example,  Mr. 
Lewes  says,  "  The  evolutions  of  Humanity  cor- 
respond with  the  evolutions  of  Thought."  1  Mr. 
Mill  says,  "  We  are  justified  in  concluding  that 
the  order  of  human  progression  in  all  respects 
will  mainly  depend  on  the  order  of  progression  in 
the  intellectual  convictions  of  mankind ;  that  is, 
on  the  law  of  the  successive  transformations  of 
human  opinions."  2  The  same  is  implied  in  Mr. 
Spencer's  law  of  evolution,3  and  in  the  law  of  the 
three  stages  of  civilization  announced  by  Comte.4 
With  respect  to  the  proposition  as  it  stands,  we 
have  no  criticisms  to  offer.  It  is  substantiated, 
not  only  by  the  numerous  facts  brought  up  in  the 
course  of  Mr.  Buckle's  work,  but  by  all  those 
furnished  by  the  history  of  mankind  in  all  ages 
and  countries.  The  annals  of  our  race  are  but 
an  illustration  of  the  law  that  "  the  evolutions 
of  Humanity  correspond  with  the  evolutions  of 
Thought." 

1  Philosophy  of  the  Sciences,  p.  23. 

2  System  of  Logic,  vol.  ii.  p.  517,  4th  edition. 

«  Social  Statics,  pp.  409-456     Essays,  pp.  1-54.    First  Principle 
pp.  146-218. 
*  Philosophie  Positive,  tome  i.  pp.  3-20. 


150  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Thus  far  Mr.  Buckle  proceeds  on  safe  ground: 
but  when  he  attempts,  in  his  second  fundamental 
law,  to  go  still  further,  and  to  determine  how 
much  of  our  civilization  is  due  to  intellectual, 
and  how  much  to  moral,  progress,  —  when  he  at- 
tempts l  to  prove  that  the  intellectual  element  in 
our  nature  is  advancing,  while  the  moral  element 
is  not,  and  that  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  progress, 
while  good  intentions  are  not,  —  he  gets  at  once 
into  complicated  difficulties ;  and  his  argument, 
when  stripped  of  its  dazzling  rhetoric,  is  so  vague, 
confused,  and  unsatisfactory  that  we  cannot  help 
suspecting  that  the  author  has  but  an  imperfect 
comprehension  of  what  he  is  arguing  for.  At  the 
outset,  he  makes  an  assertion  directly  contradic- 
tory to  the  proposition  which  he  is  to  prove.  He 
says,  "  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  people  are 
not  really  advancing,  if,  on  the  one  hand,  their 
increasing  ability  is  accompanied  by  increasing 
vice,  or  if,  on  the  other  hand,  while  they  are  be- 
coming more  virtuous  they  likewise  become  more 
ignorant.  This  double  movement,  moral  and  in- 
tellectual, is  essential  to  the  very  idea  of  civiliza- 
tion, and  includes  the  entire  theory  of  mental 
progress."  2  Having  thus  unequivocally  expressed 
what  we  shall  presently  perceive  to  be  in  all  prob- 

l  Vol.  i.  chap.  iv.  2  Vol.  i.  p.  159. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  151 

ability  the  true  state  of  the  case,  he  proceeds  to 
contradict  himself,  by  setting  to  work  to  show 
that  a  people  advance  in  civilization  according  as 
they  advance  in  knowledge,  leaving  the  moral  ele- 
ment entirely  out  of  the  question.  As  this  is  one 
of  the  most  important  points  in  his  whole  work, 
and  one  which  has  excited  hot  discussion,  we 
shall  proceed  to  examine  it  at  some  length,  taking 
up  in  succession  the  several  steps  of  the  argument. 
Amid  much  that  is  obscurely  stated,  and  much 
that  is  irrelevant  to  the  subject,  we  trace  the  fol- 
lowing line  of  propositions  :  — 

I.  The  native  faculties  of  men  do  not  improve, 
so  that  we  must  look  for  progress  only  in  their 
acquisitions. 

II.  They  acquire  but  few  "  moral  truths,"  which 
"remain    stationary;"    but   they    acquire    many 
"  intellectual  truths,"  which  are  "  continually  ad- 
vancing." 

III.  Because  civilization  cannot  be  regulated 
by  the  "  stationary  agent,"  it  must  be  regulated 
solely  by  intellectual  progress. 

Let  us  see  whether  these  statements  will  bear  a 
critical  examination.1 

1  [This  argument  of  "Intellects.  Morals"  was  regarded  by  Mr. 
Buckle  as  the  fundamental  position  of  his  book.  See  Stuart-Glennie's 
Pilgrim  Memories,  p.  196.] 


152  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

I.  Mr.  Buckle  begins  by  denying  that  the  nat- 
ural faculties  of  man  are  in  a  course  of  develop- 
ment. "  Here,  then,  lies  the  gist  of  the  whole 
matter.  The  progress  is  one,  not  of  internal 
power,  but  of  external  advantage.  The  child  born 
in  a  civilized  land  is  not  likely,  as  such,  to  be  su- 
perior to  one  born  among  barbarians,  and  the  dif- 
ference which  ensues  between  the  acts  of  the  two 
children  will  be  caused,  so  far  as  we  know,  solely 
by  the  pressure  of  external  circumstances;  by 
which  I  mean  the  surrounding  opinions,  knowl- 
edge, associations,  —  in  a  word,  the  entire  mental 
atmosphere  in  which  the  two  children  are  re- 
spectively nurtured."  l 

This  is  only  bringing  up  again  the  old  dispute 
about  "  the  innate  "  and  "  the  acquired,"  which 
has  raged  for  centuries  among  metaphysical 
thinkers,  but  which  we  thought  had  been  satis- 
factorily settled  by  the  physiologists  some  time 
before  Mr.  Buckle  penned  the  above  passage. 
After  it  had  been  proved  that  every  organism  is 
constantly  advancing  in  the  vigour  and  complexity 
of  its  functions  in  relation  to  the  conditions  which 
surround  it,  nothing  more  was  needed.  But  Mr. 
Buckle  appears  to  have  forgotten  this.  He  not 
only  ignores  some  of  the  late  results  of  physiolog- 

i  Vol.  i.  p.  162. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  153 

ical  investigation,  but,  still  worse,  in  the  passage 
just  quoted,  he  flatly  contradicts  a  theory  which 
he  elsewhere  upholds.  We  refer  to  the  doctrine, 
held  by  many  naturalists,  which  supposes  all  the 
varieties  of  organic  life,  present  and  past,  to  have 
arisen  from  one  or  two  primitive  forms,  by  suc- 
cessive modifications  of  structure  and  function. 
With  the  evidence  which  might  be  brought  for- 
ward in  favour  of  this  theory,  we  have,  at  pres- 
ent, no  concern.  It  is  enough  to  know  that  Mr. 
Buckle  is  himself  one  of  its  supporters,  as  appears 
from  several  passages  in  his  work.1 

Now,  this  theory  supposes  that  all  organic  be- 
ings are  continually  advancing,  not  only  in  com- 
plexity of  structure  and  variety  of  function,  but 
also  in  the  activity  and  vigour  of  their  faculties. 
This  may  be  illustrated  by  comparing  the  ex- 
tremes of  the  animal  kingdom.  The  hydra,  or 
fresh-water  polyp,  is  little  more  than  a  mere  bag. 
In  common  with  all  the  acrita,  he  possesses  nerv- 
ous substance,  diffused  in  a  cellular  state  through- 
out his  body.2  Moreover,  if  you  turn  him  inside 

1  Vol.  i.  p.  806,  note  130,  and  p.  822.    The  same  is  implied  on  p. 
641.    He  also  accepts  the  kindred  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  organic 
and  inorganic  worlds.    (See  vol.  ii.  pp.  529-533.) 

2  Or,  more  accurately  speaking,  he  possesses  a  sensitive  substance 
which,  in  more  elevated  beings,  is  specialized  into  nervous  tissue^ 
(See  Lewes'  Seaside  Studies,  p  390.) 


154  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

out,  his  skin  will  digest,  and  his  interior  membrane 
will  respire ;  he  will  apparently  suffer  no  discom- 
posure from  this  reversed  state  of  affairs.1  Again, 
if  you  put  him  into  a  vessel  of  water,  he  will  in- 
variably seek  that  part  of  it  least  exposed  to  the 
light,  thus  manifesting  a  rudimentary  sensibility, 
which  in  its  more  developed  state,  in  higher  or- 
ganisms, we  call  vision.2  The  lower  polyps  ex- 
hibit also  contractility  over  their  whole  body ; 
and  it  has  been  supposed  that  they  also  possess,  in 
a  diffused  condition,  the  germs  of  smell,  taste,  and 
even  hearing.3  When  now  we  ascend  to  the  verte- 
brata,  we  find  digestion  specialized  in  the  stomach, 
respiration  in  the  lungs,  contractility  in  the  mus- 
cles, sensibility  in  the  nerves  ;  taste,  smell,  hear- 
ing, and  vision,  in  the  mouth,  nose,  ears,  and  eyes. 
This  difference  coexists  with  a  great  increase  of 
power  in  the  several  functions.  The  faculties  of 
the  mammal  are,  as  every  one  knows,  far  supe- 
rior to  those  of  the  polyp.  No  one  would  think 
of  comparing  the  rudimentary  scent  of  the  zo- 
ophyte with  the  developed  scent  of  the  dog,  or  the 
rudimentary  sight  of  the  acaleph  with  the  devel- 
oped sight  of  the  Bosjesman.  Vast,  indeed,  is  the 

l  Draper's  Human  Physiology,  p.  501. 
8  Spencer's  Psychology,  p.  401. 
«  Ibid.  pp.  394-408. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  155 

difference  between  the  hydra,  whose  body  is  but 
one  organ,  feebly  performing  several  functions, 
and  the  elephant,  whose  body  is  a  community  of 
organs,  each  powerfully  performing  its  own  pecul- 
iar function:  so  vast,  that  many  persons,  even 
after  allowing  for  the  accumulated  influence  of 
causes  which  have  been  in  operation  for  countless 
ages,  are  unable  to  believe  that  the  higher  or- 
ganism could  have  come  from  the  lower,  through 
myriads  of  intermediate  forms.  Yet,  if  we  are  to 
believe  this,  —  if  we  are  to  accept  it  as  true,  that 
this  continuous  perfecting  of  all  the  physical  and 
mental  faculties  has  been  going  on  among  the 
lower  tribes  ever  since  life  first  appeared  on  the 
earth,  —  why  are  we  to  suppose  that  it  has  not 
taken  place  in  man  ?  Is  it  that,  when  man  came 
upon  the  stage,  one  of  the  most  comprehensive 
laws  of  nature  was,  by  some  miracle,  suspended 
forever  in  his  case  ?  Is  it  that  in  the  most  per- 
fect of  organized  beings,  exhibiting  both  in  struc- 
ture and  function  the  completest  instance  of  the 
evolutional  process,  that  process  could  no  longer 
be  carried  on  ?  If  we  are  to  accept  the  develop- 
ment theory  at  all,  we  must  accept  it  without 
limitations.  We  might  as  well  say  that  the  hu- 
man race  forms  an  exception  to  the  operation  of 
the  laws  of  gravitation  or  chemical  affinity  as  to 


156          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

say  that  it  forms  an  exception  in  the  case  of  the 
law  of  evolution,  provided  that  law  be  once  estab- 
lished. 

We  shall  find  our  conclusion  inductively  con- 
firmed, on  observing  that  the  development  theory 
explains  the  differences  between  the  races  of  man- 
kind, as  well  as  those  between  the  animal  tribes. 
Premising  the  fact,  well  known  to  every  anato- 
mist, that  change  in  structure  is  invariably  accom- 
panied by  change  in  function,  we  notice  that  the 
lower  races,  such  as  the  Alfurus,  resemble  the 
quadrumana  in  having  very  small  legs,  protruding 
jaws,  receding  foreheads,  thick  lips,  eyes  wide 
apart  and  curved  upwards  ;  that  as  we  proceed  in 
turn  to  the  red  Indians,  the  Turanians,  and  the 
Semites,  this  resemblance  becomes  much  less 
marked,  and  at  last  scarcely  perceptible  ;  and 
that,  on  reaching  the  Europeans,  it  can  no  longer 
be  traced,  except  in  infants.  The  legs  have  be- 
come much  longer  and  more  massive  than  the 
arms,  which  have  diminished  in  length ;  the  jaws 
have  retired;  the  forehead  has  advanced;  the  lips 
have  become  comparatively  thin :  the  eyes  have 
approached  each  other,  and  lost  their  upward  cur- 
vature. These  facts,  so  familiar  to  every  one 
that  it  is  almost  needless  to  cite  them,  show  that, 
in  respect  to  structure,  we  find  a  marked  progress 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  157 

in  the  human  species,  no  less  than  in  the  animal 
tribes.  Even  though  the  European  is  born  with 
the  structural  peculiarities  of  the  savage,  he  loses 
them  almost  immediately  after  birth ;  and  his 
possessing  them  at  birth  no  more  proves  that  his 
matured  faculties  are  on  the  same  level  with  those 
of  the  savage  than  his  possessing  the  character- 
istics of  a  fish  some  months  before  birth  proves 
that  his  matured  faculties  are  on  the  same  level 
with  those  of  a  fish.  Unless,  therefore,  Mr. 
Buckle  is  prepared  to  deny  that  development  in 
structure  is  necessarily  attended  by  development 
in  function,  he  cannot  logically  avoid  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  human  species  is  in  a  course  of  evo- 
lution from  the  less  perfect  to  the  more  perfect,  — 
or,  to  use  his  own  expressions,  that  the  progress 
of  mankind  is  one  of  "  internal  power,"  as  well  as 
of  "external  advantage." 

We  have  seen  that  Mr.  Buckle  accepts  the  law 
of  development ;  that  it  is  illogical  to  assert  that 
man  forms  an  exception  to  such  a  universal  law ; 
that  this  law,  moreover,  explains  the  facts  of  hu- 
man variation,  as  well  as  those  of  animal  varia- 
tion ;  and  that,  consequently,  Mr.  Buckle's  asser- 
tion that  human  faculties  do  not  develop  is  totally 
inconsistent  with  the  very  theory  held  by  himself 
respecting  organic  development  in  general.  We 


158  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

have  now  to  show  that  his  assertion  is  in  itself  un- 
founded. But,  preliminary  to  this,  we  must  call 
attention  to  another  point. 

How  it  is  that  Mr.  Buckle,  who  holds  fast  to 
the  law  of  development,  can  reject  the  law  of  he- 
reditary transmission,  we  are  unable  to  imagine. 
Nevertheless,  reject  it  he  does,  in  the  following 
passage,  which,  as  Mr.  Lewes  remarks,  must  ex- 
cite the  astonishment  of  the  physiologist :  — 

We  often  hear  of  hereditary  talents,  hereditary  vices, 
and  hereditary  virtues ;  but  whoever  will  critically  ex- 
amine the  evidence  will  find  that  we  have  no  proof 
of  their  existence.  The  way  in  which  they  are  com- 
monly proved  is  in  the  highest  degree  illogical ;  the 
usual  course  being  for  writers  to  collect  instances  of 
some  mental  peculiarity  found  in  a  parent  and  in  his 
child,  and  then  to  infer  that  the  peculiarity  was  be- 
queathed. By  this  mode  of  reasoning,  we  might  dem- 
onstrate any  proposition;  since,  in  all  large  fields  of 
inquiry  there  are  a  sufficient  number  of  empirical  coin- 
cidences to  make  a  plausible  case  in  favour  of  whatever 
view  a  man  chooses  to  advocate.  But  this  is  not  the 
way  in  which  truth  is  discovered  ;  and  we  ought  to  in- 
quire, not  only  how  many  instances  there  are  of  heredi- 
tary talents,  etc.,  but  how  many  instances  there  are  of 
such  qualities  not  being  hereditary.  Until  something 
of  this  sort  is  attempted,  we  can  know  nothing  about 
the  matter  inductively;  while,  until  physiology  and 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  159 

chemistry  are  much  more  advanced,  we  can  know  noth- 
ing about  it  deductively.  These  considerations  ought 
to  prevent  us  from  receiving  statements  which  posi- 
tively affirm  the  existence  of  hereditary  madness  and 
hereditary  suicide ;  and  the  same  remark  applies  to  he- 
reditary disease,  and  with  still  greater  force  does  it 
apply  to  hereditary  vices  and  hereditary  virtues ;  inas- 
much as  ethical  phenomena  have  not  been  registered  as 
carefully  as  physiological  ones,  and  therefore  our  con- 
clusions respecting  them  are  even  more  precarious.1 

All  this  sounds  very  fine ;  but  we  do  not  think 
that  our  ignorance  of  this  subject  is  so  hopeless 
as  Mr.  Buckle  supposes.  Although  we  are  at 
present  unable  to  explain  all  the  phenomena  of 
the  case,  and  account  for  all  the  apparent  excep- 
tions that  arise,  we  do,  nevertheless,  all  of  us  know 
that  oaks  always  produce  oaks,  oysters  oysters, 
sharks  sharks,  dogs  dogs,  and  men  men.  We 
should  probably  deem  it  somewhat  out  of  the 
usual  course  of  things  if  a  cow  were  to  give  birth 
to  a  leopard.  We  are  not  accustomed  to  think  of 
a  greyhound  as  having  had  for  his  sire  an  Arabian 
steed.  We  do  not  expect,  on  planting  a  nursery 
of  acorns,  to  come  back  and  find  an  orchard  of 
apple-trees.  And  even  the  most  unexcitable  of 
us  would  open  his  eyes  at  the  sight  of  a  barn-door 

i  Vol.  i.  p.  161,  note  12. 


160  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

hen  strutting  about  as  the  mother  of  a  brood  of 
eaglets.  And  yet,  if  there  is  no  such  thing  as  the 
transmission  of  qualities  from  parent  to  offspring, 
we  see  no  reason  l  why  these  hypothetical  cases 
should  not  exist  as  realities.  "  Unless  parents 
transmitted  to  offspring  their  organizations,  their 
peculiarities  and  excellences,  there  would  be  no 
such  thing  as  a  breed  or  a  race.  The  cur  would 
run  the  same  chance  as  the  best  bred  dog,  of 
turning  out  valuable.  The  greyhound  might 
point,  and  the  cart-horse  win  the  Derby.  Daily 
experience  tell  us  that  this  is  impossible.  Science 
tells  us  that  there- is  no  such  thing  as  chance. 
Physiology  tells  us  that  the  offspring  always,  and 
necessarily,  inherits  its  organization  from  its  par- 
ents ;  and  if  the  organization  is  inherited,  then  with 
it  must  be  inherited  its  tendencies  and  aptitudes."  2 
This,  from  one  profoundly  versed  in  physiology, 
expresses  what  any  one,  not  labouring  to  establish 
some  preconceived  theory,  will  at  once  recognize 

1  Lest  it  should  be  thought  that  we  do  injustice  to  Mr.  Buckle,  in 
giving  such  a  broad  significance  to  his  rejection  of  the  law  of  heredi- 
tary transmission,  we  give  a  definition  of  that  law,  taken  from  one  of 
the  greatest  thinkers  of  our  time:     "  Understood  in  its  entirety,  the 
law  is  that  each  plant  or  animal  produces  others  of  like  kind  with 
itself;  the  likeness  of  kind  consisting  not  so  much  in  the  repetition  of 
individual  traits  as  in  the  assumption  of  the  same  generic  structure." 
~-  Spencer's  Essays,  p.  263. 

2  Lewes'  Physiology  of  Common  Life,  vol.  ii.  p.  377. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  161 

as  the  real  state  of  the  case.  And,  indeed,  since 
structure  and  function  are  inseparably  connected ; 
since  diversity  of  structure  necessarily  supposes 
diversity  of  function,  and  similarity  of  structure 
similarity  of  function,  it  follows  that,  as  like  pro- 
duces like  in  the  case  of  structural  forms,  so  also 
must  like  produce  like  in  the  case  of  functional 
peculiarities ;  and  as  the  nervous  system  is  but  a 
part  of  the  organism,  and  must  come  under  the 
same  generalization  as  the  whole,  so  also  does  the 
same  hold  true  of  the  functions  of  the  nervous 
system,  that  is,  of  thought,  feeling,  and  the  like. 
In  other  words,  there  must  be  cases  not  only  of 
hereditary  madness  and  hereditary  disease,  but 
also  of  hereditary  vices  and  hereditary  virtues,  so 
long  as  disease  and  madness,  virtue  and  vice,  co- 
exist with  peculiar  structural  states.  And,  as  be- 
fore, unless  Mr.  Buckle  is  prepared  to  deny  the 
inseparable  connection  of  structure  and  f  unction., 
he  cannot  escape  this  conclusion. 

As  we  have  already  observed,  it  is  passing 
strange  that  Mr.  Buckle,  while  embracing  the 
law  of  development,  should  spurn  that  of  heredi- 
tary transmission,  to  which  it  is  so  intimately  re- 
lated, and  on  which  it,  in  some  degree,  depends 
for  its  proofs.  But  Mr.  Buckle  has  a  theory  of 

his  own  to  maintain.     He  wishes  to  show  that 
11 


162  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

the  faculties  of  men  do  not  improve.  It  is  in  or- 
der to  do  this  that  he  rejects  the  law  of  transmis- 
sion. But  it  has  been  shown  that  his  rejection  of 
it  is  illogical,  and  that  the  law  of  transmission  is 
as  universal  as  any  other,  since,  were  it  not  so, 
there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  a  species  at  all. 
With  the  help  of  this  law,  it  is  easy  to  demon- 
strate that,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  the  fac- 
ulties of  men  must  improve. 

Among  that  "highest  class  of  biological  truths," 
which  apply  to  all  organisms  whatever,  is  the  law 
that,  "  other  things  equal,  development  varies  as 
function  ; "  1  that  is,  the  growth  of  any  organ  de- 
pends upon  its  activity.  We  are  everywhere  met 
by  instances  of  this:  not  only  in  the  gymnast, 
who  surprises  us  by  the  great  size  and  power  of 
his  muscles  ;  not  only  in  the  sailor,  who  sees  a 
ship  in  the  distant  offing,  when  the  passenger  can 
descry  but  a  speck;  not  only  in  the  musician, 
who  recognizes  as  different  two  sounds  which  to 
unpractised  ears  are  alike ;  but  also  in  the  man 
of  science,  who  unravels  with  ease  problems  which 
to  common  apprehensions  are  insoluble.  "  On 
this  law  are  based  all  maxims  and  methods  of 
right  education,  intellectual,  moral,  and  physical."3 
Expressed  in  the  form,  "  Practice  makes  perfect," 

1  Spencer's  Essays,  D.  262.  2  Ibid.  p.  263. 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  163 

it  is  an  axiom  in  every  one's  mouth.  By  exer- 
cising an  organ,  we  increase  its  size  and  power. 
By  neglecting  to  exercise  it,  we  cause  it  to  be- 
come diminutive,  weak,  inefficient. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  when  an  individual  has 
grown  to  maturity  in  the  constant  exercise  of  any 
faculty,  the  organ  answering  to  that  faculty  will 
be  correspondingly  developed ;  and  that,  in  the 
natural  course  of  things,  he  will  transmit  to  his 
offspring  that  faculty  in  its  state  of  increased 
power.  Thus  it  is  that  a  Philip  becomes  the 
father  of  an  Alexander;  that  the  son  of  a  Ber- 
nardo Tasso  gives  to  the  world  a  deathless  poem ; 
and  that  a  family  of  three  hundred  musical  gen- 
iuses at  last  counts  among  its  members  Johann 
Sebastian  Bach.  In  individual  cases,  however, 
the  operation  of  this  law  is  obscured  and  often 
hindered  by  a  concurrence  of  unfavourable  cir- 
cumstances. It  is  in  the  case  of  large  collections 
of  individuals,  where  the  disturbing  causes  are 
averaged,  that  we  find  it  most  strikingly  exempli- 
fied. Thus  we  see  red  Indians  so  swift  of  foot ; 
u  the  telescopic-eyed  Bushmen  ; "  and  Peruvians 
with  sense  of  smell  so  acute  that,  according  to 
Humboldt,  they  can  distinguish  by  it,  in  the  mid- 
dle of  the  night,  to  what  race  a  man  belongs.1  Ex- 

1  Dunglison's  Human  Physiology,  vol.  i.  p.  729. 


164  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

tending  our  view  from  separate  nations  to  the 
whole  race,  we  perceive  the  law  in  still  greater 
generality.  While  some  nations  have  been  devel- 
oping in  some  faculties,  others  have  been  develop- 
ing in  others,  and  the  total  movement  has  been 
ever  onward.  Each  generation  has  inherited  the 
faculties  of  the  preceding,  still  further  improved 
by  constant  employment.  Phoenicians  have  thus 
spread  commerce  through  unknown  seas ;  Greeks 
have  educated  the  world ;  Romans  have  legislated 
for  it ;  Hindus,  Jews,  and  Arabs  have  given  it  re- 
ligions; Germans  have  deluged  it  with  systems 
of  philosophy  ;  Frenchmen  and  Englishmen  have 
given  it  positive  knowledge ;  Americans  have, 
by  inventive  genius,  furnished  material  comforts ; 
Italians  have  added  the  glorious  embodiments  of 
beauty,  grace,  and  charm  ;  and  the  consensus  of 
the  whole  is  civilization.  Retrogression  nowhere 
meets  us ;  progress  meets  us  everywhere ;  and, 
from  the  considerations  above  adduced,  we  are 
obliged  to  conclude  that  this  advance  has  been 
one  as  well  of  "  internal  power  "  as  of  "  external 
advantage."  Mr.  Buckle's  assertion  is,  therefore, 
seen  to  be  not  only  inconsistent,  but  also  un- 
founded. 

II.  Having  now  proved,  as  he  thinks,  that  we 
must  look  for  progress  in  "  external  advantage  * 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  165 

only,  and  not  in  "  internal  power,"  our  author 
goes  on  to  show  the  "  superiority  of  intellectual 
acquisitions  over  moral  feelings ; "  and  first  he 
asserts  that  all  our  acquisitions  are  either  "  moral 
truths  "  or  "  intellectual  truths,"  and  that  the 
former  are  "  stationary,"  while  the  latter  are  con- 
tinually advancing.  It  is  noticeable  that  he  here 
deplores  the  difficulties  which  arise  "  from  the 
loose  and  careless  manner  in  which  ordinary  lan- 
guage is  employed  on  subjects  that  require  the 
greatest  nicety  and  precision."  1  After  giving  us 
this  caution,  one  would  naturally  expect  to  find 
our  author  very  clear  and  accurate  in  the  choice 
of  terms,  and  in  the  statement  of  propositions ; 
bat,  on  the  contrary,  the  loose  and  careless  man- 
ner in  which  he  himself  employs  ordinary  lan- 
guage throughout  the  discussion  is  quite  amazing. 
In  the  first  place,  he  makes  a  verbally  unintelligi- 
ble distinction  between  "  intellectual  truths  "  and 
"moral  truths."  Scientifically  speaking,  there 
can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  "  moral  truth ; "  for 
every  truth  is  a  proposition,  consisting  of  subject, 
predicate,  and  copula ;  and  is  uttered  and  recog- 
nized by  the  intellect,  not  by  the  "moral  in- 
stinct," which  belongs  to  the  emotional  part  of 
our  nature.  It  is  the  province  of  intellect  to 

i  Vol.  i.  p.  159. 


166  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

think,  of  emotion  to  feel.  Mr.  Buckle  falls  into 
exactly  the  same  error  in  a  singular  passage  in 
his  second  volume,  where  he  says  :  — 

The  emotions  are  as  much  a  part  of  us  as  the  under- 
standing :  they  are  as  truthful ;  they  are  as  likely  to  be 
right.  Though  their  view  is  different,  it  is  not  capri- 
cious. They  obey  fixed  laws  ;  they  follow  an  orderly 
and  uniform  course ;  they  run  in  sequences ;  they  have 
their  logic  and  method  of  inference. 1 

All  this  is  either  strained  metaphor  or  down- 
right nonsense.  If  it  were  true,  what  would  be 
the  use  of  making  any  distinction  at  all  between 
intellect  and  feeling  ?  If  to  feel  is  to  judge,  and 
to  experience  an  emotion  is  to  lay  down  a  prop- 
osition, why  not  include  both  under  one  name? 
Mr.  Buckle  is  misled  by  the  fact  that,  in  all  our 
mental  operations,  feeling  and  thinking  are  closely 
united.  Our  wishes  colour  our  judgments.  We 
are  all  led,  in  many  cases,  to  believe  that  to  be 
true  which  we  wish  to  be  true.  Thus  emotional 
states  give  rise  to  intellectual  states.  On  the 
other  hand,  Mr.  Bain  has  shown  that  belief,  when 
active,  always  leads  to  volition  ;  2  and  as  volition  is 
the  final  stage  of  emotion,  we  perceive  that  intel- 
lectual states  likewise  occasion  emotional  statea 

1  Vol.  ii.  p.  502. 

2  Bain,  The  Emotions  and  the  Will,  pp.  568-598. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  167 

But  this  Intimate  connection  of  the  two  should 
not  lead  us  to  confound  the  one  with  the  other ; 
and  we  fall  into  a  grave  error  whenever  we  do  so. 
Once  more  we  repeat,  it  is  the  province  of  emo- 
tion to  feel,  of  the  intellect  to  think  and  form 
propositions.  Scientifically  speaking,  therefore, 
all  truths  are  intellectual ;  and  there  can  be  no 
such  thing  as  a  "  moral  truth." 

But  there  is  another  sense  in  which  the  expres- 
sion "  moral  truths  "  may  be  taken.  It  may  mean 
"  truths  relative  to  morality."  Mr.  Buckle  gener- 
ally uses  it  in  this  sense,  but  he  so  often  con* 
founds  "  moral  truths  "  with  "  moral  feelings  " 
that  the  foregoing  remarks  were  rendered  neces- 
sary to  a  right  understanding  of  his  argument. 

Our  author  then  declares  that  the  truths  which 
we  possess  relating  to  morality  have  not  changed 
for  thousands  of  years.  No,  they  have  not. 
Neither  have  "intellectual  truths."  A  truth, 
once  established,  never  changes,  cannot  change; 
otherwise  it  would  be  no  truth,  but  a  falsehood. 
Take,  for  example,  the  law  of  gravitation  :  "  All 
bodies  in  the  universe  attract  each  other  with 
forces  directly  proportional  to  iheir  masses,  and 
inversely  proportional  to  the  squares  of  their  dis- 
tances apart."  We  have  had  no  occasion  to  alter 
this  statement  since  the  time  of  Newton.  It  is  a 


168  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

demonstrated  truth,  and  will  never  be  susceptible 
of  the  slightest  change.  The  same  is  the  case 
with  the  truth,  "  It  is  wrong  to  kill."  Once  rec- 
ognized, this  truth  can  experience  no  change,  for 
the  very  reason  that  it  is  a  truth,  and  not  a  false- 
hood. In  a  word,  when  a  proposition  has  been 
once  shown  to  be  true  it  will  forever  remain  so, 
whether  it  relates  to  our  moral  obligations,  or  to 
anything  else  whatever.  There  is  no  ground  for 
Mr.  Buckle's  distinction. 

Nor  would  our  author  be  one  whit  the  more 
justified  in  saying,  as  he  might  say,  that  the  inter- 
pretation put  upon  "  moral  truths  "  is  unchanging 
as  compared  with,  that  put  upon  "  intellectual 
truths."  On  the  contrary,  it  appears  to  us  that 
the  reverse  is  the  case.  When  a  truth  relating 
to  some  of  the  simpler  subjects  of  investigation  is 
once  received,  its  interpretation  usually  admits  of 
little  change.  To  employ  the  same  example  as 
before,  the  law  of  gravitation  is  received  in  the 
same  acceptation  now  as  when  it  was  first  discov- 
ered. Advancing  to  the  more  abstruse  sciences, 
such  as  physiology,  we  find  that  the  interpreta- 
tion put  upon  generally  received  truths  suffers 
marked  variations.  The  law  of  organic  develop- 
ment has  been  held  by  the  most  eminent  scientific 
thinkers  since  the  beginning  of  the  present  cen. 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  169 

tury ;  but,  since  the  embryological  discoveries  of 
the  Germans,  it  is  held  in  a  form  different  from 
that  in  which  it  was  held  before.  The  followers 
of  Spencer,  Lewes,  and  Darwin  do  not  put  the 
same  interpretation  upon  the  law  of  development 
that  the  followers  of  Lamarck  did,  forty  years 
ago.  Coming  now  to  the  very  complex  subject  of 
morality,  we  find,  unfortunately  for  Mr.  Buckle, 
that  the  acceptation  in  which  its  propositions  are 
held  varies  with  every  phase  of  civilization. 
Among  the  American  Indians,  so  noted  for  their 
revengeful  dispositions,  the  obligation  not  to  take 
life,  if  recognized,  was  not  so  construed  as  to  in- 
clude the  miserable  object  of  the  fell  passion. 
Among  the  ancient  Jews,  the  command  "  Thou, 
shalt  not  kill "  meant  "  Thou  shalt  not  kill  Jews  ;  " 
and,  from  the  story  of  Saul  and  Agag,  we  may 
suppose  that  the  murder  of  Gentiles  was  consid- 
ered rather  a  meritorious  act  than  otherwise. 
And  in  general,  where  the  same  "  moral  truths  " 
have  been  received,  it  has  been  in  as  many  differ- 
ent ways  as  there  were  different  kinds  of  people 
to  receive  them.  This  fact,  that  the  way  in  which 
generally  received  truths  are  understood  varies  as 
the  complexity  of  the  sciences  to  which  they  be- 
long, results  from  the  obvious  circumstance  that 
the  more  complex  a  science  is,  the  less  we  know 


170  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

about  it.  As  we  know  less  about  moral  science 
than  about  any  other,  our  opinions,  even  about 
those  "  moral  truths  "  which  are  universally  ad- 
mitted, are  more  liable  to  change  than  our  opin- 
ions about  similarly  received  truths  in  other  mat- 
ters. Mr.  Buckle  could  have,  therefore,  no  ground 
for  asserting  that  the  interpretation  put  upon 
"  moral  truths  "  is  unchanging  as  compared  with 
that  put  upon  "  intellectual  truths." 

Our  author  says,  somewhat  inconsistently,  that 
"moral  truths"  receive  no  additions,  and  again 
that  they  receive  fewer  additions  than  "  intellec- 
tual truths."  We  shall  speedily  show  that  the 
first  of  these  statements  is  at  variance  with  fact, 
and  that  the  second  has  no  logical  value,  and  will 
not  help  his  argument  in  the  least. 

It  is  not  true  that  "  moral  truths "  have  re- 
ceived no  additions.  It  is  not  true,  as  Mr.  Buckle 
says,  that  "  the  sole  essentials  of  morals  have 
been  known  for  thousands  of  years,  and  not  one 
jot  or  tittle  has  been  added  to  them  by  all  the 
sermons,  homilies,  and  text-books  which  moralists 
have  been  able  to  produce."  It  is  not  true,  as 
Sir  James  Mackintosh  says,  that  "  morality  ad- 
mits of  no  discoveries."  It  is  not  true,  as  Con- 
dorcet  says,  that  "  la  morale  de  toutes  les  nations 
a  £t£  la  meme"  It  is  not  true,  as  Kant  says,  that 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  171 

"  in  der  MoralpJiilosophie  sind  wir  nicht  weiter 
gekommen  als  die  Alten."  For  what  is  Moral 
Philosophy  but  the  science  which  is  to  determine 
the  laws  to  which  our  conduct  should  conform  ? 
And  if  this  is  the  case,  we  need  only  to  look  into 
Mr.  Buckle's  work  itself,  to  find  a  system  of 
morality  containing  truths  which  only  two  cen- 
turies ago  were  not  even  dreamed  of.  Take,  for 
example,  the  moral  law  that  governments  shall 
not  interfere  with  trade.  This  is  as  much  a  moral 
law  as  that  which  forbids  stealing :  but  we  find 
Mr.  Buckle  reckoning  it  among  the  merits  of 
Voltaire,  that  he  was  one  of  the  first  to  perceive 
the  justice  of  a  free  system  of  trade.1  Its  justice 
is  even  now  denied  by  opponents  of  reform. 
This,  then,  is  a  case  of  a  "  moral  truth "  which 
has  not  been  known  for  thousands  of  years. 

Mr.  Buckle  may  say,  however,  that  he  does  not 
use  the  term  "  morality  "  in  so  wide  a  sense,  — 
that  he  means  by  it  merely  a  collection  of  general 
rules  and  precepts,  serving  as  rough  guides  for 
daily  conduct.  Of  course,  if  Mr.  Buckle  chooses 
to  define  his  terms  to  suit  himself,  he  can  prove 
anything.  If  he  defines  morality  so  as  to  make 
it  include  nothing  but  the  precepts  known  three 
thousand  years  ago,  and  then  says  that  all  moral 
i  Vol.  i.  p.  741. 


172  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays, 

truths  now  known  were  known  then,  he  merely 
asserts  that  what  was  known  then  was  known 
then;  a  statement  which  probably  few  will  be 
hardy  enough  to  dispute,  but  which  unfortunately 
leaves  the  argument  just  where  it  was  before. 

But  supposing  we  accept  this  narrow  definition 
of  morality,  what  will  become  of  our  author's 
statement,  even  then?  He  himself  quotes,  from 
several  authors,  passages  which  show  that  there 
was  a  time  when  some  nations  did  not  acknowl- 
edge the  moral  law  forbidding  murder.  "  Among 
some  Macedonian  tribes,  the  man  who  had  never 
slain  an  enemy  was  marked  by  a  degrading 
badge." 1  And  at  the  present  day,  among  bar- 
barous tribes,  as  the  Dyaks  of  Borneo,  "  a  man 
cannot  marry  until  he  has  procured  a  human 
head  ;  and  he  that  has  several  may  be  distin- 
guished by  his  proud  and  lofty  bearing,  for  it 
constitutes  his  patent  of  nobility."  2  By  calling 
up  these  facts,  Mr.  Buckle  destroys  his  own 
statement  that  "  moral  truths  "  receive  no  addi- 
tions. 

As  for  his  other  assertion,  —  that  "  moral 
truths"  receive  fewer  additions  than  "  intellectual 

l  Grote's  History  of  Greece,  vol.  xi.  p.  397,  quoted  in  Buckle,  vol 
I  p.  176,  note  29. 
3  Journal  of  Asiatic  Society,  vol.  iv.  p.  181. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  173 

truths,"  —  it  means  simply  that  fewer  discoveries 
are  made  in  moral  science  than  in  all  the  other 
sciences  put  together.  It  is  as  if  he  should  say 
that  "  optical  truths  "  receive  fewer  additions  than 
"  physical  truths."  As  we  have  shown,  he  is 
not  justified  in  using  the  expression  "  intellectual 
truths,"  so  as  to  exclude  from  it  truths  relating 
to  morality,  which  are  recognized  by  the  intellect 
as  much  as  any  others.  His  statement,  there- 
fore, merely  compares  a  part  with  all  the  other 
parts  of  the  whole  to  which  it  belongs. 

We  are  quite  willing  to  admit  that  moral  science 
has  not  been  enriched  by  as  many  discoveries  as 
any  one  of  the  other  sciences.  This  results  from 
the  circumstance  that  it  is  far  more  difficult  and 
complicated  than  the  rest.  Our  knowledge  of 
morality  is  less  complete  than  our  knowledge  of 
chemistry,  for  the  same  reason  that  our  acquaint- 
ance with  chemistry  is  less  perfect  than  our  ac- 
quaintance with  astronomy.  The  laws  express- 
ing the  relations  of  men  to  one  another  are  the 
most  recondite  of  all,  and  the  most  liable  to  ap- 
parent exceptions.  We  are  accordingly  longer  in 
ascertaining  them. 

To  sum  up  :  we  have  seen  that  the  distinction 
made  by  Mr.  Buckle  between  "  intellectual  "  and 
"  moral "  truths  is  a  vague  and  popular  one,  and 


174  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

will  not  bear  a  critical  analysis.  We  have 
throughout,  however,  used  the  expression  "  moral 
truths "  as  equivalent  to  "  truths  relating  to 
moral  subjects,"  and  the  expression  "  intellectual 
truths "  as  equivalent  to  "  truths  relating  to  all 
other  subjects  :  "  and  this  is  admissible,  because 
it  gives  the  meaning  intended  by  the  author. 
We  have  then  shown:  first,  that  intellectual 
truths  are  as  fixed  and  unchangeable  as  moral 
truths  ;  secondly,  that  the  interpretation  put  upon 
moral  truths  is  even  less  constant  than  that  put 
upon  intellectual  truths;  thirdly,  that  moral 
truths  receive  additions,  no  less  than  intellectual 
truths ;  fourthly,  that  the  fact  that  moral  truths 
receive  fewer  additions  than  intellectual  truths  is 
of  no  logical  value,  because  it  compares  one  class 
of  truths  with  several ;  and  fifthly,  that  the  cir- 
cumstance that  moral  science  advances  with  a 
slower  pace  than  the  other  sciences  shows  only 
that  it  is  more  complex  than  they  are,  but  does 
not  warrant  us  in  assuming  that  it  is  radically 
different  from  them.  Reviewing  our  conclusions 
in  this  compact  form,  we  see  that  moral  truths 
come  under  the  same  category  as  intellectual 
truths,  throughout.  This  confirms  what  we  said 
at  the  outset,  that  there  is  no  such  difference  be- 
tween them  as  Mr.  Buckle  supposes,  and  that 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  175 

both  should  be  spoken  of  together  as  truths  or 
judgments  in  distinction  from  feelings.  Mr. 
Buckle's  argument,  then,  when  laid  bare,  is  as 
follows :  that  some  truths  are  constant,  while 
others  are  not,  —  which  is  false  ;  and  that  one  set 
of  truths  receives  additions,  while  another  does 
not,  —  which  is  also  false. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Our  author's  argument  is 
not  only  untenable,  but  it  is  irrelevant  to  the  sub- 
ject in  debate.  Even  if  he  could  establish  his 
point,  he  would  be  none  the  more  forward. 
Startling  as  this  assertion  may  seem,  it  is  never- 
theless indisputable.  For  if  his  reasoning  hith- 
erto were  valid,  it  would  prove  merely  this  — 
that  our  knowledge  of  some  subjects  advances, 
while  our  knowledge  of  others  does  not.  But  Mr. 
Buckle's  professed  object  is  to  show  that  feeling 
as  compared  with  knowledge  is  of  no  account  as  a 
civilizing  force.  To  what  end,  then,  does  he  go 
so  far  out  of  his  way  in  giving  us  this  jumble  of 
ill-digested  argument  to  show  the  "  superiority  " 
of  some  intellectual  acquisitions  over  others  ?  This 
singular  aberration  results  from  his  confounding 
truth  with  feeling,  the  intellectual  with  the  emo- 
tional part  of  our  nature.  He  seems  to  forget  the 
distinction  between  knowing  in  what,  duty  con- 
sists and  having  the  intention  to  perform  it.  But 


176  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

it  is  altogether  one  thing  to  wish  to  do  right,  and 
another  thing  to  know  what  it  is  right  to  do,  as 
many  a  luckless  wight  finds  out  to  his  cost.  Far- 
ther on  Mr.  Buckle  recognizes  the  distinction 
clearly  enough. 

It  would,  however,  be  rather  unfortunate  than 
otherwise  for  Mr.  Buckle's  main  argument  if  he 
could  succeed  in  showing  that  "  the  sole  essentials 
of  morality  have  been  known  for  thousands  of 
years."  For  if  it  were  true  that  men  knew  what 
was  right  —  that  they  were  acquainted  with  all 
the  laws  to  which  our  conduct  ought  to  conform 
—  in  ancient  times  as  well  as  at  the  present  day, 
and  that  they  have  nevertheless  advanced  in  the 
practice  of  morality,  we  should  be  obliged  to  con- 
clude that,  as  the  knowledge  has  remained  station- 
ary, it  must  have  been  the  development  of  moral 
feeling  and  the  increase  of  good  intentions  alone 
which  could  have  occasioned  the  progress.  The 
contrast  is  really  between  moral  truths  and  moral 
feelings.  So  that,  if  Mr.  Buckle  had  succeeded  in 
proving  that  "  moral  knowledge  "  does  not  ad- 
vance, and  should  at  the  same  time  succeed  in  his 
attempt  to  prove  that  "  moral  feeling  "  does  not 
improve,  he  would,  if  consistent,  arrive  at  the 
singular  result  that  there  has  been  no  improve- 
ment at  all  in  the  actions  of  men. 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  177 

It  is  quite  a  relief,  on  emerging  from  this  laby- 
rinth of  baseless  assertion  and  ill-directed  argu- 
ment, to  find  that  our  author  at  last  seems  to  re- 
member his  original  object,  as  he  sets  himself  to 
work  really  to  show  the  "  superiority  "  of  knowl- 
edge over  feeling  as  a  civilizing  agent.  His  rea- 
soning is  here  very  plausible,  and  his  illustrations 
drawn  from  the  history  of  war  and  religious  per- 
secution are  well  chosen,  and  appear  at  first  quite 
convincing.  He  tells  us  that  good  intentions  were 
of  no  avail  in  stopping  persecution,  because  perse- 
cutors themselves  have  generally  had  the  best  in- 
tentions. The  heathen  emperors  of  Rome,  who  tor- 
tured Catholics,  the  Catholic  Inquisitors  of  Spain, 
who  tortured  Protestants,  all  meant  well  enough, 
he  argues,  —  they  were  very  often  men  of  the  pur- 
est character ;  but  they  did  not  know  that  it  was 
wrong  for  them  to  interfere  with  the  religious  con- 
victions of  others.  So  Mr.  Buckle  does  perceive, 
after  all,  that  our  knowledge  of  our  moral  obliga- 
tions has  increased  somewhat!  We  are  no  bet- 
ter, he  says,  than  the  Inquisitors  of  old,  but  we 
know  that  religious  persecution  is  wrong,  wicked, 
harmful;  while  they,  in  their  mistaken  zeal, 
thought  it  to  be  right,  holy,  beneficial.  This 
point  he  argues  admirably,  but  he  does  not  suc- 
ceed in  absolving  religious  persecutors  from  all 
12 


178  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

charge  of  selfish  passion.  Indeed,  he  elsewhere 
expresses  it  as  his  own  opinion  that  the  clergy 
have  been  strongly  influenced,  in  their  vindictive 
attempts  to  destroy  or  injure  those  dissenting 
from  their  views,  by  motives  of  ambitious  policy. 
We  have  no  doubt  that  such  motives  have  always 
been  of  immense  power  among  this  class  of  men, 
as  well  as  among  other  classes.  But  we  will  not 
urge  this  or  any  similar  objection  against  Mr. 
Buckle's  grand  argument.  We  will  merely  call 
attention  to  the  circumstance  that  a  man's  "  moral 
feeling,"  his  "  moral  instinct,"  his  "  conscience," 
or  whatever  any  one  chooses  to  call  it,  is  a  natural 
faculty.  In  other  words,  ethical  emotions,  being 
functions  of  the  nervous  system,  are  natural  facul- 
ties. And  we  have  already  shown  that  the  nat- 
ural faculties  of  mankind  develop.  The  refuta- 
tion of  Mr.  Buckle's  first  grand  argument  carries 
with  it  the  refutation  of  the  second. 

III.  It  carries  with  it,  likewise,  the  refutation 
of  the  third.  For  the  proposition  that  civilization 
is  regulated,  not  by  the  "stationary  agent,"  but 
by  intellectual  acquirement,  can  have  no  value, 
unless  it  be  proved  that  moral  feeling  is  the  "  sta- 
tionary agent."  But  this  cannot  be  proved.  On 
the  contrary,  it  has  been  shown  that  our  powers, 
both  moral  and  intellectual,  are  continually  devel- 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  179 

oping,  and  that  our  acquisitions,  both  moral  and 
intellectual,  are  constantly  increasing.  The  moral 
element  is,  then,  no  more  stationary  than  the  in- 
tellectual ;  and  thus  Mr.  Buckle's  third  grand  ar- 
gument falls  to  the  ground,  and  with  it  falls  his 
fundamental  law,  which  is  shown  to  be  utterly 
destitute  of  any  truth  whatever. 

It  may  be  well  to  remark,  before  proceeding 
further,  that  rejection  of  Mr.  Buckle's  second 
law  is  perfectly  compatible  with  acceptance  of 
his  first.  There  is  no  inconsistency  in  saying,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  moral  feeling  is  a  civilizing 
agency,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  progress 
of  civilization  conforms  to  the  successive  trans- 
formations of  opinion.  For  the  ethical  as  well 
as  all  the  other  emotions  enter  largely  into  every 
opinion-forming  process.  Though  our  emotions 
do  not  combine  into  propositions  the  ideas  which 
are  constituent  parts  of  our  beliefs,  they  do  none 
the  less,  as  Mr.  Bain  has  clearly  proved,1  sway 
the  intellect  as  it  performs  this  operation.  The 
emotions  accordingly  enter  into  every  act  of  be- 
lief, and  there  can  be  no  complete  theory  of  human 
opinion  which  leaves  them  out  of  account.  Thus 
our  acceptance  of  Mr.  Buckle's  first  law  confirms 

1  See  the  whole  of  his  admirable  work  on  The  Emotions  and  the 
Will. 


180  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

our  rejection  of  his  second,  and  we  see,  more 
clearly  than  ever,  that  "the  double  movement, 
moral  and  intellectual,  is  essential  to  the  very 
idea  of  civilization,"  and  that,  without  including 
both  elements,  there  can  be  no  complete  theory  of 
progress. 

It  may  likewise  be  well  to  remark  that  a  dis- 
cussion of  this  sort  has  no  immediate  bearing  on 
the  subject  of  Christianity.  It  has  been  supposed 
by  some  persons  that  Mr.  Buckle's  entire  argu- 
ment is  nothing  but  a  sinister  attack  upon  the 
Christian  religion.  We  see  nothing  of  the  kind 
in  it.  Christianity  is  a  system  of  belief,  in  which 
both  intellectual  and  moral  forces  must  co-oper- 
ate; and  a  person,  while  denying  the  civilizing 
agency  of  the  moral  element,  may  with  perfect 
consistency  maintain  the  civilizing  agency  of  that 
set  of  opinions  in  the  formation  of  which  the 
moral  element  has  had  but  a  partial  share.  Our 
author's  argument,  therefore,  is  not  to  be  con- 
strued into  an  assault  upon  Christianity,  nor  is 
our  own  argument  to  be  construed  into  a  defence 
of  it.  Confusion  necessarily  results  from  mixing 
questions  which  should  be  kept  separate. 

We  come  now  to  Mr.  Buckle's  third l  law  — 

1  On  the  first  page  of  his  second  volume,  Mr.  Buckle  places  this 
hw  second  in  order,  and  the  law  just  considered  third.  But  as  it  is 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  181 

that  scepticism  "  has  in  every  department  of 
thought  been  the  invariable  preliminary  to  all  the 
intellectual  revolutions  through  which  the  human 
mind  has  passed,"  and  that  "without  it  there 
could  be  no  progress,  no  change,  no  civilization."  J 
In  examining  this  proposition,  it  is  needful,  at 
the  outset,  to  have  a  clear  idea  of  the  nature  of 
scepticism,  as  understood  by  Mr.  Buckle.  The 
word  itself  has  been  variously  interpreted  ;  some- 
times in  a  more  general  sense,  as  meaning  the 
absolute  denial  of  all  dogmas,  theories,  and  be- 
liefs whatever ;  sometimes  in  a  more  special  sense, 
as  signifying  disbelief  in  the  peculiar  doctrines  of 
Christianity.  It  is  in  neither  of  these  senses  that 
Mr.  Buckle  uses  the  word.  He  defines  scepti- 
cism as  suspension  of  judgment,  or  hesitation  in 
forming  or  receiving  an  opinion.  A  true  sceptic, 
then,  would  neither  believe  nor  disbelieve  any- 
thing at  all.  He  would  doubt  even  his  own 
doubts.  History  presents  but  few  instances  of 
a  consistent  and  thorough-going  sceptic.  Pyrrho 
and  Hume  will,  however,  serve  sufficiently  well 
as  examples.  Scepticism  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  that  philosophy  which,  not  content  with 

..onvenient  to  examine  this  law  in  connection  with  the  fourth,  we 
have  taken  the  liberty  to  alter  Mr.  Buckle's  arrangement. 
i  Vol.  i.  p.  328. 


182  Darwinism  and   Other  Ussays. 

doubting,  absolutely  denies.  This  might  be  called 
negative  philosophy,  or  negativism,  in  broad  dis- 
tinction from  positive  philosophy,  which  aims  at 
establishing  from  incontrovertible  data  a  system 
of  results  comprising  all  that  it  is  in  the  power  of 
the  human  mind  to  know.  Negativism  and  pos- 
itivism, then,  constitute  two  opposite  phases  of 
human  thought.  As  examples  of  negative  think- 
ers, we  have  Hobbes,  Voltaire,  Lessing,  and 
Rousseau ;  while  as  instances  of  positive  thinkers 
we  may  cite  Bacon,  Leibnitz,  Newton,  and  Spen- 
cer. Scepticism  is  identical  with  neither  of  these 
philosophies,  though  it  has  some  points  in  com- 
mon with  both.  Scepticism,  indeed,  is  not  a  phi- 
losophy at  all ;  it  is  a  no-philosophy,  —  a  transi- 
tion state  where,  robbed  of  its  belief,  the  mind 
rests  not,  but  stays  unresting,  in  dreary  incerti- 
tude and  distressful  vacillation,  until  it  finds  refuge 
in  belief  again. 

Bearing  in  mind  this  meaning  of  the  word, 
we  can  safely  proceed  to  examine  the  proposition 
before  us.  We  do  not  think  it  altogether  prob- 
able that  Mr.  Buckle  would,  on  mature  reflection, 
lay  down  this  law  about  scepticism  as  a  univer- 
sal one,  operative  alike  in  all  stages  of  progress  ; 
but,  as  he  makes  no  limitations  to  it  in  the  course 
of  his  work,  we  must  discuss  it  here  in  relation 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  183 

to  the  three  stages  of  mental  evolution,  and  see 
whether  or  not  it  is  alike  applicable  to  all. 

We  shall  find,  to  begin  with,  that  it  is  not  ap- 
plicable to  the  theological  state.  When  man  first 
looked  upon  the  wonders  of  Nature,  his  untaught 
imagination  gave  birth  to  weird,  fantastic  shapes 
innumerable,  peopling  the  air,  the  streams,  the 
forest,  and  the  mountain-chasm.  Just  awakened, 
as  it  were,  to  self-consciousness,  and  feeling  his 
own  life  thrilling  within  him,  he  ascribed  that  life 
to  everything  around  him.  He  looked  upon  the 
wide,  dark  surface  of  the  "  many-sounding  sea," 
and  saw  there  a  mighty,  restless,  earth-upheaving 
Power,  which  refinement  afterwards  personified, 
and  called  Poseidon.  Gazing  above  him  on  the 
blue  expanse  which  seemed  to  encompass  the 
"  plain  of  the  earth,"  he  came  to  recognize  there 
a  Divinity  of  light  and  warmth,  a  Devas,  a  pater- 
nal Zeus.  When  the  bright  clouds  flitted  along 
the  sky,  it  was  Hermes  driving  the  celestial  cat- 
tle to  the  milking ;  when  the  north-wind  arose, 
cold  and  blustering,  it  was  Boreas  storming  in  his 
wrath ;  when  the  stars  came  out  at  night,  there 
were  countless  deities  to  whom  this  primitive  man 
made  sacred  the  days  of  the  week.  The  changes 
of  the  seasons,  the  ceaselessly  recurring  death 
and  resurrection  of  Nature,  were  typified  in  wild 


184  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

legends  of  Jemsljid  and  Zohak,  of  Osiris  and 
Thammuz,  of  Hylas  and  Orpheus.  The  whole 
universe  was  thinking,  feeling,  and  willing.  Noth- 
ing was  dead  or  inert ;  all  things  were  endowed 
with  life  and  activity.  From  this  came  sacrifices, 
shrines  and  temples,  oracles,  and  sacerdotal  or- 
ders. It  would  be  difficult  to  find  any  traces  of 
scepticism  in  all  this.  Belief  then  reigned  alone 
in  the  human  mind,  and  doubt  found  no  place 
there.  As  long  as  the  phenomenal  was  as  yet 
harder  to  comprehend  and  more  difficult  to  con- 
trol than  the  unseen  and  unexplored  world  that 
lay  beyond  it,  scepticism  was  impossible.  Not 
only  was  it  impossible,  but  it  would  have  been 
harmful.  For  the  primitive  man  was  barbarous, 
treacherous,  revengeful.1  His  selfish  instincts 
were  as  yet  all  in  all.  His  sympathetic  and  so- 
cial feelings  were  as  yet  undeveloped.  In  such 
a  rude  condition  it  was  only  the  bond  of  a  firmly 
rooted  and  wide-spread  belief  —  it  was  only  the 
ascendency  of  a  priestly  and  governmental  or- 
der, thus  secured  —  which  could  keep  society 
from  being  disorganized.  Had  scepticism  been 
once  let  in,  religious  and  political  organization 
would  have  been  weakened,  sects  and  parties 
would  have  sprung  up  prematurely,  and  the 

1  Spencer's  Social  Statics,  pp.  409-413. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  185 

strong  check  needful  to  curb  the  undisciplined 
passions  of  men  would  have  been  destroyed,  civili- 
zation would  have  stopped,  and  society  could  no 
longer  have  existed.  It  was  only  after  centuries 
of  theocratic  and  monarchic  rule  —  after  the  pri- 
meval nomadic  mode  of  life  had  been  long  aban- 
doned, and  agriculture  and  commerce  had  in 
course  of  time,  by  mingling  men  with  each  other 
in  peaceful  relations,  called  forth  social  virtues  — 
that  scepticism  could  safely  arise.  And  then  it 
did  arise.  We  find  it  first  showing  itself  in  the 
states  of  Greece,  where  popular  despots  arose  and 
were  overthrown,  as  at  Korinth,  Sikyon,  and  Me- 
gara ;  and  where  philosophers  began  to  speculate 
about  the  first  principles  of  things,  as  Thales, 
Xenophane^s,  and  Herakleitos.  Thenceforward 
scepticism  increased,  until  it  reached  for  a  time 
its  culmination  in  the  universal  doubts  of  Pyrrho. 
But  it  is  not  in  ancient  times  at  all  that  we  are 
to  look  for  any  very  prominent  manifestation  of 
scepticism.  The  spirit  of  doubting  and  hesitat- 
ing inquiry  was  of  slow  growth,  and  did  not  at- 
tain to  its  maturity  until  monotheism  had  been 
established  in  Europe  for  more  than  a  thousand 
years.  Not  only,  therefore,  has  scepticism  not 
always  been  essential  to  progress ;  not  only  have 
some  important  changes  in  human  opinion  —  as 


186  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

the  change  from  fetishism  to  polytheism  —  been 
accomplished  without  it ;  but  also,  in  the  first  of 
the  three  great  periods  of  civilization  it  did  not 
arise  at  all  until  very  late,  and  was  then  but  a 
secondary  force  in  the  minds  of  men. 

It  is  in  the  metaphysical  or  revolutionary  pe- 
riod of  modern  society,  extending  from  the  twelfth 
century  to  the  present  time,  that  we  see  the  scep- 
tical spirit  in  full  operation.  To  this  stage  of 
human  evolution  Mr.  Buckle's  proposition  is  ap- 
plicable without  any  limitations.  The  applica- 
tion he  has  himself  given  us,  with  great  fullness 
and  detail,  in  the  case  of  England,  France,  Spain, 
and  Scotland.  In  the  brief  space  to  which  we  are 
here  restricted,  it  would  be  vain  to  attempt  to  add 
to  the  profuse  and  happily  chosen  illustrations 
contained  in  those  instructive  chapters  which  our 
author  has  principally  devoted  to  this  portion  of 
his  subject.  Nowhere  else  has  the  revolutionary 
period  of  history  been  so  admirably  portrayed. 
Nowhere  else  can  we  find  a  truer,  a  juster,  a  pro- 
founder  appreciation  of  the  workings  of  the  scep- 
tical spirit.  Here  we  discover  no  inconsistencies, 
no  errors  of  statement,  vitiating  the  whole  ar- 
gument. Here  Mr.  Buckle  reveals  his  wonder- 
ful power.  Here  he  draws  sure  conclusions  from 
well  -  ascertained  data.  For  there  can  be  no 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  187 

shadow  of  doubt  that  in  the  twelfth  century  the 
sceptical  spirit  had  begun  greatly  to  increase  its 
power  and  extend  its  influence  ;  that  in  the  six- 
teenth it  had  become  a  mighty  civilizing  force ; 
and  that  in  the  eighteenth  it  had  penetrated  all 
departments  of  thought.  It  was  this  sceptical 
spirit  which  gave  rise  to  the  conceptualism  of 
Abelard,  the  infidelity  of  Vanini,  and  the  heresy 
of  Wyclif.  It  became,  as  Mr.  Buckle  remarks, 
"  in  physics,  the  precursor  of  science  ;  in  politics, 
of  liberty ;  and  in  theology,  of  toleration."  Bat 
for  the  scepticism  in  his  own  mind,  Luther  could 
not  have  become  the  founder  of  Protestantism ; 
and  but  for  the  scepticism  already  rife  in  the 
minds  of  others,  he  could  have  found  no  followers. 
We  find  scepticism  dictating  the  metaphysics  of 
Descartes  and  the  diplomacy  of  Richelieu.  We 
find  it  inciting  the  English  to  rebellion  against 
the  despotism  of  the  Stuarts,  and  striving,  though 
vainly,  in  the  wars  of  the  Fronde,  to  establish  po- 
litical liberty  in  France.  It  lay  at  the  foundation 
of  the  sensationalism  of  Locke  and  the  idealism 
of  Berkeley,  and  was  itself  at  last  organized  into 
an  independent  system  by  Hume.  It  was  the 
opening  phase  of  that  negative  philosophy  which, 
first  receiving  definite  shape  in  the  deism  of  Her- 
bert and  Bolingbroke,  ended  in  the  atheism  of 


188  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Diderot  and  Helvetius.  It  was  the  parent  of  the 
transcendentalism  of  Kant  and  Fichte,  the  physio- 
philosophic  vagaries  of  Schelling  and  Cams,  the 
absolutism  of  Hegel,  and  the  pantheism  of  Feu- 
erbach.  Carried  into  science,  it  paved  the  way 
for  the  immortal  discoveries  of  Lavoisier  and  Bi- 
chat.  Wielded  by  Voltaire,  it  broke  down  eccle- 
siastical power  in  France ;  and  in  the  hands  of 
Rousseau  swept  away  the  vilest  of  despotisms  by 
the  most  fearful  of  revolutions.  It  roused  the 
Dutch  to  cast  off  the  yoke  of  Spain,  sent  the  Pu- 
ritans to  Massachusetts,  inspired  the  Americans 
in  their  "  Declaration  of  Independence,"  and 
shaped  the  fabric  of  their  democratic  government. 
What  need  of  further  examples  ?  It  is  the  scep- 
tical spirit,  advocating  liberty  in  politics  and  tol- 
eration in  religion,  which  has  been  at  the  bottom 
of  every  change  through  which  humanity  has 
passed  in  modern  times.  Mr.  Buckle's  law  is  en- 
tirely applicable  to  the  metaphysical  period  of 
civilization,  and  is  the  key  to  the  explanation  of 
its  phenomena. 

But  the  metaphysical  state  is  not  a  permanent 
one.  It  constitutes  a  transition  from  that  primi- 
tive belief  which  was  the  offspring  of  man's  early 
endeavours  to  compass  and  explain  the  Infinite 
about  him,  to  that  new  belief  which  is  founded 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  189 

on  a  long  and  thorough  investigation  into  the 
laws  of  the  natural  world.  Giving  up  as  hope- 
less all  search  for  the  undiscoverable,  all  striving 
to  know  the  unknowable,  science  contents  itself 
with  finding  out  that  which  lies  within  our  reach. 
But  it  was  not  in  the  power  of  man,  on  first  per- 
ceiving the  inadequacy  and  incongruity  of  his  old 
belief,  to  pass  at  once  to  the  new.  No  one  can 
reject  an  old  system  of  opinions,  which  has  shaped 
his  thoughts  and  guided  his  actions  in  the  past, 
and  then  take  up  a  new  system,  to  shape  his 
thoughts  and  guide  his  actions  in  the  future,  with- 
out going  through  an  intermediate  state  of  pain- 
ful and  wearisome  doubt.  As  with  the  individ- 
ual, so  with  the  race.  The  sceptical  period  could 
not  but  intervene.  It  was  only  after  countless 
attempts  to  explore  the  dark  and  dangerous  re- 
gion of  the  Infinite  had  all  proved  futile  —  it  was 
only  after  successive  theories  had  all  been  weighed 
in  the  balance,  and  found  wanting  —  that  man 
could  come  at  last  to  repose  in  the  calm  spirit  and 
sure  methods  of  scientific  inquiry.  Before  this 
must  necessarily  have  come  that  tumultuous  sea- 
son of  doubt  and  denial,  of  discord  and  revolu- 
tion, in  which  the  sceptical  spirit  reigned  su- 
preme. The  rottenness  of  old  institutions,  forms 
and  dogmas,  had  to  be  exposed  before  they  could 


190  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

be  given  up.  Then  the  baiTenness  of  doubt  had 
to  make  itself  felt  before  it  could  be  supplanted 
by  knowledge.  It  was  not  until  Hume,  by  carry- 
ing scepticism  to  its  uttermost  extent,  had  shown 
its  unsatisfactory  character  and  vain  results,  that 
the  germs  of  scientific  method,  implanted  by  Ba- 
con and  Descartes,  could  develop  and  bear  fruit 
in  the  positive  philosophy  of  Comte. 

As  the  metaphysical  period  is  but  a  transition 
from  the  theological  to  the  positive,  it  only  re- 
mains to  show  that  scepticism  is  peculiar  to  it, 
being  a  transition  from  belief  to  knowledge.  We 
have  here  very  few  facts  to  guide  us  to  an  induc- 
tive investigation,  since  the  positive  era  is  only 
now  commencing.  But,  if  we  consider  the  state 
of  human  thought  at  the  present  day  on  the  vari- 
ous subjects  of  scientific  research,  we  shall  find 
that  in  the  most  advanced  departments  scepticism 
no  longer  finds  a  place.  Astronomers  long  ago 
gave  over  doubting  and  asking  questions  of  each 
other  about  the  fact  of  the  earth's  motion.  It 
was  the  scepticism  of  Copernicus  and  Galileo  that 
overthrew  the  old  notion  of  its  fixity ;  but  that 
scepticism  speedily  issued  in  positive  certainty. 
Whether  a  man  believes  or  disbelieves  in  the  mo- 
tion of  the  earth  is  now  a  mere  matter  of  knowl- 
edge or  ignorance.  There  is  no  place  for  doubt, 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  191 

no  room  for  difference  of  opinion.  So  with  all 
demonstrated  facts  and  laws.  A  truth  once  estab- 
lished remains  forever  a  truth.  We  cannot  choose 
but  accept  it.  And  science,  as  a  body  of  estab- 
lished truths,  cannot  admit  of  scepticism. 

The  past  history  of  science  confirms,  and  its 
future  progress  must  also  confirm,  this  conclusion, 
which  might  be  drawn  at  once  from  the  very  na- 
ture of  thought.  When  we  know  as  much  about 
the  most  complex  subjects  as  we  now  know  about 
the  most  simple  ones,  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  doubt  at  all.  "  The  mystic  drama  will  be 
sunny  clear,  and  all  Nature's  processes  will  be 
visible  to  man,  as  a  divine  Effluence  and  Life."  1 

We  have  seen  that  in  the  theological  stage  of 
human  development  scepticism  did  not  exist ; 
that  in  the  metaphysical  stage  it  arose  and  ex- 
tended its  sway  over  every  department  of  thought ; 
but  that  in  the  positive  stage  it  is  destined  to 
decrease,  until  it  exercises  no  perceptible  influ- 
ence. Corresponding  to  these  three  stages  of  evo- 
lution are  the  three  predominant  mental  states  of 
belief,  doubt,  and  knowledge.  The  three  great 
periods  into  which  Comte  has  divided  the  history 
of  civilization  might  be  named  with  perfect  accu- 
racy the  period  of  credulity,  the  period  of  scep- 

1  Lewes'  Seaside,  Studies,  p.  219. 


192  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ticismy  and  the  period  of  science.  Mr.  Buckle's 
law  has  this  much  of  truth  in  it,  that  the  scepti- 
cal age  is  the  necessary  forerunner  of  the  scien- 
tific ;  that  in  the  race,  no  less  than  in  the  indi- 
vidual, doubt  must  intervene  between  belief  and 
knowledge. 

We  shall  now  briefly  consider  Mr.  Buckle's 
fourth  fundamental  law,  —  that  "  the  great  enemy 
of  civilization  is  the  protective  spirit ; "  or  in  other 
words,  "the  notion  that  society  cannot  prosper, 
unless  the  affairs  of  life  are  watched  over  and  pro- 
tected, at  nearly  every  turn,  by  the  state  and  the 
church, — the  state  teaching  men  what  they  are  to 
do,  and  the  church  teaching  them  what  they  are 
to  believe."  1  Here,  as  in  the  foregoing  case,  Mr. 
Buckle  errs  only  in  stating  his  law  without  any 
limitations,  as  if  it  were  a  universal  one.  It  can- 
not be  questioned  that  for  several  centuries  the 
protective  spirit  has  been  extremely  prejudicial  to 
progress.  The  notion  that  government  ought  to 
control  the  actions  and  beliefs  of  men  has,  when 
carried  into  politics,  furnished  a  plea  for  despot- 
ism, and  when  carried  into  theology  it  has  been 
productive  of  intolerance  and  persecution.  Mr. 
.  Buckle  devotes  a  large  portion  of  his  work  to  the 
establishment  and  elucidation  of  this  fact.  He 
i  Vol.  ii.  p.  l. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  193 

shows  that  government  and  legislation  are  incom- 
petent to  direct  the  affairs  of  men.  He  shows 
that  politicians  have  injured  trade  by  interfering 
with  it ;  that  legislators  have  caused  smuggling, 
with  its  attendant  crimes ;  that  they  have  also  in- 
creased hypocrisy  and  perjury  ;  and  that,  by  their 
laws  against  usury,  they  have  but  heightened  the 
evil  they  sought  to  prevent.  He  shows  that  the 
protection  of  literature  by  Augustus,  by  Leo  X., 
and  by  Louis  XIV.  caused  literature  to  decline. 
In  each  case  "there  was  much  apparent  splen- 
dour, immediately  succeeded  by  sudden  ruin."  1 
The  system  of  protecting  literature  was  carried 
to  its  fullest  extent  by  Louis  XIV.,  and  nowhere 
can  we  see  more  clearly  the  baneful  effects  of 
such  a  course.  For  the  scientific  progress  which 
had  been  so  marked  in  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII. 
stopped  forthwith.  Descartes  and  Pascal,  Fer- 
mat,  Gassendi,  Riolan,  Joubert,  and  Pare*  died, 
and  left  no  successors.  Nothing  was  done  in  as- 
tronomy,  in  chemistry,  in  physiology,  or  in  bot- 
any. Of  mechanical  inventions  there  were  none. 
Even  the  fine  arts  soon  began  to  decline  ;  and  in- 
tellectual decay,  the  natural  consequence  of  pat- 
ronage, was  seen  in  every  department  of  thought 
So  in  many  other  cases  we  see  the  damage  en- 

i  Vol.  i.  p.  647. 
13 


194  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

tailed  by  the  interference  of  government.  Laws 
fixing  a  minimum  of  wages  have  caused  thousands 
of  labourers  to  be  turned  out  of  employment.1 
Laws  regulating  marriage  have  ended  in  increas- 
ing the  number  of  illegitimate  births.2  Laws  for 
the  establishment  of  sanitary  supervision  have 
spread  disease,  and  lengthened  out  the  mortality 
returns.3  Laws  for  the  support  of  colonial  gov- 
ernment have  given  rise  to  the  most  barbarous 
tyranny.4  Trade-union  projects,  economic  exper- 
iments, poor-laws,  education  -  laws,  church -laws, 
currency-laws,  have  all  turned  out  to  be  failures, 
and  in  many  cases  have  inflicted  upon  society  pos- 
itive misery,  instead  of  conferring  upon  it  positive 
benefit.  Paradoxical  as  all  this  may  at  first  seem, 
it  is  but  a  statement  of  historic  facts.5  Modern 
history  is  filled  with  similar  examples,  all  show- 
ing the  utter  incompetence  of  government  to  reg- 
ulate the  affairs  of  men.  The  duty  of  govern- 
ment is  to  insure  the  fulfilment  of  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  morality,  —  that  no  man  shall  infringe 

i  As  in  the  case  of  the  Spitalfields  weavers  in  1773. 

3  As  in  Bavaria. 

8  As  in  England,  some  years  ago,  during  the  cholera  pestilence. 

4  As  in  the  case  of  the  East  India  Company,  and  of  the  American 
Colonies  before  the  Revolution. 

«  See  the  evidence  in  Spencer's  Social  Statics,  pp.  195-406,  and  i» 
Mr.  Buckle's  volumes. 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  195 

npon  another's  sphere  of  action.  If  it  but  per- 
forms its  duty,  it  will  do  well.  But  when  it  goes 
to  making  plans  for  securing  the  "  greatest  hap- 
piness to  the  greatest  number,"  it  usually  con- 
trives to  end  up  by  securing  the  least  happiness 
to  every  one,  having  failed  in  its  projects,  and 
neglected  its  proper  function  meanwhile. 

But  on  looking  back  and  contemplating  society, 
in  its  primitive  state,  we  shall  arrive  at  very  dif- 
ferent conclusions.  We  shall  perceive  that  the 
protective  spirit,  far  from  being  prejudicial  to 
progress,  was  one  of  its  most  essential  conditions. 
Indeed,  on  calling  to  mind  all  those  centuries 
of  primeval  history,  when  there  was  nothing  to 
counteract  the  workings  of  the  protective  spirit, 
and  when  all  things  conspired  to  strengthen  its 
power,  one  might  reasonably  ask  at  the  outset 
why  it  was  that  under  such  circumstances  the 
human  race  made  such  sure  and  unceasing  prog- 
ress ;  why  it  was  that  it  progressed  at  all ;  why 
it  was  that  it  did  not  even  retrograde.  If  the 
protective  spirit  is  of  necessity  in  every  age  the 
enemy  of  civilization,  how  did  it  happen  that  we 
ever  emerged  from  a  state  of  barbarism  ?  How 
conies  it  that  we  have  not  remained  uncivilized, 
mere  nomads,  or  at  best  diggers  of  earth,  living 
from  hand  to  mouth,  little  better,  on  the  whole, 


196  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

than  a  race  of  chimpanzees?  For  Mr.  Buckle's 
own  facts  show  that  the  protective  spirit  has 
never  been  so  strong  as  in  the  early  ages  of  his- 
tory. "In  India,  slavery,  abject,  eternal  slavery, 
was  the  natural  state  of  the  great  body  of  the 
people."1  The  "vast  social  system"  of  Egypt 
was  "  based  on  despotism  "  and  "  upheld  by  cru- 
elty."2 In  Mexico  and  Peru,  "there  was  the 
same  utter  absence  of  anything  approaching  to 
the  democratic  spirit :  there  was  the  same  des- 
potic power  on  the  part  of  the  upper  classes,  and 
the  same  contemptible  subservience  on  the  part 
of  the  lower."3  Again,  in  Babylonia,  Assyria, 
and  Persia,  despotism  was  the  only  form  of  gov- 
ernment ever  experienced  or  thought  of.4  We 
have  evidence  of  the  same  in  the  case  of  China 
and  Japan.  We  find,  moreover,  that  in  barba- 
rous countries,  like  Ashantee,  despotism  univer- 
sally prevails.  Going  still  lower,  still  farther 
back,  we  see  nomadic  tribes  always  in  subjec- 
tion to  the  will  of  the  strong  man.  Now,  for 
many  thousands  of  years,5  civilization  was  advanc- 

i  Vol.  i.  p.  73.  2  Ibid.  p.  83. 

»  Ibid.  p.  101.  In  Peru,  according  to  Mr.  Prescott,  the  people 
could  not  even  change  their  dress  without  a  license  from  their  rulers ! 

4  The  passage  in  Herodotus,  b.  iii.  c.  80-83,  is  well  known  to  have 
BO  historical  value  ;  see  the  remarks  of  Rawlinson,  vol.  ii.  p.  393. 

6  Bunsen's  Egypt,  passim.     Darwin,  Origin  of  Species,  p.  83. 


Mr.  Buckles  Fallacies.  197 

ing  in  Egypt;  Babylonia,  Persia,  and  many  oi 
the  other  nations  above-mentioned  made  consider- 
able progress;  India  even  arrived  at  a  high  state 
of  refinement,  as  is  witnessed  by  her  extensive  and 
magnificent  literature.  All  this  shows  that  in 
early  times  progress  did  co-exist  with  the  strongest 
possible  manifestation  of  the  protective  spirit ; 
and  when  we  consider  that  there  was  nothing  then 
to  counterbalance  the  workings  of  the  protective 
spirit,  that  all  physical  causes  contributed  to  fa- 
vour its  development,1  and  that  scepticism,  the 
only  thing  that  could  have  weakened  it,  did  not 
exist,  we  may  suspect  that  the  protective  spirit 
could  not  have  been  so  detrimental  to  the  interests 
of  civilization  as  Mr.  Buckle  supposes. 

On  looking  at  the  matter  deductively,  it  will 
even  appear  that  without  the  protective  spirit 
there  could  have  been  no  civilization.  For  what 
but  the  most  absolute  despotism  and  the  pro- 
foundest  awe  of  the  ruling  power  could  ever  have 
kept  together  the  communities  of  the  primitive 
men,  with  their  cannibalism,  their  bloodthirsti- 
ness,  their  dishonesty  and  treachery  ?  As  long  as 
men  could  not  live  together  peaceably,  as  long 
as  they  neither  knew  nor  practised  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  morality,  there  must  have  been  some 

i  Buckle,  vol.  i.  chap.  2. 


198  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

power  sufficient  to  keep  society  from  falling  to 
pieces,  or  there  could  have  been  no  progress  at 
all;  and  the  only  such  power  conceivable  was 
that  total  subjection  of  the  many  to  the  few 
which  constitutes  the  protective  system  of  gov- 
ernment. As  long  as  Persians  mutilated  each 
other,  and  Carthaginians  burned  their  children, 
and  Chinamen  beat  to  death  their  wives ;  as 
long  as  Hindus  practised  thuggee,  and  Spartans 
practised  stealing,  and  lonians  practised  piracy, 
there  must  have  been  "  Drakonian  statutes  writ- 
ten in  blood,"  there  must  have  been  absolute  des- 
potism. Without  this,  society  would  have  become 
a  parcel  of  units.  Imagine  a  republic  of  Tatars, 
a  constitutional  democracy  of  Vandals,  and  de- 
velop the  consequences ! 

Thus  in  the  primitive  stage  of  civilization  the 
protective  spirit  played  the  same  part  as  universal 
credulity  in  preserving  society  from  disintegration. 
Thus  it  becomes  more  evident  than  before  that 
scepticism  would  have  been  harmful  at  that  early 
period.  It  would  have  weakened  the  protective 
spirit  and  destroyed  allegiance,  besides  causing 
religious  dissension.  Nothing  of  the  kind  was 
then  admissible.  The  selfish  and  brutal  feelings 
of  men  had  to  be  restrained,  and  their  social  and 
humane  feelings  called  forth,  before  the  sceptical 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  199 

spirit  could  safely  commence  its  inroads  upon  the 
spirit  of  universal  belief  and  universal  submission. 
The  protective  spirit  was  therefore  in  early  times 
the  great  safeguard  of  civilization  and  the  all- 
essential  condition  of  progress ;  and  this  very 
important  restriction  must  be  placed  upon  Mr* 
Buckle's  law. 

On  looking  at  the  subject  in  its  broadest  and 
most  general  aspect,  we  shall  arrive  at  the  conclu- 
sion that  all  systems  of  belief  and  all  great  insti- 
tutions are  beneficial  when  they  first  spring  up. 
Each  has  its  functions  to  perform,  and  the  more 
carefully  we  study  history  the  more  deeply  shall 
we  be  convinced  that  it  performs  it  in  the  best 
possible  manner.  But  after  these  beliefs  and  in- 
stitutions have  done  their  work  and  are  no  longer 
needed,  after  they  have  been  stereotyped  in  life- 
less forms,  then  it  is  that  they  become  produc- 
tive of  evil  and  are  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of 
mankind. 

With  the  help  of  these  considerations,  we  can 
more  completely  understand  Mr.  Buckle's  two 
propositions.  With  the  restrictions  here  placed 
upon  them,  they  might  be  stated  thus :  in  the 
revolutionary  period  of  modern  society,  scepticism 
has  been  uniformly  essential  to  progress,  and  the 
protective  spirit  has  been  uniformly  detrimental 


200  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

to  it.  This  is  strictly  true,  and  needs  no  qualifi- 
cation. 

In  his  second  volume  our  author  develops  an- 
other fundamental  law,  which  we  have  not  time 
to  consider  here.  It  may  be  stated  thus :  in  a 
country  where  the  deductive  method  of  investiga= 
tion  prevails,  there  will  be  a  much  greater  differ- 
ence in  the  intellectual  and  social  condition  of  the 
upper  and  lower  classes  than  in  a  country  where 
the  inductive  method  is  the  prevalent  one.  This 
may  be  illustrated  by  comparing  Greece,  Ger- 
many, and  Scotland,  on  the  one  hand,  with  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States  on  the  other.  The 
application  of  this  law  in  the  case  of  Germany 
and  America  is  to  be  contained  in  the  third  vol- 
ume. 

In  conclusion,  we  must  say  a  few  words  in  re- 
gard to  Mr.  Buckle's  application  of  his  four  great 
laws.  The  application  of  the  first  runs  through 
the  whole  work.  In  every  chapter  we  are  met  by 
numberless  illustrations  of  the  law  that  the  prog- 
ress of  humanity  conforms  to  the  progress  of 
opinion.  It  is  different,  however,  in  the  case  of 
the  second  law  which  we  have  discussed.  Mr. 
Buckle  appears  entirely  to  forget  his  theoretical 
neglect  of  the  moral  element  in  our  nature,  and 
to  take  it  practically  into  account  as  much  as  any 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  201 

one  else.  In  his  delineations  of  wars,  civil  revolu- 
tions, and  especially  of  religious  persecutions,  he 
seems  to  believe  in  spite  of  himself  that  "  moral 
feelings  "  do  exercise  as  much  power  over  men  as 
"  intellectual  acquisitions  ;  "  and  that  the  effects 
produced  by  the  former  are  quite  as  lasting  as 
those  produced  by  the  latter.  He  repeatedly  rec- 
ognizes the  fact  that  our  desires  and  impulses  in- 
fluence us  strongly  in  the  acceptance  and  defence 
of  opinions.  In  speaking  of  the  Scotch  clergy, 
he  attributes  their  tyrannical  enforcement  of  su- 
perstitious notions  to  an  inordinate  desire  for 
power,  not  to  a  mistaken  interest  in  the  welfare 
of  others.  After  noticing  the  profound  reverence 
of  the  Scotch  people  for  their  clergy,  he  observes : 
"  It  is  not  surprising  that  the  clergy,  who  at  no 
period  and  in  no  nation  have  been  remarkable 
for  their  meekness,  or  for  a  want  of  confidence  in 
themselves,  should,  under  circumstances  so  emi- 
nently favourable  to  their  pretensions,  have  been 
somewhat  elated,  and  should  have  claimed  an 
authority  even  greater  than  that  which  was  con- 
ceded to  them.  ...  It  was  generally  believed  that 
whoever  gainsaid  the  clergy  would  be  visited,  not 
only  with  temporal  penalties,  but  also  with  spir- 
itual ones.  For  such  a  crime,  there  was  punish- 
ment here,  and  there  was  punishment  hereafter- 


202  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

The  preachers  willingly  fostered  a  delusion  by 
which  they  benefited.  .  .  .  They  did  not  scruple  to 
affirm  that,  by  their  censures,  they  could  open  and 
shut  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  .  .  .  The  clergy, 
intoxicated  by  the  possession  of  power,  reached 
to  such  a  pitch  of  arrogance  that  they  did  not 
scruple  to  declare  that  whoever  respected  Christ 
was  bound,  on  that  very  account,  to  respect  them. 
.  .  .  Such  was  their  conceit,  and  so  greedy  were 
they  after  applause,  that  they  would  not  allow 
even  a  stranger  to  remain  in  their  parish,  unless 
he,  too,  came  to  listen  to  what  they  chose  to  say. 
.  .  .  How  they  laboured  to  corrupt  the  national 
intellect,  and  how  successful  they  were  in  that 
base  vocation,  has  been  hitherto  known  to  no 
modern  reader." l  He  also  tells  us  that  the 
Scotch  clergy  used  "  means  of  intimidation,"  be- 
cause, being  "  perfect  masters  of  their  own  art," 
they  well  knew  that  "  by  increasing  the  appre- 
hensions to  which  the  ignorance  and  timidity  of 
men  make  them  too  liable  "  they  would  also  "  in- 
crease their  eagerness  to  fly  for  support  to  their 
spiritual  advisers."  2 

All  this  is  very  significant.     It  shows  that  Mr. 
Buckle  is  unable  to  escape  from  recognizing  the 

i  Vol.  ii.  pp.  344,  347,  348,  357,  365. 
a  Ibid.  pp.  366,  384. 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  203 

enormous  influence  of  feeling  in  leading  to  belief 
and  action.  After  labouring  to  show  that  perse- 
cutors are  actuated  only  by  mistaken  benevolence, 
he  here  declares  that  the  tyrannical  and  intolerant 
acts  of  the  Scotch  clergy  were  dictated  by  cun- 
ning selfishness  and  long-sighted  craft.  We  think 
that  he  here  commits  almost  as  great  an  error 
as  before,  though  in  the  opposite  direction,  by  at- 
tributing too  much  to  the  selfish  desires  of  these 
men,  and  by  taking  too  little  account  of  their 
good,  but  mistaken,  intentions.  There  is  glaring 
inconsistency  in  this  :  but  when  a  man  lays  down 
a  "  law  "  so  incredibly  absurd  as  the  one  in  ques- 
tion, we  must  expect  to  find  him  inconsistent  in 
its  application. 

But  Mr.  Buckle  devotes  by  far  the  largest  por- 
tion of  his  work,  thus  far,  to  the  illustration  of  his 
third  and  fourth  laws.  As  he  treats  only  of  the 
revolutionary  period,  his  illustrations  are  all  ap- 
propriate and  forcible.  We  lack  words  to  express 
our  admiration  of  these  profound  and  instructive 
chapters.  The  inquiry  into  the  history  of  the 
intellect  in  England,  France,  Spain,  and  Scotland 
shows  an  extent  of  learning  and  a  depth  of  thought 
unsurpassed,  so  far  as  we  know,  in  historical  liter- 
ature. Our  author  traces  the  rise  of  scepticism 
and  the  decline  of  the  royal  power  in  England, 


204  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

the  workings  of  the  protective  spirit  in  England 
and  France,  the  causes,  remote  and  proximate,  of 
the  French  Revolution,  all  with  the  most  consum- 
mate skill.  In  the  case  of  Spain,  he  sets  before 
us  in  vivid  colours  the  utter  impotence  of  govern- 
ment to  direct  social  progress.  He  describes  in 
bold  outlines  the  course  of  philosophic  investiga- 
tion among  the  Scotch,  and  the  influence  of  their 
habits  of  thought  upon  their  general  condition. 
Everywhere,  in  this  part  of  the  work,  we  see  the 
touches  of  a  master;  everywhere  we  find  some- 
thing to  instruct  and  entertain.  Had  Mr.  Buckle 
written  nothing  more,  these  chapters  alone  would 
suffice  to  make  his  name  immortal.  Considered 
merely  as  historic  pictures  they  rival  anything  in 
Gibbon  or  Grote. 

We  have  not  criticized  at  length  Mr.  Buckle's 
first  law,  because  we  have  no  restrictions  to  place 
upon  it,  and  because  it  may  be  found  demons- 
trated, as  completely  as  possible,  in  Mr.  Buckle's 
own  work.  As  the  result  of  our  examination  into 
his  other  laws,  we  have  found  that  the  second 
contains  no  truth  whatever,  being  supported  by  a 
tangled  chain  of  sophisms,  every  link  in  which  is 
unsound ;  but  that  the  third  and  fourth  are  strictly 
true,  if  limited  to  the  period  of  which  Mr.  Buckle 
treats.  The  first  law  did  not  originate  with  him, 


Mr.  Buckle's  Fallacies.  205 

and  the  second  he  has  failed  to  establish ;  but  the 
third  and  fourth  may  take  their  places  as  impor- 
tant additions  to  our  knowledge  of  human  history. 
This  is  the  lasting  service  which  Mr.  Buckle  has 
already  rendered  to  science. 

With  respect  to  the  tendency  of  Mr.  Buckle's 
work,  an  unprejudiced  mind  can  have  but  one 
opinion.  It  is  calculated  to  awaken  independent 
thought,  and  to  diffuse  a  spirit  of  scientific  in- 
quiry. Written  in  an  easy  and  elegant  style,  it 
will  be  read  with  pleasure  by  many  who  would 
not  otherwise  have  the  patience  to  go  through 
with  the  subjects  of  which  it  treats.  Thus,  grand 
and  startling  in  its  views,  impressive  and  charm- 
ing in  its  eloquence,  it  cannot  fail  to  arouse  many 
a  slumbering  mind  to  intellectual  effort.  Such 
has  its  tendency  already  been,  and  such  it  will 
continue  to  be.  Indeed,  with  Mr.  Buckle's  dili- 
gence, his  honesty,  his  freedom  of  thought,  his 
bold  outspokenness,  his  hearty  admiration  for 
whatever  is  good  and  great  in  man,  the  tendency 
of  his  work  could  not  well  be  otherwise.  All 
these  are  qualities  which  will  be  remembered 
when  his  inaccuracies  and  errors,  however  great, 
shall  be  forgotten.  And  whatever  may  be  thought 
about  the  correctness  or  incorrectness  of  Mr. 


206  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Buckle's  opinions,  the  world  cannot  be  long  in 
coming  to  the  conclusion  that  his  "History  of 
Civilization  in  England"  is  a  great  and  noble 
book,  written  by  a  great  and  noble  man. 

September,  1861. 


XI. 

POSTSCRIPT  ON  MB.    BUCKLE.1 

THE  pilgrimage  of  an  "  infidel "  to  Mount  Sinai 
and  the  tomb  of  Christ  affords  a  suggestive  theme 
for  meditation.  It  is  with  no  disparaging  intent 
that  we  use  the  vague  epithet  "  infidel,"  for  Mr. 
Stuart-Glennie  is  himself  most  explicit  in  assur- 
ing us  that  neither  with  Christianity  nor  with 
what  he  calls  "  Christianism "  does  he  acknowl- 
edge any  fellowship  or  alliance.  By  Christianity 
he  means  "that  great  historical  system  which 
culminated  in  the  philosophy  of  Scholasticism, 
the  religion  of  Catholicism,  and  the  polity  of  Feu- 
dalism ;  "  and  by  Christianism  he  means  "  that 
historical  theory  which  represents  Jesus  of  Naza- 
reth as  a  supernatural  being,  who  came  on  earth 
for  the  good  of  mankind,  was  put  to  death,  and 
rose  again  to  sit  on  the  right  hand  of  God."  The 
historical  system  Mr.  Stuart-Glennie  perceives  to 

i  Pilgrim  Memories;  or,  Travel  and  Discussion  in  the  Birth- 
Countries  of  Christianity  with  the  late  Henry  Thomas  Buckle.  By 
John  8.  Stuart-Glennie,  M.  A.  New  York:  D.  Appleton  and  Co. 
1875. 


208          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

have  come  to  an  end,  and  the  historical  theory  he 
has  learned  to  regard  as  antiquated  and  unsound, 
and  he  therefore  frankly  declares  himself  an  op- 
ponent of  Christianity,  and  stigmatizes  as  dishon- 
est all  description  of  the  Christian  religion  as  a 
morality,  or  sentiment,  or  ethical  impulse.  With 
the  same  frankness  he  expresses  himself  about 
beliefs  which  "  Christianism  "  has  always  held 
dear,  in  language,  and  still  more  in  a  tone,  calcu- 
lated to  exasperate  the  Christian  world  to  the 
last  degree,  so  that  a  leading  orthodox  reviewer 
has  been  led  to  recognize  in  him  the  "  fool "  de- 
scribed by  the  Psalmist  who  has  "  said  in  his 
heart  that  there  is  no  God."  This  is,  however, 
inaccurate,  for  Mr.  Stuart-Glennie  is  certainly  no 
atheist.  It  is  the  very  purity  and  sensitiveness 
of  his  theistic  instinct  that  leads  him,  like  Theo- 
dore Parker,  to  condemn  as  degrading  much  that 
still  finds  a  place  in  popular  theology.  One 
might,  indeed,  even  plausibly  question  the  pro- 
priety of  Mr.  Stuart-Glennie  classifying  himself 
as  an  anti-Christian,  were  it  not  that  he  is  so  ex- 
plicit in  defining  what  he  rejects  as  Christianity. 
But,  in  truth,  such  questions  of  nomenclature  are 
idle,  for  "  Christian  "  is  a  word  of  such  wide  and 
vague  connotations  that,  however  well  adapted 
rt  may  be  for  various  religious  uses,  it  possesses 


Postscript  on  Mr.  Suckle.  209 

hardly  more  defining  value  than  such  a  word  as 
"  philosophical ;  "  and  whether  a  given  set  of  opin- 
ions can  be  grouped  under  such  rubric  or  not  has 
become  a  point  hardly  worth  arguing. 

While  mainly  a  personal  narrative,  this  book 
of  "  Pilgrim  Memories "  keeps  certain  ulterior 
ends  in  view.  The  author  has  projected,  and  in 
part  executed,  an  extensive  series  of  works  to  be 
entitled  "  The  Modern  Revolution,"  in  which  noth- 
ing less  is  aimed  at  than  the  establishment  of  a 
new  law  of  history,  a  new  speculative  basis  for 
religion,  and  a  new  point  of  departure  for  dra- 
matic art.  The  new  law  of  history  and  the  new 
speculative  basis  for  religion  we  are  to  seek  in 
the  conception  of  historic  development  as  "  a  cer- 
tain Change,  and  Process  of  Change,  in  men's  no- 
tions of  the  Causes  of  Change."  One  object  of 
the  present  volume  is  to  show  how  this  concep- 
tion took  shape  in  the  author's  mind  in  the  course 
of  his  journeyings  and  discussions  with  Mr. 
Buckle,  By  the  Gulf  of  Ezion-Gebir,  "  walking 
or  riding  along  a  shell-  and  coral-covered  strand  : 
on  our  right  the  sea,  red  with  the  coralline  for- 
ests of  its  depths,  and  with  a  margin  so  bright 
and  clear  that,  as  we  rode,  we  saw  all  its  gem- 
like  pavement ;  on  our  left  sandstone  precipices 
of  the  most  magnificently-varied  hues,"  —  amid 

14 


210  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

this  strangely  beautiful  scene  we  enter  upon  quite 
a  Platonic  dialogue,  in  which  the  author  seeks  to 
expound  his  new  conception  of  causation,  while 
Mr.  Buckle  occasionally  interposes  with  "I  do 
not  follow  you,  I  confess,"  or  "  That  seems  philo- 
sophical enough,"  quite  after  the  manner  of  the 
(jkuptrat  or  OVK  l/xotye  So/cct  of  Sokrates  and  his  in- 
terlocutors. This  long  conversation,  or  series  of 
conversations,  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting  por- 
tion of  the  book.  Yet  Mr.  Buckle  evidently  does 
not  get  a  thorough  hold  of  what  Mr.  Stuart-Glen- 
nie  means  by  defining  causation  as  involving  "not 
merely  the  conception  of  Uniformity  of  Sequence," 
but  also  that  of  "  Mutuality  of  Coexistence,  or 
Mutual  Determination  ;  "  and  we  must  confess 
that  to  us  also  his  meaning  seems  by  no  means 
distinctly  set  forth  or  adequately  elucidated.  It  is 
to  be  hoped  that  in  future  volumes  this  point  will 
be  thoroughly  cleared  up,  for  we  are  told  that  the 
"Change  in  our  conceptions  of  the  Causes  of 
Change,"  which  the  author  has  discovered  to  be 
the  "  Ultimate  Law  of  History,"  is  neither  more 
nor  less  than  "  an  advance  from  the  conception  of 
One-sided  Determination  to  that  of  Mutual  De- 
termination." That  this  statement  is  fraught 
with  meaning  for  Mr.  Stuart  -  Glennie  there  can 
be  no  doubt ;  he  recurs  to  it  again  and  again,  as  if 


Postscript  on  Mr.  Buckle.  211 

it  were  a  sort  of  talisraanic  formula  for  the  solu- 
tion of  all  manner  of  problems,  psychological  and 
historical.  But  it  is  just  one  of  those  formulas, 
like  Mr.  Spencer's  famous  law  of  the  change  from 
incoherent  homogeneity  to  coherent  heterogeneity, 
that  needs  to  be  charged  with  significance  by 
means  of  copious  preliminary  explanation  in  or- 
der to  convey  any  sense  at  all  to  the  mind  of  the 
reader. 

To  the  many  readers  who,  some  twenty  years 
since,  were  interested  in  what  then  bid  fair  to  be 
the  "biggest  of  big  books,"  the  most  attractive 
pages  in  Mr.  Stuart-Glennie's  volume  will  be 
those  which  give  us  glimpses  of  the  personal  pe- 
culiarities of  Mr.  Buckle.  The  sad  story  of  Mr. 
Buckle's  fruitless  journey  in  quest  of  health,  the 
rapid  decay  of  his  strength,  and  his  untimely  death 
at  Damascus  has  long  been  generally  known,  but 
it  accfuires  fresh  interest  from  the  fuller  ac- 
count now  given  by  his  fellow  -  pilgrim.  Few 
would  now  rate  the  value  of  Mr.  Buckle's  work, 
or  the  loss  to  science  from  his  premature  end,  so 
highly  as  they  were  commonly  rated  at  the  time. 
Yet,  as  a  fresh  instance  of  how  life  is  short  while 
art  is  long,  of  how  the  world  passes  away  from 
us  while  yet  we  are  stammering  over  the  alpha- 
bet of  its  mysteries,  there  is  something  infinitely 


212  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

pathetic  in  the  cry  which  went  up  from  the  ex- 
hausted and  fever-stricken  traveller :  "  My  book, 
my  book  !  I  shall  never  finish  my  book  !  "  The 
pathos  is  not  diminished,  but  perhaps  rather  deep- 
ened, by  the  reflection  that  the  book  possessed  no 
such  transcendent  value  as  its  author  ascribed  to 
it,  and  that  in  all  probability  the  strange  irony  of 
fate,  had  it  granted  to  Mr.  Buckle  the  long  life  of 
a  Carlyle  or  a  Humboldt,  would  only  have  per- 
mitted him  to  survive  his  own  reputation  as  a 
leader  in  the  world  of  thought.  It  is  seldom  that 
so  brilliant  a  success  as  Mr.  Buckle's  has  been 
even  temporarily  achieved  by  such  superficial 
thinking  and  such  slender  scholarship.  The  im- 
mense array  of  authors  cited  in  his  book  bears 
witness  to  the  extent  of  his  reading,  but  the  loose, 
indiscriminate  way  in  which  they  are  cited  shows 
equally  how  uncritical  and  desultory  his  reading 
was.  One  may  ascribe  this  looseness  to  the  na- 
tive impatience  of  temperament  illustrated  in  his 
disposing  of  Gibbon  and  Hallam  in  ten  days ;  but 
certainly  his  solitary  education  and  solitary  habits 
of  study  could  do  little  towards  curing  the  fault. 
One  reason  why  the  scholarship  of  university- 
bred  men  is  in  the  main  so  far  superior  to  that  of 
men  who  have  been  taught  at  home  is  that  the 
former  are  regularly  forced,  by  continual  contact 


Postscript  on  Mr.  Buckle.  213 

and  rivalry  with  fellow-students,  into  habits  of 
self-restraint  and  self-criticism  in  reaching  con- 
clusions which  only  the  rarest  innate  virtues  of 
intellect  can  enable  the  latter  now  and  then,  in 
spite  of  their  solitude,  to  acquire.  It  is  but  once 
or  twice  in  an  age  that  the  home-taught  student 
can  receive  the  stimulus  to  patient  sagacity  that 
was  afforded  in  the  cases  of  Grote  and  Mill.  The 
kind  of  unceasing  criticism  which  university-life 
affords  the  best  means  of  securing  is  in  most  cases 
indispensable.  Less  effective,  because  less  direct 
and  constant,  but  still  very  valuable,  is  the  disci- 
pline that  is  gained  by  early  and  frequent  author- 
ship, where  a  writer  is  so  constituted  as  to  be  able 
to  profit  alike  by  fair  and  unfair  public  criticism. 
That  there  may  be  men  of  genius  with  such 
marked  native  qualities  of  caution  and  vigilance 
as  to  enable  them  partially  to  dispense  with  such 
educational  aids  we  do  not  deny  ;  but  Mr.  Buckle 
was  not  one  of  these.  He  began  life  with  his  full 
share  of  the  "  original  sin  "  of  hasty  generaliza- 
tion ;  and  nothing  in  his  circumstances  tended  to 
check  or  control  this  disposition  until,  at  an  age 
when  one's  mental  habits  are  usually  pretty  well 
ingrained,  he  appeared  before  the  world  with  the 
first  instalment  of  his  able  and  stimulating  but 
crude  and  hastily-wrought  book. 


214  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Not  only  did  Mr.  Buckle's  impatient  and  un- 
critical habit  prevent  his  vast  reading  from  re- 
sulting in  sound  scholarship,  but  his  lack  of  sub- 
tlety and  precision  were  so  marked  as  to  stamp 
all  his  thinking  with  the  character  of  shallowness. 
He  seized  readily  upon  the  broader  and  vaguer 
distinctions  among  things,  the  force  of  which  the 
ordinary  reader  feels  most  strongly  and  with  least 
mental  effort,  and  of  such  raw  material,  without 
further  analysis,  and  without  suspecting  the  need 
for  further  analysis,  he  constructed  his  historical 
theories.  To  this  mode  of  proceeding,  aided  by 
his  warmth  of  temperament  and  the  lavish  pro- 
fusion of  his  illustrations,  he  undoubtedly  owed 
the  great  though  ephemeral  success  which  his 
book  attained.  The  average  reader  is  much  sooner 
stimulated  by  generalizations  that  are  broad  and 
indistinct  than  by  such  as  are  subtle  and  precise ; 
and  if  we  stop  to  consider  why  Mr.  Buckle's  name 
has  been  sometimes  associated  with  those  of  men 
so  far  beyond  his  calibre  as  Mill  and  Darwin,  we 
may  see  the  reason  in  the  fact  that  Mr.  Buckle 
could  be  entirely  grasped  by  many  of  those  very 
admirers  of  the  latter  writers  who  least  appreciate 
or  fathom  their  finest  and  deepest  mental  quali- 
ties. But  this  essentially  superficial  character  of 
Mr.  Buckle's  thought  is  shown  not  only  in  his  ob- 


Postscript  on  Mr.  Buckle.  215 

tuseness  to  subtle  distinctions,  but  even  more  con- 
spicuously in  his  utter  failure  to  seize  upon  any 
deeply  significant  but  previously  hidden  relations 
among  facts,  in  the  work  which  he  put  forth  as 
the  "  Novum  Organum  "  of  historical  science. 

If  we  contrast  his  book  with  some  of  the  really 
great  books  which  were  contemporary  with  it, 
such  as  Mr.  Darwin's  "  Origin  of  Species,"  Mr. 
Spencer's  "Principles  of  Psychology,"  or  Sir 
Henry  Maine's  "  Ancient  Law,"  the  difference  is 
striking  enough.  Each  of  these  works  set  forth 
old  facts  in  new  and  hitherto  unsuspected  connec- 
tions, and  in  so  doing  enunciated  thoughts  which 
have  quite  changed  the  aspect  of  the  questions 
with  which  they  deal.  There  is  not  a  naturalist 
in  either  continent  to-day  whose  most  specific  in- 
quiries do  not  bear  some  more  or  less  conscious 
reference  to  what  is  known  as  "  the  Darwinian 
theory."  The  time-honoured  contest  represented 
by  Locke  and  Leibnitz,  or  by  Hume  and  Kant, 
is  beginning  to  take  a  new  point  of  departure, 
owing  to  Mr.  Spencer's  suggestion  of  the  acquire- 
ment of  mental  faculties  through  inheritance  and 
slow  variation  ;  and  Sir  Henry  Maine's  lucid  ex- 
position of  early  ideas  regarding  contract,  prop- 
erty, and  family  relationship  obliges  us  to  look  at 
all  the  phenomena  of  society  from  an  altered 


216  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

standpoint.  But,  in  marked  contrast  with  works 
of  this  kind,  we  find  in  Mr.  Buckle's  book  sundry 
commonplace  reflections  of  quite  limited  value  or 
applicability,  such  as  the  statements  that  scepti- 
cism is  favourable  to  progress,  or  that  over-legis- 
lation is  detrimental  to  society.  No  doubt  such 
commonplaces  might  be  so  treated  as  to  acquire 
the  practical  value  of  new  contributions  to  his- 
tory. But  to  treat  them  so  requires  subtle  analy- 
sis of  the  facts  generalized,  and  all  that  Mr. 
Buckle  did  was  to  collect  miscellaneous  evidences 
for  the  statements  in  their  rough,  ready-made 
form.  Of  generalizations  that  go  below  the  sur- 
face of  things,  such  as  Comte's  suggestive  though 
indefensible  "  Law  of  the  Three  Stages,"  we  find 
none  in  Mr.  Buckle.  The  only  attempt  at  such 
an  analytic  theory  is  the  generalization  concern- 
ing the  moral  and  intellectual  factors  in  social 
progress,  wherein  Mr.  Buckle's  looseness  and  fu- 
tile vagueness  of  thought  is  shown  perhaps  more 
forcibly  than  anywhere  else  in  his  writings.  It 
is  not  of  such  stuff  as  this  that  a  science  of  historic 
phenomena  can  be  wrought. 

In  Mr.  Stuart-Glennie's  reminiscences,  which 
seem  to  be  most  carefully  and  honestly  reported, 
these  characteristics  of  Mr.  Buckle  —  his  warm, 
impatient  temperament  and  his  lack  of  mental 


Postscript  on  Mr.  Buckle.  217 

subtlety  or  deep  penetration  —  are  continually 
brought  to  our  notice  ;  and  all  the  more  forcibly 
because  of  the  absence  of  any  such  intent  on  the 
part  of  the  fellow-pilgrim  to  whom  we  owe  these 
interesting  notes  of  discussion.  To  examine  the 
details  of  these  conversations  would  carry  us  be- 
yond our  limits,  and  would  hardly  be  justified  by 
their  intrinsic  importance.  One  little  point  we 
must  note  as  characteristic,  with  regard  to  Mr. 
Buckle's  temperament  as  a  historian.  While  Mr. 
Stuart-Glennie  seems  to  have  his  whole  soul  stirred 
within  him  by  the  historic  associations  clustering 
about  the  places  visited,  and  is  moved  to  reflec- 
tions always  interesting  and  often  suggestive,  Mr. 
Buckle,  on  the  other  hand,  though  sufficiently 
alive  to  the  beauties  of  nature,  seems  quite  ob- 
livious to  historic  memories.  At  the  sepulchre 
of  Christ  his  thoughts  were  mainly  on  political 
economy,  "  the  state  of  society  and  the  habits  of 
the  people."  In  such  trivial  details  some  light  is 
thrown,  perhaps,  on  that  lack  of  intellectual  sym- 
pathy with  the  past  which  was  one  of  Mr.  Buckle's 
most  notable  defects  as  a  historian. 

But  with  all  this  intellectual  narrowness  and 
looseness  of  texture,  the  narrative  gives  one  a 
very  pleasant  impression  of  Mr.  Buckle  person- 
ally, and,  furthermore,  enables  one  to  comprehend 


218  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

how,  with  such  slight  qualifications,  he  should 
have  become  so  interesting  to  the  world.  One 
leaves  Mr.  Stuart-Glennie's  book  with  the  regret 
experienced  on  parting  with  intelligent  and  kindly 
companions.  As  we  close  it  and  lay  it  aside,  we 
feel  that  yet  another  charming  moment  of  our 
reading-life  has  gone  to  be  numbered  with  the 
things  of  the  past. 

March,  1876. 


XIL 

THE  RACES   OF  THE  DANUBE. 

IK  the  famous  Eastern  Question,  which  so  long 
has  disturbed  the  peace  of  Europe,  may  be  noted 
two  aspects  of  a  process  which,  under  great  va- 
riety of  conditions,  has  been  going  on  over  Eu- 
ropean territory  ever  since  the  dawn  of  authentic 
history.  The  formation  of  a  nationality  —  that 
is,  of  a  community  of  men  sufficiently  connected 
in  interests  and  disciplined  in  social  habits  to  live 
together  peacefully  under  laws  of  their  own  mak- 
ing —  has  been  the  leading  aspect  of  this  pro- 
cess, in  which  the  work  of  civilization  has  hitherto 
largely  consisted.  But  along  with  this,  as  a  cor- 
relative aspect,  has  gone  the  pressure  exerted 
against  the  community  by  an  external  mass  of 
undisciplined  barbarism,  ever  on  the  alert  to 
break  over  the  fluctuating  barrier  that  has  warded 
it  off  from  the  growing  civilization,  ever  threat- 
ening to  undo  the  costly  work  which  this  has 
accomplished.  Though  the  enemy  has  at  times 
appeared  in  the  shape  of  unmitigated  tribal  bar- 


220  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

barism,  —  as  in  the  invasion  of  Huns  in  the  fifth 
century  and  of  Mongols  in  the  thirteenth^  —  and 
at  other  times  in  the  shape  of  an  inferior  type 
of  civilization,  as  exemplified  by  the  Arabs  and 
Turks,  the  principle  involved  has  always  been 
the  same.  In  every  case  the  stake  has  been  the 
continuance  of  the  higher  civilization,  though  the 
amount  of  risk  has  greatly  varied,  and  in  recent 
centuries  has  come  to  be  very  slight.  At  the  pres- 
ent day  the  military  strength  of  mankind  is  al- 
most entirely  monopolized  by  the  higher  civili- 
zation, and  it  is  no  longer  in  danger  of  being 
overwhelmed  by  external  violence.  But  when 
the  Greeks  confronted  a  social  organization  of 
inferior  type  at  Marathon  and  at  Salamis,  the 
danger  was  considerable ;  and  in  pre-historic  times 
it  may  well  have  happened  more  than  once  that 
some  germ  of  a  progressive  polity  has  been  swept 
away  in  a  torrent  of  conquering  barbarism. 

Until  the  rise  of  the  Roman  power  the  chief 
military  business  of  the  cultivated  community  had 
been  to  drive  off  the  barbarian,  to  slaughter  him, 
or  reduce  him  to  slavery  ;  but  the  more  profound 
policy  of  Rome  transformed  him,  whenever  it  was 
possible,  into  a  citizen,  and  enlisted  his  fighting 
power  on  the  side  of  progress.  From  the  conquest 
of  Spain  by  Scipio  to  the  subjugation  of  Central 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  221 

Germany  by  Charles  the  Great,  this  is  the  most 
conspicuous  feature  of  Roman  history.  The  area 
of  stable  nationality  in  Europe  was  continually 
enlarged,  and  the  frontier  to  be  defended  against 
wild  tribes  was  gradually  shortened  and  pushed 
eastward  to  the  Lower  Danube.  In  the  time  of 
Marius,  the  Gaul  and  the  German  were  enemies 
who  might  possibly  undo  all  the  good  work  that 
had  been  begun.  But  the  Gaul  very  quickly  be- 
came a  thorough  Roman  in  his  habits  and  inter- 
ests, forgetting  even  his  native  language  ;  and  the 
German  tribes,  as  they  acquired  a  foothold,  one 
after  another,  within  the  limits  of  the  Empire, 
became  so  far  assimilated  that  the  transformation 
of  the  Roman  structure  effected  by  them  was  in 
no  respect,  not  even  in  a  political  sense,  an  over- 
throw. 

In  the  turbulent  period  of  the  fifth  century, 
when  the  debatable  frontier  was  still  at  the  Rhine 
and  Upper  Danube,  a  terrible  foe  appeared  in 
Attila,  with  his  horde  of  savage  Huns  ;  and  it 
was  then  mainly  by  the  prowess  of  Gauls  and 
Germans,  in  the  memorable  battle  of  Ch&lons, 
that  the  security  of  European  civilization  was 
decisively  guaranteed.  So  formidable  a  danger 
lias  perhaps  never  since  menaced  Christendom, 
though  Gibbon  reckoned  the  teaching  of  the 


222  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Koran  in  Oxford  as  one  of  the  consequences  that 
might  have  ensued  had  Charles  the  Hammer  been 
overthrown  at  Tours  by  the  Arabs.  Under  the 
grandson  of  this  doughty  hero  —  Charles  the 
Great  —  the  entire  strength  of  Germany  became 
enlisted  in  the  service  of  the  Christianized  Em- 
pire, and  among  the  results  of  this  were  the  con- 
version of  the  newly-arriving  Magyars,  Poles,  and 
Bohemians,  and  the  conquest  of  Prussia  by  the 
Teutonic  knights.  By  the  thirteenth  century  the 
fabric  of  European  civilization  had  become  so 
solid  that  a  barbaric  power  not  inferior  to  Attila's 
was  hardly  able  to  make  any  impression  upon  it. 
Batu,  with  his  fifteen  hundred  thousand  Mongols, 
gained  a  victory  at  Liegnitz  in  1241,  such  as 
Attila  had  fought  for  in  vain  at  Chalons  ;  but  it 
came  some  centuries  too  late,  for  the  contest  be- 
tween stable  nationality  and  nomadic  barbarism 
was  by  this  time  settled  forever.  The  most  the 
greasy  Mongol  could  accomplish  was  to  check  for 
a  few  generations  the  growth  of  a  national  life 
among  the  Slavic  tribes  of  Russia. 

But  though  Chalons  and  Tours  demonstrated 
that  Christian  civilization  could  hold  its  own, 
whether  against  the  barbarian  or  the  infidel,  the 
latter  nevertheless  twice  succeeded  in  marking 
serious  encroachments  on  Roman  territory. 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  223 

The  first  great  wave  of  Mohammedan  invasion 
not  only  swept  away  the  provinces  south  of  the 
Mediterranean,  but  overwhelmed  the  greater  part 
of  Spain,  and  cut  it  away  from  the  Empire  for 
several  centuries.  The  disastrous  effect  of  this 
long  isolation  upon  the  future  history  of  Spain 
has  been  often  remarked,  and  if  thoroughly 
treated  would  make  an  interesting  study.  Yet 
the  contributions  of  the  Mohammedan  conquerors 
to  the  work  of  human  culture,  which  were  by  no 
means  insignificant,  may  perhaps  be  thought  to 
have  afforded  some  compensation  for  the  harm 
done.  Spain  is  the  only  instance  of  a  country 
once  thoroughly  infused  with  Roman  civilization 
which  has  been  actually  severed  from  the  Empire  ; 
and  even  here  the  severance,  though  of  long  dura- 
tion, was  but  partial  and  temporary.  After  a 
struggle  of  nearly  eight  centuries,  the  higher  form 
of  social  organization  triumphed  over  the  lower, 
and  the  usurping  race  was  expelled. 

Contemporaneously  with  this  final  rescue  of 
Spanish  territory,  the  second  great  wave  of  Mo- 
hammedan invasion  overflowed  the  remnants  of 
the  Byzantine  Empire,  and  seemed  for  a  while  to 
threaten  the  security  of  Europe.  In  this  second 
invasion,  conducted  by  Turks,  there  was  much 
more  of  barbarism  than  in  the  older  invasion  of 


224  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

the  Arabs,  and  after  allowing  for  all  possible  mit- 
igating considerations,  it  seems  difficult  to  regard 
the  conquest  of  Constantinople  and  the  territory 
south  of  the  Danube  as  anything  but  a  great  ca- 
lamity. How  much  or  how  little  capacity  for 
renovation,  under  the  influence  of  modern  ideas, 
may  have  been  latent  in  the  Byzantine  Empire, 
we  now  shall  never  know.  But,  far  as  it  had 
sunk,  politically  and  socially,  toward  the  Asiatic 
type  of  a  community,  its  regeneration  could 
hardly  have  been  as  hopeless  an  affair  as  is  that 
of  its  Ottoman  successor.  In  such  a  society  as 
that  of  the  Turks  there  is,  indeed,  nothing  to  re- 
generate, but  the  work  of  civilization  in  the  Eu- 
ropean sense,  if  it  is  to  be  done  at  all,  must  be 
begun  from  the  beginning.  The  very  germs  of 
constitutionalism,  of  legality,  of  government  by 
discussion,  are  wanting  there  as  they  have  never 
been  wanting  in  any  European  community  in  the 
worst  of  times.  This  has  been  the  essential  vice  of 
all  the  Mussulman  civilizations.  Their  theocratic 
type  of  constitution  crushes  out  all  flexibility  of 
mind  or  individuality  of  character,  and  quenches 
all  desire  of  change.  For  this  reason  they  have 
invariably  failed,  in  the  long  run,  when  brought 
into  competition  with  the  more  mobile  societies  of 
Europe ;  and  for  this  reason,  in  spite  of  the  ro- 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  225 

mantic  splendour  and  the  scientific  achievements 
which  immortalize  the  memory  of  Bagdad  and 
Cordova,  we  must  be  glad  that  they  have  failed. 

There  has  been  neither  high  romance  nor  use- 
ful performance  of  any  sort  to  reconcile  one  to 
the  unrighteous  dominion  which  a  tribe  of  Mus- 
sulman Tatars  has  exercised  for  four  centuries 
over  some  of  the  fairest  provinces  of  Europe. 
The  history  of  that  dominion  has  been  a  monoto- 
nous display  of  brute  force  without  any  noble  ul- 
terior purpose  which  might  redeem  its  vulgarity. 
It  is  the  history  of  a  race  politically  unteachable 
and  intellectually  incurious,  which  has  contributed 
absolutely  nothing  to  the  common  weal  of  man- 
kind, while  by  its  position  it  has  been  able  to 
check  the  normal  development  of  a  more  worthy 
community. 

The  provinces  which  Muhamad  II.  wrested 
from  the  Empire  had  at  no  time  been  very  thor- 
oughly Romanized,  and  such  civilization  as  they 
had  acquired  in  antiquity  had  fared  but  ill  amid 
the  everlasting  turmoil  to  which  their  frontier 
position  had  subjected  them.  Invading  swarms 
from  the  northeast,  when  unable  to  penetrate  far- 
ther into  Europe,  halted  here  and  wrangled  for 
supremacy,  and  the  ceaseless  but  ineffectual  war- 
fare of  Avars,  Bulgarians,  Croats,  Serbs,  and  Mag- 

15 


226          Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

yars  makes  a  dreary  and  unprofitable  history. 
On  a  superficial  view  this  whole  region  seems  po- 
litically a  Bedlam,  as  it  is  linguistically  a  Babel. 
But  —  as  was  hinted  at  the  beginning  of  this 
paper  —  the  complication  of  disorder  on  the  lower 
Danube  is  perhaps  no  greater  than  has  existed,  at 
one  time  or  another,  in  those  parts  of  Europe 
that  are  now  most  thoroughly  civilized.  All  over 
Spain,  Gaul,  and  Britain,  and  even  Italy,  the  con- 
flicts of  races  have  been  fierce  and  their  intermix- 
tures extremely  intricate.  But  under  the  organ- 
izing impulse  of  Rome,  directed  alike  by  Empire 
and  Church,  the  populations  of  these  countries 
long  ago  became  so  far  consolidated  in  general  in- 
terests and  assimilated  in  manners  and  speech 
that  in  each  country  the  old  racial  differences  are 
but  occasionally  traceable  in  rural  customs  and 
patois,  and  even  when  plainly  traceable  have  lit- 
tle or  no  political  importance.  It  is  a  long  time 
since  the  Iberian,  the  Gaul,  the  Roman,  the  Visi- 
goth, the  Burgundian,  the  Frank,  the  Walloon, 
and  the  Norman  disappeared  politically  in  the 
Frenchman ;  and  the  Scot,  whose  slogan  for  ages 
was  "  Death  to  the  Sassenach  ! "  is  to-day  the 
most  loyal  of  Britons.  Over  three  fourths  of 
western  Europe  the  adoption  of  Roman  speech 
has  obliterated  old  lines  of  demarcation  until  it 


The  Maces  of  the  Danube.  227 

has  even  become  possible  to  talk  about  a  "  Latin 
race  "  !  In  like  manner  the  Prussian  of  Konigs- 
berg,  his  Lettic  mother-tongue  forgotten  for  six 
generations,  makes  common  cheer  with  the  Suevi 
of  Stuttgart  and  the  Alemanni  of  Munich.  In 
the  border-land  of  the  Danube,  on  the  other  hand, 
whatever  chance  there  might  have  been  for  any 
such  assimilation  of  races  and  dialects  was  cut 
off  by  perpetual  incursions  of  Tataric  tribes  pre- 
venting the  growth  of  anything  like  nationality. 
Under  some  circumstances  the  pressure  exerted 
by  a  totally  alien  enemy  might  serve  as  a  stimu- 
lus to  national  consolidation.  But  here  the  va- 
rious races  were  too  recently  brought  together, 
and  the  pressure  of  barbaric  attack  was  so  great 
as  to  keep  society  disorganized.  The  races  of  the 
Danube  are  accordingly  still  so  heterogeneous 
that  it  is  worth  while  to  point  out  their  various 
affinities  and  give  some  brief  account  of  their  past 
career. 

In  order  to  get  a  comprehensive  view  of  the 
subject,  it  is  desirable  to  go  back  to  the  begin- 
ning and  recall  the  principal  features  of  the  settle- 
ment of  Europe  by  the  people  who  now  possess 
it.  According  to  the  most  probable  opinion,  the 
present  population  of  Europe  is  the  result  of  the 
pre-historic  mixture,  in  varying  degrees,  of  two 


228          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

very  different  races.  The  first  or  Iberian  race 
may  be  regarded  as  aboriginal  in  Europe,  in  the 
sense  that  we  cannot  tell  how  it  got  there.  It 
was  a  black-haired  and  dark-skinned  race,  if  we 
may  judge  from  the  remnant  of  it  which  still 
preserves  its  primitive  language  in  the  isolated 
corner  of  Spain  between  the  Pyrenees  and  the 
Bay  of  Biscay.  The  second  or  Aryan  race  seems 
to  have  been  fair-haired  and  blue-eyed,  and  it 
overran  Europe  in  successive  swarms,  coming 
from  the  highlands  of  central  Asia,  where  di- 
vers tribes  of  Tatars  have  since  taken  its  place. 
The  Aryans  crowded  the  Iberians  westward,  and 
everywhere  overcame  them  (save  in  the  corner 
of  Spain  just  mentioned),  and  intermingled  with 
them,  forcing  upon  them  their  own  speech  and 
customs.  Thus  the  language  of  Europe  to-day  is 
Aryan,  and  its  legal  and  social  structure  is  Ar- 
yan, but  its  population  is  a  mixture  of  Aryan 
and  Iberian.  In  the  extremities  of  Europe  as 
looked  at  from  Asia  —  in  the  three  southern 
peninsulas,  in  Gaul,  and  in  western  and  north- 
ern Britain — the  dark  aboriginal  type  predomi- 
nates ;  while  in  Scandinavia,  northern  Germany, 
and  northern  Russia  the  blonde  type  of  the  in- 
vaders remains  in  the  ascendant.  It  is  owing  to 
this  mixture  of  strongly  contrasted  races  that  the 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  229 

peoples  of  Europe  present  such  marked  varieties 
of  complexion. 

So  much,  at  least,  is  probable,  though  more 
or  less  hypothetical.  In  following  the  successive 
stages  of  Aryan  invasion,  we  gradually  emerge 
from  this  twilight  of  plausible  hypothesis  into  the 
clearness  of  authentic  history.  The  Aryans  came, 
as  just  observed,  in  successive  swarms.  The  first 
series  of  swarms  got  natui-ally  the  most  mixed  up 
with  the  Iberian  aborigines,  and  the  result  of 
their  gradual  settlement  was  the  formation  of  the 
Keltic,  Italic,  and  Hellenic  peoples.  In  Spain  the 
aborigines  held  their  own  most  successfully,  and 
hence  the  mixture  was  recent  enough  to  be  rec- 
ognized by  Roman  historians,  who  called  the 
Spaniards  Kelt-Iberians;  but  elsewhere  it  was 
accomplished  so  early  as  to  be  forgotten  before 
people  began  to  write  history.  It  has  been  fash- 
ionable to  sneer  at  zealous  Irish  writers  for  their 
propensity  to  find  traces  of  the  Kelts  everywhere. 
But  there  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  the  Kelts 
were  once  a  very  widely  diffused  people.  They 
have  left  names  for  rivers  and  mountains  in  al- 
most every  part  of  Europe.  The  name  of  the 
river  Don  in  Russia,  for  example,  is  one  of  the 
common  Keltic  names  for  water,  and  so  we  find 
a  river  Don  in  Yorkshire,  a  Dean  in  Nottingham- 


230          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

shire,  a  Dane  in  Cheshire,  and  a  Dun  in  Lincoln- 
shire. The  same  name  appears  in  the  Rho-rfaw- 
us,  or  Rhone,  in  Gaul ;  the  Eri-cfaw-us,  or  Po,  in 
Italy ;  as  well  as  in  the  _Z)w-ieper,  Dw-iester,  and 
Daw-ube ;  and  even  in  the  Are-don  in  the  Cau- 
casus. This  is  one  example  out  of  hundreds  by 
which  we  trace  the  former  ubiquity  of  the  Kelts, 
who  as  late  as  the  Christian  era  were  present  in 
large  numbers  as  far  east  as  Bohemia. 

The  second  series  of  invading  Aryan  swarms 
consisted  of  Germans,  who  began  by  pushing  the 
Kelts  westward,  and  ended  by  overrunning  a  great 
part  of  their  territory  and  mixing  with  them  to  a 
considerable  extent.  There  is  some  German  blood 
in  Spain,  and  a  good  deal  in  France  and  northern 
Italy ;  and  the  modern  English,  while  Keltic  at 
bottom,  are  probably  half  Teutonic  in  blood,  as 
they  are  predominantly  Teutonic  in  language  and 
manners.  The  Vandals,  Goths,  Alemanni,  Suevi, 
Burgundians,  Lombards,  Franks,  Saxons,  and 
Normans,  who  invaded  and  reconstructed  the 
Roman  Empire  between  the  fifth  and  eleventh 
centuries,  were  all  Germans,  and  there  is  no  rea- 
son to  suppose  that  they  differed  except  in  their 
tribal  names.  From  the  fifth  century  onward 
these  Germans  encroached  upon  the  territory  of 
the  Empire,  mainly  because  they  were  pushed 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  231 

forward  by  Aryan  Slavs  and  Tataric  Huns  who 
attacked  them  from  the  east.  Throughout  the 
classic  period  of  antiquity,  and  until  the  fifth 
century  after  Christ,  the  Teutonic  family  appears 
far  to  the  eastward  of  its  present  position.  In 
the  time  of  Herodotos,  and  down  to  the  age  of 
Constantine,  the  inhabitants  of  Thrace  —  now 
the  centre  of  European  Turkey  —  were  blue- 
eyed  Goths,  called  Getge  by  the  classic  historians. 
Pretty  much  the  whole  of  Turkey  and  southern 
Russia  were  German  in  those  days ;  and,  as  Don- 
aldson conjectured,  it  is  possible  that  the  people 
known  to  the  ancients  as  Skythians  may  have 
been  no  other  than  Goths. 

Thus,  as  if  to  illustrate  how  completely  all  Ar- 
yan Europe  is  made  up  out  of  the  same  race- 
elements,  we  find  that  the  lower  Danube,  for  at 
least  a  thousand  years,  was  German  territory; 
and,  except  on  the  very  improbable  supposition 
that  its  old  population  has  been  entirely  exter- 
minated or  transferred  westward,  we  have  every 
reason  to  believe  that  there  is  much  German 
blood  there  at  the  present  day. 

While  this  region  was  still  in  the  hands  of  the 
Germans,  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  century 
after  Christ,  the  legions  of  the  Emperor  Trajan 
passed  beyond  the  Danube,  and,  conquering  the 


232          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

country  then  known  as  Dacia,  formed  a  perma- 
nent  settlement  there.  In  271  the  Emperor  Au- 
relian,  finding  the  province  difficult  to  defend, 
surrendered  it  to  the  Goths,  in  whose  hands  it 
remained  for  a  long  time  a  bulwark  against  the 
incursions  of  wild  tribes  from  the  northeast. 
The  Latin  language  was  firmly  established  over 
this  territory,  and  is  spoken  to-day,  in  a  modern- 
ized form,  by  six  millions  of  "  Rumans  "  in  Wal- 
lachia,  Moldavia,  and  Transylvania.  Of  this 
population,  the  Transylvanian  Rumans  have  long 
formed  part  of  the  kingdom  of  Hungary  ;  the 
rest,  under  the  nominal  suzerainty  of  the  Porte, 
are  ruled  by  a  German  prince  of  the  house  of 
Hohenzollern  ;  and  the  racial  basis  of  the  whole 
is,  no  doubt,  mainly  Teutonic,  with  a  considerable 
Roman  and  still  greater  Slavic  admixture. 

The  Slavs  make  up  the  third  and  last  division 
of  the  Aryan  conquerors  of  Europe.  Their  speech 
has  in  many  respects  departed  less  widely  from 
the  forms  of  the  common  Aryan  mother-tongue 
than  the  speech  of  the  earlier  invaders.  In  phys- 
ical characteristics  they  resemble  most  closely  the 
northern  Germans,  in  whom,  with  the  central 
Russians  and  Letts,  we  see  perhaps  the  purest 
specimens  of  the  Aryan  race;  but  in  the  south 
they  have  been  more  or  less  modified  by  inter- 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  233 

mixture  with  various  strains  of  Tataric  blood. 
Napoleon's  witticism,  however,  that  you  need  only 
scratch  a  Russian  to  get  at  the  Tatar  underneath, 
contained  little  more  wisdom  than  is  usually  to  be 
found  in  such  smart  sayings  based  on  hasty  gen- 
eralization from  inadequate  and  half-understood 
data.  On  the  whole,  the  principal  intermixture 
of  the  Slavs  has  been  with  their  nearest  congeners 
and  neighbours,  the  Teutons.  Slavonic  tribes, 
pushing  their  way  far  into  the  centre  of  Europe, 
still  hold  Bohemia,  Moravia,  and  Silesia,  while 
further  south,  in  Carinthia  and  Istria,  the  Slav 
country  comes  up  close  to  the  Tyrol  and  to  Ven- 
ice. 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  this  border  region,  from 
the  head  of  the  Adriatic  to  the  mountains  of  Bo- 
hemia, was  the  seat  of  everlasting  war ;  and  such 
immense  numbers  of  the  eastern  invaders  were 
captured  from  time  to  time  and  sold  into  slav- 
ery in  all  parts  of  Germany  that  their  national 
name  became  the  common  appellative  for  wretches 
doomed  to  involuntary  servitude.  Such  seems  to 
have  been  the  origin  of  our  English  word  "  slave." 
Until  lately  it  was  supposed  that  the  vernacular 
meaning  of  the  national  name  was  "  the  glorious," 
as  slava  is  a  common  word  for  "  glory  "  in  most 
of  the  Slavonic  languages  •,  and  frequent  comment 


234  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

was  made  on  the  curious  fate  whereby  the  proud 
name  of  a  noble  race  of  warriors  became  perverted 
into  a  common  noun  to  describe  the  most  abject 
condition  of  humanity.  It  is  very  doubtful,  how- 
ever, whether  the  striking  contrast  really  exists 
to  supply  a  fit  subject  for  moralizing.  It  is  far 
more  probable  that  the  name  Slav  is  connected 
with  slovo,  "  a  word,"  and  means  the  "  distinctly- 
speaking  people  "  as  contrasted  with  the  Njemetch, 
or  "  talkers  of  gibberish,"  by  which  polite  epi- 
thet the  Slavic  races  have  always  distinguished 
the  Germans.  This  naive  assumption,  that  it  is 
ourselves  alone  who  talk  intelligibly,  while  for- 
eigners babble  a  meaningless  jargon,  has  been  a 
very  common  one  with  uninstructed  people,  and 
"Njemetch"  is  not  the  only  national  appellative 
that  bears  witness  to  its  prevalence.  The  epithet 
"  Welsh,"  which  the  Germans  apply  to  the  Ital- 
ians, the  Dutch  to  the  Belgians,  and  the  English 
to  the  Kymry  of  western  Britain,  has  precisely 
the  same  meaning  ;  and  so  had  the  word  u  barba- 
rian," by  which  the  ancient  inhabitant  of  Hellas 
described  indiscriminately  all  people  who  did  not 
speak  Greek.1 

It  was  about  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century 

1  The  name  "  Wallach,"  by  which  the  Germans  designate  the  in- 
habitants of  Rumania,  is  the  same  word  as  "  Welsh." 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  235 

that  the  Slavonic  race  began  to  play  a  part  in 
European  history.  Advancing  from  what  is  now 
southern  Russia,  in  the  rear  of  the  Tataric  hordes 
of  Attila,  various  Slavic  tribes  overran  the  prov- 
inces of  Moesia,  Thrace,  Illyricura,  and  Mace- 
donia. Overcoming,  and,  to  some  extent,  crowd- 
ing out,  the  Gothic  inhabitants,  they  were  within 
a  century  firmly  established  throughout  the  area 
between  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Adriatic,  which 
they  have  ever  since  continued  to  occupy.  But, 
far  from  attempting  to  set  themselves  up  as  an 
independent  political  power  in  this  territory,  they 
were  readily  brought  to  acknowledge  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  Empire.  They  no  more  thought  of 
overthrowing  the  dominion  of  Rome  than  the 
Germans  did :  what  they  were  after  was  a  good 
share  of  its  material  advantages.  To  have  set  up 
a  rival  imperium  would  have  been  quite  beyond 
their  slender  political  capacity,  and  their  imagina- 
tion did  not  reach  so  far  as  to  conceive  the  idea. 
So  long  as  they  were  allowed  to  retain  their  for- 
cibly-acquired possessions  of  land  and  cattle,  they 
were  quite  ready  to  help  to  defend  the  Empire 
against  Tataric  Avars  and  other  marauders.  The 
relations  thus  knit  between  the  Slavs  and  the 
government  at  Constantinople  were  similar  to 
those  established  between  the  Germans  and  the 


236  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

imperial  authorities  in  the  West.  Slavonic  troops 
came  to  form  a  large  and  redoubtable  element  in 
the  eastern  armies,  and  to  the  infusion  of  new  life 
thus  received  we  may  no  doubt  partly  attribute 
the  prolonged  maintenance  of  the  Byzantine  Em- 
pire. It  is,  perhaps,  not  generally  remembered 
that  the  greatest  warrior  and  one  of  the  most 
illustrious  emperors  of  this  part  of  the  Roman 
world  were  of  Slavic  origin.  The  vernacular 
name  of  which  Justinian  is  the  Latin  translation 
was  Upravda,  or  "  the  Upright ; "  and  his  invin- 
cible general  Belisarius  was  a  Dardanian  Slav 
named  Beli-czar,  or  "the  White  Prince."  Within 
less  than  a  century  after  this  white  prince  had 
driven  the  Goths  from  Italy,  the  able  Emperor 
Heraclius,  contending  on  the  one  hand  against 
the  Persians  while  menaced  on  the  other  by  the 
barbaric  Avars,  invited  two  Slavic  tribes  from 
beyond  the  Danube  to  aid  in  expelling  the  latter 
invaders.  These  tribes  were  the  Croats  and  Serbs, 
and  they  have  remained  ever  since  in  the  lands 
which  were  then  granted  them  in  reward  of  their 
military  services. 

One  reason,  and  perhaps  the  chief  one,  why  the 
invading  Germans  and  Slavs  so  readily  became 
subjects  of  the  Roman  Empire  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  they  were  settled  agricultural  races, 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  237 

and  not  wandering  nomads.  It  may  seem  odd  to 
speak  of  races  as  "  settled  "  who  moved  about  so 
extensively  over  the  face  of  Europe  within  the 
short  period  of  two  centuries.  But  if  they  wan- 
dered, it  was  only  because  they  were  driven  by 
enemies  in  the  rear  too  strong  or  too  numerous 
for  them  to  overcome,  not  because  their  mode  of 
life  obliged  them  to  roam  over  vast  areas  in  quest 
of  the  means  of  subsistence.  The  profound  phi- 
lology of  the  present  day  has  shown  that  the 
Aryans,  while  still  in  their  primitive  Asiatic 
home,  and  long  before  they  had  become  distin- 
guishable as  Kelts,  Graeco-Italians,  Teutons,  Slavs, 
or  Indo-Persiaus,  had  advanced  beyond  the  hunt- 
ing and  exclusively  pastoral  stages  of  barbarism, 
and  acquired  a  subsistence  partly  by  tilling  the 
soil  and  partly  by  the  rearing  of  domestic  cattle. 
They  possessed  even  houses  and  inclosed  towns, 
and  the  rudiments  of  what  Mr.  Bagehot  calls 
"  government  by  discussion  "  were  not  wholly  un- 
known to  them.  The  picture  of  society  with 
which  we  are  familiar  in  the  Germania  of  Tacitus 
and  in  the  Homeric  poems  represents  a  condition 
of  things  in  many  respects  similar  to  that  which 
obtained  among  the  primitive  Aryans.  In  these 
respects  they  differed  widely  from  the  savage 
Tataric  hordes  which  molested  them  on  the  east, 


238  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

and  to  whose  attacks,  as  well  as  to  the  unman- 
ageable  increase  in  their  own  numbers,  we  must 
probably  ascribe  their  gradual  and  long-continued 
migrations  into  southern  Asia  and  into  Europe. 
When  after  many  centuries  those  less  civilized 
Aryans  known  as  Germans  and  Slavs  were  driven 
into  collision  with  their  more  civilized  brethren  of 
the  Roman  Empire,  their  invasion  was  in  an  all- 
important  respect  very  different  from  the  inva- 
sions of  Huns  or  Avars.  The  followers  of  Alaric, 
Hengist,  and  Chlodwig  came  to  colonize,  whereas 
the  followers  of  Attila  came  but  to  riot  and  de- 
stroy. The  vandalism  of  the  former  was  inci- 
dental, while  that  of  the  latter  was  fundamental. 

The  Teutonic  and  Slavic  invaders,  once  over 
the  first  intoxication  of  victory,  began,  as  by  nat- 
ural instinct,  to  found  rural  estates  and  cultivate 
the  soil ;  and  thus  becoming  property-holders, 
although  their  title  rested  on  violence,  it  became 
their  interest  to  assist  in  preserving  the  political 
system  so  far  as  practicable.  The  date  476, 
which  the  old  historians  made  to  mark  the  polit- 
ical fall  of  the  Roman  Empire,  in  reality  marked 
nothing  at  all  at  the  time  except  a  paltry  intrigue 
by  which  the  German  Odoacer,  having  got  rid  of 
a  faineant  emperor  who  was  too  near  at  hand, 
continued  to  administer  the  affairs  of  Italy  under 


The  Eaces  of  the  Danube.  239 

commission  from  the  government  at  Constantino- 
ple. In  reality  the  identity  of  interests  between 
the  Teutonic  settlers  and  the  imperial  system 
became  more  and  more  manifest  during  the  three 
following  centuries,  until  it  was  definitely  declared 
in  800  in  the  coronation  of  Charles  the  Great, 
whereby  the  headship  of  the  western  world  was 
restored  to  Rome,  while  the  connection  with  the 
East  was  finally  severed. 

If  we  consider  the  eastern  half  of  the  Empire  at 
this  time  —  or,  at  least,  so  much  of  it  as  was  com- 
prised in  Europe,  the  remainder  having  been 
mostly  torn  away  by  the  Saracens  —  we  find  it 
undergoing  a  gradual  process  of  Slavonization 
quite  analogous  to  the  Teutonic  reconstruction 
which  was  just  culminating  in  the  West.  Pretty 
much  the  whole  of  what  is  now  European  Turkey 
had  become  filled  with  a  Slavic  population.  For 
the  most  part  this  population  had  been  converted 
to  the  Greek  or  so-called  Orthodox  form  of  Chris- 
tianity, though  in  remote  parts  of  Serbia  pagan- 
ism lingered  till  the  thirteenth  century.  There 
was  probably  some  sense,  though  slight,  of  a  com- 
munity of  race  throughout  the  peninsula.  The 
interests  of  the  Slavs,  on  the  whole,  were  con- 
cerned in  the  protection  of  the  imperial  system 
against  external  attack,  although  the  various 


240  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

chiefs  made  war  on  each  other  and  mismanaged 
their  own  affairs  with  as  little  sense  of  allegiance 
to  the  Byzantine  suzerain  as  the  rulers  of  Brit- 
tany or  Aquitaine  felt  for  their  degenerate  Carlo- 
vingian  overlords.  Thus  on  a  superficial  view  the 
conditions  of  order  and  turbulence,  so  to  speak, 
might  have  seemed  very  similar  here  to  what  they 
were  in  the  West ;  and  all  that  was  needed  for 
the  growth  of  a  new  national  life  might  seem  to 
be  the  rise  of  a  dominant  tribe  —  after  the  like- 
ness of  the  Franks  —  which  in  due  course  of  time 
should  seize  the  falling  Byzantine  sceptre  and  as- 
sert unquestioned  sway  over  the  whole  peninsula. 
Could  something  like  this  have  happened,  the 
Eastern  Question  would  probably  never  have  come 
up  to  perturb  the  politics  of  modern  Europe,  and 
the  entire  careers  of  Russia  and  Austria  must 
have  been  essentially  modified.  But  for  the  Hun- 
garians, Crim  Tatars,  and  Turks,  something  of 
this  sort  might  very  likely  have  happened.  As  it 
was,  however,  no  sooner  did  one  Slavonic  com- 
munity begin  to  rise  to  pre-eminence  than  some 
fatal  combination  of  invaders  proceeded  to  cripple 
its  power,  and  this  state  of  things  continued  un- 
til the  turbaned  infidel  made  an  easy  prey  of  the 
whole  region. 

In  the  ninth  century  the  chronic  agitation  of 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  241 

eastern  Europe  was  raised  to  terrible  fever-heat 
by  the  approach  of  the  Hungarians,  —  a  non- Ar- 
yan race  from  central  Asia  which  has  had  a  very 
different  career  from  that  of  the  other  non-Aryan 
invaders  of  Europe.  Of  all  such  invaders  these 
alone  have  established  a  securely  permanent  foot- 
hold, unless  we  count  the  cognate  Finns,  who  were 
established  in  the  far  North  in  pre-historic  times. 
To  keep  in  his  mind  a  succinct  view  of  these  eth- 
nological facts,  the  reader  will  do  well  to  remem- 
ber that  all  the  languages  now  spoken  in  Europe 
are  Aryan  languages  descended  from  a  common 
Aryan  mother-tongue,  with  just  four  exceptions. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  Bask  of  northwestern 
Spain,  sole  remnant  of  the  aboriginal  Iberian 
speech.  The  second  is  the  group  of  Finnic  dia- 
lects spoken  by  a  Tataric  people  which  has  lived 
from  time  immemorial  on  the  eastern  shores  of 
the  Baltic.  The  third  is  the  Hungarian,  and  the 
fourth  is  the  Turkish.  These  languages  have 
absolutely  nothing  in  common  with  the  Aryan, 
either  in  grammar  or  vocabulary.  The  Bask,  too, 
has  nothing  in  common  with  the  three  other  alien 
tongues.  But  Finnish,  Hungarian,  and  Turkish 
are  quite  nearly  related  to  each  other,  and  there 
is  also  blood-relationship  between  the  peoples  who 
speak  these  languages.  Like  the  Turks,  the  Hun- 


242  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

garians  are  a  Tatar  race  ;  and  there  cannot  be  a 
more  striking  commentary  on  the  fallaciousness 
of  explaining  all  national  peculiarities  by  a  cheap 
reference  to  "blood"  than  is  furnished  by  these 
two  peoples,  the  one  being  as  highly  endowed 
with  political  good  sense  as  the  other  is  hopelessly 
destitute  of  it.  This  is  not  the  place  to  attempt 
to  explain  the  difference  in  detail  as  due  to  the 
different  circumstances  amid  which  the  two  peo- 
ples have  been  placed  ;  but  there  is  no  doubt  that 
their  careers  have  been  sufficiently  different.  In 
the  ninth  century  the  Hungarians  were  as  great  a 
terror  to  Christendom  as  the  Turks  were  in  the 
fifteenth  ;  but  the  Magyars,  after  failing  to  break 
through  the  bulwark  of  Christianized  Germans, 
which  the  genius  of  Charles  the  Great  had  pre- 
pared for  such  emergencies,  settled  down  quietly 
in  Pannonia  —  to  which  they  have  given  the 
name  of  Hungary  —  and  became  converted  to  the 
Roman  form  of  Christianity.  But  in  the  course 
of  this  settlement  the  Magyars  interfered  seri- 
ously with  the  integrity  of  the  Slavonic  communi- 
ties on  the  Danube.  They  tore  away  a  consider- 
able portion  of  Croatia  and  Serbia,  and  subjected 
so  many  Slavic  tribes  that  at  the  present  day  the 
Slavs  outnumber  the  Magyars,  even  within  the 
limits  of  Hungary  itself.1 
1  In  1850  the  population  of  Hungary  was  thus  divided :  Magyars, 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  243 

In  calling  the  Magyars  the  only  non- Aryan  in- 
vaders who  have  secured  a  permanent  foothold  in 
European  territory,  I  had  forgotten,  for  the  mo- 
ment, the  Bulgars  who  conquered  lower  Moesia  in 
the  beginning  of  the  sixth  century.  These  Bul- 
gars were  a  Tatar  race,  known  also  as  Ugrians,  a 
name  of  which  the  "  ogre  "  of  our  nursery  stories 
is  supposed  to  be  a  corruption.  But  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  Bulgars,  as  a  distinct  race,  were 
hardly  of  enough  consequence  to  keep  them  al- 
ways in  one's  memory.  Though  they  gave  the 
name  Bulgaria  to  the  Roman  province  of  lower 
Moesia,  they  were  soon  absorbed  among  the  Slavs, 
and  quite  lost  their  Tataric  speech.  And  so, 
while  Bulgaria  played  a  prominent  part  in  med- 
iaeval history,  it  figures  only  as  a  portion  of  the 
Slavonic  world.  Yet  to  this  day,  it  is  said,  the 
inhabitants  of  Bulgaria  exhibit,  in  their  high 
cheek-bones,  flat  face,  and  sunken  eyes,  as  well  as 
in  their  curious  attire,  the  characteristics  of  the 
Tatar  race.  In  the  seventh  century  Bulgaria  was 
overrun  by  the  Avars,  but  after  these  nomads 
were  expelled  the  Bulgarian  power  developed  rap- 
idly, and  was  even  extended  back  over  Bessarabia 
and  all  southern  Russia  as  far  as  the  Sea  of  Azof. 

5,000,000;  Slavs,  6,000,000;  Germans  and  Jews,  1,600,000;  Ramans 
in  Transylvania,  3,000,000. 


244  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

These  eastern  conquests  were  not  long  retained, 
but  on  the  other  hand  the  semi-independent  king- 
dom between  the  Danube  and  the  Balkan  Moun- 
tains became  more  and  more  formidable  in  its 
rivalry  with  the  imperial  government  at  Constan- 
tinople. In  long  and  obstinate  warfare  the  Bul- 
garians overcame  the  Serbs,  and  by  the  beginning 
of  the  tenth  century  they  controlled  nearly  the 
whole  peninsula  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Adri- 
atic. At  this  epoch  their  kingdom  was  perhaps 
as  civilized  as  any  in  contemporary  Europe,  if 
literary  culture  alone  were  to  be  taken  as  a  cri- 
terion. Their  noble  youth1  studied  Aristotle  and 
Demosthenes  in  the  schools  of  Constantinople, 
and  the  subtleties  of  theological  controversy  occu- 
pied their  attention  no  less  than  the  practice  of 
military  arts.  In  a  quarrel  with  the  emperor, 
their  Czar  Simeon  laid  siege  to  the  capital  and 
dictated  terms  of  peace  at  the  Golden  Horn.  But 
in  the  next  century  all  this  was  changed.  Such 
arrogant  vassals  were  not  to  be  tolerated.  In  a 
masterly  campaign,  though  sullied  by  diabolical 
cruelty,  the  Emperor  Basil  II.  overthrew  the 
power  of  the  Bulgarians,  and,  subduing  the  Serbs 
likewise,  re-established  the  immediate  authority 
of  Constantinople  as  far  as  the  Danube. 

From  this  time  forth  the  contest  for  supremacy 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  245 

was  carried  on  chiefly  between  the  emperors  and 
the  Serbian  chiefs.  The  pre-eminence  of  Serbia 
began  about  the  end  of  the  eleventh  century, 
when  Urosh  was  crowned  grand  duke.  By  the 
middle  of  the  fourteenth  century  the  whole  coun- 
try, with  the  exception  of  Rumelia  or  Thrace,  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  Serbians,  and  it  really  seemed 
as  if  the  degenerate  Greek  Empire  were  about  to 
pass  into  the  hands  of  the  Slav.  Stephen  Dushan, 
of  the  house  of  Urosh,  a  profound  statesman  and 
consummate  general,  was  the  hero  who  aspired  to 
re-enact  in  the  eastern  world  the  part  of  Charles 
the  Great.  In  1356  he  was  proclaimed  Emperor 
of  the  East,  and  if  his  life  had  been  spared  he 
might  have  made  good  the  title.  But  the  firm- 
ness of  his  monarchical  rule  was  irritating  to  his 
turbulent  vassals;  and  like  Csesar,  William  the 
Silent,  Henry  IV.,  and  Lincoln,  he  fell  by  the 
stupid  hand  of  the  assassin,  just  at  the  time  when 
a  few  years  more  of  life  might  have  been  of  ines- 
timable value  to  his  people  and  to  mankind. 
With  the  death  of  the  "  Emperor  "  Stephen,  the 
formation  of  a  Slavic  nationality  under  Serbian 
leadership  was  indefinitely  postponed.  The  feudal 
lords  who  had  so  stupidly  destroyed  the  only  gen- 
ius which  could  guide  them  to  victory  were  one 
by  one  overthrown  by  the  imperial  armies ;  and 


246  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

when  the  Turk  arrived,  in  the  next  century,  there 
was  no  solid  power  in  the  peninsula  which  could 
check  his  baleful  progress. 

To  recount  the  vicissitudes  of  Serbia  as  princi- 
pal battle-ground  between  Christian  Austrian  and 
infidel  Turk  would  be  a  task  as  tedious  as  profit- 
less. We  have  seen  how  the  Slavs  of  the  Byzan- 
tine Empire  failed  to  become  a  nation,  and  this  is 
the  only  point  which  need  concern  us.  There  is 
neither  interest  nor  instruction  in  the  record  of 
incessant  fighting  without  definite  issue ;  and  to 
the  philosophic  historian  the  career  of  Slavonic 
Turkey  becomes  almost  a  blank  until  the  begin- 
ning of  the  present  century,  when  the  uprising 
of  the  Serbs  against  the  Janissaries,  under  the 
leadership  of  the  eccentric  and  infamous  Kara 
George,  reopened  the  Eastern  Question,  and  per- 
haps heralded  the  rise  of  a  new  national  life 
among  the  southern  Slavs. 

This  sketch  of  the  Danubian  peoples  has  of 
course  been  but  the  merest  outline.  I  have  not 
attempted,  and  should  indeed  feel  quite  incompe- 
tent, to  do  more  than  define,  by  a  few  salient 
facts,  the  ethnological  relations  of  these  peoples 
and  their  position  in  the  general  history  of  Eu- 
rope. Even  so  rudimentary  an  outline  as  this, 
however,  would  be  incomplete  without  some  allu- 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  247 

sion  to  the  very  important  part  played  by  the 
Danubian  Slavs  in  the  origination  of  the  Protes- 
tant revolt  against  the  ecclesiastical  supremacy  of 
Rome.  The  circumstances  under  which  the  Bul- 
garians were  converted  to  Christianity  were  such 
that  during  their  brief  political  and  literary  emi- 
nence in  the  tenth  century  they  became  the  arch- 
heretics  of  Europe.  The  Manichsean  heresy,  sug- 
gested by  the  ancient  theology  of  Persia,  in  which 
the  Devil  appears  as  an  independently  existing 
Principle  of  Evil,  had  always  been  rife  in  Arme- 
nia ;  and  it  was  partly  by  Armenian  missionaries, 
belonging  to  the  Manichsean  sect  of  Paulicians, 
that  Bulgaria  was  converted  from  heathenism. 
In  the  middle  of  the  eighth  century  the  Emperor 
Constantino  Copronymus  transplanted  a  large  col- 
ony of  Paulicians  from  Armenia  into  Thrace,1  and 
these  immigrants  were  not  long  in  spreading  their 
heresy  beyond  the  Balkans.  A  century  later  the 
persecuting  zeal  of  the  orthodox  emperors  drove 
Armenia  into  rebellion,  and  for  a  short  time  an 
independent  Paulician  state  maintained  itself  on 
the  upper  Euphrates.  Early  in  the  tenth  century 
this  little  state  was  overthrown,  and  such  a  dire- 

i  See  the  "  Historical  Sketch  of  Bosnia,"  by  Mr.  A.  J.  Evans,  pre- 
fixed to  his  excellent  work  Through  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina  on 
Foot.  London.  1876.  8vo. 


248  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

ful  persecution  was  inaugurated  that  the  inhabit- 
ants in  great  numbers  sought  the  shelter  which 
the  Bulgarian  Czar  Simeon  was  both  able  and 
willing  to  give.  "From  this  period  onward," 
says  Mr.  Evans,  "the  Paulician  heresy  may  be 
said  to  change  its  nationality,  and  to  become 
Slavonic."  It  also  acquired  a  new  name.  In 
their  Slavonic  home  these  heretics  were  called 
Bogomiles,  from  the  Bulgarian  Bog  z'  milui,  or 
"  God  have  mercy,"  in  allusion  to  their  peculiar 
devotion  to  prayer.  The  sect  now  became  very 
powerful,  as  the  czars,  in  their  struggle  for  su- 
premacy with  the  Byzantine  overlords,  could  not 
afford  to  incur  the  displeasure  of  such  a  consider- 
able body  of  their  subjects.  Bogomilian  apostles, 
in  keen  rivalry  with  the  orthodox  missionaries, 
carried  their  Manichsean  doctrines  westward  all 
over  Serbia.  After  another  hundred  years  the 
catastrophe  which  had  driven  this  heresy  from 
Asia  into  Europe  was  curiously  repeated  in  its 
new  home.  After  the  power  of  the  Bulgarian 
czars  had  been  finally  broken  down  by  Basil  II., 
the  orthodox  emperors  began  once  more  to  roast 
the  obnoxious  Paulicians.  A  fierce  persecution 
under  Alexius  Comnenus  set  up  a  current  of  Bo- 
gomilian migration  into  Serbia,  and  as  these  im- 
migrants found  no  favour  in  the  eyes  of  the  ortho- 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  249 

dox  Serbian  princes,  their  westward  pilgrimage 
was  continued  into  that  part  of  Illyricum  now 
known  as  Bosnia,  —  a  hilly  region  inhabited,  then 
as  now,  mainly  by  fair-haired  Serbs.  From  the 
twelfth  century  onward  Bosnia  became  the  head- 
quarters of  Manichaean  heresy,  and  was  a  very 
uncomfortable  thorn  in  the  flesh  of  the  popes, 
who,  with  the  aid  of  pious  Hungarian  kings,  kept 
up  a  perpetual  crusade  against  the  stubborn  little 
country,  without  ever  achieving  any  considerable 
success. 

The  Papacy  had  very  good  grounds  for  its 
anxiety,  for  it  was  from  Bosnia  that  the  great 
Albigensian  heresy  was  propagated  through  north- 
ern Italy  and  southern  Gaul.  This  connection  be- 
tween eastern  and  western  Protestantism,  though 
generally  forgotten  now,  was  well  understood  at 
the  time.  Matthew  Paris  states  that  the  Albi- 
gensians  possessed  a  pope  of  their  own,  whose 
seat  of  government  was  in  Bosnia,  and  who  kept 
a  vicar  residing  in  Carcassonne.  By  orthodox 
writers  the  western  heretics  were  quite  frequently 
termed  "  Bulgares,"  —  a  designation  which  became 
invested  with  the  vilest  opprobrium,  —  and  a 
glance  at  the  principal  Bogomilian  doctrines  shows 
that  the  relationship  was  asserted  on  valid  grounds. 
Like  the  Manichseans  generally,  the  Bogomiles 


250  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

held  that  the  Devil  exists  independent  of  the  will 
of  the  good  God,  and  was  the  creator  of  this 
evil  world,  which  it  is  the  work  of  Christ  to  re- 
deem from  his  control.  They  accepted  as  inspired 
the  New  Testament,  with  the  Psalms  and  Proph- 
ets, but  set  little  store  by  the  historical  books 
of  the  Old  Testament,  and  rejected  the  Mosaic 
writings  as  dictated  by  Satan.  They  denied  any 
mystical  efficiency  to  baptism,  and  laughed  at  the 
doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  maintaining  that 
the  consecrated  wafer  is  in  no  wise  different  from 
ordinary  bread.  Some  of  them  are  said  to  have 
neglected  baptism  altogether.  They  regarded 
image-worship  as  no  better  than  heathen  idolatry, 
and  they  paid  no  respect  to  the  symbol  of  the 
cross,  asking,  "  If  any  man  slew  the  son  of  a  king 
with  a  bit  of  wood,  how  could  this  piece  of  wood 
be  dear  to  the  king  ?  " 1  Their  aversion  to  the 
worship  of  the  Virgin  was  equally  pronounced, 
and  they  despised  the  intercession  of  saints.  They 
wore  long  faces,  abstained  from  the  use  of  wine, 
and  commended  celibacy.  Some  went  so  far  as  to 
refuse  animal  food,  and  in  general  their  belief  in 
the  vileness  of  matter  led  them  to  the  extremes 
of  asceticism.  Their  ecclesiastical  government 
was  in  many  respects  presbyterian ;  in  politics 

i  Evans,  op.  cit.  p.  xxx. 


The  Races  of  the  Danube.  251 

they  were  generally  democratic,  with  a  leaning 
toward  communism  quite  in  keeping  with  their 
primitive  Slavonic  customs  as  well  as  with  their 
strictly  literal  interpretation  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment. 

When  we  consider  that  these  remarkable  sec- 
tarians not  only  set  on  foot  the  Albigensian  revolt 
which  Innocent  III.  overcame  with  fire  and  sword, 
but  were  also  intimately  associated  with  the  later 
Slavonic  outbreak  of  which  John  Huss  and  Jerome 
of  Prague  were  the  leaders,  it  becomes  evident 
that  the  part  played  in  European  history  by  the 
southern  Slavs  is  far  from  insignificant.  As  Mr. 
Evans  observes,  it  is  not  too  much  to  regard 
Bosnia  as  the  religious  Switzerland  of  mediaeval 
Europe,  in  whose  inaccessible  mountain  strong- 
holds was  prolonged  the  defiant  resistance  to 
papal  supremacy  which  in  the  West  repeatedly 
succumbed  to  the  overwhelming  power  of  the  In- 
quisition. The  sudden  change  which  followed  on 
the  invasion  of  the  Turks  is  instructive  as  show- 
ing the  political  danger  attendant  upon  excessive 
persecution.  As  the  armies  of  Muhamad  II.  were 
making  their  way  toward  Bosnia,  King  Stephen 
of  Hungary  began  cutting  the  throats  of  his 
Bogomile  subjects,  some  forty  thousand  of  whom 
are  said  to  have  fled  into  the  Herzeg6vina,  while 


252          Darwinism  and  Other  Essay*. 

others  were  sent  in  chains  to  be  burned  at  Rome. 
Bosnia  was  again  threatened  with  an  orthodox 
crusade,  but  the  people,  preferring  to  take  their 
chances  of  religious  immunity  with  the  Turk, 
threw  themselves  on  him  for  protection,  and  sur- 
rendered their  inexpugnable  country  to  Muhamad 
without  striking  a  blow.  The  surrender,  indeed, 
went  further  than  this  ;  for  though  the  Serbs  of 
Bosnia  have  several  times  asserted  their  political 
independence,  more  than  a  third  of  the  popula- 
tion have  become  followers  of  the  Prophet,  and 
furnish  to-day  the  sole  example  of  a  native  Eu- 
ropean race  of  Mussulmans. 

December,  1876- 


XIII. 

LIBEEAL   EDUCATION.1 

EARLY  in  the  last  century  Sir  William  Temple 
declared  that  literature  is  constantly  degenerat- 
ing, and  that  the  oldest  books  are  always  the 
best.  Not  only  is  Homer  the  greatest  of  poets 
and  .^Esop  the  wittiest  of  fabulists,  but  Phalaris 
was  a  letter-writer  with  whom  Pascal  and  Ma- 
dame SeVign£  are  not  fit  to  be  compared.  Thus 
wrote  Sir  W.  Temple,  much  to  his  own  satisfaction 
and  to  the  edification  of  many  of  his  contempora- 
ries. But  lapse  of  time  and  changes  of  circum- 
stance bring  about  signal  alterations  in  the  opin- 
ions of  men.  The  other  day  Dr.  J.  W.  Draper  — 
in  a  book  entitled  "  Civil  Policy  of  America,"  and 
made  up  chiefly  of  disconnected  statements  about 
physical  geography,  Arabian  chemists,  and  Jewish 
physicians  —  told  us  that  "  the  grand  depositories 
of  human  knowledge  are  not  the  ancient,  but  the 
modern,  tongues :  few,  if  any,  are  the  facts  worth 

i  Essays  on  a  Liberal  Education.    Edited  by  Rev.  F.  W.  Farrar, 
M.  A.,  F.  R.  S.    London:  Macmillan  &  Co.    1867. 


254  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

knowing  that  are  to  be  exclusively  obtained  by  a 
knowledge  of  Latin  and  Greek."  And  doubtless 
this  amusing  statement  will  in  some  quarters  meet 
with  as  much  applause  as  the  loose  assertions  of 
Temple  met  with  in  their  time.  For  this  old  con- 
troversy about  the  comparative  merits  of  the  an- 
cients and  the  moderns  has  been  lately  resusci- 
tated, though  in  somewhat  altered  shape.  Times 
have  changed  ;  and  what  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury was  considered  good  meat  for  strong  men 
we  should  now  regard  as  but  indifferent  milk  for 
babes.  We  therefore  no  longer  idly  argue  about 
the  comparative  amount  of  genius  possessed  by  an- 
cient and  by  modern  writers ;  but  we  dispute  quite 
zealously,  and  with  sufficient  one-sidedness,  over 
the  comparative  value  of  ancient  literature  and 
modern  science  .as  means  of  mental  discipline  and 
branches  of  liberal  education.  University  reform 
is  a  favourite  subject  of  discussion.  And  among 
the  multiplicity  of  things  that  may  be  taught  un- 
der a  reformed  scheme  of  education,  the  problem 
of  what  must  be  taught  is  pressing  ever  more 
strongly  for  a  definite  solution.  The  difficulties 
inherent  in  the  problem  are  greatly  enhanced  by 
the  inevitable  prejudices  of  the  inquirers.  One 
of  the  main  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  speedy  and 
amicable  settlement  of  the  question  arises  from 


Liberal  Education.  255 

the  fttct  that  physical  investigators  as  a  class  have 
no  well-defined  idea  of  the  benefits  to  be  derived 
from  classical  studies,  while  classical  scholars  and 
literary  men  are  too  generally  ignorant  of  the 
value  of  physical  science  as  a  means  of  training 
the  intellect.  Our  opinions  reflect  our  experience 
with  tolerable  accuracy,  and  we  can  hardly  be  ex- 
pected to  have  a  very  lively  sense  of  the  worth  of 
pursuits  in  which  we  have  never  heartily  engaged. 
If  we  have  always  smoked  meerschaum  we  are 
apt  to  think  poorly  of  briarwood.  So  when  a  lit- 
erary man  takes  up  a  treatise  on  "  Determinants  " 
with  the  casual  remark  that  he  hates  the  sight  of 
such  a  book,  we  may  be  pretty  sure  that,  what- 
ever else  his  opinions  may  be  good  for,  he  is  no 
very  competent  judge  of  the  educational  value  of 
mathematics.  It  is  quite  obvious  that  he  dislikes 
the  subject  as  some  women  dislike  politics,  be- 
cause he  has  never  mastered  the  rudiments  of  it. 
To  him  a  parabola  is  only  a  neat-looking  curve, 
as  to  the  average  classical  scholar  a  Ley  den  jar  is 
only  a  glass  bottle  with  a  rod  stuck  through  the 
cork,  and  to  many  a  student  of  physics  the  Iliad 
is  nothing  but  a  tiresome  account  of  the  squabbles 
of  a  parcel  of  barbarians,  "  proving  nothing,"  as 
worthy  Mr.  Vince  would  have  said. 

So  deep-seated  at  present  is  the  incapacity  of 


256  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

our  "  ancients  "  and  "  moderns  "  to  understand 
each  other,  that  when  a  man  of  catholic  culture, 
like  Mr.  Mill,  presents  both  sides  of  the  case  with 
equal  force  we  find  either  party  disposed  to  rely 
upon  one  half  of  his  argument,  while  ignoring  or 
disparaging  the  other  half.  Dr.  Youmans,  for 
example,  in  the  Introduction  to  his  valuable  col- 
lection of  essays  on  "  Modern  Culture,"  having 
quoted  Mr.  Mill's  address  in  behalf  of  scientific 
studies,  thinks  it  but  fair  to  add  that  the  same 
discourse  contains  a  vigorous  argument  for  the 
classics.  "  But  while,"  says  Dr.  Youmans,  "  Mr. 
Mill  urges  the  importance  of  scientific  studies  for 
all,  an  examination  of  his  argument  for  the  clas- 
sics will  show  that  it  is  applicable  only  to  those 
who,  like  himself,  are  professional  scholars,  and 
devote  their  lives  to  philological,  historical,  or 
critical  studies."  Now,  possibly  Mr.  Mill  ought 
to  have  limited  his  argument  in  this  way ;  but  he 
certainly  has  not  done  so.  He  makes  no  such 
distinction :  nowhere  does  he  even  faintly  inti- 
mate that  he  is  not  putting  one  class  of  studies 
upon  the  same  footing  as  the  other.  His  whole 
magnificent  Discourse  is  devoted  to  showing  the 
urgent  necessity  which  exists  for  a  well-planned 
scheme  of  education  in  which  both  kinds  of  learn- 
ing shall  be  recognized.  He  believes  that  there  is 


Liberal  Education.  257 

no  reason,  except  the  stupidity  of  instructors,  why 
classics  and  the  sciences  should  not  both  be 
taught ;  and  he  holds  that  our  earnest  recognition 
of  the  claims  of  the  one  should  never  blind  us  to 
the  claims  of  the  other. 

In  view  of  this,  it  is  pleasant  to  meet  with  a 
book,  written  chiefly  by  classical  scholars  who 
have  taken  university  honours,  in  which  the  just 
claims  of  physical  science  and  the  shortcomings 
of  a  merely  literary  education  are  adequately  rec- 
ognized. The  writers  of  the  nine  essays  forming 
the  volume  now  under  consideration  are  all  grad- 
uates of  Cambridge,  and  all  but  one  have  at  one 
time  or  another  obtained  fellowships  in  that  uni- 
versity. Most  of  them,  therefore,  may  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  moderately  acquainted  with  ancient 
literature,  and  to  some  extent  sensible  of  the  ad- 
vantages attending  the  study  of  it.  The  editor, 
Mr.  Farrar,  has  devoted  a  large  part  of  his  time 
to  philological  studies,  and  has  written  a  treatise 
on  Greek  syntax,  besides  two  volumes  on  the  ori- 
gin and  development  of  language,  all  of  which 
are  works  of  considerable  philosophical  merit, 
though  not  perhaps  of  the  highest  and  most  ac- 
curate scholarship.  Of  the  other  writers,  two  at 
least  —  Professor  Seeley  and  Lord  Houghton  — 


258  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

are  well  known  as  men  of  wide  literary  culture 
and  trained  judgment. 

The  opinions  of  such  men  upon  the  subject  of 
classical  education  are  entitled  to  respectful  con- 
sideration ;  and  when  we  find  among  them  the 
most  complete  unanimity  in  the  declaration  that 
a  large  part  of  the  classical  instruction  now  given 
in  English  universities  is  utterly  worthless,  and 
ought  to  be  replaced  by  a  course  in  physical  sci- 
ence, we  cannot  set  aside  the  judgment  on  the 
plea  of  ignorant  prejudice.  Let  not  Philistinism 
clap  its  hands  too  hastily,  however ;  for  the  ob- 
ject of  this  Cambridge  book  is,  not  to  supersede, 
but  to  complement,  classical  studies.  It  declares, 
not  against  the  study  of  antiquity  (Alterthums- 
wissenschaft'),  but  against  the  pedantry  with  which 
that  study  is  now  carried  on ;  and  one  of  the 
ablest  essays  in  the  volume  is  devoted  to  showing 
that  physical  science  is  habitually  taught  with 
quite  as  much  pedantry  as  any  branch  of  ancient 
learning. 

The  long  career  of  irrational  stultification, 
through  defect  in  the  method  of  instruction,  is 
usually  begun  in  our  school-days.  Most  countries 
have  rivers  running  through  them  ;  and  in  study- 
ing elementary  geography,  we  are  expected  duly 
to  learn  their  courses.  Many  countries  are  inter- 


Liberal  Education.  259 

sected,  or  are  parted  from  their  neighbours,  by 
chains  of  mountains ;  and  this  second  class  of 
facts  we  are  likewise  called  upon  to  master.  But 
we  are  not  told  that  the  two  sets  of  phenomena 
are  inseparably  related.  We  are  not  told  that, 
since  all  rivers  must  run  down  hill,  therefore  their 
positions  and  courses  must  depend  upon  the  posi- 
tion of  mountains,  so  that  by  knowing  the  latter 
we  may  be  helped  to  the  knowledge  of  the  former. 
We  are  required  to  learn  these  facts  as  they  stand 
in  the  elementary  text-books,  in  "godlike  isola- 
tion." We  are  compelled  to  take  in  a  host  of  de- 
tails by  a  sheer  effort  of  unintelligent  memory, 
while  the  process  of  association,  by  appealing  to 
which  alone  is  memory  made  serviceable,  is  ap- 
pealed to  as  little  as  possible.  So  in  grammar, 
when  by  dint  of  irksome  mechanical  repetition 
we  have  become  able  to  state  that  "  a  verb  must 
agree  with  its  nominative  case  in  number  and 
person,"  we  have  learned  a  bare  fact,  which,  apart 
from  its  explanation,  is  a  useless  fact ;  and  that  it 
has  or  admits  of  any  explanation  we  are  rarely 
led  to  suspect. 

In  approaching  foreign  languages  we  become 
immersed  still  deeper  in  the  mire  of  elementary 
unintelligibility.  We  commit  to  memory  scores 
of  intricate  paradigms,  containing  all  possible 


260  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

forms  of  the  noun  or  verb,  before  we  have  been 
introduced  to  a  single  sentence  in  which  these 
forms  are  presented.  In  mute  dismay  we  con- 
template ingeniously  framed  rules  of  syntax,  be- 
fore we  have  been  shown  a  glimpse  of  the  facts 
upon  which  these  rules  depend.  We  get  the  gen- 
eralization before  the  particulars,  the  abstract  be- 
fore the  concrete  ;  we  learn  to  repeat  formulas 
before  we  have  the  notions  needful  for  filling 
them.  As  a  natural  result,  our  Latin  and  Greek 
seem  very  difficult.  To  enhance  our  perplex- 
ity, the  same  thing  is  generally  introduced  to  us 
under  different  names,  or,  quite  as  often,  differ- 
ent things  under  the  same  name.  We  are  told 
that  the  genitive  in  Greek  denotes  possession,  and 
next  that  it  likewise  denotes  origin,  and  again 
that  it  denotes  separation.  We  are  informed  that 
the  Latin  genitive,  primarily  denoting  possession, 
may,  however,  if  of  the  first  or  second  declension 
and  singular  number,  be  used  to  signify  place,  an 
idea  conveyed  by  the  ablative  also,  which  for  the 
time  being  kindly  neglects  its  proper  function  of 
expressing  removal.  The  genitive,  moreover,  may 
express  one  kind  of  resemblance,  another  kind 
being,  by  a  mysterious  dispensation  of  Providence, 
indicated  by  the  dative.  Even  if  all  these  cum- 
brous rules  for  learning  ancient  languages  were 


Liberal  Education.  261 

correct,  instead  of  being  many  of  them  inaccurate, 
and  nearly  all  of  them  antiquated,  they  would 
still  be  worse  than  useless  to  the  young  student. 
Thrust  into  his  mind  as  they  are,  before  he  has 
had  concrete  examples  of  them,  they  are  utterly 
meaningless.  He  knows  not  how  or  where  to  ap- 
ply them.  They  serve  only  to  confuse  and  di* 
courage  him.  Nor  are  matters  mended  much 
when  we  begin  to  do  what  we  should  all  along 
have  been  doing,  —  when  we  begin  to  read.  We 
read  a  few  sentences  each  day,  parsing  as  we  go 
along,  according  to  the  inexplicable  rules  just  re- 
ferred to,  and  paying  little  or  no  attention  to  the 
meaning  of  our  author.  Seldom  do  we  read  a 
sufficient  mass  of  matter  consecutively  to  have 
the  language  take  any  hold  upon  us.  Thus  we 
read  Aristophanes,  and  hardly  suspect  his  con- 
summate and  irresistible  humour.  We  read  De- 
mosthenes, and  remain  ignorant  of  Athenian  poli- 
tics. And  a  few  years  after  leaving  college  we 
are  able,  by  dint  of  much  thumbing  of  the  dic- 
tionary, and  with  occasional  reference  to  the 
grammar,  to  pick  out  the  meaning  of  Latin  and 
Greek  sentences.  This  is  too  often  the  sorry  re- 
sult which  is  dignified  by  the  name  of  a  classical 
education. 

Yet  perhaps  our  scientific  education,  as  at  pres- 


262  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ent  carried  on  by  means  of  text-books,  is  not 
much  better.  We  take  up  a  book  on  physics,  and 
are  told  that  the  Newtonian  theory  is  still  one  of 
the  great  rival  theories  of  light,  although  it  was 
utterly  overthrown  at  the  beginning  of  the  pres- 
ent century.  We  take  up  a  book  on  astronomy, 
and  are  told  that  the  earth  is  95,000,000  miles 
distant  from  the  sun,  although  the  researches  of 
M.  Foucault  have  shown  that  the  distance  is  only 
91,000,000.  We  take  up  a  book  on  physiology, 
and  read  about  "  a  vital  principle  which  suspends 
natural  laws,"  although  every  competent  physiol- 
ogist well  knows  that  any  such  "  principle  "  is  as 
much  a  distorted  figment  of  the  fancy  as  the  basi- 
lisks which  in  old  times  were  supposed  to  haunt 
secluded  cellars.  We  hear  grave  lectures  on  psy- 
chology, in  which  the  systems  of  Locke  or  Kant 
are  laboriously  expounded,  while  of  the  recent  in- 
novations made  by  writers  like  Bain  and  Mauds- 
ley  we  get  not  the  slightest  hint.  So  in  history 
and  philology  we  are  too  often  taught  as  if  Momm- 
sen  and  Grote  had  never  written.  Grimm's 
magnificent  researches,  throwing  light  upon  the 
whole  structure  of  language,  and  presenting  the 
history  of  human  thought  under  an  entirely  new 
aspect,  are  non-existent  to  the  mind  of  the  stu- 
dent. He  pursues  the  even  tenour  of  his  way  in 


Liberal  Education.  263 

blissful  ignorance  of  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  and  sees 
no  absurdity  in  the  mythological  theories  of  Eu- 
hemeros. 

Now  it  seems  to  us  that  the  reform  which  is 
most  urgently  needed  in  our  system  of  liberal 
education  consists  not  in  the  substitution  of  one 
branch  of  studies  for  another  so  much  as  in  the 
more  liberal,  rational,  and  intelligent  pursuit  of 
various  branches.  In  the  main,  fairness  of  mind, 
accuracy  of  judgment,  and  shrewdness  of  per- 
ception are  to  be  secured  as  much  by  one  kind  of 
research  as  by  another  kind.  The  alleged  nar- 
rowness and  torpidity  —  the  "  Kronian  "  charac- 
teristics (to  use  an  Aristophanic  word)  —  of 
classical  scholars  are  due  far  more  to  the  irra- 
tional method  in  which  they  have  pursued  their 
studies  than  to  those  studies  themselves.  Let  the 
student  really  fathom  who  Julius  Csesar  was, 
what  he  thought,  what  he  did,  wherein  he  differed 
from  Cato  or  Pompey,  why  his  policy  succeeded, 
and  what  its  effects  have  been  upon  all  subse- 
quent generations  down  to  our  time,  —  let  him 
duly  fathom  all  this,  and  he  will  have  gone  far 
toward  getting  as  good  a  political  education  as  a 
man  needs  to  have.  Let  him,  again,  justly  esti- 
mate the  value  of  ancient  chronology  ;  let  him 
once  have  critically  examined  the  works  of  Bun. 


264  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

sen  and  Lepsius  until  he  has  fairly  detected  their 
weak  points,  and  he  will  be  as  little  likely  to  sur- 
render himself  to  any  current  delusion  as  the  man 
who  has  studied  astronomy  or  chemistry.  The 
real  difficulty  is  that  our  scheme  of  classical  edu- 
cation does  not  provide  for  any  adequate  knowl- 
edge, even  of  classical  subjects.  Its  energies  are 
entirely  devoted,  during  eight  or  ten  years,  to  the 
imperfect  acquirement  of  two  languages  which 
ought  to  be  very  well  learned  in  four  or  five; 
and  then  no  time  is  left  for  anything  else. 

Our  system  of  classical  education  has  come 
down  to  us  from  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  — 
from  a  time  when  nearly  all  that  was  valuable  in 
literature  was  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  an- 
cient authors.  Until  toward  their  close,  the  Mid- 
dle Ages  had  accomplished  little  in  literature 
worthy  to  be  compared  with  the  great  works  of 
Greek  and  Roman  antiquity.  And  when,  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  the  expulsion  of  Greeks  from 
Constantinople  and  the  invention  of  printing 
brought  about  the  rapid  dissemination  of  ancient 
literature  among  people  at  last  socially  prepared 
to  welcome  it,  the  effect  was  as  if  a  new  continent 
had  been  opened  to  view  in  the  mental  world  as 
vast  and  inviting  as  that  discovered  by  Columbus 
beyond  the  Atlantic.  The  exploration  of  the  one 


Liberal  Education.  265 

was  carried  on  as  keenly  as  that  of  the  other. 
For  a  long  time  there  could  be  no  better  or  more 
profitable  study  than  that  of  ancient  literature. 
Before  a  new  career  of  progress  could  be  inaugu- 
rated, old  forgotten  acquisitions  must  be  recovered 
and  earnestly  studied  in  the  light  of  new  political, 
social,  and  intellectual  circumstances.  Accord- 
ingly, in  those  days  there  were  classical  scholars 
of  gigantic  calibre.  From  the  fifteenth  to  the 
seventeenth  century  we  have  the  names  of  Eras- 
mus, Budseus,  the  Scaligers,  Grotius,  Reuchlin, 
Salmasius,  Casaubon,  Lipsius,  Selden,  Bentley,  and 
Huet,  representatives  of  a  mighty  and  astonishing 
style  of  scholarship,  which  doubtless,  from  the 
absence  of  the  proper  social  conditions,  will  never 
be  seen  again.  Philosophers,  like  Bacon,  Des- 
cartes, and  Leibnitz,  bent  upon  mastering  the  sum 
of  human  knowledge,  could  do  no  better  than  to 
read  with  critical  eyes  the  writings  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  In  light  literature,  as  represented  by 
Rabelais,  Montaigne,  Ben  Jonson,  and  Burton, 
classical  learning  was  equally  conspicuous.  And 
in  social  intercourse  Latin,  and  to  some  extent 
Greek,  held  the  place  since  usurped  by  French 
and  other  modern  tongues.  While  modern  lan- 
guages were  but  little  studied,  the  common  dia- 
lect of  educated  Europeans  was  formed  by  the 


266  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

tongues  of  antiquity.  These  languages  were 
therefore  learned  to  be  written  and  spoken,  not  to 
be  dozed  over,  dabbled  in,  and  forgotten.  They 
were  learned  in  the  natural  way,  by  concrete 
examples,  and  by  assiduous  practice,  not  out  of 
grammars  bristling  with  inexplicable  abstrac- 
tions. Homer  and  Virgil  were  read  for  their  lit- 
erary interest,  not  as  the  text  for  monotonous 
parsing-lessons  and  useless  disquisitions  on  syl- 
labic quantity. 

The  changes  which  classical  education  has  since 
undergone  are  narrated  by  Mr.  Parker  in  the  first 
essay  contained  in  the  volume  before  us.  We 
have  not  space  to  rehearse  the  interesting  details 
which  are  there  given,  but  must  call  attention  to 
the  striking  remarks  of  Mr.  Farrar  and  Professor 
Seeley  upon  the  method  of  teaching  the  classics 
now  prevalent  in  the  English  universities.  Mr. 
Farrar's  essay  is  devoted  to  exposing  the  worth- 
lessness  of  Greek  and  Latin  verse-making  as  a 
means  of  culture.  If  there  be  in  our  day,  says 
Mr.  Farrar,  any  kind  of  achievement  which  is  at 
once  impossible  to  do  and  useless  when  done,  it  is 
the  writing  of  good  Latin  or  Greek  verses.  Our 
American  universities,  so  far  as  we  know,  do  not 
require  it  to  be  done.  Once  in  a  while  they  en- 
courage students  to  attempt  these  nugce  difficiles, 


Liberal  Education.  267 

in  the  hope  of  obtaining  prizes  or  a  college  reputa- 
tion, in  case  of  success.  But  in  our  best  colleges 
any  student  can  graduate,  and  most  do  gradu- 
ate, without  ever  having  written  Latin  or  Greek 
except  in  more  or  less  halting  prose.  In  Eng- 
land, however,  there  lingers  in  many  quarters  a 
queer  superstition,  that  the  chief  end  of  clas- 
sical education  is  to  enable  its  votaries  to  beguile 
their  leisure  hours  by  stringing  together  hexa- 
meters. As  the  result  of  this  system,  we  have 
some  pretty  poems  in  the  "  Arundines  Cami," 
Mr.  D' Arcy  Thompson's  "  Prolusiones  Homericae," 
Lord  Lyttelton's  "  Samson  Agonistes,"  and  many 
hundred  reams  of  detestable  trash,  written  in  a 
dialect  such  as  Aristophanes  would  hardly  have 
thought  fit  for  the  silliest  geese  and  cockatoos  of 
his  Cloudcuckooville.  In  the  time  now  wasted 
in  verse  composition  in  each  college  career,  the 
methods  and  leading  results  of  several  physical 
sciences  might  easily  be  learned.  This  is  the 
kind  of  "  instruction "  which  our  essayists  would 
be  glad  to  see  done  away  with.  They  hold  that 
the  chief  end  of  classical  education  is,  beside  af- 
fording scope  for  the  exercise  of  sagacity  in  rea- 
soning, to  enlarge  our  minds  by  making  us  ac- 
quainted with  the  ideas,  feelings,  and  customs  of 
a  time  when  men  thought,  felt,  and  acted  very 


268  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

differently  from  now.  The  man  who  thoroughly 
knows  Alterthumswissemchaft,  or  the  science  of 
Greek  and  Roman  antiquity,  differs  from  the  man 
who  does  not,  in  much  the  same  way  that  the  man 
who  has  travelled  all  over  the  world  with  his  eyes 
open  differs  from  the  man  whose  knowledge  of 
the  world  is  limited  to  what  is  going  on  in  his 
own  village.  But  how  a  knowledge  of  ancient 
civilization  is  to  be  got  by  vain  attempts  to  imi- 
tate the  diction  of  Ovid  or  Theokritos  it  would  be 
difficult  to  say.  The  proposal  to  study  the  life  of 
modern  Germany,  to  get  an  accurate  idea  of  its 
political  and  social  condition,  its  literature,  its  do- 
mestic habits,  its  contributions  to  human  improve- 
ment, and  the  predominant  sentiments  which  ac- 
tuate its  people,  by  writing  quatrains  in  imitation 
of  the  hymns  in  "  Faust,"  would  be  saluted  with 
peals  of  inextinguishable  laughter.  Yet  it  would 
be  about  as  sensible  as  the  method  of  studying 
antiquity  adopted  by  the  verse-makers. 

The  subject  of  verse-making,  as  we  have  said, 
does  not  concern  us  so  intimately  as  our  brethren 
across  the  water,  England  being  alone  among  civ- 
ilized nations  in  the  importance  which  she  at- 
taches to  this  pursuit.  But  though  our  schools 
and  colleges  do  not  require  the  writing  of  verses, 
they  often  waste  a  great  deal  of  time  and  energy 


Liberal  Education.  269 

in  teaching  the  rules  of  prosody,  as  well  as  by  the 
cumbrous  and  inefficient  method  in  which  they 
conduct  classical  instruction  in  general,  and  par- 
ticularly by  their  habit  of  beginning  at  the  wrong 
end.  We  learn  French  and  German  with  ease, 
because  we  begin  with  concrete  examples.  In 
studying  Latin  and  Greek,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
begin  with  abstract  rules,  and  are  not  seldom  com- 
pelled to  memorize  what  we  cannot  understand. 
Hence  the  difficulties  under  which  we  labour  are 
so  great  that,  by  the  time  they  are  conquered, 
we  have  too  often  neither  leisure  nor  interest  left 
for  other  studies.  By  this  process  the  mind  is  in 
many  cases  stupefied  rather  than  quickened ;  and 
the  system,  far  from  producing  liberally  educated 
men,  fails  even  to  produce  good  classical  scholars. 
We  believe  that  the  only  efficient  way  to  learn 
foreign  languages,  ancient  or  modern,  is  to  learn 
them  as  we  learn  our  own  in  childhood.  We  can- 
not indeed  have  Greek  and  Roman  nurses,  but 
we  can  at  least  have  the  living  phenomena  of 
language  presented  to  our  minds,  instead  of  the 
dead  formulas  of  grammar.  If  this  natural  method 
were  to  be  duly  inaugurated,  we  believe  that 
Greek  and  Latin  might  be  thoroughly  learned  in 
one  third  of  the  time  now  spent  in  learning  them 
superficially.  We  should  again  have  excellent 


270  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Hellenists  and  Latinists,  —  not,  perhaps,  scholars 
like  Erasmus  and  Scaliger,  for  we  no  longer  need 
the  same  sort  of  work  that  was  needed  once,  and 
Donaldson's  notion  that  learned  works  should  still 
be  written  in  Latin  may  safely  be  pronounced  a 
chimera ;  but  we  should  have  men  among  us 
capable  of  reading  ancient  literature  with  ease 
and  pleasure,  —  men  capable  of  extracting  from  it 
an  amount  of  historical  and  philosophical  knowl- 
edge to  which  the  great  scholars  of  the  Renais- 
sance were  utter  strangers.  The  scholarship  of 
the  present  day  is  necessarily  of  a  quite  different 
type  from  that  of  three  centuries  ago.  It  has 
been  reacted  upon  by  physical,  political,  and  his- 
torical science.  Its  ideal  consists  in  the  thorough 
knowledge  of  ancient  life,  manners,  moral  ideas, 
and  superstitions,  as  an  essential  part  of  the  whole 
history  of  mankind.  Its  representatives  are  men 
like  Grote,  Littre",  and  Mommsen.  Properly  pur- 
sued, it  enlarges  our  sympathies,  shows  us  the 
people  of  bygone  times  as  men  like  ourselves, 
alike  yet  different,  actuated  by  like  passions,  but 
guided  by  different  opinions  and  different  con- 
ceptions. It  forbids  us  to  judge  of  them  by  the 
standard  of  our  own  age  ;  it  corrects  the  preju- 
dices inseparable  from  ignorance  of  history  ;  it 
gives  us  lessons  in  political  conduct ;  it  makes  us 


Liberal  Education.  271 

cosmopolitan  and  hospitable  in  mind.  These  are 
reasons  why  classical  learning  should  not  be  given 
up.  They  are  reasons  why  it  will  never  be  given 
up,  but  will  be  rationalized  in  its  method  and  ex- 
tended in  its  province. 

To  illustrate  more  fully  what  is  meant  by  say- 
ing that  the  proper  way  to  teach  is  to  begin  with 
the  concrete,  we  shall  take  the  case  of  one  of  the 
natural  sciences  as  it  has  been  skilfully  treated 
by  Mr.  Wilson,  in  his  contribution  to  the  present 
volume.  His  essay  shows  that  science  is  often 
quite  as  cumbrously  taught  as  the  classics  ;  but  it 
also  shows  how  it  ought  to  be  taught. 

Botany  and  experimental  physics,  according  to 
Mr.  Wilson,  are  of  all  branches  of  science  the  most 
interesting  and  the  most  intellectually  profitable 
to  children.  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  we  have 
a  class  of  moderately  intelligent  children  to  start  in 
botany :  how  shall  we  begin  the  subject  in  order 
that  it  may  be  made  at  once  interesting  and  intel- 
lectually profitable  ?  Text-books  will  not  help  us 
much.  For  instance,  Dr.  Gray's  excellent  little 
book,  "  How  Plants  Grow,"  begins  as  follows  :  — 

Plants  are  chiefly  made  up  of  three  parts,  namely, 
of  root,  stem,  and  leaves.  These  are  called  the  plant's 
organs ;  that  is,  its  instruments.  And  as  these  parts 
are  all  that  any  plant  needs  for  its  growth,  or  vegeta- 
tion, they  are  called  the  ORGANS  OF  VEGETATION. 


272  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Plants  also  produce  flowers,  from  which  comes  the 
fruit,  and  from  this  the  seed.  These  take  no  part  in 
nourishing  the  plant.  Their  use  is  to  enable  it  to  give 
rise  to  new  individuals,  which  increase  the  numbers  of 
that  kind  of  plant ;  to  take  the  place  of  the  parent  in  due 
time,  and  keep  up  the  stock,  —  that  is,  to  reproduce  and 
perpetuate  the  species.  So  the  flower,  with  its  parts, 
the  fruit  and  the  seed,  are  called  the  plant's  ORGANS  OP 

EEPKODUCTION. 

Now  this  is  very  pleasant  reading  for  grown 
people,  who  know  something  about  the  subject, 
are  slightly  familiar  with  the  conceptions  of  nu- 
trition, heredity,  and  genesis,  and  have  learned, 
however  rudely,  to  classify  their  notions.  But 
for  boys  and  girls  who  begin  botany  at  the  age 
when  it  ought  to  be  begun,  this  would  be  neither 
pleasant  nor  profitable.  If  set  to  learn  the  above 
passage  by  rote,  in  the  ordinary  way,  they  would 
be  likely  to  find  it  irksome,  and  would  certainly 
fail  to  gain  accurate  ideas  corresponding  to  all  the 
expressions  employed  in  it.  And,  above  all,  those 
who  learned  their  lesson  would  have  taken  the 
first  step  towards  acquiring  the  pernicious  habit 
of  accepting  statements  upon  authority.  If  ques- 
tioned concerning  their  grounds  for  believing  that 
the  organs  of  vegetation  in  a  plant  are  its  root, 
stem,  and  leaves,  they  would  perforce  reply  that 


Liberal  Education.  273 

they  believed  it  because  it  was  so  written  in  the 
book.  Here  is  the  fatal  vice  of  our  common 
methods  of  education.  They  appeal  to  faith,  and 
not  to  reason.  It  is  supposed  that  children  are 
properly  instructed  if  they  are  told  that  certain 
things  are  so  and  so,  and  understand  what  is  told 
them  sufficiently  to  repeat  the  words  of  it. '  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  erroneous.  No  mental  discipline, 
worthy  of  the  name,  can  be  secured  in  this  way. 
We  are  benefited,  not  by  the  truths  which  we 
passively  accept,  but  by  those  which  we  actively 
find  out.  It  makes  little  difference  whether  a 
child  is  told  that  "  a  plant  consists  of  root,  stem, 
and  lea,ves,"  or  that  "  a  verb  must  agree  with  its 
nominative  case  in  number  and  person."  The 
former  proposition  is  the  more  intelligible ;  but  in 
either  case  the  child  is  taught  to  accept  on  author- 
ity a  generalization  which  he  should  be  taught  to 
make  for  himself  from  a  due  comparison  of  in- 
stances. With  the  traditional  let  us  now  contrast 
the  rational  method  of  studying  botany.  We 
cannot  possibly  do  this  better  than  in  Mr.  Wil- 
son's own  words :  — 

Suppose,  then,  your  class   of   thirty   or   forty  boys 
before  you,  as  they  sit  at  their  first  botanical  lesson  : 
some  curious  to  know  what  is  going  to  happen,  some  re- 
signed to  anything,  some  convinced  that  it  is  all  a  folly. 
18 


274  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

You  hand  round  to  each  boy  several  specimens,  say  of 
the  herb  Robert;  and  taking  one  of  the  flowers,  you 
ask  one  of  them  to  describe  the  parts  of  it.  '  Some 
pink  leaves,'  is  the  reply.  '  How  many  ? '  '  Five.' 
'  Any  other  parts  ? '  '  Some  little  things  inside.'  '  Any- 
thing outside?'  'Some  green  leaves.'  'How  many?' 
'  Five.'  '  Very  good.  Now  pull  off  the  five  green  leaves 
outside,  and  lay  them  side  by  side  ;  next  pull  off  the  five 
pink  leaves,  and  lay  them  side  by  side ;  and  now  ex- 
amine the  little  things  inside:  what  do  you  find?' 
'A  lot  of  little  stalks  or  things.'  'Pull  them  off,  and 
count  them.'  They  find  ten.  Then  show  them  the 
little  dust-bags  at  the  top,  and  finally  the  curiously  con- 
structed central  column  and  the  carefully  concealed 
seeds.  By  this  time,  all  are  on  the  alert.  Then  we  re- 
sume: The  parts  in  that  flower  are,  outer  green  envel- 
ope, inner  coloured  envelope,  the  little  stalks  with  dust- 
bags, and  the  central  column  with  the  seeds.  Then  you 
give  them  all  wall-flowers ;  and  they  are  to  write  down 
what  they  find.  By  the  end  of  the  hour  they  have 
learned  one  great  lesson,  —  the  existence  of  the  four 
floral  whorls,  though  they  have  not  yet  heard  the 
name. 

Here,  let  it  be  noted,  the  students  are  making 
their  own  way.  They  are  not  told  that  a  flower 
consists  of  four  whorls,  but  they  find  it  out  for 
themselves,  and  know  it  henceforth  on  the  evi- 
dence of  their  own  senses.  If  they  w6re  to  see  or 


Liberal  Education.  275 

hear  the  fact  disputed,  they  would  be  incredu- 
lous ;  they  would  no  longer  bow  to  authority.  In 
the  next  place,  they  are  gaining  ideas  before  they 
are  dosed  with  words.  They  are  not  wasting 
their  energies  in  conning  half -understood  formu- 
las ab6ut  sepals,  petals,  stamens,  and  pistils ;  but 
they  take  note  of  the  green  leaves,  the  pink  leaves, 
the  stems  with  dust-bags,  and  the  column  with 
seeds  in  it ;  and  by  and  by  they  find  it  conven- 
ient to  describe  these  things  by  one  word  for 
each,  thus  avoiding  circumlocution  and  waste  of 
breath.  In  this  way  the  terms  calyx,  corolla,  etc., 
come  to  have  a  definite  meaning ;  and  are  in  no 
danger  of  being  used  emptily,  without  reference 
to  the  ideas  which  they  ought  to  convey.  The 
besetting  sin  of  human  reasoning  is  the  employ- 
ment of  words  without  regard  to  their  full  con- 
notation and  exact  meaning;  and  for  this  our 
systems  of  early  education  are  in  part  responsible. 
It  should  be  recognized  as  an  inflexible  rule  that 
the  student  is  not  to  be  taught  to  use  a  word  until 
he  feels  the  need  of  it  in  order  to  express  his  ideas 
more  readily. 

Next,  Mr.  Wilson  would  let  his  pupils  guess 
about  the  uses  of  the  parts  of  the  flower,  —  what 
the  green  leaves  are  for,  what  the  central  column 
is  for,  what  the  dust-bags  are  for  ;  and  would  tell 


276  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

them  just  enough  to  help  them  to  hit  upon  the 
answer.  Then  he  would  give  them  an  unsymmet- 
rical  flower,  like  the  pelargonium  or  the  garden 
geranium,  which,  on  picking  to  pieces,  they  would 
discover  to  be  formed  on  the  same  general  plan. 
Then  would  come  the  daisy  and  dandelion,  where 
the  outer  green  envelope  and  the  little  dust-bags 
are  not  so  easy  to  find.  Then  he  would  call  at- 
tention to  the  spiral  arrangement  of  leaves;  the 
overlapping  of  sepals  in  the  rose ;  and  the  alter- 
nance  of  parts ;  and  from  this  to  Goethe's  mag- 
nificent generalizations  there  would  be  but  a  step, 
and  that  a  step  easy  to  be  taken. 

Taught  in  this  way,  whatever  flower  a  boy  sees, 
after  a  few  lessons,  he  looks  at  with  interest,  as  modi- 
fying the  view  of  flowers  he  has  attained  to.  He  is 
tempted  by  his  discoveries :  he  is  on  the  verge  of  the 
unknown,  and  perpetually  transferring  to  the  known. 
All  that  he  sees  finds  a  place  in  his  theories,  and  in  turn 
reacts  upon  them,  for  his  theories  are  growing.  He  is 
fairly  committed  to  the  struggle  in  the  vast  field  of  ob- 
servation, and  he  learns  that  the  test  of  a  theory  is  its 
power  of  including  facts.  He  learns  that  he  must  use 
his  eyes  and  his  reason,  and  that  then  he  is  equipped 
with  all  that  is  necessary  for  discovering  truth.  He 
learns  that  he  is  capable  of  judging  of  other  people's 
views,  and  of  forming  an  opinion  of  his  own.  He  learns 


Liberal  Education.  277 

that  nothing  in  the  plant,  however  minute,  is  unimpor- 
tant ;  that  he  owes  only  temporary  allegiance  to  the  doc- 
trines of  his  master,  and  not  a  perpetual  faith. 

Only  contrast  this  with  the  common  practice  of 
loading  a  boy's  memory  with  cellules  and  paren- 
chyma, protoplasm  and  chlorophyll,  rhizomes  and 
bulbs,  endosmose  and  exosmose,  before  he  has  any 
definite  and  abiding  conception  of  how  a  plant  is 
put  together ! 

Mr.  Wilson's  method  carries  with  it  its  own 
recommendation  ;  and  his  method  of  teaching  bot- 
any is  the  method  upon  which  all  teaching,  if  it  is 
to  discipline  the  intelligence,  should  be  conducted. 
First  the  facts,  then  the  generalization,  lastly  the 
nomenclature.  All  the  knowledge  which  in  the 
conduct  of  life  we  are  able  to  use  to  any  good 
purpose  is  necessarily  acquired  in  this  way.  If 
we  had  no  knowledge  of  human  nature  save  what 
might  be  gained  by  the  memorizing  of  abstract 
ethical  formulas,  we  should  never  acquire  the 
knack  of  dealing  sensibly  with  our  fellow-crea- 
tures. But  we  notice  how  men  act  under  given 
circumstances ;  day  by  day,  and  year  by  year,  we 
gather  and  collate  such  facts  of  observation  into 
general  opinions,  crude  indeed  as  compared  with 
the  exhaustive  generalizations  of  physical  science, 
yet  as  far  as  they  go  embodying  the  results  of 


278  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

genuine  experience.  Thus  our  knowledge  of  men 
gradually  acquires  the  accuracy  and  precision 
needful,  in  order  that  we  may  act  upon  it  se- 
curely. In  gathering  such  knowledge,  —  in  learn- 
ing how  to  live  rightly,  —  our  early  education 
ought  to  help  us.  Reasoning  is  reasoning,  and 
its  canons  are  substantially  the  same,  whether 
flowers,  or  triangles,  or  participles,  or  human  na- 
ture constitute  the  matter  reasoned  about.  By 
reasoning  out  what  we  know,  we  make  knowledge 
lead  to  wisdom  ;  we  become  civilized  as  we  grow 
older.  If  the  vast  body  of  truths  constituting 
modern  science  could  have  been  miraculously  told 
to  our  mediaeval  ancestors,  an  imposing  quantity 
of  pretentious  scholarship  might  have  been  called 
into  existence,  but  the  world  would  not  have 
become  civilized  much  the  sooner.  It  is  the  con- 
scious effort  put  forth  in  making  all  these  dis- 
coveries which  has  worked  the  profound  modifi- 
cation of  mind  and  character  called  civilization. 
Humanity  could  not,  after  toilfully  elaborating 
the  laws  of  gravitation  and  chemical  affinity,  re- 
main as  barbarous  and  untutored  as  before.  This 
was  in  part  what  Lessing  had  in  his  mind,  when 
he  said  that  if  God  were  to  hold  in  his  right  hand 
perfect  truth,  and  in  his  left  hand  the  untiring 
search  for  truth,  he  would  unhesitatingly  choose 


Liberal  Education.  279 

the  latter.  It  is  upon  discovery,  not  upon  rote- 
learning,  that  humanity  has  thrived.  And  if  — 
to  adopt  another  idea  of  that  incomparable  man 
—  civilization  is  but  the  education  of  the  race,  it 
is  after  the  course  of  civilization  that  a  rational 
course  of  education  should  in  miniature  be  pat- 
terned. 

To  Professor  Seeley's  excellent  essay  on  Com- 
petitive Tests  we  can  only  briefly  allude.  The 
state  of  things  at  Cambridge  which  it  describes  is 
exceedingly  instructive.  At  Cambridge,  if  any- 
where in  the  world,  the  system  of  competition  has 
been  put  to  a  crucial  test.  The  examinations  are 
formidable,  alike  from  their  severity  and  from 
their  rigid  accuracy.  Immense  rewards  await  the 
successful  scholar,  and  all  possible  means  for  ob- 
taining a  creditable  position  are  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  ambitious  student.  Yet  the  results 
thus  far  obtained  from  the  competitive  system 
are  by  no  means  brilliant.  It  does  not  apparently 
increase  the  number  of  eminent  scholars,  or  even 
of  thoroughly  educated  men,  produced  by  the 
university.  The  complaint  is  even  made  that 
England  has  ceased  to  produce  great  scholars, 
that  in  point  of  erudition  she  is  falling  behind 
the  Continental  nations ;  and  it  is  frequently  re- 
marked as  a  significant  fact  that  the  most  learned 


280  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

of  Englishmen  in  the  present  age  —  men  like  Mill 
and  Huxley,  Garnett  and  Grote  —  have  not  been 
educated  at  the  universities.  But  this  accusation 
is  exaggerated  and  somewhat  irrelevant ;  for  the 
competitive  system  is  a  very  modern  institution, 
and  the  great  scholars  just  mentioned  are  in  no 
way  the  contemporaries  of  those  brought  up  un- 
der it.  Yet,  if  we  are  to  reason  in  this  way,  it 
must  be  said  that  England  has  no  cause  to  be 
ashamed  of  the  array  of  illustrious  scholars  which 
she  has  to  show  for  the  nineteenth  century.  And 
most  of  them  have  been  university  men  who  have 
graduated  either  with  high  honours,  or  at  least 
with  credit. 

It  is  not  so  much,  however,  by  the  number  of 
great  scholars  which  it  turns  out,  as  by  the  gen- 
eral standard  of  intelligence  among  its  graduates, 
that  the  system  of  a  university  is  to  be  judged. 
A  man  who  lives  to  edit  Lucretius  or  Aristotle, 
as  Mr.  Munro  and  Sir  A.  Grant  have  done,  will 
most  likely  in  his  college  days  study  for  the  sake 
of  study,  and  the  competitive  or  any  other  system 
can  exert  but  a  transient  effect  upon  him.  The 
English  universities  afford  great  facilities  to  a 
young  man  who  desires  to  study  in  earnest,  and 
is  already  a  scholar  in  embryo.  But  the  question 
which  here  especially  concerns  us  is,  What  is  the 


Liberal  Education.  281 

worth  of  the  competitive  system  now  in  use  as  a 
wholesome  incentive  to  the  average  young  man 
who  does  not  passionately  love  knowledge  for  its 
own  sake  ?  Does  it  tend  to  widen  and  render 
more  thorough  the  education  which  he  will  get  at 
the  university  ?  Experience  is  beginning  to  tell 
us  plainly  that  the  reverse  is  the  case.  The  edu- 
cation of  young  men  in  the  English  universities 
is  narrowed  and  rendered  more  superficial  by  the 
competitive  system.  Whatever  results  may  be 
brought  forth  by  comparing  the  lists  of  great 
scholars  which  England  and  the  Continental  na- 
tions can  respectively  furnish,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  average  college  graduate  in  France 
or  Germany  attains  to  a  far  higher  degree  of 
knowledge  and  culture  than  the  average  graduate 
of  Oxford  or  Cambridge.  He  does  not  ordinarily 
manifest  that  preternatural  ignorance  of  every- 
thing except  the  classics  which  characterizes  the 
English  student.  And  his  study  of  the  classics 
has  usually  enriched  him  with  a  more  or  less  val- 
uable stock  of  literary,  critical,  and  philosophical 
ideas,  which  the  Englishman,  absorbed  in  verse- 
writing  and  prize-getting,  has  never  caught  sight 
of.  He  knows  a  greater  number  of  authors,  and 
he  knows  them  to  more  profit.  Now  for  this  su- 
perficiality and  narrowness  of  English  education 


282  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

the  competitive  system  is  directly  responsible,  It 
transforms  the  means  into  the  end.  It  makes  the 
student  think  more  of  winning  the  prize  than  of 
mastering  the  subject  in  hand  according  to  his 
own  intellectual  needs.  And  that  there  is  all  the 
difference  in  the  world  between  mastering  a  sub- 
ject and  making  a  brilliant  show  with  it  at  an 
examination  every  scholar  well  knows.  Professor 
Seeley  has  graphically  described  the  results  of 
the  system  at  Cambridge.  The  object  of  the  tri- 
pos examinations  being  to  distinguish  accurately 
the  merit  of  the  students,  it  follows  that  those  sub- 
jects in  which  attainments  can  be  tested  with  pre- 
cision take  precedence  of  subjects  in  which  they 
cannot.  These  latter  subjects,  "  however  impor- 
tant they  may  be,  gradually  cease  to  be  valued,  or 
taught,  or  learned,  while  the  former  come  into  re- 
pute, and  acquire  an  artificial  value.  This  cannot 
take  place  without  an  extraordinary  perversion  of 
views  both  in  the  taught  and  the  teachers.  They 
learn  to  weigh  the  sciences  in  a  perfectly  new 
scale,  and  one  which  gives  perfectly  new  results. 
They  reject  as  worthless  for  educational  purposes 
the  greatest  questions  which  can  occupy  the  hu- 
man mind,  and  attach  unbounded  importance  to 
some  of  the  least."  Philosophy,  for  instance,  is 
rejected,  while  the  useless  details  of  grammar  and 


Liberal  Education.  283 

prosody  are  made  much  of.  On  the  one  hand, 
young  men  may  graduate  with  signal  honour,  and 
yet  never  know  what  great  principles  were  at 
stake  in  the  Peloponnesian  War ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  these  same  young  men  are  taught  to 
be  "ashamed  of  falling  short  of  perfect  knowl- 
edge in  the  genders  of  Latin  nouns,  which  involve 
no  principles  at  all,  and  in  which  a  minute  ac- 
curacy can  hardly  be  attained  without  a  certain 
frivolity  or  eccentricity  of  memory  !  " 

Still  worse,  the  competitive  system  vulgarizes 
the  mind  of  the  student.  Scholarly  enthusiasm, 
an  exalted  opinion  of  the  value  of  knowledge, 
faith  in  culture  as  such,  —  "  divine  curiosity,"  in  a 
word,  —  should  be  the  student's  incentives  to  la- 
bour. These  are  the  only  motives  which  can  ever 
lead  to  any  culture  worthy  of  the  name.  The 
competitive  system  tends  to  destroy  these  mo- 
tives, replacing  them  by  the  vulgar  desire  to  out- 
shine one's  companions. 

Instead  of  enlarging  the  range  of  the  student's  an- 
ticipations, it  narrows  them.  It  makes  him  careless  of 
his  future  life,  regardless  of  his  higher  interests,  and 
concentrates  all  his  thoughts  upon  the  paltry  examina- 
tion upon  which  perhaps  a  fellowship  depends,  or  suc- 
cess in  some  profession  is  supposed  to  depend.  It  is 
well  known  that  any  one  who  asks  himself  the  question, 


284  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

'Is  this  course  of  study  good  for  me  ?  does  it  favour  my 
real  progress,  my  ultimate  success?'  is  not  fit  for  the 
tripos.  Thinking  of  any  kind  is  regarded  as  dangerous. 
It  is  the  well-known  saying  of  a  Cambridge  private  tu- 
tor: 'If  So-and-so  did  not  think  so  much,  he  might  do 
very  well.'  I  may  content  myself  with  remarking  that 
the  particular  student  who  did  think  too  much,  and  who, 
perhaps  as  a  consequence,  was  beaten  in  the  tripos,  now 
stands  in  scientific  reputation  above  all  his  contempo- 
raries. 

An  adequate  examination  of  Professor  Seeley's 
arguments,  and  especially  of  the  practical  expedi- 
ents by  which  he  would  do  away  with  the  evils 
just  mentioned,  would  carry  us  far  beyond  our 
limits.  The  volume  before  us  is  not  one  which 
can  easily  be  epitomized  and  furnished  with  a 
running  commentary.  So  many  suggestions  are 
made  and  questions  opened  in  it  that  any  at- 
tempt to  treat  it  thus  thoroughly  would  end  in 
the  production  of  a  companion  volume  rather  than 
a  brief  article.  But  from  what  has  been  said  it 
will  be  seen  that  our  essayists  do  not  belong  to 
the  number  of  those  who  disparage  classical  stud- 
ies as  unfit  for  the  needs  of  our  time.  The  Phi- 
listinism which  regards  everything  as  useless  that 
is  not  utilitarian  need  seek  for  no  encouragement 
in  this  book.  The  claims  of  physical  science  are 


Liberal  Education.  285 

urged  from  considerations  of  general  culture,  and 
not  of  narrow  utility.  And  for  this  we  heartily 
commend  the  writers.  There  is  no  reason  what- 
ever why  Philistinism  should  be  allowed  the  ex- 
clusive protectorship  of  physical  science.  To  as- 
sail or  defend  the  study  of  it,  while  taking  into 
account  only  its  utilitarian  aspects,  is  wholly  to 
ignore  the  true  state  of  the  question.  It  is  to 
commit  a  mistake  like  that  committed  by  Ma- 
caulay  in  his  eloquent  but  superficial  essay  on 
Bacon.  The  study  of  science,  properly  conducted, 
is  by  no  means  subservient  to  objects  of  narrow 
utility.  The  utilitarian  point  of  view,  in  the  lim- 
ited sense  of  the  word,  is  not  at  all  apparent  in 
Laplace's  explanation  of  the  perturbed  motions  of 
the  planets,  in  Gerhardt's  theory  of  atomicity,  in 
Cuvier's  classification  of  animals,  or  in  Darwin's 
investigations  into  the  principles  of  variation. 
Indeed,  that  profound  but  somewhat  chimerical 
writer,  Auguste  Cointe,  expressly  finds  fault  with 
contemporary  followers  of  science  because  they 
do  not  sufficiently  confine  themselves  to  investi- 
gations which  have  a  perceptible  bearing  upon 
the  interests  of  society.  In  his  pontifical  fashion, 
he  authoritatively  warns  us  against  pursuing  such 
useless  inquiries  as  those  which  concern  stellar 
astronomy,  the  cellular  structure  of  organic  be- 


286  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

ings,  the  origin  of  species,  etc.  But  we  have  no 
fear  that  the  investigating  world  will  take  heed 
of  his  misapplied  caution.  That  inborn  curiosity 
which,  according  to  the  Semitic  myth,  has  al- 
ready made  us  "  like  gods,  knowing  good  and 
evil,"  will  continue  to  inspire  us  until  the  last 
secret  of  nature  is  laid  bare  ;  and  doubtless  in  the 
untiring  search  we  shall  uncover  many  priceless 
jewels  in  places  where  we  least  expect  to  find 
them.  The  legitimate  claim  which  science  makes 
is  that,  while  drawing  the  mind  toward  investi- 
gation and  activity  for  its  own  sake,  it  confers 
upon  humanity  unlooked-for  rewards. 

But  in  order  that  either  a  literary  or  a  scien- 
tific education  shall  produce  worthy  results,  it 
must  be  rationally  conducted,  with  a  single  eye  to 
the  greatest  possible  perfection  of  culture.  Noth- 
ing will  be  gained  by  giving  up  Greek  composi- 
tion, and  studying  botany  or  chemistry  as  a  mere 
collection  of  "  useful "  details.  The  adversaries 
of  a  classical  and  literary  culture  will  do  well  to 
bear  this  in  mind.  It  is  not  by  throwing  over- 
board a  valuable  portion  of  the  cargo,  but  by 
adopting  improved  methods  of  navigating  the 
ship,  that  we  shall  make  a  successful  voyage. 

June,  1868. 


XIV. 

TJNIVEKSITY  EBFOEM. 

IT  seems  to  be  quite  generally  felt  that  the 
present  time  is  a  favourable  one  for  entertaining 
and  discussing  various  projects  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  University  at  Cambridge.  To  the 
question  of  reform,  in  its  general  outlines,  the  at- 
tention of  our  readers  has  already  been  directed 
by  able  hands.1  It  is  here  proposed  to  pursue 
the  subject  more  into  detail,  and  to  deduce  from 
a  few  general  principles  the  rudiments  of  a  sys- 
tematic scheme  of  reform. 

Note,  first,  that  the  idea  of  reform  is  to  be  kept 
distinctly  separate  from  that  of  revolution,  and 
that,  while  advocating  the  former,  all  encourage- 
ment to  the  latter  will  here  be  strictly  withheld. 
The  improvements  from  time  to  time  aimed  at 
should  as  far  as  possible  be  brought  about  with- 
out effacing  the  distinctive  characteristics  of  the 

*  See  F.  H.  Hedge's  article  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  September, 
1866.  The  important  change  in  the  constitution  of  the  university,  by 
which  the  Board  of  Overseers  became  an  elected  body,  had  just  been 


288  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

original  system.  We  are  unable  to  sympathize 
with  the  radical  spirit  which  would  make  a  bon- 
fire of  all  churches  because  the  Pentateuch  does 
not  teach  geology,  or  which  would  upset  an  in- 
digenous and  time-honoured  government  because 
certain  social  evils  co-exist  with  it.  And  we  can- 
not but  think  that  an  attempt  to  revolutionize  our 
university,  by  assimilating  it  to  sister  institutions 
in  England  or  Germany,  would  be  productive  of 
at  least  as  much  harm  as  good.  If,  for  instance, 
in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a  perfect  university,  we 
were  to  abolish  our  dormitories,  obliterate  the  dis- 
tinction between  classes,  abandon  the  entire  sys- 
tem of  marking,  and  transfer  the  task  of  main- 
taining order  from  the  Parietal  Committee  to  the 
civil  police,  we  should  no  doubt  be  as  much  dis- 
appointed as  the  men  of  1789,  who  attempted  to 
make  English  institutions  grow  on  French  soil, 
and  got  a  Bonaparte  dynasty  for  their  pains. 
There  is  a  place  as  well  as  a  time  for  all  things, 
and  a  great  deal  will  always  have  to  be  conceded 
to  the  habit  which  men  have  of  getting  used  to 
old  institutions  and  customs,  and  of  disliking  to 
see  them  too  roughly  dealt  with.  A  German  uni- 
versity is  little  else  than  an  organized  aggregate 
of  lecture -rooms,  libraries,  laboratories,  and  other 
facilities  for  those  who  desire  to  study,  —  resem- 


University  Reform.  289 

bling  in  this  respect  our  scientific  and  professional 
schools.  Our  New  England  colleges,  founded  in 
a  Puritan  environment,  less  imbued  with  the 
modern  spirit,  and  in  many  cases  even  dating 
from  an  earlier  period,  have  always  combined 
with  their  instruction  more  or  less  of  coercion  ; 
and  have  laid  claim  to  a  supervision  over  the  de- 
meanour of  their  students,  in  the  exercise  of  which 
the  liberty  of  the  latter  is  often  egregiously  inter- 
fered with.  The  freedom  of  the  undergraduate 
at  Harvard  is  hampered  by  restrictions,  many  of 
which,  if  once  justifiable,  have  in  the  lapse  of 
time  grown  to  be  quite  absurd,  and  should  cer- 
tainly be  removed  with  all  possible  promptness : 
of  these  we  shall  speak  presently.  But  to  re- 
move all  restrictions  whatever  with  one  and  the 
same  sweep  of  our  reformatory  besom  would  ex- 
cite serious  and  extensive  popular  distrust.  The 
New  England  mind,  which  tolerates  Maine  liquor- 
laws  and  Sabbatarian  ordinances  and  protective 
tariffs,  would  not  regard  with  favour  such  a  revo- 
lutionary measure.  So  much  liberty  would  bear 
an  uncanny  resemblance  to  license,  —  a  resem- 
blance which,  we  freely  admit,  might  not  at  first 
be  wholly  imaginary.  The  college  would  lose 
much  of  its  popularity  ;  young  men  would  be 
sent  elsewhere  to  pursue  their  studies  ;  ar>d  thus 

19 


290  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

great  injury  would  be  manifestly  wrought  to  the 
cause  of  university  reform,  which  must  needs  be 
supported  to  a  considerable  extent  by  popular 
sentiment  in  order  duly  to  prosper.  A  large 
amount  of  discretion  must  therefore  be  used,  even 
in  the  removal  of  those  features  wherein  our  col- 
leges compare  unfavourably  with  those  of  other 
countries.  But  there  are  some  respects  in  which 
the  American  university  may  claim  a  superiority 
quite  unique,  —  some  cases  in  which  a  radical 
change  must  ever  be  earnestly  deprecated.  That 
arrangement  by  virtue  of  which  each  student  is 
a  member,  not  only  of  the  university,  but  of  a 
particular  class,  is  fraught  with  such  manifold 
benefits  that  any  advantages  to  be  derived  from 
giving  it  up  must  disappear  when  brought  into 
comparison.  No  graduate  needs  to  be  told  what 
a  gap  would  be  made  in  his  social  and  moral  cul- 
ture, if  all  the  thoughts  and  emotions  resulting 
from  his  relations  to  his  classmates  were  to  be 
stricken  from  it.  For  the  genial  nurture  of  the 
sympathetic  feelings,  the  class  system  affords  a 
host  of  favourable  conditions  which  can  ill  be 
dispensed  with.  By  means  of  it,  the  facilities  of 
the  university  for  becoming  a  centre  of  social  no 
less  than  of  intellectual  development  are  greatly 
enhanced.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  to  be 


University  Reform.  291 

denied  that,  in  requiring  students  of  all  degrees  of 
mental  ability  and  working  power  to  complete  the 
same  course  of  study  in  the  same  length  of  time, 
there  is  much  irrationality  as  well  as  some  in- 
justice. This  evil,  which  is  so  seriously  felt  in 
American  colleges,  does  not  afflict  the  universities 
of  England  and  Germany,  where  the  class  system 
is  not  in  use.  To  obviate  it,  however,  it  is  for- 
tunately not  necessary  to  resign  the  advantages 
which  that  system  alone  is  competent  to  secure. 
Partly  by  allowing  greater  option  in  the  selection 
of  studies,  partly  by  extending  the  privilege,  at 
present  occasionally  granted  to  students,  of  taking 
their  degrees  one  or  two  years  after  the  termina- 
tion of  the  regular  course,  sufficient  recognition 
can  be  given  to  differences  of  mental  capacity, 
without  essentially  infringing  upon  the  individu- 
ality of  the  successive  classes.  Here,  then,  is  a 
clear  case  in  which  a  judicious  reform  might  at- 
tain all  the  ends  sought  by  a  sweeping  revolution, 
without  incurring  the  grievous  detriment  which 
the  latter  would  inevitably  entail.  We  believe 
that  the  same  principle  will  apply  in  nearly  every 
case;  that  it  is  possible  to  secure  all  the  most 
valuable  benefits  conferred  by  European  systems, 
without  sacrificing  the  fundamental  elements  of 
our  own  ;  and  that,  by  uniformly  shaping  our 


292  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

ameliorative  projects  with  conscious  reference  to 
such  an  end,  the  efficiency  of  our  university  will 
be  most  successfully  maintained,  and  its  prosper- 
ity  most  thoroughly  insured. 

Next,  in  order  to  impart  to  our  notions  of  re- 
form the  requisite  symmetry  and  coherence,  the 
legitimate  objects  of  university  education  must  be 
clearly  conceived  and  steadfastly  borne  in  mind. 
The  whole  duty  of  a  university  toward  those  who 
are  sheltered  within  its  walls  may  be  concisely 
summed  up  in  two  propositions.  It  consists,  first, 
in  stimulating  the  mental  faculties  of  each  stu- 
dent to  varied  and  harmonious  activity,  —  in  sup- 
plying every  available  instrument  for  sharpening 
the  perceptive  powers,  strengthening  the  judg- 
ment, and  adding  precision  and  accuracy  to  the 
imagination  ;  secondly,  in  providing  for  all  those 
students  who  desire  it  the  means  of  acquiring  a 
thorough  elementary  knowledge  of  any  given 
branch  of  science,  art,  or  literature.  In  a  word, 
to  teach  the  student  how  to  think  for  himself, 
and  then  to  give  him  the  material  to  exercise  his 
thought  upon,  —  this  is  the  whole  duty  of  a  uni- 
versity. Into  that  duty  the  inculcation  of  doc- 
trines as  such  does  not  enter.  The  professor  is 
not  fulfilling  his  proper  function  when  he  incon- 
tinently engages  in  a  polemic  in  behalf  of  this  or 


University  Reform.  293 

that  favourite  dogma.  His  business  is  to  see  that 
the  pupil  is  thoroughly  prepared  and  equipped 
with  the  implements  of  intellectual  research,  that 
he  knows  how  to  deduce  a  conclusion  from  its 
premise,  that  he  properly  estimates  the  value  of 
evidence  and  understands  the  nature  of  proof  ; 
he  may  then  safely  leave  him  to  build  up  his 
own  theory  of  things.  His  first  crude  conclu- 
sions may  indeed  be  sadly  erroneous,  but  they 
will  be  worth  infinitely  more  than  the  most  sal- 
utary truths  acquired  gratis,  or  lazily  accepted 
upon  the  recommendation  of  another.  It  is  de- 
sirable that  our  opinions  should  be  correct,  but 
it  is  far  more  desirable  that  they  should  be  ar- 
rived at  independently  and  maintained  with  intel- 
ligence and  candour.  Sceptical  activity  is  better 
than  dogmatic  torpor ;  and  our  motto  should  be, 
Think  the  truth  as  far  as  possible,  but,  above  all 
things,  think.  When  a  university  throws  its  in- 
fluence into  the  scale  in  favour  of  any  party,  re- 
ligious or  political,  philosophic  or  aesthetic,  it  is 
neglecting  its  consecrated  duty,  and  abdicating 
its  high  position.  It  has  postponed  the  interests 
of  truth  to  those  of  dogma.  These  are  matters 
which  our  own  university  should  seriously  pon- 
der. It  does  not  always  strive  so  earnestly  to 
make  its  students  independent  thinkers  as  to 


294  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

imbue  them  with  opinions  currently  deemed 
wholesome.  But  science  will  never  prosper  in 
this  way.  Political  economy  will  gain  nothing 
by  one-sided  arguments  against  Malthus  and  Ri- 
cardo ;  sound  biological  views  will  never  be  fur- 
thered by  undiscriminating  abuse  of  Darwinism ; 
nor  will  the  interests  of  religion  be  ever  rightly 
subserved  by  threatening  heretics  with  expulsion. 

An  endless  amount  of  discussion  has  been 
wasted  over  the  question  whether  a  mathemati- 
cal or  a  classical  training  is  the  more  profitable 
for  the  majority  of  students.  The  comparative 
advantages  of  spending  all  one's  time  upon  one 
favourite  pursuit,  and  of  devoting  more  or  less  at- 
tention to  various  branches  of  study,  have  also 
supplied  the  text  for  much  vague  and  unsatisfac- 
tory discourse.  By  the  view  of  university  edu- 
cation here  adopted,  these  questions  are  placed 
in  a  somewhat  favourable  position  for  getting 
disposed  of.  The  office  of  the  university  is  not 
to  enforce  doctrine,  but  to  point  out  method.  It 
is  not  so  much  to  cram  the  mind  of  the  student 
with  divers  facts,  which  in  after  life  it  may  be 
useful  for  him  to  have  learned,  as  to  teach  him 
the  proper  mode  of  searching  for  facts,  and  of 
dealing  with  them  when  he  has  found  them.  Aa 


University  Reform.  295 

Jacobs  says,  "  It  is  of  less  importance  in  youth 
what  a  man  learns  than  how  he  learns  it." 1  A 
fact  considered  in  itself  is  usually  a  very  stupid 
and  quite  useless  object.  Viewed  in  relation  to 
other  facts,  as  the  illustration  of  a  general  prin- 
ciple, or  as  an  item  of  evidence  for  or  against  a 
theory,  it  suddenly  becomes  both  interesting  and 
valuable.  If  the  truth  is  to  be  told,  by  far  the 
greater  number  of  facts  which  are  to  be  encoun- 
tered in  the  various  departments  of  nature  are  to 
most  persons  utterly  insignificant  and  unattrac- 
tive ;  chiefly,  because  they  have  never  been  fur- 
nished with  the  means  of  estimating  their  illus- 
trative and  evidentiary  value.  Universal  logic, 
therefore,  —  the  relations  of  phenomena  to  each 
other,  and  the  methods  of  investigation  and  modes 
of  proof  applicable  to  widely  different  subjects, 
—  should  occupy  an  important  place  in  college 
teaching.  And  that  this  end  can  be  secured  by 
studying  any  one  kind  of  science  alone  is  of  course 
impossible. 

The  advocate  of  the  utility  of  mathematical 
studies,  when  confronted  with  the  insurmountable 
fact  that  very  little  use  is  made  of  algebra  and 
geometry  in  ordinary  life,  is  wont  to  shelter  him- 
self behind  the  assertion  that  nevertheless  these 

i  Vermischte  Schrtften,  III.,  §  27,  p.  254. 


296  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

studies  "discipline  the  mind."  Though  exqui- 
sitely vague,  as  thus  expressed,  this  favourite 
apology  is  doubtless  essentially  valid.  The  al- 
most universal  distaste  for  mathematics,1  co-exist- 
ing as  it  does  in  many  persons  with  excellent 
reasoning  powers,  proves  that  the  faculty  of 
imagining  abstract  relations  is  ordinarily  quite 
feebly  developed.  Not  reason,  but  imagination, 
is  at  fault.  The  passage  from  premise  to  con- 
clusion could  easily  be  made,  if  the  abstract  rela- 
tions of  position  or  quantity  which  are  involved 
could  be  accurately  conceived  and  firmly  held  in 
the  mind.  Now  the  ability  to  imagine  relations 
is  one  of  the  most  indispensable  conditions  of  all 
precise  thinking.  No  subject  can  be  named,  in 
the  investigation  of  which  it  is  not  imperatively 
needed  ;  but  it  can  nowhere  else  be  so  thoroughly 
acquired  as  in  the  study  of  mathematics.  This 
fact  alone  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  university  in 
requiring  its  students  to  devote  some  attention  to 
such  a  study.  But  the  excellence  of  mathematics 
as  an  instrument  of  mental  discipline  by  no  means 

i  Which  probably  attained  its  sublimest  expression  some  years  ago 
in  the  case  of  a  Sophomore  who,  coming  from  Harvard  Hall,  where 
his  "annual"  had  goaded  him  to  desperation,  was  heard  to  declare, 
in  language  equally  with  Caligula's  deserving  immortality,  his  wish 
that  the  whole  of  mathematical  science  might  be  condensed  into  a  sin- 
gle lesson,  that  he  might  "  dead  "  on  it  all  at  once ! 


University  Reform.  297 

ends  here.  It  is  indeed  a  fallacy  to  suppose  that 
greater  certainty  is  attainable  in  geometry  than 
elsewhere.  Not  greater  certainty,  but  greater 
precision,  is  that  which  distinguishes  the  results 
obtained  by  mathematical  deduction.  Dealing 
constantly  with  definite  or  determinable  magni- 
tudes, its  processes  are  characterized  by  quantita- 
tive exactness.  It  is  not  obliged  to  pare  off  and 
limit  its  conclusions,  to  make  them  tally  with 
concrete  facts  ;  but  can  treat  of  length  as  if  there 
were  no  such  thing  as  breadth,  and  of  plane  sur- 
faces just  as  if  solidity  were  unknown.  It  is  thus 
the  most  perfect  type  of  deductive  reasoning; 
and  if  logical  training  is  to  consist,  not  in  re- 
peating barbarous  scholastic  formulas  or  mechan- 
ically tacking  together  empty  majors  and  minors, 
but  in  acquiring  dexterity  in  the  use  of  trust- 
worthy methods  of  advancing  from  the  known  to 
the  unknown,  then  mathematical  investigation 
must  ever  remain  one  of  its  most  indispensable 
implements.  Once  inured  to  the  habit  of  accu- 
rately imagining  abstract  relations,  recognizing 
the  true  value  of  symbolic  conceptions,  and  fa- 
miliarized with  a  fixed  standard  of  proof,  the 
mind  is  equipped  for  the  consideration  of  quite 
other  objects  than  lines  and  angles.  The  twin 
treatises  of  Adam  Smith  on  social  science,  where- 


298  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

in,  by  deducing  all  human  phenomena  first  from 
the  unchecked  action  of  selfishness  and  then  from 
the  unchecked  action  of  sympathy,  he  arrives  at 
mutually  -  limiting  conclusions  of  transcendent 
practical  importance,  furnish  for  all  time  a  bril- 
liant illustration  of  the  value  of  mathematical 
methods  and  mathematical  discipline. 

If  magnitudes  and  quantities  thus  contemplated 
in  the  abstract  yield  such  wholesome  pabulum  for 
the  intellect,  no  less  beneficial  in  many  respects 
is  the  study  of  the  direct  applications  of  mathe- 
matics to  the  concrete  phenomena  of  mechanics, 
astronomy,  and  physics.  Not  only  do  the  numer- 
ous devices  by  which  algebraic  expressions  are 
utilized  in  the  solution  of  physical  problems  af- 
ford extensive  scope  for  inventive  ingenuity,  but 
some  familiarity  with  quantitative  conceptions  of 
the  action  and  interaction  of  forces  is  eminently 
conducive  to  the  entertainment  of  sound  philo- 
sophic views.  The  reorganization  of  mechanics 
by  Lagrange,  and  the  beautiful  construction  by 
Fourier  of  a  mathematical  doctrine  of  heat,  were 
innovations  in  philosophy  as  well  as  in  science ; 
and  although  the  student  can  hardly  be  expected 
to  gain  even  a  rudimentary  knowledge  of  these 
recondite  subjects,  he  may  at  least  with  profit  to 
himself  be  enabled  to  form  some  general  notion 


University  Reform.  299 

of  the  symbolic  conceptions  of  force  which  they 
systematically  embody.  Of  especial  importance 
is  the  study  of  astronomy,  both  philosophically, 
as  imparting  a  knowledge  of  the  cosmic  relations 
of  our  planet,  and  logically,  as  exhibiting  in  its 
highest  perfection  the  deductive  investigation  of 
concrete  phenomena.  The  right  use  of  that  in- 
dispensable but  dangerous  weapon  of  thought, 
hypothesis,  can  nowhere  be  so  conveniently  or 
so  satisfactorily  learned  as  in  astronomy,  where 
hypotheses  have  been  more  skilfully  framed  and 
successfully  applied  than  in  any  other  province 
of  scientific  research. 

But  it  is  not  by  the  study  of  mathematics  and 
its  applications  alone  that  a  comprehensive  logical 
training  can  be  acquired.  There  are  other  kinds 
of  proof  than  mathematical  proof ;  and  the  deduc- 
tive method  is  not  the  only  method  of  reason- 
ing. In  estimating  the  comparative  advantages  of 
mathematical  and  of  classical  discipline,  too  slight 
and  too  feeble  recognition  has  been  extended  to 
the  great  body  of  inductive  science,  which  has 
grown  up  and  attained  to  philosophic  significance 
only  in  quite  modern  times.  Chemistry  and  con- 
crete physics  have  their  means  of  arriving  at 
truth,  very  different  from  those  employed  in 
mathematics,  but  quite  as  essential  to  sound 


300  Darwinism  and   Other  JVssays. 

scientific  thinking.  To  acquire  expertness  and 
elegance  in  the  use  of  deductive  methods,  while 
remaining  contentedly  ignorant  of  the  fundamen- 
tal canons  of  induction,  is  to  secure  but  a  lame 
and  one-sided  mental  development.  It  is  often 
remarked  that  many  men,  whose  opinions  upon 
any  subject  with  which  they  are  familiar  are  sober 
enough,  do  not  scruple  to  utter  the  most  childish 
nonsense  upon  topics  with  which  they  are  only 
partially  acquainted.  The  reason  is  that  they 
have  learned  to  think  correctly  after  some  par- 
ticular fashion,  but  know  nothing  of  the  general 
principles  on  which  thinking  should  be  conducted. 
They  are  what  is  fitly  called  narrow-minded  ; 
and  since  each  branch  of  knowledge  is  more  or 
less  closely  interlaced  with  every  other  branch,  a 
searching  scrutiny  will  usually  show  that  even  in 
their  control  of  their  own  specialty  there  is  ample 
room  for  improvement.  Each  science  has  its  log- 
ical methods  and  its  peculiar  species  of  evidence ; 
and  to  insure  an  harmonious  development  of  the 
mental  powers,  there  is  no  practicable  way  except 
to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  all. 

To  acquire  such  a  command  of  scientific  meth- 
ods, it  is  not  necessary,  even  were  it  possible,  to 
devote  much  study  to  the  details  of  each  separate 
science.  To  master  the  details  of  any  single  sci- 


University  Reform.  301 

ence  is  a  task  for  the  accomplishment  of  which 
a  lifetime  is  much  too  short.  Recollecting,  how- 
ever, that  not  doctrine,  but  method,  is  for  the 
student  the  thing  above  all  others  needful,  it 
will  be  seen  that  our  scheme  does  not  make  too 
great  demands  even  upon  the  limited  time  em- 
braced in  a  university  course.  The  principles  of 
investigation  involved  in  every  one  of  the  induc- 
tive sciences  might  easily  be  learned  in  the  time 
now  devoted  to  the  acquisition  of  facts  in  chem- 
istry alone.  The  college  now  attempts  to  teach 
chemistry  as  if  each  student  might  possibly  come 
to  be  a  physician,  metallurgist,  or  pharmaceutist 
in  after  life.  And  the  amount  of  time  spent  upon 
it  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  that  allotted  to  the 
other  natural  sciences,  some  of  which,  as  anatomy 
and  geology,  are  not  even  included  in  the  regular 
course  of  electives.  But  total  ignorance  of  or- 
gans and  tissues  is  too  great  a  price  to  pay  for 
even  an  extensive  acquaintance  with  acids  and 
salts.  The  study  of  chemical  details  should  be 
reserved  for  the  elective  course,  of  which  we  shall 
presently  treat.  The  fundamental  principles  of 
chemistry,  its  relation  to  kindred  sciences,  the 
scope  which  it  affords  for  observation  and  exper- 
iment, the  philosophical  value  of  its  unrivalled 
nomenclature,  —  these  are  matters  of  universal 


302  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

importance,  and  their  study  forms  an  inseparable 
part  of  a  catholic  education.  As  thus  conducted, 
the  study  of  chemistry  need  not  consume  more 
than  one  third  of  the  time  at  present  assigned  it, 
and  other  sciences,  now  sadly  neglected,  might 
assert  their  just  claims  to  attention. 

Chemistry  and  molecular  physics  constitute  the 
proper  field  for  the  employment  of  the  purely 
inductive  method.  As  we  arrive  at  the  organic 
sciences,  deduction  again  assumes  a  prominent 
position.  Of  our  three  principal  instruments  for 
interrogating  Nature,  —  observation,  experiment, 
and  comparison,  —  the  second  plays  in  biology  a 
quite  subordinate  part.  But  while,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  extreme  complication  of  causes  involved 
in  vital  processes  renders  the  application  of  ex- 
periment altogether  precarious  in  its  results,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  endless  variety  of  organic 
phenomena  offers  peculiar  facilities  for  the  suc- 
cessful employment  of  comparison  and  analogy. 
Zoology  and  botany  are  pre-eminently  the  sciences 
of  classification ;  and  if  skill  in  the  use  of  this 
powerful  auxiliary  of  thought  is  ever  to  be  ac- 
quired, it  must  be  sought  in  the  comparative 
study  of  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms. 
Theoretical  logic  may  divide  and  sub-divide  as 
much  as  it  likes ;  but  genera  and  species  are  dull 


University  Reform.  303 

and  lifeless  things,  when  contemplated  merely  in 
their  places  upon  a  logical  chart.  To  become  cor- 
rect reasoners,  it  is  not  enough  that  we  should 
know  what  classes  and  sub-classes  are  ;  we  should 
also  know  how  to  cunningly  make  them.  From 
pure  considerations  of  discipline,  therefore,  biol- 
ogy should  form  one  of  the  regular  studies  of 
the  university  course,  and  some  proficiency  in  it 
should  be  expected  of  every  candidate  for  a  bach- 
elor's degree.  Practical  considerations  also  join 
in  urging  that  steps  should  be  taken  to  raise  the 
organic  sciences  from  the  insignificant  position 
now  assigned  them.  If  some  sagacious  traveller 
from  a  distant  world,  like  Voltaire's  Microme'gas, 
were  to  visit  Harvard  College,  he  would  doubtless 
give  vent  to  unpleasant  sarcasms  concerning  the 
profound  anatomical  ignorance  of  its  graduating 
classes.  He  would  pronounce  it  hardly  creditable 
to  the  institution  that  men  who  have  received  its 
honours  should  be  guilty  of  classifying  cuttle-fishes 
with  the  vertebrata  (we  state  facts),  and  should 
betray  even  less  acquaintance  with  the  structure 
of  their  own  bodies  than  with  the  physical  con- 
figuration of  the  moon.  The  scientific  study  of 
life  has  its  practical  as  well  as  its  speculative 
advantages.  For  want  of  sound  views  of  biolog- 
ical method,  intelligent  persons  are  daily  seen 


304  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

yielding  faith  to  unscientific  fallacies  like  those 
embodied  in  homoeopathy,  or  to  wretched  delu- 
sions like  cranioscopic  phrenology. 

It  is  therefore  recommended  that  the  time  re- 
quired for  the  study  of  chemistry  be  limited  to 
one  term,  instead  of  extending  over  three ;  that 
in  the  second  term,  along  with  the  botany  now 
taught,  some  instruction  be  given  in  general  and 
comparative  anatomy ;  to  be  followed,  in  the 
third,  by  a  brief  but  comprehensive  survey  of 
physiology ;  while  such  knowledge  of  geology  as 
is  needful  for  the  better  understanding  of  these 
subjects  might  be  simultaneously  imparted  by 
means  of  lectures.  An  arrangement  of  this  sort 
would  possess  the  signal  advantage  of  throwing 
the  organic  sciences  into  their  proper  place,  be- 
tween chemistry,  upon  which  they  partially  de- 
pend, and  psychology,  to  which  they  constitute 
the  natural  introduction. 

There  is  the  less  need  for  insisting  upon  the 
value  of  psychology,  metaphysics,  and  logic,  as 
instruments  of  mental  discipline,  since  few  per- 
sons are  disposed  to  call  it  in  question.  In  fol- 
lowing a  difficult  metaphysical  discussion,  all  the 
intellectual  faculties  are  brought  into  healthful 
activity ;  and  although  men  may  reason  well 
without  understanding  the  nature  of  the  psychi- 


University  Reform.  305 

cal  processes,  there  is  no  doubt  that  an  acquaint- 
ance with  psychology  guarantees  its  possessor 
against  the  adoption  of  many  a  plausible  fallacy. 
After  the  student  has  acquired,  through  his  scien- 
tific studies,  some  dexterity  in  the  use  of  logical 
methods,  he  will  approach,  with  all  the  more  in- 
terest and  enthusiasm,  the  study  of  those  methods 
as  organized  into  a  coherent  system.  In  view  of 
what  has  already  been  said,  it  is  almost  unneces- 
sary to  add  that  we  do  not  regard  the  science  of 
logic  as  consisting  solely  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
syllogism.  It  will  no  longer  do  to  ignore  the  fact 
that  induction  has  its  tests  and  canons,  as  well  as 
deduction.  Mr.  Mill's  great  treatise  has  been  be- 
fore the  public  for  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century ; 
and  though  far  too  learned  and  ponderous  for  a 
text-book,  its  introduction  into  the  college  course, 
in  an  epitomized  form,  would  be  attended  with 
happy  results.  As  for  metaphysics,  much  of  its 
value  in  education  depends  upon  the  catholicity 
of  the  spirit  in  which  it  is  taught.  Metaphysical 
doctrines  are  not  so  incontrovertibly  established 
as  the  leading  theorems  of  physical  science.  On 
nearly  every  question  there  are  at  least  two  mu- 
tually incompatible  opinions,  while  on  some  points 
there  are  scores  of  such.  The  latest  speculations 
do  not,  as  usually  happens  in  science,  render  an- 


306  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

tiquated  the  older  ones ;  and  accordingly,  in  teach- 
ing metaphysics,  extensive  use  should  be  made  of 
the  historical  method  of  presentation.  Recita- 
tions from  the  text-book  might  profitably  be  com- 
bined or  alternated  with  lectures  upon  the  history 
of  philosophy,  in  which  the  aim  should  be  to  in- 
dicate as  graphically  as  possible  the  relations  sus- 
tained by  each  system  to  its  predecessors.  In  de- 
fault of  any  such  arrangement,  the  university 
already  possesses,  in  the  works  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  with  their  profound  historical  con- 
sciousness, as  fair  a  substitute  as  mere  text-books 
can  furnish. 

The  study  of  history,  with  reference  to  the 
scientific  methods  involved  in  it,  would  in  a  uni- 
versity be  utterly  impracticable.  That  there  is  a 
causal  sequence,  which  must  sooner  or  later  admit 
of  being  formulated,  in  the  tangled  and  devious 
course  of  human  affairs,  we  not  only  readily 
grant,  but  we  also  steadfastly  maintain.  But 
speculations  of  this  sort  are  too  hopelessly  ab- 
struse, and  require  too  vast  and  minute  a  knowl- 
edge of  details,  to  be  profitably  included  even  in 
the  most  advanced  undergraduate  course.  His- 
torical laws  cannot,  like  physical  laws,  be  obtained 
from  the  inspection  of  a  few  crucial  instances. 
The  enormous  heterogeneity  of  social  phenomena 


University  Reform.  307 

forbids  their  becoming  amenable  to  any  such  pro- 
cess. Only  in  political  economy,  and  to  some  ex- 
tent in  ethics,  where  the  action  of  certain  moral 
forces  is  independently  treated,  can  the  student 
be  expected  to  comprehend  general  truths.  Far 
from  being  in  a  condition  to  appreciate  general 
views  of  historic  evolution,  he  is  usually  ignorant 
of  most  of  the  leading  facts  upon  which  they  are 
founded.  Historical  instruction,  therefore,  must 
continue  to  consist  chiefly  in  the  exposition  of 
details.  It  is  important,  however,  that  the  atten- 
tion should  be  principally  directed  toward  those 
events  which  have  constituted  turning-points  in 
human  progress.  It  is  better  to  confine  the  atten- 
tion to  a  few  cardinal  epochs,  like  the  rise  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  the  Crusades,  the  Refor- 
mation, or  the  Revolt  of  the  Netherlands,  than  to 
try  to  commit  to  memory  a  compendium  like 
Michelet's  "  Precis,"  which  is  nothing  but  a  dis- 
jointed chronological  table,  a  potpourri  of  un- 
meaning dates  and  unexplained  occurrences, 
wherein  trivial  anecdotes  and  events  of  eternal 
significance  are  incontinently  huddled  together, 
without  the  slightest  attempt  at  historical  per- 
spective. Above  all,  the  essential  unity  and  con- 
tinuity of  ancient  and  modern  history  should  be 
kept  steadily  in  view  ;  and  to  this  end,  far  more 


308  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

importance  should  be  assigned  to  the  history  of 
Imperial  Rome  than  is  now  the  case.  Ancient 
history  will  always,  as  at  present,  be  best  studied 
in  connection  with  ancient  languages  and  litera- 
ture. And  this  remark  suggests  the  last  of  the 
subjects  requiring  notice  in  our  brief  survey,  in 
proceeding  to  consider  which  let  it  be  premised 
that  the  most  inestimable  benefits  arising  from 
the  study  of  history  are  here  passed  over,  as  im- 
plied in  what  we  shall  have  to  say  about  the 
classics. 

If  we  have  reserved  the  last  place  for  the  men- 
tion of  classical  studies,  it  is  not  because  we  es- 
teem them  least  in  value.  After  what  has  been 
said  concerning  the  advantages  of  mathematical 
and  scientific  training,  our  assertion  of  the  para- 
mount importance  of  the  classics  will  incur  no 
risk  of  being  ascribed  to  one-sided  prejudice.  We 
therefore  make  no  scruple  of  recording  our  opin- 
ion that,  both  in  quantity  and  in  quality,  the 
mental  discipline  obtainable  from  the  intelligent 
study  of  the  Greek  and  Lathi  languages  equals 
that  which  can  be  acquired  by  any  other  educa- 
tional means  whatever.  To  which  it  may  be 
added  that,  if  accuracy  and  precision  are  most 
thoroughly  imparted  by  the  study  of  exact  science, 
on  the  other  hand  practical  sagacity,  catholic 


University  Reform.  309 

sympathies,  and  breadth  of  view  are  the  qualities 
most  completely  developed  by  philological  and 
literary  pursuits.  Indeed,  were  it  not  for  the 
amount  of  attention  so  generally  bestowed  upon 
the  literatures  and  dialects  of  Greece  and  Rome, 
our  intellectual  sympathies  would  become  con- 
tracted to  a  deplorable  degree.  As  Dr.  William 
Smith  has  observed,  "  their  civilization  may  be 
said  to  be  our  civilization,  their  literature  is  our 
literature,  their  institutions  and  laws  have 
moulded  and  modified  our  institutions  and  laws ; 
and  the  life  of  the  western  nations  of  Europe  is 
but  a  continuation  of  the  life  of  Greece  and 
Rome."  The  reasons  habitually  adduced  for 
studying  the  history  of  our  own  country  and  that 
of  England,  from  which  our  political  institutions 
most  directly  emanate,  apply  with  scarcely  inferior 
cogency  to  the  study  of  that  antique  civilization, 
whence  the  best  and  most  enduring  elements  of 
our  social  structure,  our  science,  laws,  and  litera- 
ture, even  most  of  our  religious  ideas,  are  ulti- 
mately derived.  And  how  much  or  how  little 
of  ancient  life  can  be  comprehended  without  a 
knowledge  of  ancient  languages  we  are  willing 
to  let  every  classically  educated  man  declare  for 
himself.  There  is  thus  a  profound  reason  for  the 
fact  that  universities  have  ever  made  the  classic 


310  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

languages  the  basis  of  their  instruction.  The 
progress  of  modern  discovery  may  greatly  modify 
the  circumstances  under  which  this  arrangement 
was  originally  made,  but  it  can  never  entirely  do 
away  with  them.  Sanskrit,  for  instance,  the  im- 
mense importance  of  which  we  would  be  the  last 
to  underrate,  can  never  be  placed  upon  an  equal 
footing  with  Latin  and  Greek.  Valmiki  and  Kal- 
idasa,  says  Mommsen,  are  the  precious  treasures 
of  literary  botanists,  but  Homer  and  Sophokles 
bloom  in  our  own  garden.  With  Indian  civili- 
zation we  are  but  remotely  connected ;  and  our 
obligations  to  Csesar,  Paul,  and  Aristotle  will 
ever  be  infinitely  greater  than  to  Kanada  or  Sak- 
yamuni.  The  noble  thoughts  of  Hellenic  philos- 
ophers and  Roman  jurists  have  not  only  helped 
to  inaugurate  modern  civilization,  but  have  since 
continually  reacted  upon  it.  The  impulse  given 
to  jurisprudence  by  the  discovery  of  Justinian's 
Pandects  at  Amalfi  may  have  been  exaggerated 
by  uncritical  historians,  as  Hallam  and  Savigny 
have  maintained.  But  the  Renaissance,  with  its 
innumerable  consequences,  will  remain  forever  an 
abiding  refutation  of  the  detractors  of  classical 
studies.  Well  might  the  renewal  of  intercourse 
with  antiquity  be  called  a  new  birth  for  the  mod- 
ern mind ;  it  nerved  it  with  vigour  for  its  greatest 


University  Reform.  311 

achievements.  The  spirit  of  Aristotle  and  Galen 
dwelt  not  with  the  stupid  schoolmen  who,  parrot- 
like,  repeated  their  doctrines,  but  with  Galileo 
and  Harvey,  who  overthrew  them. 

Not  only  does  classical  scholarship  ripen  the 
judgment  and  widen  the  sympathies ;  it  also  af- 
fords unrivalled  scope  for  the  exercise  of  practical 
sagacity.  In  order  to  acquire  tolerable  proficiency 
in  the  use  of  an  ancient  language,  it  is  necessary 
to  go  through  with  an  endless  amount  of  reason- 
ing, classifying,  and  guessing.  Hypotheses  must 
be  skilfully  framed,  inferences  must  be  correctly 
drawn,  probabilities  must  be  carefully  balanced; 
a  high  degree  of  shrewdness  must  continually  be 
applied  to  the  solution  of  questions  for  the  mo- 
ment of  practical  importance,  and  to  the  removal 
of  constantly  occurring  practical  difficulties.  It 
is  a  grave  error  to  suppose  that  all  this  mental 
exertion  can  take  place  without  beneficial  effect 
upon  the  after  life  of  the  student.  Even  if  he  is 
so  unwise  or  so  unfortunate  as  to  allow  his  classi- 
cal attainments  to  slip  from  his  memory,  he  will 
be  the  better  fitted  for  all  the  business  of  life,  by 
reason  of  the  exercise  which  they  have  entailed. 
Whatever  native  keenness  and  capacity  for  pa- 
tient drudgery  he  may  have  in  him  will  show  it- 
self developed  and  strengthened,  just  as  his  alert- 


312  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ness  and  muscular  vigour  will  be  the  better  for  his 
early  rowing  and  cricket-playing,  though  he  may 
never  touch  bat  or  oar  again.  Impatient  utili- 
tarianism, in  directing  all  education  to  immediate 
practical  ends,  and  in  turning  universities  into 
polytechnic  schools,  sacrifices  more  than  it  gains. 
The  example  of  Rawlinson,  as  it  has  been  well 
observed,  proves  that  a  soldier  does  not  fight  the 
worse  at  Candahar  because  he  has  deciphered 
cuneiform  inscriptions  at  Ecbatana :  to  which  it 
may  be  added  that  Julius  Caesar  was  not  the 
worse  general  because  he  wrote  on  philology  even 
in  the  midst  of  his  wonderful  campaigns ;  that 
men  like  Gladstone  and  Lewis  are  not  worse,  but 
better,  statesmen  because  of  their  consummate 
classical  scholarship ;  and  that  Henry  Sumner 
Maine  is  not  likely  to  prove  less  competent  as  a 
member  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  India  because 
he  is  the  author  of  the  profoundest  treatise  ex- 
tant upon  legal  and  social  archaeology. 

Lastly,  the  current  argument  against  classical 
studies,  that,  though  imparting  vigour  and  keen- 
ness to  the  mind,  they  are  not  immediately  appli- 
cable to  practical  or  professional  purposes,  is  pre- 
cisely one  of  the  strongest  arguments  in  their 
favour.  "  In  proportion  as  the  material  interests 
of  the  present  moment  become  more  and  more 


University  Reform.  313 

engrossing,  more  and  more  tyrannical  in  their  ex- 
actions, in  the  same  proportion  it  becomes  more 
necessary  that  man  should  fall  back  on  the  com- 
mon interests  of  humanity,  and  free  himself  from 
the  trammels  of  the  present  by  living  in  the  past." 
In  this  age  of  hurry  and  turmoil,  these  words  of 
the  lamented  Donaldson  are  daily  assuming  more 
and  more  of  vital  significance.  If  there  is  ever 
to  be  a  limit  to  the  minute  sub-division  of  labour, 
if  the  excessive  specialization  of  employments  is 
not  to  go  on  unchecked  by  counter-processes,  if 
man  is  not  to  be  degraded  into  a  mere  pixjducing 
and  manufacturing  automaton,  if  individuality  of 
character  is  destined  to  reassert  its  antique  pre- 
eminence, this  must  be  brought  about  by  sedu- 
lously fostering  those  pursuits  which  are  not  di- 
rectly subservient  to  objects  of  narrow  utility. 
And  to  this  end,  no  studies  can  be  more  needful 
and  appropriate  than  the  studies  of  history,  lan- 
guage, literature,  and  archseology,  —  those  studies 
which  Steinthal,  with  reference  to  their  effect 
upon  the  mind,  has  classified  together  and  aptly 
entitled  "  retrospective."  l  They  enlarge  our 
mental  horizon ;  they  reveal  our  indebtedness  to 
the  patient  thinkers  and  workers  who  have  gone 
before  us,  and  to  whom  we  owe  most  of  our  pres- 

1  De  Pronomine  Relative,  pp.  4,  5. 


314  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ent  comforts  ;  they  cultivate  our  sympathy  with 
the  joys  and  sorrows,  the  hopes  and  disappoint- 
ments, of  past  generations  ;  they  preserve  us  from 
the  worst  effects  of  the  petty  annoyances  and 
carking  anxieties  of  daily  life,  —  the  fj.fpip.val  /3«o- 
TI/CCU,  against  which  the  highest  religious  and  eth- 
ical teaching  has  solemnly  warned  us.  These  are 
benefits  too  priceless  to  be  thrown  away,  in  order 
that  our  young  men  may  gain  a  year  or  two  for 
their  professional  labours ;  and  they  are  amply 
sufficient  to  justify  the  university  in  continuing, 
as  it  has  always  done,  to  make  classical  scholar- 
ship an  indispensable  part  of  a  liberal  education. 

Our  hasty  survey  of  these  various  departments 
of  study  brings  to  light  claims  on  the  part  of 
each  one  which  cannot  wisely  be  ignored.  In 
order  adequately  to  perform  its  first  great  duty 
of  evoking  the  mental  capacities,  the  university 
must  extend  some  recognition  to  all.  Some  pro- 
ficiency in  mathematics,  in  each  of  the  physical 
and  moral  sciences,  in  history,  and  in  classics 
should  be  demanded  of  every  student  who  wishes 
to  take  a  degree.  The  amount  of  work  needful 
to  be  done  in  each  of  these  branches  in  order  to 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  a  liberal  education,  it 
is  for  professors  and  tutors  to  determine.  But 


University  Reform.  315 

we  may  here  extend  to  all  required  studies  the 
suggestion  already  made  in  regard  to  chemistry, 
that  only  a  minimum  of  attainment  should  be 
expected  of  the  whole  body  of  students.  In  the 
case  of  the  sciences,  only  so  much  attention  should 
be  given  to  details  as  is  requisite  for  the  compre- 
hension of  methods  and  general  results.  For  this 
purpose,  some  knowledge  of  special  facts  is  of 
course  requisite.  We  cannot  understand  the 
atomic  theory  or  the  doctrine  of  definite  propor- 
tions without  knowing  something  about  oxygen, 
hydrogen,  and  the  other  elements ;  but  it  is  not 
necessary  to  learn  all  the  ways  in  which  the 
metals  are  extracted  from  their  ores.  To  under- 
stand methods  and  results  in  biology,  we  need  to 
be  acquainted  with  organs,  fluids,  and  tissues,  and 
to  have  some  knowledge  of  function  as  well  as 
of  structure ;  but  we  need  not  enter  into  the  mer- 
its and  shortcomings  of  Mr.  Gulliver's  theory  of 
inflammation,  or  be  particular  as  to  the  proper 
classification  of  the  Bryozoa.  The  mathemati- 
cal course  might  perhaps  be  allowed  to  close  with 
plane  trigonometry,  and  the  course  in  classics 
might  be  materially  abridged.  Far  less  attention 
might  be  given  to  supremely  useless  matters,  like 
Greek  prosody  ;  and  the  time  now  spent  in  com- 
mitting to  memory  arbitrary  rules  for  the  scan- 


316  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

ning  of  choral  passages  in  ^schylus  would  thus 
be  saved  for  the  study  of  ancient  history  and  pol- 
itics, in  which  important  branches  the  require- 
ments of  the  university  have  not  yet  attained  even 
a  respectable  minimum.  Doubtless  in  many  other 
respects  the  amount  of  compulsory  study  might 
be  curtailed.  But  these  hints  are  merely  thrown 
out  by  way  of  illustration.  In  a  matter  demand- 
ing so  much  circumspection,  only  the  wisdom  and 
experience  of  practised  instructors  are  competent 
to  decide.  Satisfactory  results  could  easily  be 
obtained,  if  the  head  of  each  department  were  to 
fix  the  minimum  to  be  required  in  his  own  spe- 
cialty, subject  to  the  concurrence  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  other  departments.  The 
course  of  study,  thus  regulated,  would  slightly 
resemble  what  at  Oxford  is  called  the  "pass- 
course,"'  and  all  parts  of  it  should  be  made  com- 
pulsory for  all  students. 

In  advocating  the  adoption  of  a  required  course 
so  extensive  and  yet  so  elementary,  our  aim  is 
not  to  encourage  crude  smattering  or  vain  scio- 
lism, but  to  enable  the  student  to  approach  his 
own  special  subject  in  the  light  thrown  upon  it 
by  widely  different  subjects,  and  with  the  varied 
mental  discipline  which  no  single  study  is  com- 
petent to  furnish.  Nature  is  not  a  mere  juxtapo- 


University  Reform.  317 

sition  of  parts,  but  a  complex  organic  whole  ;  and 
the  different  branches  of  science  are  so  closely 
allied  that,  without  a  general  knowledge  of  all, 
we  cannot  have  a  complete  comprehension  of  any. 
From  the  lack  of  a  well-defined  knowledge  of 
the  boundaries  which  divide  chemistry  from  phys- 
iology, many  eminent  chemists  of  the  present 
century,  including  such  men  as  Raspail,  Berthol- 
let,  and  even  Liebig,  have  attempted  to  treat 
physiological  questions  by  methods  of  investiga- 
tion applicable  only  to  chemical  questions.  There 
has  thus  arisen  an  ill-digested  mass  of  specula- 
tion, embracing  some  inquiries  which  are  purely 
chemical,  and  others  which  are  purely  physiolog- 
ical, to  which  has  been  given  the  name  of  Or- 
ganic Chemistry.  The  amount  of  misdirected 
theorizing  which  resulted  from  this  confusion  of 
subjects  and  methods  it  would  be  no  light  task 
to  estimate.  The  doctrine  of  definite  proportions 
was  assailed,  the  distinction  between  ultimate  and 
immediate  analysis  was  lost  sight  of,  and  theories 
of  respiration  and  animal  heat  were  propounded, 
whose  rare  beauty  and  artistic  symmetry  of  con- 
ception rendered  only  the  more  palpable  and  de- 
plorable their  extreme  logical  deficiency.  This 
example,  out  of  many  which  might  be  given,  will 
suffice  to  illustrate  our  present  position,  that  uni- 


318  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

versal  philosophic  culture  is  essential  to  the  right 
understanding  of  any  one  science. 

But  a  general  elementary  training  we  deem 
serviceable  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  ancillary  to  the 
intelligent  study  of  special  subjects;  and  in  pro- 
viding for  the  former,  our  scheme  of  education  is 
only  half  completed.  Provision  must  also  be 
made  for  the  latter.  Along  with  the  pass-course 
at  Oxford,  there  is  another  system  of  study,  mak- 
ing quite  different  demands  upon  the  energies 
of  the  student,  and  called  the  class-course.  Our 
system  of  minimums  likewise  needs  to  be  supple- 
mented by  a  course  entailing  far  greater  labour, 
and  crowned  with  still  higher  results.  In  re- 
ducing, as  here  recommended,  the  amount  of  work 
in  the  required  studies,  in  uniformly  postponing 
doctrine  to  method,  in  contemplating  scientific 
truths  only  in  their  general  bearings,  and  in  ex- 
tending its  instruction  over  so  wide  a  field,  the 
university  will  have  secured  but  one  of  its  great 
educational  ends.  It  will  have  supplied  the  in- 
struments for  investigation ;  it  must  now  supply 
the  material.  In  order  to  discharge  its  second 
great  duty  of  providing  each  student  with  the 
means  of  thoroughly  conducting  special  duties, 
the  university  should  introduce  an  extensive  and 
well-regulated  system  of  electives.  For  this  we 


University  Reform.  319 

have  an  obvious  analogue  in  the  usage  of  our  an- 
cestral institution  in  England.  We  allude,  of 
course,  to  the  triposes  of  the  University  of  Cam- 
bridge, so  called,  not  from  anything  triple  or 
tripartite  in  their  structure,  but  because  of  the 
"  stool  or  tripos  on  which  the  bachelor  of  the  day 
sat  before  the  proctors  during  the  disputations  on 
Ash- Wednesday."  Along  with  the  course  of 
required  studies,  remodelled  according  to  the 
principles  here  laid  down,  a  series  of  triposes 
should  be  instituted.  The  classic  languages,  with 
ancient  history  and  ancient  philosophy,  would 
naturally  constitute  one  tripos ;  a  second  might 
be  made  up  of  pure  and  applied  mathematics  ;  a 
third,  of  chemistry  and  the  organic  sciences;  a 
fourth,  of  psychology,  logic,  and  the  history  of 
philosophy ;  a  fifth,  of  modern  history,  political 
economy,  and  elementary  law ;  while  a  sixth  might 
be  assigned  to  modern  languages  and  general  phi- 
lology. At  the  beginning  of  the  Sophomore  year, 
—  when,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  matriculation 
should  be  granted  and  the  proper  university  course 
should  commence,  —  the  student  should  be  al- 
lowed to  select  one  or  more  of  these  triposes,  in 
which  to  pursue  his  studies  until  graduation.  As 
in  each  tripos  the  degree  of  proficiency  requisite 
in  order  to  graduate  with  honour  should  obviously 


320  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

be  placed  very  high,  few  students  would  think  it 
advisable  to  take  up  more  than  one.  Thus  or- 
ganized, the  system  of  triposes  would  for  all  prac- 
tical purposes  correspond  to  the  Oxford  class- 
course. 

Many  students  will  in  every  year  be  found  will- 
ing to  content  themselves  with  the  pass-course. 
They  have  no  desire  to  do  more  than  the  mini- 
mum of  work  needful  in  order  to  get  through  col- 
lege without  disgrace.  Or  perhaps  they  are  feeble 
in  health,  or  have  been  imperfectly  trained  at 
school,  and  cannot  therefore  expect  to  do  justice 
to  the  severe  requirements  of  a  tripos.  These 
should  be  allowed  to  act  their  pleasure  :  the  edu- 
cation they  will  get  from  the  pass-course  is  vastly 
better  than  none  ;  and  there  are  better  means 
than  direct  compulsion  for  inducing  the  student 
to  follow  the  more  laborious  and  profitable  path. 
Either  a  higher  degree  should  reward  the  perse- 
verance of  the  class-man,  as  some  have  already 
suggested,  or  the  maximum  of  credit  should,  for 
the  pass-man,  be  reduced  by  one  half  or  even  by 
two  thirds.  In  any  case,  all  the  honours  of  the 
university,  all  its  scholarships,  prizes,  and  emolu- 
ments, should  be  strictly  reserved  for  those  who 
have  distinguished  themselves  in  a  tripos.  Be- 
sides this,  for  the  class-men,  the  constraint  of  com- 


University  Reform.  321 

pulsory  attendance  upon  recitations  and  lectures 
should  be  materially  diminished.  Every  one  pos- 
sessed of  the  requisite  experience  knows  that,  for 
the  able  and  diligent  student,  too  frequent  recita- 
tion is  not  only  a  hardship,  but  a  hindrance.  The 
explanations  of  the  professor,  adapted  as  they 
must  be  to  the  comprehension  of  all  his  hearers, 
are  often  entirely  superfluous  to  any  one  who  has 
properly  gone  over  the  subject  beforehand ;  while 
listening  to  the  awkward  blunders  of  dull  or  lazy 
classmates  is  not  only  a  waste  of  time,  but  an  irri- 
tation to  the  nerves.  Nor  could  any  class-man  be 
expected  to  acquit  himself  satisfactorily  upon  his 
final  examination,  if  three  hours  were  to  be  sub- 
tracted from  his  time  for  study  each  day.  Four 
or  five  recitations  every  week  in  the  studies  of 
the  tripos  would  be  amply  sufficient.  The  class- 
man should  also  be  exempted  from  pursuing  that 
portion  of  the  pass-course  covered  by  the  subjects 
embraced  in  his  tripos.  Obviously,  he  who  se- 
lects Latin  and  Greek  for  his  special  studies  will 
gain  nothing  by  following  the  instruction  given 
upon  those  subjects  to  the  pass-men,  though  in 
all  other  departments  he  must  keep  up  to  the 
minimum  required.  As  a  further  means  of  re- 
lieving class-men  from  the  distractions  of  contin- 
ual recitation,  and  in  order  to  provide  all  stu- 
21 


322  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

dents  with  a  wholesome  incentive  to  exertion,  a 
conditional  exemption  from  recitations  might  be 
granted  in  the  studies  of  the  pass-course.  For 
example,  all  persons  attaining  a  certain  standard 
of  excellence  in  the  monthly  examination  might 
be  required  to  attend  only  half  the  stated  num- 
ber of  recitations  for  the  month  following.  The 
next  examination  would  afford  both  a  test  of  the 
faithfulness  with  which  the  student  had  employed 
the  time  thus  left  to  his  control,  and  an  occasion 
for  withdrawing  the  privilege  in  case  of  its  abuse. 
Some  such  system  as  this  might  be  put  into  oper- 
ation even  in  the  present  state  of  affairs.  Its 
merits,  in  creating  a  powerful  yet  thoroughly  nat- 
ural motive  for  promptness  and  diligence,  are 
perfectly  apparent.  It  goes  far  toward  obviating 
the  defects  of  the  system  of  compulsory  attend- 
ance, while  it  does  not  ignore  the  value  of  that 
discipline  which  can  only  be  got  from  occasional 
intercourse  with  tutors  and  fellow-students  in  the 
recitation-room. 

The  advantages  of  solving  problems,  constru- 
ing an  ancient  author,  or  rehearsing  the  results 
of  one's  reading  in  the  presence  of  classmates  and 
subject  to  professorial  criticism  are  indeed  suffi- 
ciently obvious.  Skill  in  acquiring  knowledge 
ought  certainly  to  be  accompanied  by  skill  in  re- 


University  Reform.  323 

producing  it ;  nor  would  the  student  be  likely  to 
do  credit  to  himself  in  the  examination,  who 
should  fail  previously  to  test  his  powers  of  an- 
swering questions  on  the  spur  of  the  moment. 
But  the  business  of  recitation  should  not  be  con- 
fined to  going  over  in  public  what  has  already 
been  gone  over  in  private.  The  instructor's  su- 
perior knowledge  and  more  extensive  sources  of 
information  should  be  applied  to  the  elucidation 
of  the  subject  in  hand.  Questions  should  be  freely 
asked,  and  discussion,  wherever  relevant,  should 
be  encouraged.  Thus  conducted,  the  recitation 
would  fulfil  its  appropriate  function  of  making 
good  the  shortcomings  inherent  in  a  system  of 
merely  private  study,  of  supplying  illustrations 
which  cannot  be  found  in  text-books,  and  of 
smoothing  the  difficulties  which  from  time  to  time 
beset  the  student  in  his  progress. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  the  recitation  is  properly 
an  auxiliary  to  study,  rather  than  a  gauge  of  the 
student's  attainments.  The  latter  purpose  can  be 
adequately  subserved  only  by  the  examinations, 
on  which  the  rank  assigned  to  the  student  should 
exclusively  depend.  The  marks  given  on  indi- 
vidual recitations  are  nearly  worthless  as  an  index 
of  scholarship.  By  dint  of  "  cramming,"  the  use 
of  keys,  translations,  and  other  abominations,  a 


324  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

delusive  show  of  knowledge  can  easily  be  pro- 
duced, which  may  answer  the  demands  of  the  mo- 
ment, but  which  a  shrewd  examination  will  inevi- 
tably dispel.  If  recitations  were  not  allowed  to 
influence  rank,  and  were  conducted  in  the  con- 
versational manner  here  recommended,  the  chief 
temptation  to  the  employment  of  these  wretched 
subterfuges  would  be  at  once  removed.  Accuracy 
of  scholarship  can  never  be  looked  for  in  a  man 
who  refuses  to  grapple  with  obstacles  himself ; 
and  to  translations  in  particular  it  may  be  ob- 
jected that,  being  not  always  executed  by  com- 
petent scholars,  their  interpretations  of  difficult 
passages  are  often  quite  untrustworthy.  Any 
system  of  conducting  recitation,  whose  tendency 
is  to  banish  these  treacherous  guides  from  the 
precincts  of  the  university,  is  by  that  circum- 
stance alone  recommended  at  the  outset. 

The  object  of  the  triposes  is  to  encourage  mi- 
nute and  thorough  scholarship.  To  this  end,  the 
distribution  of  honours  should  be  determined  by 
the  results  of  a  competitive  examination  held  at 
the  close  of  the  college  course,  in  which  the  re- 
quirements should  be  so  great,  and  the  questions 
so  searching,  as  to  render  hopeless  all  attempts  at 
succeeding  by  surreptitious  means.  At  Oxford, 
for  instance,  the  final  class-papers  in  mathematics 


University  Reform.  325 

include  questions  covering  the  whole  subject  of 
pure  and  mixed  mathematics;  and  there  is  no 
reason  why  our  standard  of  proficiency  should  not 
be  equally  high,  since  in  a  purely  optional  course 
neither  inability  nor  distaste  for  the  subject  can 
reasonably  be  pleaded.  From  the  classical  stu- 
dent, besides  thorough  familiarity  with  the  text 
and  subject-matter  of  at  least  ten  difficult  authors, 
we  should  demand  a  knowledge  of  ancient  history 
at  once  extensive  and  accurate,  as  well  as  some 
skill  in  treating  the  higher  problems  of  philology 
and  criticism.  And  in  the  other  class  examina- 
tions the  requirements  should  be  similar.  With 
such  an  organization,  it  would  be  strange  if  the 
university  did  not  each  year  send  forth  a  consid- 
erable number  of  persons  in  every  way  prepared 
to  become  finished  scholars.  With  the  compul- 
sory system  reduced  to  the  lowest  practicable 
minimum,  and  the  elective  system  carried  out 
with  the  greatest  possible  completeness,  the  chief 
ends  of  a  liberal  education  can  most  effectually  be 
secured ;  and  the  most  excellent  features  of  the 
European  university  will  thus  be  adopted  without 
resigning  any  single  point  of  superiority  possessed 
by  the  American  college. 

As  already  hinted,  the  existing  constitution  of 
the  freshman  year   should  not  be  materially  in- 


326          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

fringed.  A  course  of  study  like  the  one  here  de- 
scribed cannot  profitably  be  undertaken  without 
more  thorough  elementary  preparation  than  the 
student  is  likely  to  obtain  at  school.  In  such  a 
country  as  England,  where  a  dense  population  is 
confined  to  a  small  area,  and  where  a  considerable 
degree  of  uniformity  prevails  in  the  civilization 
of  different  localities,  all  the  necessary  work  pre- 
liminary to  a  university  career  can  easily  be  per- 
formed in  the  great  public  schools.  If,  however, 
the  present  population  of  England  were  loosely 
spread  over  all  the  country  between  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Dnieper,  and  if,  while  some  parts  were  as 
highly  educated  as  London,  other  parts  were  as 
poorly  educated  as  Dalrnatia,  the  state  of  things 
would  be  analogous  to  that  which  now  exists  in 
our  own  country.  It  is  in  conformity  with  these 
different  circumstances  that  our  system  of  edu- 
cation must  be  organized.  We  have  no  Eton  or 
Rugby ;  but  we  have  hundreds  of  schools  for  el- 
ementary education,  scattered  over  an  immense 
tract  of  country,  and  differing  widely  in  the 
amount  and  quality  of  the  instruction  which  they 
impart  to  their  pupils.  The  social  environment 
in  which  they  are  situated  is  usually  very  differ- 
ent from  that  of  Cambridge ;  and  the  especial 
preparation  of  students  for  Harvard  College  can- 


University  Reform.  327 

not,  except,  perhaps,  in  Massachusetts,  be  re- 
garded as  one  of  the  ends  for  which  they  exist* 
While  the  student  coming  from  New  England  or 
any  of  the  adjacent  states  is  likely  to  be  well 
prepared  to  begin  his  studies  at  Harvard,  the  stu- 
dent who  comes  from  the  West  or  from  the  South 
is  equally  likely  to  be  ill  prepared.  These  dis- 
advantages are  now  to  a  great  extent  compen- 
sated under  the  regime  of  the  freshman  year, 
and  the  circumstances  by  which  they  are  occa- 
sioned furnish  a  sufficient  reason  for  retaining 
that  year  as  a  period  of  probation,  instead  of 
giving  it  up  altogether,  or  of  making  it  a  part  of 
the  regular  university  course.  It  should  there- 
fore, we  think,  be  retained  in  its  present  form, 
with  an  examination  both  at  its  beginning  and  at 
its  close,  upon  the  latter  of  which  the  attainment 
of  matriculation  should  be  made  to  depend. 

Our  brief  sketch  of  a  university  reform  would 
not  be  complete  without  a  few  remarks  upon  the 
numerous  police  restrictions  by  which,  at  Harvard 
and  elsewhere,  the  American  student  is  gratui- 
tously harassed.1  When  the  university  under- 
takes to  prescribe  the  colour  of  the  student's 
dress,  to  determine  when  and  where  he  shall 
smoke  his  cigar  in  the  streets,  and  under  what 
1  Statutes  of  Harvard  College,  ch.  x.t  §  101. 


328  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

conditions  he  shall  keep  a  dog  or  a  horse,  it  is 
not  only  exceeding  its  proper  functions,  but  it  is 
also  forgetting  its  own  dignity.  Years  ago,  when 
black  broadcloth  was  generally  considered  the 
only  suitable  material  for  a  gentleman's  coat,  and 
when  none  but  truckmen  and  coal-heavers  smoked 
in  the  streets,  these  laws  might  have  been  rea- 
sonable, though  they  were  not  even  therefore 
necessarily  justifiable.  Now  they  have  neither 
reason  nor  justice  to  recommend  them.  The  state 
of  things  to  meet  which  they  were  framed  has 
entirely  passed  away,  and  the  result  of  maintain- 
ing and  even  partially  enforcing  them  is  to  widen, 
instead  of  closing,  the  social  gulf  which  is  fixed 
between  instructors  and  students.  Only  when 
this  chasm  is  removed  by  more  familiar  inter- 
course, and  by  the  abolition  of  the  petty  re- 
straints which  have  in  times  past  caused  students 
to  regard  with  distrust  and  suspicion  the  officers 
placed  over  them,  can  the  graver  evils  of  college 
life,  such  as  hazing  and  rowdyism,  be  effectually 
done  away  with.  The  self-respect  awakened  in 
the  mind  of  the  student  by  treating  him  as  a  gen- 
tleman will  go  much  farther  toward  insuring  his 
gentlemanly  behaviour  than  all  the  censorial  laws 
which  corporations  can  frame  and  proctors  ex- 
ecute. That  undergraduates  have  too  often  de. 


University  Reform.  329 

meaned  themselves  like  grown-up  children  follows 
naturally  from  the  circumstance  that  they  have 
to  an  extent  only  too  great  been  regarded  as 
such. 

That  a  limited  amount  of  penal  legislation  is 
needful,  under  the  present  constitution  of  our 
colleges,  we  have  already  admitted.  If  the  sys- 
tem of  compulsory  attendance  upon  lectures,  reci- 
tations, and  the  roll-call  —  currently  known  as 
"  morning  prayers  "  —  is  not  entirely  to  be  given 
up,  some  penalty  must  await  non-attendance.  But 
that  this  penalty  should  interfere  with  the  rank 
of  the  student,  should  affect  his  apparent  scholar- 
ship, is  utterly  absurd.  There  is  conspicuous  ab- 
surdity in  the  state  of  things  which  allows  a  man 
who  has  attained  an  average  mark  of  seven 
eighths  to  graduate  without  honour,  because  of 
his  irregular  attendance  upon  college  exercises. 
His  low  rank  is  considered  by  the  public  to  be 
an  evidence  of  inferior  scholarship ;  nor  will  any 
amount  of  mere  explanation  suffice  to  remove  the 
impression.  The  old  system  of  fining  would  be 
far  preferable  to  this.  .As  for  rioting,  sedition, 
and  gross  indecorum,  they  should,  after  due  warn- 
ing, be  visited  with  expulsion.  Further  than  this, 
the  penal  legislation  of  the  university  cannot  le- 
gitimately extend. 


330  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

Such  in  its  leading  outlines  is  the  scheme  of 
university  reform  which  has  long  been  present, 
with  more  or  less  distinctness,  to  the  mind  of  the 
writer.  We  are  not  sufficiently  vain  or  sanguine 
to  hope  that  it  will  at  once  recommend  itself  to 
those  in  whose  hands  the  work  of  reform  has  been 
placed.  We  have  throughout,  however,  avoided 
the  discussion  of  Utopian  measures  for  the  attain- 
ment of  ideal  excellence,  and  have  proposed  no 
innovations  for  which  we  do  not  consider  the  times 
to  be  fully  ripe,  and  the  means  of  execution  en- 
tirely at  command.  If  our  suggestions  shall  have 
at  all  contributed  to  fix  and  give  shape  to  the 
floating  ideas  of  any  graduate  who  may  be  now 
first  approaching  the  subject  of  reform,  their  end 
will  be  amply  subserved.  Something  would  have 
been  said,  had  space  allowed,  on  the  important 
subject  of  a  post-graduate  course.  But  for  the 
present  we  must  be  content  with  directing  the  at- 
tention of  the  alumni  and  the  public  to  the  im- 
perative need  which  exists  for  an  arrangement 
whereby  those  graduates  who  desire  it  shall  be 
enabled  to  pursue  their  studies  indefinitely,  under 
the  shadow  of  the  university.  Only  under  such 
a  system  can  we  make  due  provision  for  thorough 
scholarship.  Our  literature  cannot  hope  to  com. 
pete  with  that  of  other  countries,  so  long  as  our 


University  Reform.  331 

young  men  of  literary  taste  and  ability  have  no 
choice  but  to  embark  in  an  active  profession,  or 
engage  in  mercantile  employments.  To  institute 
a  number  of  fellowships  —  the  essential  condition 
of  a  post-graduate  course  —  will  require,  no  doubt, 
a  much  greater  revenue  than  the  university  has 
now  at  its  disposal.  But  the  end  which  is  not 
straightway  attainable  should  still  be  kept  stead- 
ily in  view.  A  system  of  post-graduate  instruc- 
tion is,  we  repeat,  the  great  need  both  of  the  uni- 
versity and  of  the  country.  Literature,  science, 
and  high  scholarship  have  never  prospered  where 
they  have  not  been  recognized  as  legitimate  spe- 
cial pursuits.  Individual  zeal  and  genius  may  in- 
deed perform  wonders,  but  they  cannot  supply  the 
place  of  systematic  organization.  Our  mother 
university  has  in  recent  days  enriched  mankind 
by  the  labours  of  a  Donaldson,  a  Munro,  and  a 
Merivale ;  and  when  we,  by  means  of  a  well- 
organized  system  of  fellowships,  are  able  to  do 
likewise,  our  country  also  may  hope  to  rival  its 
mother  in  learning  and  scholarship,  as  it  now 
rivals  her  in  material  prosperity. 

October,  1866. 


XV. 

A  LIBRARIAN'S  WORK. 

I  AM  very  frequently  asked  what  in  the  world 
a  librarian  can  find  to  do  with  his  time,  or  am 
perhaps  congratulated  on  my  connection  with 
Harvard  College  Library,  on  the  ground  that, 
"being  virtually  a  sinecure  office  (!),  it  must 
leave  so  much  leisure  for  private  study  and  work 
of  a  literary  sort."  Those  who  put  such  ques- 
tions, or  offer  such  congratulations,  are  naturally 
astonished  when  told  that  the  library  affords 
enough  work  to  employ  all  my  own  time,  as  well 
as  that  of  twenty  assistants  ;  and  astonishment  is 
apt  to  rise  to  bewilderment  when  it  is  added  that 
seventeen  of  these  assistants  are  occupied  chiefly 
with  "cataloguing;"  for  generally,  I  find,  a  li- 
brary catalogue  is  assumed  to  be  a  thing  that  is 
somehow  "made"  at  a  single  stroke,  as  Aladdin's 
palace  was  built,  at  intervals  of  ten  or  a  dozen 
years,  or  whenever  a  "  new  catalogue  "  is  thought 
to  be  needed.  "  How  often  do  you  make  a  cata- 
logue ?  "  or,  "  When  will  your  catalogue  be  com- 


A  Librarian's   Work.  338 

pleted?"  are  questions  revealing  such  transcen- 
dent misapprehension  of  the  case  that  little  but 
further  mystification  can  be  got  from  the  mere 
answer,  "  We  are  always  making  a  catalogue,  and 
it  will  never  be  finished."  The  "  doctrine  of  spe- 
cial creations,"  indeed,  does  not  work  any  better 
in  the  bibliographical  than  in  the  zoological  world. 
A  catalogue,  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term,  is 
not  something  that  is  *'  made  "  all  at  once,  to  last 
until  the  time  has  come  for  it  to  be  superseded  by 
a  new  edition,  but  it  is  something  that  "  grows," 
by  slow  increments,  and  supersedes  itself  only 
through  gradual  evolution  from  a  lower  degree  of 
fulness  and  defmiteness  into  a  higher  one.  It  is 
perhaps  worth  while  to  give  some  general  explana- 
tion of  this  process  of  catalogue-making,  thus  an- 
swering once  for  all  the  question  as  to  what  may 
be  a  librarian's  work.  There  is  no  better  way  to 
begin  than  to  describe,  in  the  case  of  our  own  li- 
brary, the  career  of  a  book  from  the  time  of  its 
delivery  by  the  expressman  to  the  time  when  it 
is  ready  for  public  use. 

New  American  books,  whether  bought  or  pre- 
sented, generally  come  along  in  driblets,  two  or 
three  at  a  time,  throughout  the  year ;  large  boxes 
of  pamphlets,  newspapers,  broadsides,  trade-cata- 
logues, and  all  manner  of  woful  rubbish  (the  ref- 


334  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

use  of  pr.vate  libraries  and  households)  are  sent 
in  from  time  to  time  ;  and  books  from  Europe  ar- 
rive every  few  weeks  in  lots  of  from  fifty  to  three 
or  four  hundred.  It  is  in  the  case  of  foreign  books 
that  our  process  is  most  thoroughly  systematized, 
and  here  let  us  take  up  our  illustrative  example. 

When  a  box  containing  three  or  four  hundred 
foreign  books  has  been  unpacked,  the  volumes  are 
placed,  backs  uppermost,  on  large  tables,  and  are 
then  looked  over  by  the  principal  assistant,  with 
two  or  three  subordinates,  to  ascertain  if  the 
books  at  hand  correspond  with  those  charged  in 
the  invoice.  As  the  titles  are  read  from  the  in- 
voice, the  volumes  are  hunted  out  and  arranged 
side  by  side  in  the  order  in  which  their  titles  are 
read,  while  the  entry  on  the  invoice  is  checked  in 
the  margin  with  a  pencil.  These  pencil-checks 
are  afterwards  copied  into  the  margins  of  the 
book  in  which  our  lists  of  foreign  orders  are  regis- 
tered, so  that  we  may  always  be  able  to  deter- 
mine, by  a  reference  to  this  book,  whether  any 
particular  work  has  been  received  or  not.  This 
order-book,  with  its  marginal  checks,  is  the  only 
immediate  specific  register  of  accessions  kept  by 
us,  as  our  peculiar  system  entails  considerable 
delay  in  bringing  up  the  "  accessions-catalogue." 

After  this  preliminary  examination  and  regis. 


A  Librarian's   Work.  335 

try,  the  books  are  ready  for  me  to  look  over,  and 
I  must  first  decide  to  what  "  fund  "  each  book  en- 
tered on  the  invoice  must  be  charged.  The  uni- 
versity never  buys  books  with  its  general  funds, 
but  uses  for  this  purpose  the  income  of  a  dozen 
or  more  small  funds,  given,  bequeathed,  or  sub- 
scribed, expressly  for  the  purchase  of  books. 
Sometimes  the  donors  of  such  funds  allow  us  to 
get  whatever  books  we  like  with  the  money,  but 
more  often  they  show  an  inclination  to  favour  the 
growth  of  departments  in  which  they  feel  a  per- 
sonal interest.  Thus  the  munificent  bequest  of 
the  late  Mr.  Charles  Sumner  is  appropriated  to 
the  purchase  of  works  on  politics  and  the  fine 
arts,  while  Dr.  Walker's  bequest  provides  more 
especially  for  theology  and  philosophy,  and  the 
estate  of  Professor  Farrar  still  guards  the  inter- 
ests of  mathematics  and  physics.  Under  such 
circumstances,  it  is  of  course  necessary  to  keep  a 
separate  account  with  each  fund,  and  the  data  for 
such  an  account  are  provided  by  charging  every 
new  book  as  it  arrives.  On  the  margin  of  the 
invoice  the  names  of  the  different  funds  are  writ- 
ten in  pencil  against  the  entries,  while  the  assist- 
ants separate  the  books  into  groups  according  to 
the  funds  to  which  they  are  charged.  Five  or  six 
more  assistants  now  arriving  on  the  scene,  the 
work  of  "  collating  "  begins. 


336  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

Properly  speaking,  to  "  collate  "  is  to  compare 
two  things  with  each  other,  in  order  to  estimate 
or  judge  the  one  by  a  reference  to  the  other  taken 
as  a  standard.  In  our  library  usage  the  word  has 
very  nearly  this  sense  when  duplicate  copies  of 
the  same  work  are  collated,  to  see  whether  they 
coincide  page  for  page.  But  as  we  currently  use 
the  word,  to  collate  a  book  is  simply  to  examine 
it  carefully  from  beginning  to  end,  to  see  whether 
every  page  is  in  its  proper  place  and  properly 
numbered,  whether  any  maps  or  plates  are  miss- 
ing or  misplaced,  whether  the  back  is  correctly 
lettered,  or  whether  any  leaves  are  so  badly  torn 
or  defaced  as  to  need  replacing.  In  English  cloth- 
bound  books  this  scrutiny  involves  the  cutting  of 
the  leaves,  —  a  tedious  job  which  in  half-bound 
books  from  the  Continent  is  seldom  required.  En 
revanche,  however,  the  collating  of  an  English 
book  hardly  ever  brings  to  light  any  serious  de- 
fect, while  in  the  make-up  of  French  and  German 
books  the  grossest  blunders  are  only  too  common. 
Figures  are  unaccountably  skipped  in  numbering 
the  pages;  plates  are  either  omitted  or  are  so 
bunglingly  numbered  that  it  is  hard  to  discover 
whether  the  quota  is  complete  or  not ;  title-pages 
are  inserted  in  the  wrong  places ;  sheets  are 
wrongly  folded,  bringing  the  succession  of  pagea 


A  Librarian's   Work.  337 

into  dire  confusion ;  sometimes  two  or  three  sheets 
are  left  out,  and  sometimes,  where  a  work  in  ten 
volumes  is  bound  in  five,  you  will  find  that  the 
first  of  these  contains  two  duplicate  copies  of  Vol. 
I.,  while  for  any  signs  of  a  Vol.  II.  you  may  seek 
in  vain.  In  all  bungling  of  this  kind  the  Ger- 
mans are  worse  than  the  French ;  but  both  are 
bad  enough  when  contrasted  with  the  English, 
either  of  the  Old  World  or  of  the  New. 

This  work  of  collating  is  in  general  of  lower 
grade  than  the  work  of  cataloguing,  and  can  be 
entrusted  to  the  less  experienced  or  less  accom- 
plished assistants ;  but  to  some  extent  it  is  shared 
by  all,  and  where  difficulties  arise,  or  where  some 
book  with  Arabic  or  Sanskrit  numbering  turns 
up,  an  appeal  to  headquarters  becomes  necessary. 
When  a  book  has  been  collated,  the  date  of  its 
reception  and  the  name  of  the  fund  to  which  it 
has  been  charged  are  written  in  pencil  on  the 
back  of  the  title-page,  and  at  the  bottom  of  the 
title-page,  to  the  left  of  the  imprint,  is  written 
some  modification  of  the  letter  C,  C',  C°,  C1,  etc., 
which  is  equivalent  to  the  signature  of  the  assist- 
ant who  has  done  the  collating  and  is  responsible 
for  its  accuracy. 

After  this  is  all  over,  the  books,  still  remaining 
grouped  according  to  their  "  funds,"  are  ready  to 


338  Darwinism  and   Other 

have  the  "seals"  put  in.  The  seal  is  the  label 
of  ownership,  bearing  the  seal  of  the  university 
and  the  name  of  the  fund  or  other  source  from 
which  the  book  has  been  procured,  and  is  pasted 
on  the  inside  of  the  front  cover.  Above  it,  in  the 
left  corner,  is  pasted  a  little  blank  corner-piece, 
on  which  is  to  be  marked  in  pencil  the  number  of 
the  alcove  and  shelf  where  the  book  is  to  be 
placed,  or  "  set  up." 

To  set  up  a  book  on  a  shelf  is  no  doubt  a  very 
simple  matter,  yet  it  involves  something  more 
than  the  mere  placing  of  the  volume  on  the  shelf. 
Each  alcove  in  the  library  has  a  "shelf-cata- 
logue," or  list  of  all  the  books  in  the  alcove,  ar- 
ranged by  shelves.  Such  a  catalogue  is  indispen- 
sable in  determining  whether  each  shelf  has  its 
proper  complement  of  volumes,  and  whether,  at 
the  end  of  the  year,  all  the  books  are  in  their 
proper  places.  When  the  book  is  duly  entered 
on  this  shelf-catalogue,  and  has  its  corner-piece 
marked,  it  is  at  last  ready  to  be  "  catalogued." 
After  our  lot  of  three  or  four  hundred  books  have 
been  treated  in  this  way,  they  are  delivered  to 
the  principal  assistant,  who  parcels  them  out 
among  various  subordinate  assistants  for  catalogu- 
ing. 

Here  we  enter  upon  a  very  wide  subject,  and 


A  Librarian's    Work.  339 

one  that  is  not  altogether  easy  to  expound  to  the 
uninitiated.  A  brief  historical  note  is  needed,  to 
begin  with.  In  1830  Harvard  University  pub- 
lished a  printed  catalogue  (in  two  volumes,  oc- 
tavo) of  all  the  works  contained  in  its  library  at 
that  date.  In  1833  a  supplement  was  published, 
containing  all  the  accessions  since  1830,  and  these 
made  a  moderate-sized  volume.  Here  is  the  es- 
sential vice  of  printed  catalogues.  Where  the 
number  of  books  is  fixed  once  for  all,  —  as  in  the 
case  of  a  private  library,  the  owner  of  which  has 
just  died,  and  which  is  to  be  sold  at  auction,  — 
nothing  is  easier  than  to  make  a  perfect  catalogue, 
whether  of  authors  or  of  subjects.  It  is  very  dif- 
ferent when  your  library  is  continually  growing. 
By  the  time  your  printed  catalogue  is  completed 
and  published,  it  is  already  somewhat  antiquated. 
Several  hundred  books  have  come  in  which  are 
not  comprised  in  it,  and  among  these  new  books 
is  very  likely  to  be  the  one  you  wish  to  consult, 
concerning  which  the  printed  catalogue  can  give 
you  no  information.  If  you  publish  an  annual 
supplement,  as  the  Library  of  Congress  does,  then 
your  catalogue  will  become  desperately  cumbrous 
within  five  or  six  years.  When  you  are  in  a 
hurry  to  consult  a  book,  it  is  very  disheartening 
to  have  to  look  through  half  a  dozen  alphabets, 


340          Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

besides  depending  after  all  on  the  ready  memory 
of  some  library  official  as  to  the  books  which  have 
come  in  since  the  last  supplement  was  published. 

This  inconvenience  is  so  great  that  printed 
catalogues  have  gone  into  discredit  in  all  the 
principal  libraries  of  Europe.  Catalogues  are  in- 
deed printed,  from  time  to  time,  by  way  of  pub- 
lishing the  treasures  of  the  library,  and  as  biblio- 
graphical helps  to  other  institutions  ;  but  for  the 
use  of  those  who  daily  consult  the  library,  man- 
uscript titles  have  quite  superseded  the  printed 
catalogue.  In  European  libraries  this  is  done  in 
what  seems  to  us  a  rather  crude  way.  Their 
catalogues  are  enormous  brown  paper  blank- 
books  or  scrap-books,  on  the  leaves  of  which  are 
pasted  thin  paper  slips  bearing  the  titles  of  the 
books  in  the  library.  Large  spaces  are  left  for 
the  insertion  of  subsequent  titles  in  their  alpha- 
betical order ;  and  as  a  result  of  this  method,  the 
admirable  catalogue  of  the  library  of  the  British 
Museum  fills  more  than  a  thousand  elephant 
folios !  An  athletic  man,  who  has  served  his 
time  at  base-ball  and  rowing,  may  think  little  of 
lifting  these  gigantic  tomes,  but  for  a  lady  who 
wishes  to  look  up  some  subject  one  would  think 
it  desirable  to  employ  a  pair  of  oxen  and  a  wind* 


A  Librarian's   Work.  341 

All  the  libraries  of  western  Europe  which  I 
have  visited  seein  to  have  taken  their  cue  from 
the  British  Museum.  But  in  America  we  have 
hit  upon  a  less  ponderous  method.  To  accom- 
plish this  end  of  keeping  our  titles  in  their  proper 
alphabetical  order,  we  write  them  on  separate 
cards,  of  stiff  paper,  and  arrange  these  cards  in 
little  drawers,  in  such  a  way  that  any  one,  by 
opening  the  drawer  and  tilting  the  cards  therein, 
can  easily  find  the  title  for  which  he  is  seeking. 
Our  new  catalogue  at  Cambridge  is  a  marvel  of 
practical  convenience  in  this  respect.  At  each 
end  the  row  of  stiff  cards  is  supported  by  bevelled 
blocks,  in  such  a  way  that  some  title  lies  always 
open  to  view ;  and  by  simply  tilting  the  cards 
with  the  forefinger,  any  given  title  is  quickly 
found,  without  raising  the  card  from  its  place  in 
the  drawer. 

In  September,  1833,  our  library  began  its  sec- 
ond supplement,  consisting  of  two  alphabetical 
manuscript  catalogues.  Volumes  received  after 
that  date  were  catalogued  upon  stiff  cards  ar- 
ranged in  drawers,  while  pamphlets  were  cata- 
logued, after  the  European  fashion,  on  slips  of 
paper  pasted  into  great  folio  scrap-books.  This 
distinction  between  pamphlets  and  volumes  was  a 
most  unhappy  one.  To  a  librarian  the  only  prac- 


342          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

tical  difference  between  these  two  kinds  of  book 
is  that  the  latter  can  generally  be  made  to  stand 
on  a  shelf,  while  the  former  generally  tumbles 
down  when  unsupported.  This  physical  fact 
makes  it  necessary  to  keep  pamphlets  in  files  by 
themselves  until  it  is  thought  worth  while  to 
bind  them.  But  for  the  purposes  of  cataloguing 
it  makes  no  difference  whether  a  book  consists  of 
twenty  pages  between  paper  covers  or  of  five 
hundred  pages  bound  in  full  calf.  If  you  wish  to 
find  M.  Leon  de  Rosny's  "  Aperc,u  general  des 
Langues  se"mitiques,"  you  do  not  care,  and  very 
likely  do  not  know,  whether  it  is  a  "  pamphlet "  of 
fifty  pages  or  a  "  volume  "  of  three  hundred,  and 
you  naturally  grumble  at  a  system  which  sends 
you  to  a  second  alphabet  in  order  to  maintain  a 
purely  arbitrary  and  useless  distinction.  In  prac- 
tice this  double  catalogue  was  found  to  be  so  in- 
convenient that  in  1850,  after  the  pamphlet  titles 
had  come  to  fill  eight  cumbrous  volumes,  it  was 
abandoned,  and  henceforth  pamphlets,  as  well  as 
maps  and  engravings,  were  placed  on  the  same 
alphabet  with  bound  volumes. 

Before  long,  however,  it  began  to  be  felt  neces. 
sary  to  reform  this  whole  cumbrous  system.  To 
ascertain  whether  a  given  work  was  contained  in 
the  library,  one  had  now  to  consult  four  different 


A  Librarian  s   Work.  343 

alphabets,  —  the  old  printed  catalogue,  the  first 
or  printed  supplement,  the  second  or  card  supple- 
ment, and  the  eight  ugly  folios  of  pamphlet  titles. 
These  later  supplements,  moreover,  being  accessi- 
ble only  to  the  librarian  and  his  assistants,  were 
of  no  use  to  the  general  public,  who,  for  the 
135,000  titles  added  since  1833,  were  obliged  to 
get  their  information  from  some  of  the  officials. 
To  remedy  this  state  of  things,  a  new  card  cata- 
logue, freely  accessible  to  the  public,  and  destined 
to  embrace  in  a  single  alphabet  all  the  titles  in 
the  library  without  distinction,  was  begun  in  1861 
by  my  predecessor,  Professor  Ezra  Abbot.  This 
catalogue  was  not  intended  to  supersede  the  pri- 
vate card  supplement  begun  in  1833,  which  for 
many  reasons  it  is  found  desirable  to  keep  up. 
But  for  the  use  of  the  public  it  will,  when  fin- 
ished, supersede  everything  else,  and  become  the 
sole  authoritative  catalogue  of  the  library.  Since 
1861  all  new  accessions  have  been  put  into  this 
catalogue,  while  the  work  of  adding  to  it  the  older 
titles  has  gone  on  with  varying  speed  ;  in  1869  it 
came  nearly  to  a  standstill,  but  was  resumed  in 
1874,  and  is  now  proceeding  with  great  rapidity. 
About  fifty  thousand  titles  of  volumes,  and  as 
many  more  of  pamphlets,  still  remain  to  be  added 


344  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

before  this  new  catalogue  can  become  the  index 
to  all  the  treasures  of  the  library.1 

Another  great  undertaking  was  begun  simul- 
taneously  in  1861.  The  object  of  an  alphabetical 
catalogue  like  those  above  described  is  "  to  enable 
a  person  to  determine  really  whether  any  particu- 
lar work  belongs  to  the  library,  and,  if  it  does, 
where  it  is  placed."  If  you  are  in  search  of 
Lloyd's  "  Lectures  on  the  Wave-Theory  of  Light," 
you  will  look  in  the  alphabetical  catalogue  under 
"  LLOYD,  Humphrey."  Now  this  alphabetical  ar- 
rangement is  the  only  one  practicable  in  a  public 
library,  because  it  is  the  only  one  on  which  all 
catalogues  can  be  made  to  agree,  and  it  is  the 
only  one  sufficiently  simple  to  be  generally  under- 
stood. For  the  purpose  here  required,  of  finding 
a  particular  work,  an  arrangement  according  to 
subject-matter  would  be  entirely  chimerical. 
Nothing  short  of  omniscience  could  ever  be  sure 
of  finding  a  given  title  amid  such  a  heterogeneous 
multitude.  Every  man  who  can  read  knows  the 
order  of  the  alphabet,  but  not  one  in  a  thousand 
can  be  expected  to  master  all  the  points  that  de- 
termine the  arrangement  of  a  catalogue  of  sub- 
jects, —  as,  for  example,  why  one  of  three  kindred 

1  About  seventeen  thousand  of  these  old  titles  were  added  during 
the  two  years  ending  in  July,  1877. 


A  Librarian's   Work.  345 

treatises  should  be  classed  under-  the  rubric  of 
Philosophy,  another  under  Natural  Religion,  and 
a  third  under  Dogmatic  Theology.1  But  while  it 
would  thus  be  impracticable  to  place  our  final  re- 
liance on  any  other  arrangement  than  an  alpha- 
betical one,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  a  subsidi- 
ary subject-catalogue  is  not  extremely  useful.  He 
who  knows  that  he  wants  Lloyd's  book  on  the 
undulatory  theory  is  somewhat  more  learned  in 
the  literature  of  optics  than  the  majority  of  those 
who  consult  libraries.  For  one  who  knows  as 
much  as  this,  there  are  twenty  who  know  only 
that  they  want  to  get  some  book  about  the  un- 
dulatory theory.  Now  a  subject-catalogue  is  pre- 
eminently useful  in  instructing  such  people  in  the 
literature  of  the  subject  they  are  studying.  They 
have  only  to  open  a  drawer  that  is  labelled  "  OP- 
TICS," and  run  along  the  cards  until  they  come  to 
a  division  marked  "  OPTICS  —  Wave- Theory,"  and 
there  they  will  find  perhaps  a  do/en  or  fifty  titles 
of  books,  pamphlets,  review  articles,  and  memoirs 
of  learned  societies,  all  bearing  on  their  subject, 
and  enabling  them  to  look  it  up  with  a  minimum 
of  bibliographical  trouble.  Such  a  classified  cata- 
logue immeasurably  increases  the  usefulness  of  a 

i  See  the  excellent  remarks  of  Professor  Jevons  in  his  Principles  oj 
Science,  ii.  401. 


346  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

library  to  the  general  public.  At  the  same  time, 
the  skilful  classification  of  books  presents  so  many 
difficulties  and  requires  so  much  scientific  and 
literary  training  that  it  adds  greatly  to  the  labour 
of  catalogue-making.  For  this  reason  great  libra- 
ries rarely  attempt  to  make  subject -catalogues. 
At  every  library  which  I  have  happened  to  visit 
in  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy,  I  have 
received  the  same  answer :  "  We  do  not  keep  any 
subject-catalogue,  for  we  shrink  from  so  formida- 
ble an  undertaking."  With  a  boldness  justified 
by  the  result,  however,  Professor  Abbot  began 
such  a  catalogue  of  the  Harvard  library  in  1861, 
and  carried  out  the  work  with  the  success  that 
might  have  been  expected  from  his  truly  stupen- 
dous erudition  and  most  consummate  ingenuity. 

It  is  sometimes  urged  that,  in  deference  to  the 
feebleness  of  human  memory,  an  ideal  library 
should  have  yet  a  third  catalogue,  arranged  alpha- 
betically, not  according  to  authors,  but  according 
to  titles.  This  is  to  accommodate  the  man  who 
knows  that  he  wants  "Lectures  on  the  Wave- 
Theory  of  Light,"  but  has  forgotten  the  author's 
name.  In  an  "  ideal "  library  this  might  perhaps 
be  well.  But  in  a  real  library,  subject  to  the  ordi- 
nary  laws  of  nature,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
any  serious  addition  to  the  amount  of  catalogue- 


A  Librarian's   Work.  347 

room  or  to  the  labour  of  the  librarian  and  assist- 
ants is  an  expense  which  can  be  justified  only  by 
the  prospect  of  very  decided  advantages.  In  most 
cases,  the  subject-catalogue  answers  the  purposes 
of  those  who  remember  the  title  of  a  work,  but 
have  forgotten  the  author.  In  the  very  heteroge- 
neous classes  of  Drama  and  Fiction,  where  this  is 
not  so  likely  to  be  the  case,  the  exigency  is  pro- 
vided for  in  Professor  Abbot's  system  by  a  full  set 
of  cross-references  from  titles  to  authors. 

From  this  account  it  will  be  seen  that  any  new 
book  received  to-day  by  our  library  must  be  en- 
tered on  three  catalogues,  —  first  on  the  card  sup- 
plement which  continues  the  old  printed  cata- 
logue, secondly  on  the  new  all  -  comprehensive 
alphabet  of  authors,  thirdly  on  the  classified  in- 
dex of  subjects.  In  our  technical  slang  the  first 
of  these  catalogues  is  known  under  the  collective 
name  of  "  the  long  cards,"  the  second  as  "  the  red 
cards,"  the  third  as  "  the  blue  cards,"  —  names 
referring  to  the  shape  of  the  cards  and  to  certain 
peculiarities  of  the  lines  with  which  they  are 
ruled.  When  our  lot  of  three  or  four  hundred 
books  is  portioned  out  among  half  a  dozen  assist- 
ants to  be  catalogued,  the  first  thing  in  order  is 
to  write  the  "  long  cards."  Each  book  must  have 
at  least  one  long  card ;  but  most  books  need  more 


348          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

than  one,  and  some  books  need  a  great  many. 
Suppose  you  have  to  catalogue  Mr.  Stuart-Glen- 
nie's  newly-published  "  Pilgrim  Memories."  This 
is  an  exceedingly  easy  book  for  the  cataloguer, 
but  it  requires  two  cards,  because  of  the  author's 
compound  name.  The  book  must  be  entered 
under  "  Stuart-Glennie,"  because  that  is  the  form 
in  which  the  name  appears  on  the  title-page,  and 
which  the  author  is  therefore  supposed  to  prefer. 
It  is  very  important,  however,  that  a  reference 
should  be  made  from  "  Glennie"  to  "  Stuart-Glen- 
nie," else  some  one,  remembering  only  the  last 
half  of  the  name,  would  look  in  vain  for  "  Glen- 
nie," and  conclude  that  the  book  was  not  in  the 
library. 

Suppose,  again,  that  your  book  is  Jevons  on 
"  Money  and  the  Mechanism  of  Exchange."  This 
belongs  to  the  "  International  Scientific  Series," 
and  therefore  needs  to  be  entered  under  "Jev- 
ons," and  again  on  the  general  card  which  bears 
the  superscription  "International  Scientific  Se- 
ries." Without  such  a  general  entry,  books  are 
liable  to  be  ordered  and  bought  under  one  head- 
ing when  they  are  already  in  the  library  and  cata- 
logued under  the  other  heading.  The  risk  of 
such  a  mishap  is  small  in  the  case  of  the  new  and 
well-known  series  just  mentioned,  but  it  is  con- 


A  Librarian's  Work.  349 

siderable  in  the  case  of  the  different  series  of 
"  British  State  Papers,"  or  the  **  Scelta  di  Curio- 
sita  Italiane  ; "  and  of  course  one  rule  must  be  fol- 
lowed for  all  such  cases.  Suppose,  again,  that  your 
book  is  Grimm's  "Deutsches  Woerterbuch,"  be- 
gun by  the  illustrious  Grimm,  but  continued  by 
several  other  hands.  Here  you  must  obviously 
have  a  distinct  entry  for  each  collaborator,  and 
each  of  these  entries  requires  a  card. 

In  writing  l;he  long  card,  the  first  great  point 
is  to  ascertain  every  jot  and  tittle  of  the  author's 
name ;  and,  as  a  general  rule,  title-pages  are  very 
poor  helps  toward  settling  this  distressing  ques- 
tion. For  instance,  you  see  from  the  title-pages  of 
"  Money  "  and  "  Pilgrim  Memories  "  that  the  au- 
thors are  "  W.  Stanley  Jevons,"  and  "  John  S.  Stu- 
art-Glennie ;  "  but  your  duty  as  an  accurate  cat- 
aloguer is  not  fulfilled  until  you  have  ascertained 
what  names  the  W.  and  S.  stand  for  in  these 
cases.  In  the  alphabetical  catalogue  of  a  great 
library,  it  is  a  matter  of  the  first  practical  im- 
portance that  every  name  should  be  given  with 
the  utmost  completeness  that  the  most  extreme 
pedantry  could  suggest.  No  one  who  has  not  had 
experience  in  these  matters  can  duly  realize  that 
the  number  of  published  books  is  so  enormous  as 
to  occasion  serious  difficulty  in  keeping  apart  the 


350          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

titles  of  works  by  authors  of  the  same  name. 
"  Stanley  Jevons  "  and  "  Stuart  -  Glennie  "  are 
very  uncommon  combinations  of  names ;  yet  the 
occurrence  of  two  or  three  different  authors  in  an 
alphabetical  catalogue,  bearing  this  uncommon 
combination  of  names,  would  not  be  at  all  surpris- 
ing. 

Indeed,  —  to  say  nothing  of  the  immense  num- 
ber of  accidental  coincidences,  —  I  think  we  may 
lay  it  down  as  a  large  comprehensive  sort  of  rule, 
that  any  man  who  has  published  a  volume  or 
pamphlet  is  sure  to  have  relatives  of  the  same 
name  who  have  published  volumes  or  pamphlets. 
Such  a  fact  may  have  some  value  to  people,  like 
Mr.  Galton,  who  are  interested  in  the  subject  of 
hereditary  talent,  and  who  have  besides  a  keen 
eye  for  statistics.  I  have  never  tabulated  the 
statistics  of  this  matter,  and  am  stating  only  a 
general  impression,  gathered  from  miscellaneous 
experience,  when  I  say  that  the  occurrence  of  al- 
most any  name  in  a  list  of  authors  affords  a  con- 
siderable probability  of  its  re-occurrence,  asso- 
ciated with  some  fact  of  blood-relationship.  One 
would  not  be  likely  to  realize  this  fact  in  collect- 
ing a  large  private  library,  because  private  libra- 
ries, however  large,  are  apt  to  contain  only  the 
classical  works  of  quite  exceptional  men  and  the 


A  Librarians   Work.  351 

less  important  works  which  happen  to  be  specially 
interesting  or  useful  to  the  owner.  But  in  a  pub- 
lic library  the  treasures  and  the  rubbish  of  the 
literary  world  are  alike  hoarded ;  and  the  works  of 
exceptional  men  whom  everybody  remembers  are 
lumped  in  with  the  works  of  all  their  less  distin- 
guished cousins  and  great-uncles,  whose  names  the 
world  of  readers  has  forgotten. 

A  librarian  has  the  opportunity  for  observing 
many  curious  facts  of  this  sort,  but  he  will  seldom 
have  leisure  to  speculate  about  them.  For  while 
a  great  library  is  an  excellent  place  for  study  and 
reflection,  for  everybody  except  the  librarian,  his 
position  is  rather  a  tantalizing  one.  In  the  midst 
of  the  great  ocean  of  books,  it  is  "  water,  water 
everywhere,  and  not  a  drop  to  drink." 

To  make  up  for  the  extreme  vagueness  with 
which  authors  customarily  designate  themselves 
on  their  title-pages  is  the  work  of  the  assistants 
who  write  the  long  cards,  and  it  is  apt  to  be  a 
very  tedious  and  troublesome  undertaking.  Bio- 
graphical and  bibliographical  dictionaries,  the 
catalogues  of  our  own  and  other  libraries,  uni- 
versity-catalogues, army-lists,  clerical  directories, 
genealogies  of  the  British  peerage,  almanacs, 
"  conversations  -  lexicons,"  literary  histories,  and 
volumes  of  memoirs,  —  all  these  aids  have  to  be 


352          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

consulted,  and  too  often  are  consulted  in  vain,  01 
give  conflicting  testimony  which  serves  to  raise 
the  most  curious  and  perplexing  questions.  To 
the  outside  world  such  anxious  minuteness  seems 
useless  pedantry  ;  but  any  sceptic  who  should 
serve  six  months  in  a  library  would  become  con- 
vinced that  without  it  an  alphabetical  catalogue 
would  soon  prove  unmanageable.  "  Imagine  the 
heading  '  SMITH,  J.,'  in  such  a  catalogue ! "  says 
Professor  Abbot.  Where  a  name  is  very  com- 
mon, we  are  fain  to  add  whatever  distinctive 
epithet  we  can  lay  hold  of ;  as  in  the  case  of  six 
entries  of  "  WILSON,  William,"  which  are  differ- 
enced by  the  addition  of  "  Scotch  Covenanter," 
"  poet,  of  London,"  "  M.  A.,  of  Musselburgh,"  "  of 
Poughkeepsie,"  "  Vicar  of  Walthamstow,"  "  Pres. 
of  the  Warrington  Nat.  Hist.  Soc."  1 

New  difficulties  arise  when  the  title-page  leaves 
it  doubtful  whether  the  name  upon  it  is  that  of 
the  author,  or  that  of  an  editor  or  compiler.  The 
names  of  editors  and  translators  are  often  omitted, 
and  must  be  sought  in  bibliographical  dictionaries. 
Dedicatory  epistles,  biographical  sketches,  or  in- 
troductory notices  are  often  prefixed,  signed  with 

1  Sometimes  these  headings  are  very  odd,  as  in  the  case  of  a  host 
of  "John  Jacksons,"  one  of  whom  is  neatly  distinguished  as  "  JACK. 
SON,  John,  murderer,"  —  the  work  thus  catalogued  being  the  "con- 
fession "  of  one  John  Jackson  who  had  murdered  his  wife. 


A  Librarian's   Work.  353 

exasperating  initials,  for  a  clue  to  which  you  may 
perhaps  spend  an  hour  or  two  in  fruitless  inquiry. 
In  accurate  cataloguing,  all  such  adjuncts  to  a 
book  must  be  noticed,  and  often  require  distinct 
reference  -  cards.  Curious  difficulties  are  some- 
times presented  by  the  phenomena  of  compound 
or  complex  authorship,  as  in  works  like  the  Bol- 
landist  "  Acta  Sanctorum,"  conducted  by  a  group 
of  men,  some  of  whom  are  removed  by  death, 
while  their  places  are  supplied  by  new  collabora- 
tors. Some  other  immense  work,  like  Migne's  "  Pa- 
trologise  Cursus  Completus,"  will  give  rise  to  nice 
questions  owing  to  the  indefiniteness  with  which 
its  various  parts  are  demarcated  from  each  other. 
Many  German  books,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
troublesome  from  the  excessive  explicitness  with 
which  they  are  divided,  with  sub-titles  and  sub- 
sub-titles  innumerable,  in  accordance  with  some 
subtle  principle  not  always  to  be  detected  at  the 
first  glance.  The  proper  mode  of  entry  for  re-' 
ports  of  legal  cases  and  trials,  periodicals,  and 
publications  of  learned  societies,  governments, 
and  boards  of  commissioners,  is  sure  to  call  for 
more  or  less  technical  skill  and  practical  discrim- 
ination. Anonymous  and  pseudonymous  works 
are  very  common,  and  even  the  best  bibliograph- 
ical dictionaries  cannot  keep  pace  with  the  issue 


354          Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

of  them.  Where  we  can  find,  by  hook  or  by 
crook,  the  real  name  of  the  author  of  a  pseudony- 
mous work,  it  is  entered  under  the  real  name, 
with  a  cross-reference  from  the  pseudonym. 
Otherwise  it  is  entered  provisionally  under  the 
fictitious  name,  as,  for  example,  "  VEEITAS, 
pseudon."  Anonymous  works  are  entered  under 
the  first  word  of  the  title,  neglecting  particles; 
and  the  head-line  is  left  blank,  so  that  if  the  au- 
thor is  ever  discovered,  his  name  may  be  inserted 
there,  enclosed  within  brackets.  In  former  times 
it  was  customary  for  the  cataloguer  to  enter  such 
works  under  what  he  deemed  to  be  the  most  im- 
portant word  of  the  title,  or  the  word  most  likely 
to  be  remembered ;  but  in  practice  this  rule  has 
been  found  to  cause  great  confusion,  since  people 
are  by  no  means  sure  to  agree  as  to  the  most  im- 
portant word.  To  some  it  may  seem  absurd  to  en- 
ter an  anonymous  "  Treatise  on  the  Best  Method 
of  preparing  Adhesive  Mucilage  "  under  the  word 
"  Treatise  "  rather  than  under  "  Mucilage  ;  "  but 
it  should  be  remembered  that  he  who  consults  an 
alphabetical  catalogue  is  supposed  to  know  the 
title  for  which  he  is  looking ;  and,  in  our  own  li- 
brary at  least,  any  one  who  remembers  only  the 
subject  of  the  work  he  is  seeking  can  always  refer 
to  the  catalogue  of  subjects. 


A  Librarian's   Work.  355 

To  treat  more  extensively  of  such  points  as 
these,  in  which  none  but  cataloguers  are  likely  to 
feel  a  strong  interest,  would  not  be  consistent 
with  the  purpose  of  this  article.  For  those  who 
wonder  what  a  librarian  can  find  to  do  with  his 
time,  enough  hints  have  been  given  to  show  that 
the  task  of  "  just  cataloguing  a  book"  is  not,  per- 
haps, quite  so  simple  as  they  may  have  supposed. 
These  hints  have  nevertheless  been  chosen  with 
reference  to  the  easier  portions  of  a  librarian's 
work,  for  a  description  of  the  more  intricate 
problems  of  cataloguing  could  hardly  fail  to  be 
both  tedious  and  unintelligible  to  the  uninitiated 
reader.  Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  a 
cataloguer's  work  requires  at  the  outset  consider- 
able judgment  and  discrimination,  and  a  great 
deal  of  slow,  plodding  research,  "he  facts  which 
we  take  such  pains  to  ascertain  may  seem  petty 
when  contrasted  with  the  dazzling  facts  which  are 
elicited  by  scientific  researches.  But  in  reality 
the  grandest  scientific  truths  are  reached  only 
after  the  minute  scrutiny  of  facts  which  often 
seem  very  trivial.  And  though  the  little  details 
which  encumber  a  librarian's  mind  do  not  minis- 
ter to  grand  or  striking  generalizations,  though 
their  destiny  is  in  the  main  an  obscure  one,  yet 
if  they  were  not  duly  taken  care  of  the  usefulness 


356  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

of  libraries  as  aids  to  high  culture  and  profound 
investigation  would  be  fatally  impaired.  To  the 
student's  unaided  faculties  a  great  library  is 
simply  a  trackless  wilderness;  the  catalogue  of 
such  a  library  is  itself  a  kind  of  wilderness,  albeit 
much  more  readily  penetrated  and  explored ;  but 
unless  a  book  be  entered  with  extreme  accuracy 
and  fulness  on  the  catalogue,  it  is  practically  lost 
to  the  investigator  who  needs  it,  and  might  al- 
most as  well  not  be  in  the  library  at  all. 

In  the  task  of  entering  a  book  properly  on  the 
alphabetical  catalogue,  the  needful  researches  are 
for  the  most  part  made  by  the  assistants ;  but  the 
questionable  points  are  so  numerous,  and  so  unlike 
each  other,  that  none  of  them  can  be  considered 
as  finally  settled  until  approved  at  headquarters. 
After  the  proper  entry  has  been  decided  on,  the 
work  of  transcribing  the  title  is  comparatively 
simple  in  most  cases.  The  general  rule  is  to  copy 
the  whole  of  the  title  with  strict  accuracy,  in  its 
own  language  and  without  translation,  including 
even  abbreviations  and  mistakes  or  oddities  in 
spelling.  Mottoes  and  other  really  superfluous 
matters  on  the  title-page  are  usually  omitted,  the 
omission  being  scrupulously  indicated  by  points. 
As  regards  the  use  of  capital  letters,  title-pages 
do  not  afford  any  consistent  guidance,  being  usu- 


A  Librarian's   Work.  357 

ally  printed  in  capitals  throughout.  Our  own 
practice  is  to  follow  in  capitalizing  the  usage  of 
the  language  in  which  the  title  is  written ;  but 
many  libraries  adopt  the  much  simpler  rule  of  re- 
jecting capitals  altogether  except  in  the  case  of 
proper  names,  and  this  I  believe  to  be  practically 
the  better  because  the  easier  method,1  though  the 
result  may  not  seem  quite  so  elegant. 

After  the  transcription  of  the  entire  title,  the 
number  of  volumes,  or  other  divisions  of  the 
book,  is  set  down ;  and  next  in  order  follows  the 
"  imprint,"  or  designation  of  the  place  and  date 
of  publication.  Finally,  the  size  of  the  book 
(whether  folio,  or  quarto,  octavo,  etc.)  is  desig- 
nated, after  an  examination  of  the  "  signature 
marks ; "  the  number  of  pages  (if  less  than  one 
hundred  or  more  than  six  hundred)  is  stated ; 2 
plates,  woodcuts,  maps,  plans,  diagrams,  photo- 
graphs, etc.,  are  counted  and  described  in  general 
terms.  Any  peculiarities  relating  not  to  the  edi- 
tion, but  to  the  particular  copy  catalogued,  are 

1  Since  this  article  was  written,  I  have  adopted  the  simpler  rule, 
applying  the  French  system  of  capitalization  to  all  languages,  with 
the  sole  concession  to  our  English  prejudices  of  capitalizing  proper  ad- 
jectives in  English  titles.     Much  time  is  thereby  saved,  and  much  ut- 
terly useless  vexation  avoided. 

2  In  order  to  point  out  books  of  an   exceptionally  large  or  small 
size.    I  believe,  however,  it  would  be  better  to  state  the  number  of 
pages  in  every  case. 


358  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

added  below  in  a  note ;  such  as  the  fact  that  the 
book  is  one  of  fifty  copies  on  large  paper,  or  has 
the  author's  autograph  on  the  fly-leaf.  In  many 
cases  it  is  found  desirable  to  add  a  list  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  work  ;  and  if  it  be  a  book  of  miscel- 
laneous essays,  each  essay  often  has  an  additional 
entry  on  a  card  of  its  own.1 

These  details  make  up  the  sum  of  what  is  en- 
tered on  the  body  of  the  long  card ;  but  in  addi- 
tion to  all  this,  the  left-hand  margin  contains  the 
date  of  reception  of  the  book,  the  fund  to  which 
it  is  charged,  or  the  name  of  the  donor,  and  the 
all-important  "  shelf-mark,"  which  shows  where 
the  book  is  to  be  found;  while  on  the  right-hand 
margin  is  written  a  concise  description  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  book  (i.e.  "5  vol.,  green  cloth"), 
and  a  note  of  its  price.  When  all  this  is  finished, 
the  book  is  regarded  as  catalogued,  and  is  sent, 
with  its  card  in  it,  to  the  principal  assistant  for 
revision.  From  the  principal  assistant  it  is  passed 
on  to  me,  and  it  is  the  business  of  both  of  us  to 
see  that  all  the  details  of  the  work  have  been 
done  correctly.  A  pencil-note  on  the  margin  of 
the  card  shows  the  class  and  sub-class  to  which 

1  Where  the  essays  are  by  different  authors,  a  separate  entry  for 
each  is  of  course  always  necessary,  though  this  is  not  always  mad* 
on  the  long  cards. 


A  Librarian's   Work.  359 

the  book  is  to  be  assigned  in  the  catalogue  of  sub- 
jects ;  and  then  the  card  is  separated  from  the 
book.  The  book  goes  on  to  its  shelf,  to  be  used 
by  the  public ;  the  card  goes  back  to  some  one  of 
the  assistants,  to  be  "  indexed."  In  our  library- 
slang,  "  indexing  "  means  the  writing  of  the  "  red  " 
and  "  blue  "  cards  which  answer  to  the  "  long  " 
card ;  in  other  words,  the  entry  of  the  title l  on 
the  new  alphabetical  and  subject -catalogues  be* 
gun  in  1861.  For  the  most  part  this  is  merely  a 
matter  of  accurate  transcription,  requiring  no  re- 
search. When  these  "red"  and  "blue"  cards 
have  been  submitted  to  a  special  assistant  for 
proof-reading,  they  are  returned  to  me,  and  after 
due  inspection  are  ready  to  be  distributed  into 
their  catalogues.  But  for  the  original  "  long 
card  "  one  further  preliminary  is  required  before 
it  can  be  put  into  its  catalogue. 

Besides  the  various  catalogues  above  described, 
our  library  keeps  a  "  record -book  "  or  catalogue 
of  accessions  arranged  according  to  dates  of  re- 
ception. This  accessions  -  catalogue  was  begun 
October  1, 1827,  and  records  an  accession  for  that 
year  of  one  volume,  price  ten  shillings  and  six- 
pence !  In  1828,  according  to  this  record,  the 

1  The  marginal  portions  of  the  long  card  are  not  transcribed  in  in- 
dexing. 


360  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

library  received  twenty -one  volumes,  of  which 
eighteen  were  gifts,  while  three  were  bought  at 
a  total  cost  of  $14.50  !  But  either  these  were  ex- 
ceptionally unfruitful  years,  or  —  what  is  more 
likely  —  the  record  was  not  carefully  kept,  for 
the  ordinary  rate  of  increase  in  those  days  was  by 
no  means  so  small  as  this,  though  small  enough 
when  compared  with  the  present  rate.  The  ac- 
cessions-catalogue has  grown  until  it  now  fills 
twenty-one  large  folio  volumes.  The  entries  in  it 
are  made  with  considerable  fulness  by  transcrip- 
tion from  the  long  cards.  Usually  a  month's  ac- 
cessions are  entered  at  once,  and  when  this  has 
been  done  the  long  card  is  ready  to  take  its  place 
in  the  catalogue. 

In  this  account  of  the  career  of  a  book,  from  its 
reception  to  the  time  when  it  is  duly  entered  on 
all  the  catalogues,  we  find  some  explanation  of 
the  way  in  which  a  librarian  employs  his  time. 
For  while  the  work  of  cataloguing  is  done  almost 
entirely  by  assistants,  yet  unless  every  detail  of  it 
passes  under  the  librarian's  eye  there  is  no  ade- 
quate security  for  systematic  unity  in  the  results. 
The  librarian  must  not  indeed  spend  his  time  in 
proof-reading  or  in  verifying  authors'  names;  it 
is  essential  that  there  should  be  some  assistants 
who  can  be  depended  upon  for  absolute  accuracy 


A  Librarian's   Work.  361 

in  such  matters.  Nevertheless,  the  complexity  of 
the  questions  involved  requires  that  appeal  should 
often  be  made  to  him,  and  that  he  should  always 
review  the  work,  for  the  correctness  of  which  he 
is  ultimately  responsible.  As  for  the  designation 
of  the  proper  entry  on  the  subject-catalogue,  the 
cases  are  rare  in  which  this  can  be  entrusted  to 
any  assistant.  To  classify  the  subject-matter  of 
a  book  is  not  always  in  itself  easy,  even  when  the 
reference  is  only  to  general  principles  of  classifica- 
tions ;  but  a  subject-catalogue,  when  once  in  ex- 
istence, affords  a  vast  mass  of  precedents  which, 
while  they  may  lighten  the  problem  to  one  who 
has  mastered  the  theory  on  which  the  catalogue 
is  constructed,  at  the  same  time  make  it  the  more 
unmanageable  to  any  one  who  has  not  done  so. 
To  assign  to  any  title  its  proper  position,  you  must 
not  merely  know  what  the  book  is  about,  but  you 
must  understand  the  reasons,  philosophical  and 
practical,  which  have  determined  the  place  to 
which  such  titles  have  already  been  assigned.  It 
is  a  case  in  which  no  mere  mechanical  following 
of  tradition  is  of  any  avail.  No  general  rules  can 
be  laid  down  which  a  corps  of  assistants  can  fol- 
low ;  for  in  general  each  case  presents  new  fea- 
tures of  its  own,  so  that  to  follow  any  rule  se- 
curely would  require  a  mental  training  almost  as 


362  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

great  as  that  needed  for  making  the  rule.  Hence 
when  different  people  work  independently  at  a 
classified  catalogue,  they  are  sure  to  get  into  a 
muddle. 

Suppose,  for  example,  you  have  to  classify  a 
book  on  the  constitution  of  Massachusetts.  I  put 
such  books  under  the  heading  "  LAW —  Mass.  — 
Const.,"  but  another  person  would  prefer  "LAW 

—  Const.  —  Mass.,"  a  third  would  rank  them  un- 
der "  LAW  —  U.  S.  —  Const.  §  Mass.,"  a  fourth 
under  "LAW  —  U.  S.  —  (Separate  States)  §  Mass. 

—  Const.,"  a  fifth  under  "LAW—  Const.  §  U.  S. 

—  Mass."  and  so  on,  through  all  the  permutations 
and  combinations  of  which  these  terms  are  sus- 
ceptible.    Yet  each  of  these  arrangements  would 
bring  the  title  into  a  different  part  of  the  cata- 
logue, so  that  it  would  be  quite  impossible  to  dis- 
cover, by  simple  inspection,  what  the  library  con- 
tained  on   the   subject   of   constitutional  law  in 
Massachusetts;  and  to  this  extent  the  catalogue 
would  become   useless.     Many  such   defects  are 
now  to  be  found  in  our  subject-catalogue,  greatly 
to   the   impairment  of   its   usefulness ;  and  they 
prove  conclusively  that  the  work  of   classifying 
must  always  be  left  to  a  single  superintendent 
who  knows  well  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the  cata> 
logue.     This  work  consumes  no  little  time.     The 


A  Librarian's   Work.  363 

titles  of  books  are  by  no  means  a  safe  index  to 
their  subject-matter.  To  treat  one  properly  you 
must  first  peer  into  its  contents ;  and  then,  no 
matter  how  excellent  your  memory,  you  will  often 
have  to  run  to  the  catalogue  for  precedents. 

As  a  rule,  comparatively  few  cards  are  written 
by  the  librarian  or  the  principal  assistant.  Only 
the  most  difficult  books,  which  no  one  else  can 
catalogue,  are  brought  to  the  superintendent's 
desk.  Under  this  class  come  old  manuscripts, 
early  printed  books  without  title-pages,  books 
with  Greek  titles,  and  books  in  Slavonic,  or  Ori- 
ental, or  barbarous  languages.  Early  printed 
books  require  special  and  varying  kinds  of  treat- 
ment, and  need  to  be  carefully  described  with  the 
aid  of  such  dictionaries  as  those  of  Hain,  Panzer, 
and  Graesse.  One  such  book  may  afford  work 
for  a  whole  day.  An  old  manuscript  is  likely  to 
give  even  more  trouble.  There  is  nothing  espe- 
cially difficult  in  Greek  titles,  save  for  the  fact 
that  our  assistants  are  all  women,  who  for  the 
most  part  know  little  or  nothing  of  the  language.1 
In  general  these  assistants  are  acquainted  with 
French,  and  with  practice  can  make  their  way 
through  titles  in  Latin  and  German.  There  are 

1  We  have  since,  I  am  glad  to  say,  found  an  exception  to  this  rule, 
and  Greek  titles  are  now  disposed  of  in  regular  course. 


364  Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

some  who  can  deal  with  any  Romanic  or  Teutonic 
language,  though  more  or  less  advice  is  usually 
needed  for  this.  But  all  languages  east  of  the 
Roman  -  German  boundary  require  the  eye  of  a 
practised  linguist.  To  decipher  a  title,  or  part  of 
a  preface,  in  a  strange  language,  it  is  necessary 
that  one  should  understand  the  character  in  which 
it  is  printed,  and  should  be  able  to  consult  some 
dictionary  either  of  the  language  in  question  or  of 
some  closely  related  dialect.  One  day  I  had  to 
catalogue  a  book  of  Croatian  ballads,  and,  not 
finding  any  Croatian  dictionary  in  the  library,  set 
up  a  cross-fire  on  it  with  the  help  of  a  Serbian  and 
a  Slovenian  dictionary.  This  served  the  purpose 
admirably,  for  where  a  cognate  word  did  not  hap- 
pen to  occur  in  the  one  language  it  was  pretty 
sure  to  turn  up  in  the  other.  Sometimes  —  in  the 
case,  say,  of  a  hundred  Finnish  pamphlets  —  the 
labour  is  greater  than  it  is  worth  while  to  under- 
take; or  somebody  may  give  us  a  volume  in 
Chinese  or  Tamil,  which  is  practically  undeci- 
pherable. In  such  cases  we  consider  discretion 
the  better  part  of  valour,  and  under  the  heading 
"  FINNISH  "  or  "  CHINESE  "  write  "  One  hundred 
Finnish  pamphlets,"  or  "A  Chinese  book,"  trust- 
ing to  the  future  for  better  information.  Some- 
times a  polyglot  visitor  from  Asia  happens  in,  and 


A  Librarian's   Work.  365 

is  kind  enough  to  settle  a  dozen  such  knotty  ques- 
tions at  once. 

Another  part  of  a  librarian's  work  is  the  order- 
ing of  new  books,  and  this  is  something  which 
cannot  be  done  carelessly.  Once  a  year  a  coun- 
cil of  professors,  after  learning  the  amount  of 
money  that  can  be  expended  during  the  year,  de- 
cides upon  the  amounts  that  may  be  severally  ap- 
propriated to  the  various  departments  of  litera- 
ture. Long  lists  of  desiderata  are  then  prepared 
by  different  professors,  and  handed  in  to  the  li- 
brary. Besides  this  a  considerable  sum  is  placed 
under  the  control  of  the  librarian,  for  miscella- 
neous purchases,  and  any  one  who  wishes  a  book 
bought  at  any  time  is  expected  to  leave  a  written 
request  for  it  at  my  desk.  As  often  as  we  get 
materials  for  a  list  of  two  or  three  hundred  titles, 
the  list  is  given,  before  it  is  sent  off,  to  one  of  our 
most  trustworthy  assistants,  to  be  compared  with 
the  various  catalogues  as  well  as  with  the  record 
of  outstanding  orders.  To  ascertain  whether  a 
particular  work  is  in  the  library,  or  on  its  way 
thither,  may  seem  to  be  a  very  simple  matter ; 
but  it  requires  careful  and  intelligent  research, 
and  on  such  a  point  no  one's  opinion  is  worth  a 
groat  who  is  not  versed  in  all  the  dark  and 
crooked  ways  of  cataloguing.  The  fact  that  a 


366          Darwinism  and  Other  Essays. 

card-title  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  catalogue 
proves  nothing  of  itself,  for  very  likely  the  card 
may  be  "  out "  in  the  hands  of  some  assistant. 
Nothing  is  more  common  than  for  a  professor  to 
order  some  well-known  work  in  his  own  depart- 
ment of  study  which  has  been  in  the  library  for 
several  years,  and  so  long  as  the  art  of  cataloguing 
is  as  complicated  as  it  now  is  such  misunder- 
standings cannot  be  altogether  avoided.  Very 
often  this  is  due  to  the  variety  of  ways  in  which 
one  and  the  same  book  may  be  described,  and 
cannot  be  ascribed  to  any  special  cumbrousness  or 
complexity  of  our  system.  All  this  necessitates  a 
thorough  scrutiny  of  every  title  that  is  ordered, 
for  to  waste  the  library's  money  in  buying  dupli- 
cates is  a  blunder  of  the  first  magnitude.  Yet  in 
spite  of  the  utmost  vigilance,  it  is  seldom  that  a 
case  of  two  or  three  hundred  books  arrives  which 
does  not  contain  two  or  three  duplicates.  One 
per  cent,  is  perhaps  not  an  extravagant  allowance 
to  make  for  human  perversity,  in  any  of  the  af- 
fairs of  life  in  which  the  ideal  standard  is  that  of 
complete  intelligence  and  efficiency. 

The  danger  of  buying  a  duplicate  because  a 
card- title  does  not  happen  to  be  in  its  place  is  one 
illustration  of  the  practical  inconvenience  of  card- 
catalogues.  The  experience  of  the  past  fifty  years 


A  Librarian's   Work,  367 

has  shown  that  on  the  whole  such  catalogues  are 
far  better  than  the  old  ones  which  they  have 
superseded  ;  but  they  have  their  shortcomings, 
nevertheless,  and  here  we  have  incidentally  hit 
upon  one  of  them.  Besides  this,  a  card -catalogue, 
even  when  constructed  with  all  the  ingenuity 
that  is  displayed  in  our  own,  is  very  much  harder 
to  consult  than  a  catalogue  that  is  printed  in  a 
volume.  On  a  printed  page  you  can  glance  at 
twenty  titles  at  once,  whereas  in  a  drawer  of 
cards  you  must  plod  through  the  titles  one  by  one. 
Moreover,  a  card-catalogue  occupies  an  enormous 
space.  Professor  Abbot's  twin  catalogue  of  au- 
thors and  subjects,  begun  fourteen  years  ago,  is 
now  contained  in  three  hundred  and  thirty -six 
drawers  occupying  a  case  fifty-one  feet  in  length ! 
During  the  past  six  weeks  some  four  thousand 
cards  have  been  added  to  it.  What  will  its  di- 
mensions be  a  century  hence,  when  our  books  will 
probably  have  begun  to  be  numbered  by  millions 
instead  of  thousands  ?  Gore  Hall  is  to-day  too 
small  to  contain  our  books  :  will  it  then  be  large 
enough  to  hold  the  catalogue?  Suppose,  again, 
that  our  library  were  to  be  burned  ;  it  is  disheart- 
ening to  think  of  the  quantity  of  bibliographical 
work  that  would  in  such  an  event  be  forever  ob- 
literated. For  we  should  remember  that  while  a 


868  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

catalogue  like  ours  is  primarily  useful  in  enabling 
persons  to  consult  our  books,  it  would  still  be  of 
great  value,  as  a  bibliographical  aid  to  other  li- 
braries, even  if  all  our  own  books  were  to  be  de- 
stroyed.1 This  part  of  its  function,  moreover,  it 
cannot  properly  fulfil  even  now,  so  long  as  it  can 
be  consulted  only  in  Gore  Hall.  Our  subject- 
catalogue,  if  printed  to-day,  would  afford  a  noble 
conspectus  of  the  literature  of  many  great  depart- 
ments of  human  knowledge,  and  would  have  no 
small  value  to  many  special  inquirers.  Much  of 
this  usefulness  is  lost  so  long  as  it  remains  in 
manuscript,  confined  to  a  single  locality. 

For  such  reasons  as  these,  I  believe  that  the 
card-system  is  but  a  temporary  or  transitional  ex- 
pedient, upon  which  we  cannot  always  continue 
to  rely  exclusively.  By  the  time  Professor  Ab- 
bot's great  catalogue  is  finished  (i.  e.  brought  up 
to  date)  and  thoroughly  revised,  it  will  be  on  all 
accounts  desirable  to  print  it.  The  huge  mass  of 
cards  up  to  that  date  will  then  be  superseded,  and 
might  be  destroyed  without  detriment  to  any  one. 
But  the  card-catalogue,  kept  up  in  accordance 
with  the  present  system,  would  continue  as  a  sup- 

1  Thus  I  often  find  valuable  information  in  the  printed  catalogue  of 
the  Bodleian  Library,  and  wish  that  the  splendid  catalogue  of  th« 
jnillion  books  in  the  British  Museum  were  as  readily  accessible. 


A  Librarian's   Work.  369 

plement  to  the  printed  catalogue.  The  cum- 
brousness  of  consulting  a  number  of  alphabets 
would  be  reduced  to  a  minimum,  for  there  would 
be  only  two  to  consult :  the  printed  catalogue  and 
its  card  supplement.  Then,  instead  of  issuing 
numberless  printed  supplements,  there  might  be 
published,  at  stated  intervals  (say  of  ten  years), 
a  new  edition  of  the  main  catalogue,  with  all  the 
added  titles  inserted  in  their  proper  places.  On 
this  plan  there  would  never  be  more  than  two 
alphabets  to  consult ;  and  of  these  the  more  volu- 
minous one  would  be  contained  in  easily  manage- 
able printed  volumes,  while  the  smaller  supple- 
ment only  would  remain  in  card -form. 

It  is  an  obvious  objection  that  the  frequent 
printing  of  new  editions  of  the  catalogue,  accord- 
ing to  this  plan,  would  be  attended  with  enor- 
mous expense.  This  objection  would  at  first  sight 
seem  to  be  removed  if  we  were  to  adopt  Professor 
Jewett's  suggestion,  and  stereotype  each  title  on 
a  separate  plate.  Let  there  be  a  separate  stereo- 
type-plate for  each  card,  so  that  in  every  new 
edition  new  plates  may  be  inserted  for  the  added 
titles ;  and  then  the  ruinous  expense  of  fresh  com- 
position for  every  new  edition  would  seem  to  be 
avoided.  It  is  to  be  feared,  however,  that  this 
show  of  having  solved  the  difficulty  is  illusory. 


870  Darwinism  and   Other  Essays. 

For  to  keep  such  a  quantity  of  printer's  metal 
lying  idle  year  after  year  would  of  itself  entail 
great  trouble  and  expense.  The  plates  would 
take  up  a  great  deal  of  room  and  would  need  to 
be  kept  in  a  fire-proof  building ;  and  the  interest 
lost  each  year  on  the  value  of  the  metal  would  by 
and  by  amount  to  a  formidable  sum.  It  is  per- 
haps doubtful  whether,  in  the  long  run,  anything 
would  be  saved  by  this  cumbrous  method.  Pos- 
sibly —  unless  some  future  heliographic  invention 
should  turn  to  our  profit — the  least  expensive 
way,  after  all,  may  be  to  print  at  long  intervals, 
without  stereotyping,  and  to  depend  throughout 
the  intervals  on  card-supplements.  But  this  ques- 
tion, like  many  others  suggested  by  the  formi- 
dable modern  growth  of  literature,  is  easier  to 
ask  than  to  answer. 

In  this  hasty  sketch  many  points  connected  with 
a  librarian's  work  remain  unmentioned.  But  in 
a  brief  paper  like  this,  one  cannot  expect  to  give 
a  complete  account  of  a  subject  embracing  so 
many  details.  As  it  is,  I  hope  I  have  not  wearied 
the  reader  in  the  attempt  to  show  what  a  libra- 
rian finds  to  do  with  his  time. 

November,  1875. 


INDEX. 


A. 

Botany  for  children,  271-277. 

Bow-wow  theory,  43. 

ABBOT,  Ezra,  343-346. 

Brain  and  mind,  70-75. 

Albigensians,  249. 
Alexius  Comnenus,  248. 

British  Museum  catalogue,  340. 
Brown,  Thomas,  134. 

Amatongo,  114. 

Buchner,  Louis,  50-55,  65. 

Amoeba,  24. 

Buckle,  H.  T.,  his  History  of  Civili- 

Amphioxus,  23. 

zation,  143-206  ;  his  death  at  Da- 

Anaxagoras, 104. 
Ancients  and  moderns,  253. 

mascus  211  •  his  mental  impatience 
212;  his  lack  of  subtlety,  214. 

Antelopes  and  lions,  15. 

Bulgarian  heresy,  249. 

Arabs  in  Spain,  223. 

Bulgars,  243. 

Aristotle's  "  Politics,"  144. 

Butterflies  in  Java  and  Celebes,  16. 

Armenian  heresies,  247. 

Aryan  race,  228. 

Ascidian,  23. 

C. 

Atheism,  50. 

Attila,  222,  235. 

CANDOUR  of  Mr.  Darwin,  34 

Aurelian,  232. 

Cause,  5. 

Australian  fauna,  26. 

Chalons,  battle  of.  222. 

Chaos  and  order,  104. 

Charles  the  Great,  222,  239. 

B. 

Charles  the  Hammer,  222. 

Christianity     and     "  Christianism," 

BACH,  J.  S.,  163. 

207. 

Basil  II.,  244,  248. 

Clairaut,  2,  9. 

Bask  language,  241. 

Class-system  in  American    colleges, 

Bateman,  Dr.,  his  ignoratio  denchi, 

290. 

42. 

Classics,  study  of,  263,  308. 

Batrachians,  23. 

Classifications  of  organisms,  22  ;   of 

Bat's  wings,  25. 

the  sciences,  223. 

Battle  of  life,  13. 

Codfish,  multiplication  of,  13. 

Batu,  222. 

Collating,  336. 

Bayle,  P.,  142. 

Colours  of  animals.  15. 

Beaks  and  feet  of  pigeons,  17. 

Belisarius,  236. 
Berkeley's  psychology,  65. 
Bibliolatry,  117. 

Competitive  tests,  279-284. 
Comte,  A.,  131-142,  285  ;  his  "  law  of 
the  three  stages,"  136,  216. 
Condorcet,  145. 

Biology,  study  of,  302. 
Birds  and  reptiles,  22. 

Constantine  Copronymus,  247. 
Correlation  of  forces,  and  the  matert 

Blachford,  Lord,  57. 

alistic  hypothesis,  70. 

Blue-eved  tomcats,  17. 
Bogomiles,  248. 

Correlation  of  growth,  17. 
"  Cosmical  weather,''  98. 

Bosnia,  249. 

Cottin,  Angelique,  129. 

Bossuet,  144. 

Crookes  on  "  psychic  force,"  122. 

372 


Index. 


DACIA,  232. 

Vaim  onion  of  Sokrates,  113,  116. 

Darwinian  theory  compared  with 
Newtonian,  1-10 ;  theistic  objec- 
tion to  it,  4  ;  misrepresented  by  Mi- 
Tart,  11,  33-39;  does  not  assert 
universal  or  continuous  progress, 

Deaf  tomcats,  17. 

Delphic  oracle,  114. 

Descartes,  75. 

Destruction  of  life,  13. 

Domestication,  12. 

Dramatic  tendencies  in  nature,  98- 

103. 

Draper,  J.  W.,  253. 
Dyak  morality,  172. 


lip,  213. 
Echidna  and  duck-bill,  22. 
Edentata,  27. 
Electric  girls,  129. 
Elephant  and  mammoth,  16. 
Embryology,  24. 
Emotion  and  reason,  166. 
Epilepsy,  114. 
Ethnology  of  Europe,  227. 
Exorcism,  114. 


F. 

FARRAB,  F.  W.,  267. 

Fasting  girls,  130. 

Fellowships,  331. 

Fetishism,  183. 

Finns,  241. 

Fixity  of  species,  16. 

Force,  illegitimate  use  of  the  term,  5. 

Freeman,  E.  A.,  on  the  advantages  of 

iteration,  62. 
Frogs,  shower  of,  128. 
Future  life,  75-78. 


G. 

GALAPAGOS  Islands,  27. 

Gallon,  F.,  350. 

Genius,  112. 

Geographical  distribution  and  geo- 
logical succession  of  organisms, 
26. 

Getse  and  Goths,  231. 

Gills  in  human  throat,  25. 

Goethe,  109. 

Gorillas  and  Parthenon?,  49. 


HAECKEL,  52. 

Hair  and  teeth  of  dogs,  17. 

Halley's  comet,  2,  9. 

Hamilton,  Sir  W.,  134,  306. 

Hammond,  W.  A.,  120-130. 

Harrison,  F.,  56,  60,  77. 

Heraclius,  236. 

Heredity   in  book-making,   350 :  ME 

Buckle's  loose  talk  about  heredity, 

159. 

Hermann,  the  magician,  128. 
Hermes,  183. 
History,  study  of,  307. 
Home,  the  charlatan,  122. 
Horse,  pedigree  of,  30. 
Houdin,  R.,  128. 

Huggins  on  "  psychic  force,''  124. 
Hungarians,  241. 
Huns,  221. 
Huxley,  T.  H.,  29,  31,  57,  58,  60,  61, 

62,  66,  74,  78|  1~  """ 
Hypnotism,  127. 
Hysteria,  114. 


IBERIAN  race,  228. 
Immortality  of  the  soul,  75-78. 
Imperfections  in   geological   record, 

29. 
Infancy,  and  the  origin  of  mankind, 

Inspiration,  111-119. 

Intellectual  and  moral  progress,  151- 

180. 
Isaiah,  lia 


J  VSTIMAX,  236. 


KARA  GEORGE,  246. 
Keltiberians,  229. 
Keltic  race,  229. 
Kepler,  9,  53. 
Kovalevsky,  37. 


LALANBE,  2. 
Lamettrie,  65. 
Language,  origin  of,  48. 
Leibnitz,  2,  88,  144. 
Lessing,  G.  E. ,  278. 


Index. 


373 


"L*vitation,"128. 

Opossum,  26. 

Lewes,  G.  H.,  149,  158,  160,  19L 
Liegnitz,  battle  of,  222. 
Lions  and  antelopes,  15. 
Lions  and  leopards,  20. 

Orang-outang,  infancy  of,  48. 
Owen,  R.  D.,  duped  by  spiritualists, 
129. 

Locke,  88. 

P. 

Louis  XIV.,  his  injurious  influence 

on  science  and  literature,  193. 

PACHYDERMS  and  ruminants,  28, 

Pamphlets  and  volumes,  341. 

Pascal,  144 

M. 

Pass  and  class,  318. 

MACHIAVELLI,  145. 

Paternal  theory  of  government,  193. 
Paulicians,  247. 

Mackintosh,  Sir  J.,  170. 

Persecution,  177. 

Maine,  Sir  H.,  215,  312. 

Peruvian  sense  of  smell,  163. 

Mammoth,  16 

Philistinism  and  science,  285. 

Mandril,  foetal  life  of,  24. 

Phillips,  Wendell,  66. 

Mania,  114. 

Phrenology,  138,  304. 

Manichaeans,  247. 

Physics  and  chemistry,  299-302 

Marathon,  battle  of,  220. 

Poseidon,  183. 

Marius,  221. 

Positivism  and  Lucretianism,  104. 

Marsh's  discovery  of  pedigree  of  the 

Positivists  and  their  droll  ecclesias- 

horse, 29-31. 

tical  tone,  60,  77. 

Marsupials  in  Australia,  26. 
Materialism,  50,  60-77. 

Possession  by  spirits,  113. 
Protective  spirit,  193. 

Mathematical  studies,  utility  of,  296. 

Protococcus,  24. 

Maver's  meteoric  theory,  98. 

"  Psychic  force,"  122. 

Medicine  men,  114 

Mill.  J.  S.,  133,  141,  256,  305  ;  com- 

pared with  Chauncey  Wright,  83. 

R. 

Mind  as  a  product  of  evolution,  67-70. 
Mivart,  St.  G..  misrepresents  Darwin- 

RADIATA, 23. 

ism,  11,  33-39  ;  attacked  by  Wright, 
105  ;  ignores  Wright's  surrejoinder, 

Recitations,  322. 
Renaissance,  264,  310. 

35. 

Retrospective  studies,  313. 

Mohammed,  113. 

Rhythm  of  motion,  101. 

Mongols,  220. 
Monotheism,  116. 

River-names  hi  Europe,  229. 
Roman  policy  toward  barbarians,  220. 

Montesquieu,  145. 

Rudimentary  organs,  25. 

Morphology,  25. 

Rumania,  232. 

Miiller,  Max,  40,  46. 

Russia's  growth  checked  by  Mongols, 

N. 
NAMES  of  authors,  349. 

S. 
SALAMIS,  battle  of,  220. 

Napoleon  I.  on  Russian  ethnology 

Saul  and  Agag,  169. 

233. 

Scepticism,  181. 

Natural  selection,  11  ;  misunderstood 
by  Mivart,  16,  36. 

Scholarship,  modern,  270. 
School-books,  stupidity  of,  259-262. 

Nature,  constancy  of,  88. 

Schools,  preparatory,  326. 

Nebular  hypothesis,  98. 
Neptune,  discovery  of,  9. 

Science  and  theology,  7. 
Scotch  clergy,  201. 

Newtonian  theory  slowly  received  2. 

Seeley,  J.  R.,  279. 

Njemetch,  234. 

Serbia,  245. 
Shamans,  114. 

Sheep  and  antelopes,  15. 

O. 

Siberian  mammoth,  16. 

Simeon  of  Bulgaria,  244,  248. 

ODOACER,  238. 

Skythians,  231. 

Ogre,  243. 

Slave,  etymology  of  the  word,  234. 

Onomatopoeia,  48. 

Slavic  race,  232. 

374 


Index. 


Smell,  Peruvian  sense  of,  163. 

Universe,  how  little  we  know  of  it, 

Snakes  with  hind  limbs,  fa 

96. 

Sokrates,  113,  116. 

University  education  and  its  advan- 

South American  fauna,  27. 

tages,  212,  280,  294-314. 

Spanish  civilization,  223. 

Unseen  Universe,  95. 

Spanish  ethnology,  229. 

Urosh  of  Serbia,  245. 

Species,  fixity  of,  16. 

Spencer,  H.,  v.,  47,  61,  62,  66,  68,  69, 

87,  90,  94,  95,  101,  103,  107,  131,  139, 

V. 

146,  149,  160,  182,  184,  194,  215. 

"Spherical  intelligence,"  82. 
Spiritualism,  120-130. 

VERSE-MAKING,  Greek  and  Latin,  266. 
Vico,  145. 

Stephen  Dushan,  245. 

Virtue  and  pleasure,  37. 

Struggle  for  existence,  13. 

Voltaire,  145. 

Stuart-Glennie,  J.  S.,  207-218. 
Subject-catalogues,  344. 
Survival  of  the  fittest,  14. 

W. 

WALLACE,  A.  R.,  on  causes  of  man's 

T. 

intellectual  supremacy,  38,  46  ;  his 

TABIJB-TIPPING,  120-130 

surprising  credulity  as  to  spiritual- 
ism, 127. 

Taine,  H.  A.,  62. 

Wallach,  234. 

Tatars,  233. 

Weather,  cosmical,  98. 

Teeth  and  hair  of  dogs,  17. 

Welsh,  234. 

Teeth  in  embrvonic  birds,  25,  28. 

Wright,  Chauncey,  79-110;  his  crit- 

Teleology, 97,  103. 

icism  of  Mivart,  35,  105  ;  his  diffi- 

Temple, Sir  W.,  253. 

cult  style,  81  ;  compared  with  J.  S. 

Test  of  truth,  88. 

Mill,  83  ;  his  distrust  of  broad  gen- 

Teutonic knights,  222. 

eralizations,  86  ;    his    hostility   to 

Teutonic  race,  230. 
Theistic  objection  to  Darwinism,  4. 

Spencer's  philosophy,  87-104  ;   his 
aversion  to   teleology,  97  ;    "  cos- 

Thrace, 231. 

mical  weather,"  98  ;  his  objections 

Three  stages,  Comte's  theory  of,  136, 

to  nebular  hypothesis,  98  ;  his  pos- 

216. 

itivism,  103  ;  his  attack  on  Anax- 

Title  pages,  slovenliness  of,  349. 

agoras,  104  ;  his  personal  qualities, 

Tours,  battle  of,  222 

106-109. 

Trajan,  231. 

Triposes,  319. 

Tunicata,  23. 

Y. 

Turks,  223. 

Tylor,  E.B.,113. 

YOUMANS.E.  L.,256. 

Tyndall,  J.,  132. 

Z. 

U. 

ZTOS,  183. 

UNCONSCIOUS  cerebration,  112. 

Zulu  diviners,  111 

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